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If I were to give an award for the single best idea anyone has ever had, I‘d give it to 
Darwin, ahead of Newton and Einstein and everyone else. In a single stroke, the idea of 
evolution by natural selection unifies the realm of life, meaning, and purpose with the 
realm of space and time, cause and effect, mechanism and physical law. 
 







Break the pattern which connects the items of learning and you necessarily destroy all 
quality.  
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Educational philosophy generally and the Philosophy of Music Education in particular have 
been slow to consider in any real depth the findings of those sciences most concerned  with  
explaining  human nature, that is, the attributes (capacities, aptitudes, predilections, appetites) 
we have in common because we share the same genome, much of which we also share with 
other species. There are several such sciences which may collectively be called Darwinian 
Science in that they all take as axiomatic Darwin‘s explanation for how life evolves according 
to the law of natural selection – a simple, mindless and purposeless algorithm that has played 
out for over four billion years and which continues to do so, driving not only biological 
evolution but, as this study argues, cultural evolution as well. Evolutionary Psychology 
(including Biomusicology and Evolutionary Aesthetics), Cognitive Neuroscience and Gene-
Culture Coevolution Theory are the overlapping fields that this study draws from in developing 
an understanding of the adapted mind useful for engaging with questions germane to the 
Philosophy of Music Education, principally those concerning the nature and value of music and 
how best it should feature in general education.  These are questions that have not hitherto been 
addressed from a Darwinian perspective. This study develops such a perspective and applies it 
not only to questions around music‘s educational values and possibilities, but to more 
encompassing philosophical questions, wherein the goals of music education are made 
accountable in relation both to Dewey‘s ideal of society as a function of education, and to an 
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A note to the reader on my use of Wikipedia 
 
I have found Wikipedia a wonderful tool for getting a quick, often well-informed and generally 
up-to-date take on ... well just about anything.  Where I have found a Wiki-article particularly 
useful I have embedded a hyperlink to the relevant webpage. These remain underlined in this 
printed version and need only be copied into the Wikipedia search box to get to the article in 
question. Recognizing that Wikipedia articles can and do change over time, I have refrained 
from using Wikipedia as a direct source of information. I do however cite a few Wiki-articles 
where they have been the means by which original works have been revealed to me, but in such 
cases I have accessed the original texts to ascertain the accuracy of referencing. (See page 183 
for an example.) I have also done this in respect of all other secondary quotations.  




It strikes me as commonsense that education should be grounded on the best possible 
understanding of human nature, an understanding, that is to say, of all those attributes 
we share that allow us to think, feel and act as we do (some, but only some, of which are 
unique to our species, Homo sapiens). Education, as I conceive it at least, is about 
developing people‘s abilities to think, feel and act and influencing this development to 
bring about individuals who think, feel and act in ways needed for the achievement of 
vital social and ecological goals. Here I am invoking a key tenet of John Dewey‘s 
philosophy in claiming that we must see education, not as a ―function of society,‖ but as 
the most important agent for social and ecological amelioration and, where needed, 
transformation. We must, as Dewey put it, see ―society as a function of education‖ 
(Dewey 1916, cited in Giroux & McLaren, 1989: xvii).  
 
Actually, society is a function of people; it is one of the things they do. Just as it is the 
physical brain that ‗creates‘ mind, so do physical organisms of the species Homo 
sapiens ‗create‘ society and culture. Some would have it that society creates people (or 
at least that ‗part‘ of personhood that people style as ‗the self‘) but one must then ask 
how the cart got in front of the horse? It is the belief of just about every author cited in 
this dissertation that the mind is not some discreet, immaterial entity that inhabits us 
(what Descartes had ‗in mind‘ when he proclaimed ―I think, therefore I am.‖); rather, it 
is what the brain does. Is it not better to conceive of society similarly, not as a coherent, 
external volitional agent that creates us, but as what people do when they interact with 
each other, drawing from what has gone before and what has been created by human 
effort (the artifactual world)? If we think in this way, there is and can be no cart or horse 
or question of which comes first or which is more the determining factor as regards 
behavioral consequences. We should also conceive culture in this way. Thomas 
Sowell‘s take on culture is apropos (1996: 378, quoted in Pinker 2002: 67):  
 
A culture is not a symbolic pattern, preserved like a butterfly in amber. Its place is not in a 
museum but in the practical activities of daily life, where it evolves under the stress of 
competing goals and other competing cultures. Cultures do no exist as simply static 
―differences‖ to be celebrated, but compete with one another as better and worse ways of 
getting things done – better and worse, not from the standpoint of some observer, but from 
the standpoint of the peoples themselves, as they cope and aspire amid the gritty realities of 
life.  
 
Where a group of people are sufficiently ‗connected‘ we can speak of a society or 
culture. But all that we are really saying is that there is a marked level of commonality 
or agreement in what they do and this reflects commonality or agreement in how they 
think and what they believe. (Nowadays people do not even have to interact face-to-face 
in order to be thought of as a society or culture.)  Other species do not create anything 
close to either; they cannot, for the simple reason that they lack certain in-built neural-
cognitive mechanisms, even though they may possess a great deal of what is needed in 
this regard. This raises the question of how much of the commonality or agreement that 
underpins phenomena like society and culture is the result of aptitudes and 
predispositions that we come hard-wired for as opposed to what we have learned along 




suggests that we have important attributes that are not socially or culturally contingent; 
altruism, empathy, and an intuitive sense of fair play are examples that jump to mind. 
 
Psychology has been the science that education has traditionally turned to for insights 
into our nature, at least for everything about us that we call ‗mental.‘ The main interest 
has been in how we learn and how we develop intellectually, emotionally and socially 
(including morally and culturally). However, Education has been slow to consider in 
any real depth the findings of those sciences that seek to understand our innate 
psychology: the aptitudes, dispositions and their corresponding neural mechanisms that 
are encoded for in our genes and which make it possible for us to acquire skills and 
knowledge and to develop the myriad competences we require in order to engage 
socially, economically and culturally and thus to function successfully in the 
environments in which we live out our lives, environments that in key respects have 
been made by us. 
 
The three principal sciences in this regard are Evolutionary Psychology, Cognitive 
Neuroscience, and Gene-Culture Coevolution Theory and they will be tapped into in the 
following two chapters. More specific in their research foci and more directly relevant 
to the Philosophy of Music Education are the even newer fields of Evolutionary 
Aesthetics and Biomusicology which seek evolutionary explanations for artistic abilities 
and propensities including those vital to most musical behavior. For the most part they 
can be subsumed under Evolutionary Psychology because of their overriding concern 
with accounting for human psychological and social phenomena in terms of biological 
adaptations. 
 
That these sciences have yet to inform educational theory or philosophy to any 
significant degree (Cognitive Neuroscience being a partial exception) may be in part 
due to a general inertia in Education together with the relative newness of these 
sciences. In his Transformative Learning: Educational Vision for the 21st Century 
(1999: 54) O‘Sullivan claims inertia to be ―the most powerful social force.‖ Taking a 
Darwinian view, I would argue that inertia is less a social force (which suggests society 
to be some kind of thing, a volitional agent that can exert force) than it is the expression 
of a strong, innate proclivity that evolved in our species because it increased the 
reproductive success of our Paleolithic (and pre-Paleolithic) forbears.1 People are by 
their nature conformists and have an in-built resistance to change coupled with a 
predisposition to: ‗go with the flow,‘ ‗just play the gig,‘ not ‗rock the boat‘ and not 
‗reason why‘ (rather ‗just do and die‘). Moreover, when something becomes or is 
perceived to be the status quo, it is the wont of humans to assume it to be appropriate, 
even obvious or natural. Therein lies the biggest problem and challenge for education, 
now more urgent than ever given the high probability of ecological (and therefore also 
social) collapse that will only be averted if people radically change their patterns of 
                              
1  The Paleolithic covers the time from the earliest known stone tools by pre-sapiens ancestors (e.g. 
Homo habilis) about 2.5 million until 12 thousand years ago when agriculture began to be practiced, 
i.e. over 99% of the existence of our ‗kind‘ (of the genus Homo) or 94% of the time since Homo 
sapiens first appeared around 200 thousand years ago. We shared a common ancestor with modern 
day chimpanzees around 6.5 million years ago, but notwithstanding this much longer span of time, our 




behaviour, recognizing that the global status quo with its rampant consumerism and 
exponential population growth cannot be for long sustained.2   
 
Inertia is not the only problem.  While it may explain the torpidity of the masses, it does 
not account sufficiently for evolutionary science‘s negligible impact on educational 
philosophy and on the so-called ‗Humanities.‘ Not infrequently in my career as an 
educator, educationist  and Humanities academic, I have encountered a distinct lack of 
awareness of what has been coming forth from the afore-mentioned sciences which I 
collectively refer to as Darwinian Science for reasons that will be given presently. ―It is 
not my field‖ is heard commonly enough, but I have also encountered, among 
colleagues and in my readings, determined resistance to attempts by the ‗natural 
sciences‘ to explain psychological, social and cultural phenomena, resistance of 
different kinds, revealing different ideological underpinnings, and having different 
rationales for giving short shrift to these sciences.  
 
In this study I will examine and contest the more influential of these rationales. I must 
do this if I am to succeed in my principal purpose which is to demonstrate the critical 
relevance of Darwinian Science to educational philosophy generally and to the 
Philosophy of Music Education in particular. In some cases, it is not active resistance 
so much as indifference based on the assumption that Darwinian Science and the 
‗natural sciences‘ have nothing significant to offer Education or the study of music and 
other ‗arts.‘3 Until a few years ago, I fitted into this category although I have for long 
believed, based on my own life experience in different countries and among people 
from different cultures, that there is much more about what we humans are 
psychosocially that is ‗pre-cultural‘ than what academia outside of the natural sciences 
seem wont to concede. But there are many who believe Darwinism‘s core tenets to be in 
one or another way antithetical, potentially at least, to the best interests of society and of 
people generally. If not antithetical, they are at least ‗dangerous‘ in their view. History 
has shown how Darwin‘s natural selection can be appropriated to serve perverse 
ideologies (e.g. Nazism) and their inhuman social engineering programs. And, of 
course, Darwin can be anathema to the seriously religious.  
 
As will become apparent in the discussions that follow, one cannot really embrace 
Darwinism without calling into question widely-held beliefs that Darwinian Science 
refutes or at least shows to be highly improbable as indicative of how things really are 
and how they got to be that way. Going the whole distance with Darwin must entail 
engagement with metaphysical questions and the kinds of answers this leads to are often 
not concordant with what most people want to believe. It is oddly ironic that much of 
what they (the majority it seems) want to believe, for example, that life has a purpose 
(beyond propagating our genes) or that we as a species have been divinely favoured, or 
that it really matters who wins the Soccer World Cup, can be understood and explained 
in relation to our innate psychological being, that is, in terms of cognitive 
predispositions that are biological adaptations. Nothing is more in the realm of 
Metaphysics than the belief that there is a non-physical self in control of the physical 
self and that it continues to exist when the physical self dies. These beliefs (e.g. belief in 
                              
2  The biosphere, that part of Earth wherein life is found, is the dimensional equivalent of a thin layer of 





God) did not just somehow appear. They make intuitive sense, they feel right, and 
people embrace them naturally. But it also makes intuitive sense to claim that the sun 
orbits the Earth or that the Earth is flat.  
 
All of the fields explored in this study are Darwinian in that they take as axiomatic 
Charles Darwin‘s explanation for how life has evolved – and continues to evolve - 
according to the process of natural selection, which ultimately is the playing out of a 
simple, mindless and purposeless algorithm. Everything that we are, mentally, 
physically, emotionally, kinesthetically and psychosocially, and all that we are capable 
of is possible only because this mindless, purposeless process has resulted in organisms 
with the necessary biological equipment. 
 
An in-depth consideration of- and case for - Darwinism follows further along in this 
chapter including an explication of the simple algorithm which is claimed to be driving 
everything. Suffice to say here that the still common notion that we come into the world 
as blank slates must by now be dismissed as errant nonsense given what is reliably 
known about the computational sophistication of our brains as they come pre-wired, and 
of the genetically instructed predispositions that incline and constrain our behaviour, 
even though this by no means makes us genetic automatons; nor does it deny the critical 
role of environment in shaping us into what we become.  Indeed, because of particular 
innate attributes such as language, our ability to imitate, and our extraordinary capacity 
for remembering things, our ‗minds‘ provide a fertile environment in which the same 
algorithm is quite possibly at work, not on genes, but on the neurally encoded 
informational units that we call ideas, for which Richard Dawkins (1976) coined the 
term ‗memes.‘ Imagine the metaphysical shift required if it can be convincingly shown 
that, contrary to what is so intuitive and commonsensical – that we have ideas, it turns 
out rather that ideas have us, or that free-will and consciousness itself are but illusions. 
The nascent science of Memetics, which considers seriously such claims, will be 
explored in depth in my discussion of Gene-Culture Coevolution Theory in Chapter 
Three. 
 
What I am in no doubt of is that there is far more to our innate psychology than has 
been conceded by the Humanities and Social Sciences  and that what we are coming to 
know about our nature should provoke serious reconsideration of many of the 
assumptions that inform educational philosophy and practice in so much of the world, 
like, for example, that traits such as jealousy, competitiveness, mistrust, greed, 
materialism, hunger for status and manipulativeness are the result of society‘s 
corrupting influence (as Jean Jacques Rousseau hypothesized). I am a ‗child of the ‗60s‘ 
and I would still very much like to believe that such failings are purely social, that our 
real nature is to trust, share, be humble, and love one another, that it is the ‗system‘ that 
makes us competitive, greedy, materialistic, status hungry and manipulative. 
Evolutionary Psychology has effectively pulled the rug out from under such notions and 
it now seems clear that the ‗triumph‘ of capitalism over socialism is attributable not to 
the former being better or more ‗right‘ (it could well be the recipe for our ultimate 
extinction) only that it is more congruent with our innate psychology; it more 
successfully exploits our instinctive leanings and even tries to sanctify some of them 
(competitiveness and materialism for example). In actuality, as per my remarks 
regarding ‗society,‘ capitalism is no it in the sense of a discrete, free-floating entity with 
intentionality and capable of exploiting anything. There are only people doing for the 




But evolution has also equipped us with the means to override our genetic default 
settings and actualize the norms and values expressed in so many of those great songs of 
the sixties.4  And there has been at least some success in the achievement of democratic 
socialism in parts of the world. Our ―ability to transcend our genetic imperatives‖ is ―a 
biological fact, visible to natural science, and something that requires an explanation 
from natural science‖ (Dennett 2007: 4). But how successful one is in transcending 
these imperatives depends critically on the nurturing of what is biologically given. 
Indeed, as will become ever more clear in the ensuing discussions, enabling and guiding 
the transcendence of our genetic imperatives is an apt way of summing up education‘s 
main task and raison d‟être. There is no other way in which broader social and 
ecological goals can be achieved.  For that matter, there is no other way to the 
acquisition of capacities such as literacy, propositional thinking, moral reasoning or 
musicianship. 
 
Of particular interest to the Philosophy of Music Education is the question of whether or 
not (or to what extent) music is a biologically evolved adaptation, pertinent because it 
must influence how we conceputalize music and what values or benefits we ascribe to 
different kinds of musical engagement and activity. If the cognitive mechanisms with 
which the brain processes musical stimuli prove to be largely innate, the implications 
for what and how we teach in and through ‗music‘ are considerable. Such implications 
need to be inferred, articulated and understood curricularly. The same holds if most of 
what we call music turns out to have no adaptive explanation or function, that it is only 
―auditory cheesecake‖ as Steven Pinker has expressed it (1997: 534). Suffice to mention 
here that reading and writing are not biological adaptations, and this fact has not 
negatively affected their perceived value to human life.  
 
Virtually all of what comprises our innate psychology are adaptations that evolved 
because they enhanced the reproductive success of our ancestors during the thousands 
of millennia during which they inhabited environments vastly different to what we 
occupy in the 21st century. Much of what our Paleolithic forbears needed by way of 
physical and mental prowess is no longer needed and other demands and challenges 
must now be met for which the kinds and levels of competence demanded are not 
genetically provided for (even though our genes instruct the ontogeny of the necessary 
computational equipment); they must be acquired through learning. Music may or may 
not be a biological adaptation, a matter that will be considered in depth in Chapter Two, 
but even if, like reading, it is not, it most certainly relies on attributes selected for by 
natural selection because they served Paleolithic or pre-Paleolithic needs, for example, 
the capacity of our brains to analyze harmonically rich sounds into their frequency 
components which is essential for language where we have to be able to distinguish 
different vowel sounds. I should rather say that such attributes served the propagation of 
Paleolithic genes nearly all of which are shared by modern day humans (and modern 
day chimpanzees as it turns out).  The upshot is that we continue to live out our lives 
with what is almost entirely a Paleolithic innate psychology.  
                              
4  The eminent linguist and evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker, in the introduction to Chapter 7 of 
his How the Mind Works (1997: 425), strings together some of the best known lines which he wrongly 
(I believe) styles as ‗treacle,‘ e.g.: ‗Come on people now, smile on your brother! Everybody get 
together; try to love one another right now. … Harmony and understanding, sympathy and trust 






Biomusicology is the name that has come to be applied to attempts to understand and 
explain music in adaptive terms, that is, in terms of evolved traits that helped our distant 
ancestors to more successfully adapt to the environments they inhabited, to secure mates 
and to raise offspring to sexual maturity, all of this necessary for getting their genes 
replicated in subsequent generations. The ‗Darwinizing‘ of musicology is essentially 
what Biomusicology is about and this, as will be seen, can entail many things. To 
Darwinize means to make something consistent with what we can confidently accept as 
true – or at least probable - about our evolved nature, that is to say, about the attributes 
that all members of the species Homo sapiens have in common, that are genetically 
provided for and thus the outcome of natural selection.  
 
The truth of the matter is that despite resistance to Darwinian intrusions into social and 
cultural studies and the ‗human sciences‘ generally, there has always been a tacit 
acceptance of the fact that we are a cognitively complex species even before 
environmental influences have a chance to act upon us. Although flaws in their theories 
have been revealed in the decades that have followed their work, Education and the 
human sciences still pay heed to Piaget, Erikson, Kohlberg, Vygotsky, Maslow and 
others who found common features in the ways that we unfold psychosocially, 
intellectually, emotionally and morally. While these theories all agree that the specifics 
of how we unfold and what we unfold into are critically dependent on the environments 
we occupy, they have to acknowledge that this necessitates far more than just some 
general learning capacity that allows environment to write itself on what is essentially a 
blank slate. Noam Chomsky (though himself far from being an ardent Darwinist) made 
this abundantly clear half a century ago with his ‗universal grammar,‘ a theory that was 
quickly taken up by key individuals in musical studies because of what they saw as 
clear implications for our understanding of innate musicality. John Blacking and 
Leonard Bernstein are the two luminaries who first come to mind in this regard.   
 
Even in Cultural Anthropology there has been an acknowledgement that despite the 
degree of différance culturally and socially among the peoples of the world, underlying 
it are common human competences and dispositions. Ascertaining the patterns of 
thought underlying all human activity, be it in pre- or post- industrial societies, was the 
substance of the late Lévi-Strauss‘s structuralism. His notion of one such universal 
competence, bricolage, begs investigation from an Evolutionary Psychology 
perspective and has particular relevance as regards the role of improvisation in music 
education.  Bricolage, is the ability and inclination "to make creative and resourceful 
use of whatever materials are at hand (regardless of their original purpose)".  
 
Two of postmodernism‘s better known writers, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guatarri, 
characterized the unconscious mind as a number of impersonal ‗desiring machines‘ at 
work in a factory. Alternatively, they use the image of a rhizome (e.g. couch-grass) 
whose root system is a widely complex network with each point connectable to all other 
points in the network (Macey 2000: 88-89). Their metaphors are wonderfully apropos 
Evolutionary Psychology‘s portrayal of the brain as a massively parallel computational 
system connecting up a complex network of neurocognitive mechanisms. The role of 
emotion in the workings of all of this is the focus of the work of the eminent cognitive 
neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, whose work will feature in several of the discussions 
that follow, as I believe it to have key implications for how we think about artistic 





In order to make better sense of the title of this work – Darwinizing the Philosophy of 
Music Education – I need to give clarity as to the nature of the something that I claim to 
be in need of being Darwinized. What is the Philosophy of Music Education and what 
kinds of questions is it concerned with? Moreover, I need to say more about Darwinism 
generally and why it is that I have found Darwinian theory and science so compelling 
and relevant to Education and, therefore also, to Music Education. In other words, I 
need to make clear my rationale for embarking on this study. But, let us deal first with 




On Philosophy and related matters 
 
We can talk about having a philosophy of life, of marriage, of art, of music, of whatever, 
meaning some set of beliefs that one or more people have about whatever it is that 
comes after of. These beliefs don‘t have to be shown to be true on the basis of empirical 
evidence or otherwise demonstrate scientific validity; they are just what we believe, 
what we take on faith to be true, contingently true, or at least true enough to guide our 
actions. When I capitalize the term – Philosophy – I am referring not to what one 
personally believes, but to the broad field of inquiry that systematically studies the 
meaning and justification of beliefs and ideas; and these may relate to a wide range of 
things. There are several branches of Philosophy concerned with different kinds of 
questions, mostly metaphysical. Epistemology, for example, is the branch concerned 
with knowledge while Ontology investigates the nature of being and existence itself. 
Aesthetics is concerned with how and why we value particular kinds of experience such 
as those provided by the arts. All of these branches (and there are many others) deal 
with aspects of being human and although they do not generally proclaim it as such, 
they all seem to, indeed, they must operate on the assumption, however tacit, that there 
are human capacities and proclivities that are not culturally or socially specific or 
contingent, even though their behavioral consequences will be very much influenced by 
the particulars of the social and cultural contexts in which they are played out. 
 
The names given these branches (as with those of individual sciences) are also 
capitalized because they are labels that stand for conceptually coherent pursuits 
informed by a significant body of theory, knowledge and research. (They are also 
commonly used as labels for courses of study at universities.) Capitalizing them in no 
way is meant to exalt them. Their credentials must speak for themselves. Rather, it 
serves to distinguish a set of individually held beliefs  (a philosophy) from a corpus of 
understanding (Philosophy) to whose development well-read people apply themselves 
assiduously, motivated by a desire to improve this understanding, especially as regards 
its ‗truth value,‘ whatever we may take that to mean. I also capitalize Education and 
Music Education when I am writing, not about educational processes (e.g. teaching and 
learning), but about the fields of scholarly engagement that have grown up around these 






On the Philosophy of Music Education 
 
As I conceive it, the Philosophy of Music Education is the field of inquiry that should 
be primarily concerned with understanding how music can most optimally feature in 
and as learning activity so as to achieve the best possible educational results. I 
emphasize the word educational because I believe that many if not most music 
educators would substitute the word musical, seeing the cultivation of musicianship 
(being able to do the things musicians do) as music education‘s raison d‟être. With my 
formulation I am giving expression to a key tenet of my own philosophy of music 
education (note no capitalization) that can be summed up by the formulation: education 
through music, and this implies something quite different from education in, about, or 
for music. And it points to the need for some elaboration of my philosophical 
orientations as regards the broader issues of education and society, the latter being what 
I, in line with Dewey, regard as education‘s ultimate function.  The primary implication 
of this is that when I speak of music education, I am referring to a context of effort 
wherein all that takes place is accountable ultimately to overarching, interdisciplinary 
educational goals which in turn are accountable to social and ecological needs and 
goals. I believe that whatever takes place under and in the name of education should be 
similarly accountable. Individuals may decide to pursue musical studies for personal or 
professional reasons, or other reasons none of which need be subordinate or accountable 
to anything broader. But I prefer not to call this music education; perhaps music 
training (or training in music) is a more apt label for many such undertakings.  What 
takes place within schools and which is intended for all students should be educational, 
meaning (for me at least) that the achievement of musical goals must be shown to be 
means to the achievement of broader educational, and ultimately, social and ecological 
goals. Musicianship (being able to do the things musicians do) is a worthy goal for all 
kinds of reasons, but this does not automatically mean that it is a goal that all young 
people should be expected to achieve or that the world would necessarily be a better 
place if they all did. The Philosophy of Music Education has only recently begun to be 
more similarly outward looking in its deliberations on the whys and wherefores of 
music education. Paul Woodford (2005: 86), for example, posits ―social intelligence‖ as 
an essential goal for music education. 
 
[M]usic education should be reconceived as a study in social intelligence in which 
consideration is given not just to the pursuit of musical knowledge and skills but also to 
inculcating in children and music education majors moral imagination and those kinds of 
personal skills, dispositions, virtues, and attributes needed to mindfully engage in public 
criticism of musical values.‖  
 
I endorse Woodford‘s proposal except that I would argue that the ‗social intelligence‘ 
that music education needs to foster should be of the broadly applicable kind, not 
limited to musical values, but concerning ideology generally, that is, the assumptions 
that people accept as ‗how things are and should be‘ and that inform ‗who they are‘ and 
‗how they act‘ not only in relation to music but to life as a whole. In this regard, I 
choose the concept praxis and use it in the Marxian sense and as it was developed by 
Paulo Freire, where the essential element is ‗critical consciousness‘ (conscientizacao), a 
capability for questioning one‘s historical and social situation, for ‗reading the world‘ 
(Freire & Macedo 1987).  Implicit in praxis are marked capacities for moral reasoning 




imagination, intuition, creativity and even spirituality. Ecopedagogy adds ecological 
consciousness to the list.  
 
What seems implicit in Dewey‘s insight is that before educational ways and means can 
be decided on (for example, education through music, science, sports, basket-weaving, 
or whatever), there must be some clarity about the kind of society education should be 
engaged in bringing about. One can get no help from Darwinian Science here. If it is not 
already apparent from what has been said, it will become so in discussions further 
along, and that is that Darwinian Science can only account for how life has come to be 
as it is (including such evolutionary anomalies as society and culture); it does not have - 
indeed, it cannot have -anything to say about how things should be or where society 
should be going. It offers no utopian vision and has little predictive value. It can 
however help us to understand why ideas (and complexes of ideas) resonate with people 
in the ways they do, sometimes becoming enshrined as principles or ideals that people 
aspire to,  create institutions around, and commit to, sometimes to the extent that they 
will sacrifice their own life and/or the lives of others in pursuance of an ideal. In most 
cases however, ideas are just part of the communal furniture, very much in the 
background, such that they are thought of little if at all. They are not anything like 
ideals, but they are in sum a more potent and pervasive influence on the behaviour of 
the majority of people. They are the stuff of ideology, the assumptions that people abide 
without ever really questioning. But be it an articulate ideal, an unwitting assumption, 
or just a general sense about something, ideas are mental constructs that are able to take 
shape and induce behaviour only by virtue of the synaptic organization and functional 
capacity of the human brain which, notwithstanding its plasticity, runs on neural-
chemical hardware common to all humans. Surely it is crucial to gain an understanding 
of why the brain is organized the way it is given the innumerable other ways it could 
have been organized. Even though it is still very early days, Darwinian Science can 
already tell us much about what we as a species come hard-wired with and how it 
predisposes and constrains our cognitive processes. And here it is worth noting that 
predispositions that served the needs of surviving and procreating in Pleistocene 
environments may in today‘s world induce behavior that is socially and ecologically 
counterproductive and thus maladaptive. Nepotism is an example that jumps to my 
mind in this regard.  
 
 
A need for utopian vision? 
 
Is Education (including Music Education) in need of a utopian vision? Who could 
reasonably argue that human society is as good as it could or should be, that education 
need only be concerned with maintaining the status quo? And yet that generally seems 
to be the assumption informing educational practices in today‘s world. Certainly there is 
much talk of ‗development,‘ but little is said as to where this development should 
ultimately be leading us. O‘Sullivan (1999: 4) speaks of a kind of ‗entrancement‘ in 
modern global society which he couples with ―a kind of optimism and verve that ours is 
the best of all possible worlds‖ and the attendant sense that ―we should continue what 
we are doing … in the same direction that has taken us to this point.‖ He considers this 
entrancement ―a profound cultural pathology‖ which as per his notion of inertia is an 
idea  that I and most evolutionary psychologists would challenge, arguing that  the 
problem lies rather with what is one of our strongest innate cognitive biases – our 




that ‗society‘ has infected us with. But whichever is the best explanation, the problem is 
the same: an inertia that education must overcome if we are to avert the ecological 
calamity that is inevitable should we carry on with business as usual. Notwithstanding 
my disagreements with O‘Sullivan regarding the causes underlying educational inertia, I 
totally agree with him that: 
 
The fundamental educational task of our times is to make the choice for a sustainable 
planetary habitat of interdependent life forms over and against the dysfunctional calling of 
the global competitive marketplace. (1999: 2) 
 
The incessant valorization of Science and Mathematics in school curricula is, as I see it, 
a response to this calling O‘Sullivan speaks of.  The ‗heroes‘ of South Africa‘s 
matriculation examinations, those who achieve seven ‗A‘s, seem also to be heeding the 
‗call‘ judging by the numbers who are choosing Actuarial Science as their career path. 
What better way of equipping one for success in playing the international casino we call 
the Market, where the vast majority of transactions are not paying for any product or 
service but are only speculative gambles carrying various degrees of risk (which 
‗actuarial scientists‘ are adept at gauging)?  
 
O‘Sullivan has been strongly influenced by the late cosmologist and Catholic priest, 
Thomas Berry, and his ecozoic vision according to which: ―the human is derivative, the 
Earth is primary.‖ The larger ―earth community‖ must be, in this view, the ―primary 
referent‖ for and ―concern of every profession, institute, and activity‖ (Berry 1996). I 
for the most part share Berry‘s vision which is utopian in its ideal of an ecologically 
balanced and sustainable earth community of interdependent life forms. Where my 
Darwinism comes in is in my understanding that none of the life forms that comprise 
the larger earth community is inherently or intrinsically more worthy or entitled. We 
humans call the shots, but not because we should, only because we can. For that matter, 
no particular vision of ecological homeostasis can be claimed to represent how things 
were meant to be. From this it seems inescapable that there must be nihilistic and/or 
radically relativistic tendencies in Darwinian thinking, a matter that I take up at various 
points in this dissertation. For now, the suggestion that education should be driven by 
and accountable to a utopian vision needs further discussion given the paucity of such 
vision in educational philosophy and the apparent disinclination of philosophers of 
Education to advance any such vision. 
 
Notwithstanding his endorsement of Berry‘s vision of an ecozoic era or his espousal of 
a ―cosmological perspective,‖ O‘Sullivan takes pains to make clear his nonpartisanship 
with anything ―Utopian or new age‖ (1999: 6).  He evidently realizes how much the 
term utopia has been ‗tainted‘ by association with the New Age movement, which 
should not be entirely a ‗bad‘ thing given all that is laudable and ecologically sound in 
New Age thinking. The problem lies with the spiritual beliefs embraced by many who 
are identified with the movement, especially those rooted in occultism, astrology, 
shamanism and other forms of mysticism (for which a whole industry has arisen to 
supply the accoutrements, e.g. crystals, spirit-catchers, tarot cards, etc.). ‗Utopia‘ seems 
to have little currency these days, particularly in academia, and is avoided even by some 
whose thinking is arguably utopian.  The Zeitgeist movement, for example, eschews the 
concept utopia which it sees as ―static.‖ And yet everywhere in its presentations it 
alludes to an ideal world, not some final state of perfection, but nonetheless a world in 




labor, the absence of any monetary or barter system, etc.), a world ―where negative 
social consequences, such as social stratification, war, biases, elitism and criminal 
activity will be constantly reduced and, idealistically, eventually become nonexistent 
within the spectrum of human behavior itself‖ (The Zeitgeist Movement website). What 
is paradoxical is that notwithstanding the movement‘s exaltation of science and 
scientific method as cornerstones in the envisaged order, it maintains a strenuously 
blank slate take on humanity. It portrays as ―escapist‖ the notion that our innate nature 
has much to do with the said ―negative social consequences.‖  
 
In reality, we are nearly clean slates when we are born and it is our environment that shapes 
who we are and how we behave. (The Zeitgeist Movement website) 
 
The following makes clearer what is meant by ―nearly clean.‖ 
 
The bottom line is that it is environmental conditioning that really affects 99% of our 
actions, and all diligent behavior studies have proven this time and time again. (Ibid.) 
 
No such studies are cited and the studies that will be cited in the course of this inquiry 
will bear out my earlier dismissal of such a claim as errant nonsense.  But here, still 
more needs saying as to the need for a utopian vision, if indeed there is such need. 
 
A utopian vision is unavoidably idealistic but in the positive, straightforward sense of 
representing an ideal, and ideals are useful, often essential, in providing direction to our 
efforts, most particularly those efforts directed toward making things better, education 
being foremost in this regard. Of course, a utopian vision is of no value if demonstrably 
unachievable or absurdly unrealistic. But how can we decide how realistic something is 
without properly understanding the agents or catalysts that are to be called upon, that 
are necessary for its realization?  We Homo sapiens are amazingly clever and creative, 
and it is popular to believe that there are no limits to what we can do or achieve. But 
this simply is not true. At the very least we need to understand what informs, influences, 
constrains, indeed, what constitutes our agency, that is, our ―faculty of acting or of 
exerting power‖ (Wikitionary – ―agency‖5). This agency is, in fact, comprises many 
‗faculties‘ that integrate in various ways depending on what is required in the moment. 
Certain of these faculties are what make possible such unique behaviors as language, 
imitation, remembering, planning, reflecting and so on, and these in turn are what allow 
our agency to be shaped by what we experience in the course of our lives, what we 
learn that is to say.  The question of just how much we are ‗free agents‘ in all this will 
be taken up at various points in this study as it is a crucial question for Educational 
Philosophy.  
 
A utopian vision, according to much postmodernist thinking, must be embedded in 
some or another metanarrative, which Stephens (1998: 9) defines as ―a global or 
totalizing cultural narrative schema which orders and explains knowledge and 
experience,‖ ―a body of shared allusions and experiences that expresses a society‘s 
central values and assumptions.‘ Like anything ideological it needs to be treated with 
scepticism. This is likely another reason why O‘Sullivan, who has definite 
postmodernist leanings, eschews the concept utopia. This could also explain, in part, the 
                              




scepticism that is met in the Humanities and Social Sciences regarding Sociobiology 
and Evolutionary Psychology (the latter by and large being the new name for the 
former), or whatever science seeks what ultimately are biological explanations for 
psychological and (accordingly) social phenomena (perhaps including such complex 
phenomena as ‗metanarratives‘ or ‗art‘).  
 
Darwinian Science remains tainted, in many minds it seems, by Social Darwinism, the 
late 19th century movement that misappropriated  Darwin‘s ‗survival of the fittest‘ 
(which was not Darwin‘s formulation), changing what was to be understood by ‗fittest‘ 
so as to rationalize social stratification and the exploitation that fuelled the emerging 
industrial order.  Behaviour Genetics is easily seen as Social Darwinism‘s current guise 
especially when it postulates on racial differences, even if, as Tooby & Cosmides (1992: 
35) have it, Evolutionary Psychology is able to distance itself from theories of 
difference because its concern is with what is universal and common to us all.  
 
Obviously, claims about a complexly organized, universal human nature, by their very 
character, cannot participate in racist explanations. Indeed, they contradict the central 
premises of racialist approaches. 
 
This could be too facile especially as there is a fair deal of research going on in Gene-
culture Coevolution Theory concerned very much with quantitative variations in 
phenotypic attributes between populations of people whose ancestors lived in relative 
isolation long enough for natural selection to bring about changes in the genome. It is 
not sufficiently relevant to the present discussion to pursue the matter further here, but it 
does need to be pursued and will be taken up in Chapter Three. 
 
One other possible explanation for the seeming disinclination of philosophers of 
education to embrace utopian visions is that too much specificity in the determination of 
ultimate ends is seen as intrinsically undemocratic or even fascist. If education is to 
serve the realization of a vision, everyone must have and ‗believe‘ in the same vision. 
How could this ever be achieved without education becoming indoctrination? And yet, 
it can be argued that there are utopian visions that are embraced widely, not only by 
some quirky cult of devotees or disciples, but by the broad base of humanity. In the last 
one hundred years we have again and again witnessed nations and people from diverse 
cultural backgrounds coming together and agreeing on important principles concerning, 
for example, human rights, environmental standards, and economic relations. And this 
seems to suggest that there are principles that transcend cultural and other social 
differences. And what is a principle if not an ideal, that is, the articulation of how 
something should ideally be, e.g. that all people should be treated fairly, that children 
should not be subjected to any form of abuse, or that other sentient beings (whales and 
gorillas for example) have as much right to life on this planet as do we humans. In an 
ideal society (a utopia), these principles would be optimally realized. So it stands to 
reason that principles collectively describe or at least imply a utopia, a society where the 
principles are manifest in how its citizens live out their lives.  
 
The most all-embracing and generally the most exalted principles have been given 
names, for example: democracy, socialism, ubuntu, and equity. As is the nature of the 
English language and those who speak it (and as may well be the case with other 
languages), by naming them, by making them nouns, we reify them and they become 




collectives: societies, cultures, movements, nations, humanity. All that they are really 
are just descriptions of how things might be or could be provided that certain conditions 
(not always agreed upon) are met as regards how some group of people behave and how 
they relate to each other. My argument, therefore, is that they are meaningless terms 
unless they describe praxis and what praxis means in the simplest possible terms is that 
people are living out the principles and doing so in a seemingly natural, spontaneous 
and unforced way, even though there is much in their nature that would have them do 
otherwise. What is being alluded to here are people at the highest levels of moral self-
actualization as Kohlberg portrayed them in his famous theory, people for whom morals 
are not things that you believe, but rather how you do things because of who you are. 
Laws are not prescriptions or proscriptions so much as social contracts that apply only 
provided that they serve the greatest common good. In the utopia I envisage, laws 
and/or social contracts are redundant because people have so thoroughly actualized 
ethical principles that they have become nonnegotiable bottom-lines in all their actions. 
(Justice is the first principle in this regard.) Very few people achieve such levels of 
moral excellence, such as we associate with rare exemplars like Mahatma Gandhi or 
Nelson Mandela.  
 
However much academics in the Social Sciences may eschew essentialism, notions of a 
universal human nature (beyond some ‗basic instincts‘ and a general learning ability), 
and utopian visions, few of them would style themselves radical relativists, nihilists, or 
anarchists. There are principles that they embrace and it has been among such 
academics that I have found, more than in any other milieu, a strong commitment to 
social and environmental justice. It is a milieu to which I strongly feel a part, my 
Darwinism notwithstanding. I hope to show that there is nothing like an unbridgeable 
chasm between the explanations for psychological and social phenomena offered by 
sociologists and those offered by evolutionary psychologists. The matter has been 
exaggerated I believe. Moreover, the Evolutionary Psychology portrayal of the 
Standard Social Science Model (SSSM), which is dealt with further along, was posited 
well over a decade ago and in this time the influence of postmodernism has waned 
considerably. More and more the social and the natural sciences seem to be finding 
themselves on the same page and consilience should be the name of the game. 
 
Everywhere you turn in today‘s world you find principles being agreed upon and 
articulated, most commonly in documents: charters, constitutions, mission statements, 
protocols and so forth. Let us take for example the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), a document that academics from both the social and the natural 
sciences endorse without reluctance. Where this is not so, it is mostly in respect of 
articles that are problematic vis-à-vis some or another religious tenet. Indeed, there are 
only a very few of the UDHR's articles that have been publicly challenged, for example, 
those that are seen to be in conflict with Shariah law by some Islamicists and those 
'positive' rights that conservatives and laissez-faire capitalists argue contravene what 
they see as the natural, inalienable right to manage and dispose of one's 'property' as 
one sees fit. But the point that is urgent here is that the majority of the articles have not 
been contested. When it was voted on by the UN General Assembly in 1948, 48 




Bloc states as well as Yugoslavia, South Africa and Saudi Arabia.6  Much has changed 
in the ensuing six-plus decades. The Soviet Union is no longer and South Africa now 
has a constitution seen as the world's most democratic and consistent with the UDHR. 
Indeed, the USA, the erstwhile champion of democracy, has become the principal 
detractor when it comes to international efforts to promote compliance - for example, 
the International Court of Justice, as well as agreements such the Kyoto Accord.  
 
What I find remarkable about the UDHR is that the authority that invests human kind 
with these rights (the authorizing agent) is nowhere specified. It might have been 
expected that some entity would be invoked, be it political (the United Nations) or 
transcendent (God). What is more, the UDHR articulates standards of humaneness that 
often conflict with one or more innate dispositions, the genetic biases that are part of 
our evolved psychology, like ‗racialism‘ it might be argued.  And yet, the articles are 
standards that resonate with people, that seem intuitively appropriate, and that seem 
strongly resistant to refutation. Less resonant is the notion that other species have such 
rights and there is as yet nothing like the UDHR for Earthlings who are not of the 
species Homo sapiens. We are not inclined to accord rights to organisms we cannot 
procreate with.  From a gene‘s-eye view, this is an entirely valid disinclination. But 
from a gene‘s-eye view, nepotism, xenophobia, infanticide and even genocide are valid 
stratagems. 
 
The important point is that we seem able to uphold such worthy standards and values 
without having to ascribe them to a higher power and yet many of these same standards 
and values go against the grain as far as our instincts are concerned. It is amazing how 
far people will override their nature because of what they believe, celibate priests and 
suicide bombers being extreme cases. The Social Sciences are most certainly correct to 
invoke social and cultural influences in attempting to solve such paradoxes but they 
should not ignore the reality that much of one‘s moral sensibility is innate, considerably 
more than has hitherto been acknowledged if we are to take evolutionary psychologists 
like Marc Hauser (2007) seriously. When you think of it, most of your judgments are 
made spontaneously without conscious consideration of principles. Our behaviour is 
decided on the basis of how it causes us to feel and for most people across the world, 
helping feels good whereas hurting or cheating feels bad. Accordingly we feel helping to 
be right while we feel hurting and cheating to be wrong. We do NOT have to be taught 
this, but education can nurture and cultivate what nature has provided; we can be taught 
to think and feel in ways that extend and refine what comes naturally, for example, 
extending our humaneness to species other than our own, or at least to generations of 
humans yet born. The failure of education to foster genuine ecological intelligence 
makes it an accomplice to the collapse that now seems so sadly inevitable and which 
will deny future generations health and ‗well-being‘ if not life itself, unless our ways of 
‗being in the world‘ change dramatically.  
 
For those teachers that give much thought to the ultimate rationale for their 
discipline/subject, they usually do so based on particular attributes that they believe are 
being cultivated in - or acquired by - their students (musicianship for example). Because 
particular attributes appear to be widely esteemed (by others in one's profession, 
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community, culture, religious milieu, etc.) they are assumed to be worthy and are 
accepted without any serious interrogation of reasons for why - or explanations for how 
- a particular attribute came to be widely esteemed or how those who have developed 
these attributes can offer more toward – how they can better serve - the realization of a 
more ideal world. Accordingly, no need is felt for a vision of utopia as an ultimate 
determiner of what they should be striving for through their teaching. Many teachers 
think of their profession firstly as teaching a subject or discipline as opposed to 
teaching students, i.e. helping them to become ‗better‘ people. They are drawn to the 
profession more by their passion for the subject/discipline than by their commitment to 
education or social amelioration. The standard line one hears from Music Education 
majors is that their curricular choice is an insurance policy, something to fall back on if 
they don‘t crack it as a professional musician. But there are also many music teachers 
who do have their student‘s interests as their primary concern and they operate on the 
assumption that what their students ‗get‘ from music education makes them better 
people, because they have been empowered in ways that at the very least affords them 
rich forms of pleasure (aesthetic pleasure, for example) that are edifying or otherwise of 
value. Some might go further to theorize the nature of the ‗value‘ (edifying can mean so 
many things) and speak in terms of forms of knowing, cognitive capacities, or such-like.  
 
The philosophy that David Elliott advances in Music Matters: A new philosophy of 
music education (1995) is grounded on forms of cognitive engagement that he 
convincingly argues to be active in various forms of ‗musicing,‘ that is, in doing the 
things musicians do like performing, composing, improvising, and listening to music. 
As he puts it: ―Music making and music listening are unique forms of thinking and 
unique sources of the most important kinds of knowledge human beings can gain‖ (14). 
But he never, according to my reading, makes clear why the kinds of knowledge he 
exalts are so important. He does not suggest, except indirectly, how being able to use 
one‘s cognitive resources the way praxial musicians do makes an individual ‗better‘ 
socially, ethically or ecologically. Neither does he suggest in what ways a world of 
‗praxial musicers‘ constitutes a better world than that which we live in. This is not to 
diminish the importance and value of Elliott‘s contribution to the Philosophy of Music 
Education, but it reveals what I see as a fundamental misorientation that I have found to 
characterize the field generally. The leading philosophies7 are almost entirely in 
agreement that the purposes and values of music education should derive from - and be 
consistent with – the nature and values of music.  As Elliott8 put it, ‗the nature of music 
education depends on the nature of music‘ and ‗the significance of music education 
depends on the significance of music in human life‘ (1995: 12). It is as if the paradigm 
should be ‗education for music‘, not the other way around. Should not the ‗significance 
of music education‘ depend on what it contributes to making the world a better place 
because of how it helps to improve individuals, not only cognitively, but socially and in 
terms of how they think and behave ecologically?   
 
Perhaps the reason that writers in the Philosophy of Music Education have refrained 
from couching their theories of music‘s nature and value within a broader educational 
value system based upon some social-ecological vision (even if one does not want to 
                              
7  that is, philosophies that have been articulated in widely read texts and subjected to critical review by 
other scholars working in the Philosophy of Music Education. 




style it as ‗utopian‘) is because of the possibility that music might turn out not to matter, 
or at least not so much that it justifies inclusion in the education of everyone. Perhaps it 
mattered more in former times, but like so many other commonplaces of yesteryear, it 
has been largely superseded by more recent and efficacious ‗pleasure technologies‘ that 
are more successful in commanding our attention, and in ‗satisfying‘ social needs and 
functions. Wherever I have traveled in the world, I have encountered video (or DVD) 
rental shops, but seldom (almost never) shops that rent music CDs. When someone puts 
on a video or DVD, all present are expected to watch and keep silent so that there is no 
distraction, and yet this is almost never expected when music is put on. How many 
people, musicians included, actually ‗listen‘ to music with the same attention as they 
give to watching a TV programme or a movie? Indeed, how many people are even able 
to keep their focus on what is unfolding musically while they listen, sticking with a 
piece of music from beginning to end without their minds wandering off? I find it 
almost impossible and have restarted a track on my MP3 player four or five times, each 
time committed to following it through from the first note to the last. But as is usually 
my experience with Transcendental Meditation, within a short time – and without being 
aware of exactly when or how it happens – I find my ‗mind‘ somewhere else.  This does 
not happen when I watch a DVD. And I repeatedly ask friends, colleagues and fellow 
musicians about their experiences in this regard and they admit to the same.9 
 
Because of its ubiquity and because of the plethora of other stimuli that are more 
entertaining, music seems to have been devalued in the 20th and 21st century.  It might 
be more accurate to say that its value has changed with changes in the way people relate 
to music. But here we are talking about how they relate to music as aural experience. 
The situation is somewhat different when it comes to making music, but even then, not 
many people would argue that everyone should become capable of performing or 
otherwise making music. Elliott (as does just about every Music Education philosopher) 
certainly thinks that everyone should and it could well be – I most assuredly believe - 
that developing the forms of knowledge he shows to be essential to praxial music 
making also empowers people in ways needed for the realization of a better, more ideal 
world, for example, by cultivating in them ―the flexible, situated knowledge that allows 
one to think-in-action,‖ to engage in praxis (Elliott 1995: 252). I am confident that he 
thinks as much, perhaps seeing it as obvious and not feeling compelled to be too explicit 
in this regard.  
 
So perhaps the notion of utopia is more palatable when it describes a world, not in terms 
of material conditions, technologies and infrastructure, but in terms of the kinds of 
people who inhabit it, in terms of what they can and are disposed to do. My idea of 
                              
9   Around ten years ago I attended a workshop given by an eminent jazz saxophonist who I will not 
name. Both I and my sax students were enthusiastic and full of questions of the tricks-of-the-trade 
variety which the presenter answered more than adequately. But something in his body language 
expressed disenchantment, as if there was something that worried him about the kinds of questions 
being asked, perhaps what it revealed about the aspirations of the questioners.  After the workshop, I 
went up to meet and thank him.  I really felt I had gained a lot and wanted him to know.  He listened 
graciously and then came closer so as to speak to me alone and said:  ―There is something you should 
know. I have come to the conclusion that music is overrated.‖ He had nothing more to say on the 
matter. I may have muttered something in reply but I cannot remember what.  I do remember feeling 





utopia is a world where declarations of principles such as the UDHR and the Earth 
Charter are essentially redundant because the principles they articulate have become 
enshrined in praxis; they have become the ways in which people do things, the choices 
they make, how they relate to each other and to the rest of life on Earth, in sum, how 
they live out their lives.  For this there needs to be a large enough and sufficiently 
influential population of people who have achieved the highest levels of moral maturity 
as described by Lawrence Kohlberg and who have become true self-actualizers as 
described by Abraham Maslow. They have also achieved the critical consciousness and 
commitment to social justice Paulo Friere spoke so convincingly to, and they are 
possessed of the compassion and empathy that we here in Africa give the name ubuntu. 
And lastly, they have achieved high levels of ecological understanding and commitment 
as are implicit in the principles of the Earth Charter.  I describe my utopia in terms of 
the kind of humans I would most want to share the world with for the simple reason that 
so much of what the world is has been made the way it is by humans. They are and have 
for long been the catalysts and if they are catalysts of the kind characterized in this 
paragraph, the changes they bring about will in all probability be the most socially and 
ecologically ameliorative and, where necessary, transformative.  No vision of how the 
world should be technologically, politically or ecologically is realizable without such 
catalysts and education is the only means by which they can be brought into being, no 
matter how promising the innate material. Indeed, the crises that continue to dog 
humanity, like poverty, war, and pollution, need to be acknowledged as symptoms of 
educational failure on a global scale. But here a caveat must be included: that schooling 
is but one means of education and not necessarily the most important factor in 
influencing what a person becomes in life. Schooling may be the only institution that 
has (or should have) education as its raison d‟être, but most of the shaping occasioned 
by life‘s experiences happens outside of school. I almost used the term nurturing but 
this implies a helping along to an improved state or condition. The most potent of 
shaping influences, the mass media, is not grounded in any nurturing ethos or utopian 
vision. Profit is its bottom line and that is best served by a population of torpid 
consumers whose main interest is in keeping entertained and acquiring the latest ‗stuff.‘ 
But helping them to wake up and think critically about what they do and why it seems 
to come so naturally to them does not appear to be anything like a priority in the school 
classroom, not here in South Africa according to my experience. That of course is a 
generalization and there are enlightened teachers who really qualify as educators in 
being themselves self-actualizers and critical thinkers that treat what they do as praxis 
and try to guide their charges accordingly, but they are sadly very much in the minority. 
Most of the rest are ‗just playing the gig‘ and the gig seems more geared to market 
needs than to the achievement of the educational ideals proffered in this discussion. 
Understanding ‗what comes naturally‘ is crucial to any effort to transcend it and to 
actualize what we potentially can be. This transcendence does not imply becoming 
‗unnatural,‘ or that we must deny our nature (which is impossible really and would not 
negate it in any case). We must just make the best possible use of it; and for this we 
need the best possible understanding of what ‗it‘ is and how it influences what we 
become.  
 
As I undertook to do earlier, and as I feel is necessary in making clearer my rationale for 
turning to Darwinian Science, I now will go into more depth in presenting my 
understanding of Darwinism and of what Darwinian Science may have to offer 
philosophical deliberations about educational ends and the means of achieving them. I 




fundamental tenets and how they have been responded to in academia and in society 
generally. Some of these will be taken up again and expanded on further and I will try, 
wherever apropos, to suggest what the impact of a Darwinian precept might be vis-à-vis 
questions of what education should be achieving and why. 
 
 
On Darwinism, Darwinian Science and Darwinizing educational philosophy 
 
There is no single, generally agreed upon definition for Darwinism and the term has 
been used by both proponents and opponents of the theory of natural selection presented 
by Charles Darwin (1859) one hundred and fifty years ago in On the Origin of Species 
by Means of Natural Selection.  It is frequently used as a reference to evolutionary 
thinking in general, for any conceptual system that explains phenomena in terms of 
evolutionary processes and which is likely to incorporate findings and theories that 
Darwin himself never espoused.  Several of these have extended our understanding of 
how natural selection works and what it can reliably be used to explain. The most 
important of these for sure are the laws of inheritance arrived at by the Augustinian 
priest, Gregor Mendel in the 1860s which provided the foundation for the science of 
Genetics.  Subsequent breakthroughs like the discovery of DNA, Mitochondrial DNA 
and an array of technologies crucial to Molecular Biology have placed Darwin‘s core 
idea – evolution by natural selection – beyond dispute10. Accordingly, the Darwinism 
that informs this study treats natural selection as a law of nature and not just a theory 
among others for explaining the incredible diversity of life on this planet as well as the 
attributes that characterize our species, Homo sapiens.   
 
The idea of evolution by natural selection is so compelling because, as Daniel Dennett 
(1995: 21) has put it: 
 
In a single stroke, [it] unifies the realm of life, meaning, and purpose with the realm of 
space and time, cause and effect, mechanism and physical law. 
 
It is encouraging, for Darwinists at least, that natural selection is accorded ‗law‘ status 
in the National Science Education  Standards11 (1996:116)  where along with Newton‘s 
laws of force and motion and Kepler‘s laws of planetary motion, it is presented as 
evidence of ‗order and regularity‘ in the cosmos. As Daniel Dennett (1995) would have 
it, the order and regularity we encounter, from which we are sometimes able to induce 
laws of nature, demonstrate that physical reality is inherently algorithmic. What we 
observe, what science tries to explain, and what may ultimately be  expressible as a law 
or algorithm are natural processes following fixed steps, according to fixed conditions 




                              
10  Natural selection can be accepted as a law of nature describing a process that has been proven to work 
and to yield evolutionary results; but this does not require believing that it governs every evolutionary 
process or that it can be used to explain everything that living organisms do. 
11  These are the standards devised to guide science education in the USA. They are not mandatory and 
the extent to which they are pursued and achieved varies considerably from state to state and even 




The natural selection algorithm 
 
Dennett (1995) takes a passage in On the Origin of Species and shows how Darwin 
succeeded, without being aware of it, in reducing natural selection to an algorithm , in 
this case one of the ‗if …, if …, then…‘ variety. The passage, as excerpted by Dennett 
from the original 1859 edition, is given below. The emphases are those added by 
Dennett. 
 
If, during the long course of ages and under varying conditions of life, organic beings vary 
at all in the several parts of their organization, and I think this cannot be disputed;  if there 
be, owing to the high geometric powers of increase of each species, at some age, season, or 
year, a severe struggle for life, and this certainly cannot be disputed; then, considering the 
infinite complexity of the relations of all organic beings to each other and to their 
conditions of existence, causing an infinite diversity in structure, constitution, and habits, to 
be advantageous to them, I think it would be a most extraordinary fact if no variation ever 
had occurred useful to each being‟s own welfare, in the same way as so many variations 
have occurred useful to man.  But if variations useful to an organic being do occur, 
assuredly individuals thus characterized will have the best chance of being preserved in the 
struggle for life, and from the strong principle of inheritance they will tend to produce 
offspring similarly characterized. This principle of preservation, I have called, for the sake 
of brevity, Natural Selection.  (from chapter 4 of The Origins of Species as quoted in 
Dennett 1995: 48) 
 
Darwin had abundant evidence that traits do get passed on to succeeding generations 
and that variation does occur. But without a unit of selection like a gene, he could not 
specify what exactly was being replicated, be it with total fidelity or varied in some 
way.12 Mendel‘s discovery and the science of Genetics it engendered have made it 
possible to modify the above passage, to translate and condense it into something more 
like an algorithm or law of nature. The following is my attempt to do this. 
 
 If conditions are such that some entity replicates; and 
 if the resulting copies similarly replicate, increasing in number within a finite 
environment with finite resources; 
 then there will be competition for resources (and space perhaps) and not all 
copies will successfully replicate. 
 If in such circumstances some copies are not exact; and  
 if the difference enhances their chances for successful replication; 
 then those copies with the difference will in time come to be dominant in their 
environment provided that key environmental conditions remain sufficiently 
stable.  
 
Genes are the entities that replicate with variation when it comes to almost all of what is 
called life on this planet.13  They are able to do so because they encode information that 
                              
12  It seems logical that the frequency and degree of variation has to be within some bounds if natural 
selection is to take place. This is a crucial issue when it comes to the validity of Memetics as a science 
as will be discussed in Chapter Three.  Genetic evolution occurs at a rapid rate in the case of viruses 
when compared for example with the human genome. And this is because variation (genetic mutation) 
is occurring much more frequently. 
13  Prions are an example of what many biologists would call a biological replicator even if strictly 




instructs the development of an organism of some kind, capable of behavior allowing it 
to survive and produce offspring in which its genes get replicated in total or in part.14 
Here it is apropos to point out that a mutated gene may be and apparently often is 
disadvantageous in relation to its replication prospects, or it may be neutral as is also 
often the case. In the former instance, the organism concerned -what is most commonly 
understood as the phenotype  (as opposed to genotype) - will be less likely to succeed in 
reproduction and the problem genes will in time be selected out. This, although not 
stated, can be logically inferred from the algorithm and has happened innumerable times 
in evolutionary history. Neutral mutations will get replicated in succeeding generations 
and could become fitness enhancing because of further mutation or because of mutation 
elsewhere in the genome, the total complement of genetic information that gets passed 
on.  (Genes do not produce phenotypic results independently. There is no single music 
gene for example.) However, phenotypic adaptations (the physical expressions of 
genetic information such as organs, cognitive modules in the brain, appendages, etc.) 
cannot be neutral in a functional sense. If they no longer are used, they will over 
generations atrophy and be lost. This is because they become, as Ridley (2000: 279) 
puts it, ―shot through with mutations.‖ Function evolves in response to environmental 
conditions and if those conditions change in particular ways, natural selection will no 
longer be able to act on the genes concerned and there will be mutational decay.15  
 
Genes may not be the only replicating entities however. The Universal Darwinism 
espoused by Dawkins (1976), Dennett (1995), Blackmore (1999) claims that the natural 
selection algorithm will play out with any replicating entity provided the ‗if‘ conditions 
of the algorithm are met.16 Daniel Dennett‘s understanding of algorithms (1995: 50-51) 





Substrate neutrality means that the physical materials involved are irrelevant to the 
algorithmic process which relies only on its logic for its evolutionary efficacy.  As long 
as the conditions are being met, the material nature of the replicating entity (its 
molecular constitution) is ‗immaterial.‘ This is because what ultimately gets replicated 
                                                                                      
certain other proteins to change shape and assume the same molecular structure when they come into 
contact with each other. The result is replication in so far as prions increase in number. Unfortunately 
some prions tend to do so exponentially within the brains of certain species including ours and this has 
dire consequences. Whether or not replicating is the same thing as being replicated is by no means a 
moot point vis-à-vis the algorithm and will be later discussed as a key issue vis-à-vis the validity of 
Memetics. 
14  With sexual reproduction there is a mixing (but not a blending) of the genes from each parent. The 
leading theory as to why sexual reproduction evolved as a means of gene replication is that it ensures 
a degree of variation sufficient to keep the offspring resistant to contagion by viruses and other 
parasites. 
15  Cormorants on islands in the Galapagos have lost wing size and become flightless because conditions 
there over evolutionary time almost never warranted the considerable energy costs of flying.  As fish 
eaters, improved speed under water made it a good trade-off.  Ridley (ibid) gives as his example 
shrimp and fish that long ago colonized dark caves, whose eyes have virtually disappeared after 
generations of having no use. 
16  There is no condition that requires other replicating entities to be the same as genes in every respect 




is information, something that can be encoded in any number of ways using any number 
of materials. A recipe for baking a cake, for example, could be in someone‘s head, 
written down or printed, implicit in the act of baking the cake, or interspersed with 
humorous chit-chat on an episode of The Galloping Gourmet. The core information 
remains the same.17  Life elsewhere in the universe could very likely involve entirely 
different substrates.  The substrate neutrality of the natural selection algorithm has been 
proven by it successfully having ‗run‘ in the binary environment of a computer.18   
 
Substrate neutrality is an absolutely critical factor in determining whether Memetics is a 
science worth considering.  Memes are the informational units that Memetics proposes 
as replicating entities responsible for cultural evolution as will be discussed in depth in 
Chapter Three. They are essentially what might be called ideas and may be encoded in a 
number of substrates: in neural networks in the brain, in verbal utterances and other 
symbolic representations, or in artifacts. If cultural evolution is shown to be 
predominantly the playing out of the natural selection algorithm, the implications are 
dramatic and rather scary.  As Dennett remarks: ‗This idea, that all the fruits of 
evolution can be explained as the products of an algorithmic process, is Darwin‘s 





Perhaps the biggest challenge that Darwinian thinking presents is that it effectively pulls 
the carpet out from under teleological beliefs and assumptions that are widely held by 
people, beliefs and assumptions that intuitively make sense; they feel right and seem 
obvious.  For example, the incredible complexity of functional organization that 
characterizes life on this planet (that manifests in an eye for example) screams ‗Design‘.  
What Darwin discovered and was able to explain was that life evolved to present levels 
of complexity without involving any design whatsoever.  A design is an intentional plan 
for how something is to be carried out so as to achieve a functional result, and a design 
necessarily involves a designer and a purpose or intention.  None of these is needed as it 
turns out.   
 
What appears as design comes about because replication is not always exact and some 
variation among the copies occurs. Occasionally, rarely even, the difference in some 
way improves the prospects of that copy getting replicated and copies with the 
difference become more numerous in the environment they occupy. This may and often 
will be at the expense of copies that do not have the advantageous difference because 
replication requires resources and space for which there will be competition. Those with 
the advantageous difference are fitter, but this does not imply that their associated 
phenotypes, the organisms they engender and inhabit, are necessarily more intelligent or 
physically stronger. (A virus is far ‗fitter‘ than any human.) And it most certainly does 
                              
17  Which raises the question: What is information? This will be taken up in Chapter ___ in connection 
with gene-culture coevolutionary theory and, more especially, with Memetics, the science of memes. 
18  Aunger (2002) cites as an example the computer simulation TIERRA and its various ‗descendants.‘ ‗It 
is evident from these simulations that digital analogues to DNA- or RNA-based viruses exist: These 
are indeed viral agents that exhibit a wide variety of phenomena that parallel those of their biological 
cousins. This parallel suggests that evolutionary processes really are "universal" in replicators of 




not imply that they are more worthy or entitled, adjectives that are actually meaningless 
from a Darwinian standpoint. 
 
Most humans like to believe that our species is somehow more worthy, that we matter 
more, and that we are thus entitled to subjugate and exploit the rest of life on our planet. 
But it is impossible for us to be worthier in any inherent or intrinsic sense if, like all 
other life forms, we are merely the result of the playing out of a mindless algorithm. 
Indeed, it is not our interests that matter. All that matters according to evolution is 
replication and humans do not, in fact, replicate. We are merely the means for the 
replication of our genes.  Indeed, humans entertain notions of self- importance and 
entitlement only because they have been cognitively biased toward such notions by their 
genes. And it is not that anything actually ‗matters‘ to genes. They do not replicate 
because they want to, because there is some purpose to their doing so, or because they 
are part of some design.  They replicate simply because they can. In most cases they are 
able to replicate because in their structure is encoded information that, given certain 
environmental conditions, will lead to the growth of individual organisms19 capable of 
and predisposed to behavior that enhances the prospects that the genes they carry will 
get replicated.  
 
That a simple algorithmic process could lead to organisms of such incredible 
complexity and agency as inhabit our planet seems too much to believe possible. But 
this is because it is so difficult to grasp the time frames involved. What may help is to 
take the 4.6 billion year history of our planet and compress it into one calendar year 
(with the result that 146 years = one second) Accordingly, the first replication event (the 
beginning of life) would have taken place somewhere near the end of February.  
Eukaryotes (cells with nuclei) had to wait until around mid-July to make their 
appearance and in early September came the first multi-celled organisms. The 
Paleozoic, the 300 million year period that experienced a burgeoning of multi-cellular 
life including the first fish, land plants and insects began on the 18th of November and 
ended on the 12th of December when some cataclysmic event caused the extinction of 
96% of life. The Mesozoic, the age of dinosaurs, lasted until the 26th of December when 
there was another mass extinction occasioned by a comet hitting the Earth. Then 
followed the Cenozoic, the age of mammals; But it was only at about 5:18 PM on New 
Years Eve, December 31st, that hominids first appeared. Our species, Homo sapiens, 
had to wait until 11:48. Christ lived for about a quarter of a second less than 14 seconds 
before midnight (i.e. the present moment).  But, even though the entire existence of our 






Merriam –Webster online provides perhaps the most apropos definition of foolproof, 
i.e. ‘so simple, plain, or reliable as to leave no opportunity for error, misuse, or 
                              
19  And, in some cases like ants, collectives of organisms. 





failure‘.21  As Dennett, Blackmore, Dawkins and other Universal Darwinists claim: if 
the conditions22 of the algorithm are met, you must get evolution. 
 
Stuart Kauffman is a complexity theorist who suggests that natural selection is an 
―incompressible computer algorithm‖ and agrees that it will play out wherever and 
whenever it can. Yet because of the randomness of mutation, we cannot predict with 
any certainty what the evolutionary result will ever be even though environmental 
factors (gravity for example) constrain in various ways what is ultimately possible. Our 
existence as a species is the result of pure chance, a sequence of evolutionary 
serendipities that has been going on for at least 3 billion years.  We are, after all, the 
only Homo species to have survived to the present. But, as Kauffman avers, while ―we 
can never hope to predict the exact branching of the tree of life, … we can uncover 
powerful laws that predict and explain their general shape‖ (Kauffman 1996: 23). Doing 
so with regard to the cognitive adaptations that have evolved in human kind is arguably 




Darwinism and nihilism 
 
Kauffman does not only characterize these laws as powerful, but also as ―deep and 
beautiful laws governing [an] unpredictable flow‖ (ibid).  And he is far from alone in 
deriving great satisfaction from contemplating their elegance, reveling in the awe and 
sense of wonder they excite.  Darwinian thinking, even Universal Darwinism, does not, 
as so many seem to fear, lead inexorably to nihilism, the belief that nothing ultimately 
matters. You may know that nothing matters in an abstract, rational way, a seemingly 
inevitable result when following Darwinism to its logical conclusion. But it feels as 
though things do matter and how things feel is what really matters in life. I will be 
building up an argument for this claim at various points in what follows, drawing 
heavily on the work of cognitive neuroscientist, Antonio Damasio.  It must at the very 
least be made clear that spirituality is in no way the exclusive province of religion.  
Spirituality, as I conceive it, is like aesthetic experience in being foremost a matter of 
feeling.  Spiritual people are those that more readily and intensely undergo the 
feelingful states that we speak of with nouns like awe, veneration, exaltation, bliss and 
ecstasy, and with adjectives like sublime, profound, peak and transcendent.   
 
 
It‟s all about feeling! 
 
Neuropsychologists like Antonio Damasio (1994, 1999, 2004) have shown convincingly 
that feeling is indispensable to even the driest, most boringly rational forms of 
cognition. Everything comes down to the firing of neurons and the neural chemicals that 
either promote or impede this. There is never cognitive activity that does not entail 
neural activation in those parts of the brain crucial to feeling and emotion except when 
pathways have been severed by injury, disease or some congenital pathology. 
 
                              
21  http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/foolproof 




All of life has emotional content and people universally seek out opportunities to 
experience emotional elevation.  Pleasure is life‘s bottom-line, or so I will argue, and it 
can take innumerable forms from subtle to intense, some ephemeral, some lasting, some 
libidinal or carnal, some intellectual or ‗cerebral,‘ some sadistic, masochistic or 
otherwise self-serving, while others entail empathy, compassion and self-giving, some 
are passive while others require engagement, commitment and effort, some are regarded 
as base, while others are esteemed as virtuous and edifying, some common, some 
esoteric.  
 
Pleasure is the ever-present need that motivates all behavior including behavior that is 
anything but pleasurable in the doing of it but which as a result of the doing begets a 
satisfaction worth the delay in gratification and worth whatever effort and sacrifice 
involved. We, like all other sentient life-forms, are innately disposed to seek pleasure 
because certain associated behaviors were crucial in our evolutionary past. Sex is the 
most obvious example.  
 
Bringing education back into the discussion 
 
Educational philosophy concerns questions of what education should achieve and why. 
These questions cannot ever be answered adequately without an understanding of what 
being human really means. The Darwinian understanding thus far presented, its 
ontological stance, is that we are just another life form without any privileged status in 
some grand scheme.  There is no grand scheme. Our only ‗purpose‘ is as vehicles for 
the propagation of the genes that we carry in our DNA. As phenotypes, we are nothing 
more than pleasure seekers, pursuing states of gratification through behavior that 
enhances the chances for our genes to get replicated.     
  
So what could be the upshot for education of such an unflattering take on human 
nature? We can be certain that no education mission statement or curriculum has ever 
proposed ‗genetic fitness enhancement‘ as the overarching purpose of education.  But 
then, neither has ‗the survival of our species‘ ever been thus presented even though our 
behavior as a species, shaped by ‗educational‘ interventions, has made our survival less 
and less a certainty and has been disastrous for innumerable other species now extinct or 
close to extinction. 
 
What then could be proposed as the purpose of education if one‘s first principles accord 
with the Darwinism described above, which do not even accord purpose status to our 
very survival? Is education‘s purpose to make us more successful in our pleasure-
seeking pursuits? Yes, most definitely! As shamelessly hedonistic as this might sound, 
it is the conclusion that I argue as inescapable when one‘s first principles are Darwinian.  
It is also a conclusion difficult to grasp, let alone agree with, if certain facts pertinent to 
biological and cultural evolution are not adequately understood. 
 
 
Biological vs. cultural evolution 
 
Given that it is what this study is ultimately concerned with, it is firstly important to 
remember that institutionalized education (or formal education as it is often called) is a 
very recent development for our species. Schools have existed for at most only a few 




innate psychology,  the cognitive abilities and dispositions we are genetically ‗wired‘ 
for, evolved to advantage the reproductive success of our hunter-gatherer ancestors 
during the Paleolithic (over 100,000 generations), from the first stone tools 2-3 million 
years ago until around 12,000 years ago when agriculture began to spread and with it 
‗civilization.‘23 Most of what we call cultural evolution, which has given rise to such 
edifices as institutions of learning, has taken part in the last 12 millennia (approximately 
600 generations), less than one half of one percent of ‗human‘ existence. There was 
culture long before that to be sure, but its evolution was at a snail‘s pace before the 
agricultural revolution and the social transformations it engendered (urbanization, trade, 
commerce, war, exponential technological development). Literacy and the later 
invention of media (books, audio recordings, radio, television, and the internet) caused a 
telescoping in the rates of cultural change and accumulation (although they are now 
causing an increased homogenization of culture that we call globalization). And we 
need to further bear in mind that a significant part of our innate nature had evolved 
before the genus Homo emerged 2.5 or so million years ago.  
 
 
The role of environment in natural selection 
 
Paleolithic and pre-Paleolithic environments were vastly different to the environments 
most of the human population now occupies and, as already intimated, environmental 
factors are what determine whether a phenotypic variation will be advantageous to 
genetic fitness or not. The environments we inhabit today are in large measure made by 
us. In this regard, it might seem that natural selection is no longer acting on the human 
genome given the advances in medicine, food production, and technology with the 
result that weak genes no longer are being selected out by natural selection.  
 
Has cultural evolution made biological evolution redundant? Not at all! There is clear 
evidence of relatively recent physiological evolution such as smaller teeth and 
decreased jaw size due to dietary changes brought about by agriculture, or the increased 
lactose tolerance of populations in high latitudes (where there is less vitamin D 
available from sunlight) who have a tradition of dairy farming. It could be that as much 
as 10% of our genes have been modified in the last 40,000 years, which, if true, has 
significant implications as to how genes and culture co-evolve, a topic that will be 
explored in depth in Chapter Three. Cultural evolution will never be able to make 
                              
23  The problem with this term is that it implies civility and there has been so much that is uncivil in the 
civilizations of the past and present. Here I am reminded of the reply that Gandhi is purported to have 
given when questioned as to what he thought of Western civilization. ‗I think it would be a very good 
idea.‘  I use the term as a reference for any large population of interdependent people successfully 
subsisting together. Obviously there must always be some degree of civility in large and dense 
populations of interdependent people unless there is either forced compliance or anarchy. What varies 
from place to place and from time to time is the extent to which civility is extended and to whom. As 
will be argued further along, predilections for both greater and lesser levels of civility are parts of our 
genetic makeup. We do have moral instincts as Marc Hauser (2007) has so convincingly argued.  It is 
true that the prospects for achieving a civilization that is genuinely a civil society rests on far more 
than the genetic potential of the citizenry. Yet that potential, what we come hard-wired with, is 




biological evolution redundant until such time as we begin to engineer the genes of our 
offspring by technological means.24  
 
What cultural evolution has done is to bring about disparities in the reproductive rates 
of people living in different social, economic and cultural circumstances. There are 
countries that have achieved negative population growth through family planning and 
birth control. But in other parts of the world, population continues to expand 
exponentially. Notwithstanding the AIDS pandemic, Africa‘s population is increasing 
3% per year (Walt 2009) meaning that it will double in 24 years. 
 
To say that natural selection weeds out the weak is misleading. Are we referring to the 
physically weak, the intellectually weak, the economically weak, or some combination 
of these? If we are taking a genes-eye view, the only humans who are ‗weak‘ are those 
producing fewer offspring, for example, those practicing birth control. Population 
growth is highest among the poor and less ‗educated.‘ At least 80% of humans live on 
less than $10 (USA) per day (Shah 2010); And according to the Human Development 
Report 2007/2008 (HDR) of the United Nations Development Program, the poorest 
40% of humans accounts for 5% of global income while the richest 20% accounts for 





But such disparities would not have been able to come about and to increase without 
there having been a relative degree of climatic stability during the 12 millennia since the 
agricultural revolution, thus allowing the production of food surpluses. Again we are 
reminded that genes are only fitness enhancing given certain environmental conditions. 
Global warming could change everything radically. Changing rainfall patterns and 
rising temperature could devastate agricultural output, especially if the change becomes 
exponential, for example, because of the sudden release of the massive amounts of 
methane locked in the tundra of the north, or because of the rapid melting of ice and 
snow which reflects heat back out into space while water absorbs it. A significant rise in 
sea level leading to the flooding of coastal lowlands will by far impact the poor the most 
(McGranahan, G. et al 2007).  Moreover, a rapid decrease in oil reserves will increase 
food prices dramatically because of increased transportation and fertilizer costs and 
because of more agricultural land being used for growing biofuels.   
 
Even if we were to consider such scenarios as but remote possibilities, this should be 
enough to activate effort to avert them on every available front. It is on the educational 
front that we should expect to see the greatest impact being made. The Ecopedagogy 
movement is trying to move things forward in this regard but it is confronted by the 
inertia of a status quo which marginalizes environmental education as well as by the 
general apathy of the rank-and-file, all of which is good news for corporations facing 
financial loss should they have to comply with the kind of legislation and enforcement 
needed to bring us back from the brink of ecological collapse. But they need not fear too 
                              
24  Even then it could be argued that biological evolution will continue. It is only that genetic variation 




much as long as ‗education‘ is doing so little to bring about the critical mass of public 
indignation needed to force the hand of legislators and enforcement agencies.  
 
 
Who cares?  
  
As established in the introduction, my philosophy of education is strongly informed by 
my ecological thinking and vision of ‗optimal‘ ecological balance, but this does not 
imply or demand that it be Darwinian. (Darwinism offers no vision as has been 
explained.) I could be a devout Christian, Jew or Moslem who believes that what God 
meant by the words ‗in our image‘25 and by granting us dominion over all other life, 
was that we were being entrusted with his/her/their creation and, by virtue of being 
made in his/her/their image, expected to treat it with the love and care with which 
he/she/they is/are expected to treat us. Or I may be a pantheist, believing God to exist in 
everything around me and accordingly being committed to protecting, sustaining and 
communing with nature, not subjugating and exploiting it. Or I may, as I do, align 
myself with the Ecopedagogy movement and see the achievement of sustainability as a 
practical matter of survival and a precondition for any real progress toward social 
justice and an authentically civil society. But I am also a biophile, I genuinely feel 
connection with all that lives on this planet and that admittedly inclines me toward an 
ontology that doesn‘t stop at the species ‗barrier.‘ I definitely felt this connection long 
before I had even heard the name Darwin. That it could be rooted in my innate 
psychology seems feasible and it may be apropos that Howard Gardner includes 
‗naturalistic intelligence‘ as one of the eight intelligences, suggesting that we all have, 
albeit in varying degrees, an intuitive sense of connectedness with nature and inclination 
toward its nurturance.  
 
I do not need to be a Darwinist to take on any of the personas alluded to above. Indeed, 
a true Darwinist will argue that all of them are vainly anthropocentric.  To argue that 
there is an ideal kind of ecological homeostasis that we should strive toward could be 
portrayed as a kind of Gaian fascism. Environmental changes that are catastrophic for 
our species could be a boon for others. Just as we are not intrinsically any worthier than 
any other life form, neither is one environmental state intrinsically better than any other. 
So having said all this, what could Darwinism possibly bring to the table when 
contemplating what the ends and means of education should be? Should we concern 
ourselves at all with an ontology that seems to deny us value or purpose, the arguably 





The reality of course, as intimated earlier, is that things do matter to us because we are 
innately disposed to notions of value and purpose. Our purposefulness is one of our 
most salient and unique attributes as a species. Such notions entail positive feelings and 
feelingful states that we naturally seek. We want to have lives in which we feel happy 
and fulfilled, something that does not come automatically and which too many people 
                              
25  In all the editions I have checked, Genesis 1:26 give the possessive pronoun ‗our‘ which has always 




fail to achieve adequately, in many cases because just surviving is a 24/7 struggle, in 
many cases because education has failed them and they have not succeeded in 
developing the competences and dispositions needed for true self-actualization as 
characterized by Abraham Maslow almost fifty years ago. And surely the blame lies not 
only with the educators to whom they have been entrusted, their parents being the most 
important, but lies as much with the kinds of psychosocial environments they inhabit 
and the forces that shape them. Here I am thinking mostly of the mass media and the 
enticing virtual environments they construct for us; and I despair of the inordinate 
amounts of time that growing numbers of people spend as passive consumers of culture, 
seemingly content with the ephemeral and shallow pleasures that the profit driven 
entertainment industries offer in overabundance.26 
 
 
Pressing Paleolithic buttons 
 
The phrase ‗lowest common denominator‘ is often used in a non-mathematical sense in 
reference to people lacking sophistication in taste, sensibility and critical judgment, the 
targets of advertisers, film and TV producers and car salesmen. But who are these 
‗sheep‘ who are being so targeted and how numerous are they in reality?  Are they in 
the majority? To pin down such nebulous attributes as taste, sensibility, sophistication, 
and even critical judgment, surely cannot be done in an entirely culturally neutral way. 
Moreover, given the fluidity of culture, how could any position on the matter ever claim 
to have long standing applicability? Yet, many advertisements and film genres have 
mass appeal across cultures and ethnicities; and many maintain their popularity across 
generations. 
 
The cynical, vulgar yet pertinent take on those who target the ‗lowest common 
denominator‘ (dubbed ‗Joe Sixpack‘ in the USA) is that they knowingly appeal to the 
‗Four F‘s,‘ they being our most fundamental instincts: feeding, fleeing, fighting and 
fornicating. Those who are not quite the lowest common denominator might 
additionally wish to be amused and have some laughs, but surely this is also an innate, 
species-general proclivity. Cynical all this may be, but it is clearly Darwinian (though 
Evolutionary Psychologists usually employ other terms for the Four F‘s).   
 
Perhaps now the need for educational philosophy to take serious account of what 
Darwinian Science is uncovering starts to become more apparent, especially as regards 
Evolutionary Psychology and the sciences that share its theoretical underpinnings 
(Biomusicology and Darwinian Aesthetics for example). Although it is early days for 
these sciences and much remains speculative, enough is known with confidence to mark 
them as the most fecund and reliable sources of insight into our innate psychology and 
the cognitive biases that the entertainment and advertising industries seem to understand 
in a very practical and profitable way. But the understandings that EP and the like are 
offering us, as the ensuing chapters will hopefully demonstrate, go way beyond the Four 
                              
26  As quoted from ‗The Sourcebook for Teaching Science‘ website: ‗According to the A.C. Nielsen Co., 
the average American watches more than 4 hours of TV each day (or 28 hours/week, or 2 months of 






F‘s and shed light on evolved psychological adaptations that make both possible and 
rewarding the gratification of ‗higher order‘ needs.27  
 
 
Darwinism and Humanistic Psychology 
 
To my knowledge, Maslow did not ever speak to evolutionary thinking in setting out his 
humanistic theory of self-actualization with its well-known hierarchy of needs. This is 
not surprising as there were only the dimmest glimmerings of what was to become 
Evolutionary Psychology when he was writing his influential texts. Yet he was 
convinced that what he was proposing about the maturation process we undergo is 
applicable to all people, everywhere, even if different cultures might place different 
values on the human attributes he described, particularly on those he posited as 
characterizing the genuine self-actualizer. His psychology was naturalistic in so far as 
he recognized that while we all have basic needs, those alluded to by the Four F‘s, so 
too do we have needs requiring more faceted and refined forms of engagement, and 
most importantly, we all, barring some congenital limitation, have the potential to be 
more than just sheep and torpid consumers of schlock culture. Evolutionary Psychology 
(EP), I believe, bears out Maslow‘s humanistic outlook and convincingly shows that 
those who appear to fit the ‗lowest common denominator‘ bill have not been 
condemned to this status by their genes. However, there is a huge range of human types 
between the lowest common denominator and the self-actualizer with most of humanity 
falling somewhere around the middle. Maslow observed that those who fit the self-
actualizer bill are very much a minority, an elite actually. Is this only because society 
and education have failed the rest? Or could it be due to genetic constraints? If all of 
what we are is physical, should we not expect psychosocial and intellectual achievement 





As I have emphasized repeatedly, environment is paramount in how genes get expressed 
at the phenotypic level. In the virtual environments created by the purveyors of schlock 
culture, it is our more primitive pleasure buttons that tend to get pressed. But because it 
is titillating, people get seduced. They get sucked in. This happens easily with people 
holding down tedious and often stressful jobs from which they come home tired and 
wanting to escape to an environment that is the least demanding possible, where you 
(and your kids) can be almost totally passive, uninterested in anything requiring 
intellectual engagement or wit, and not even having to be sociable. 
 
                              
27  To characterize something as higher-order suggests a value judgment and as has been emphasized 
repeatedly Darwinism accepts that value and purpose are irrelevant ideas in a genes-eye view of 
things. But even the staunchest Darwinists aspire to ideals of personal growth and achievement and 
many would characterize themselves as self-actualizers as per Maslow‘s hierarchy. 
28  I used to be an avid marathon and ultra-marathon runner. But even at peak fitness and having followed 
the best possible training program, there was NO possibility that I ever could have run a marathon in 
under two and a half hours (when the winning times are much closer to two hours). Compared with 




Of course it is television that provides this environment most efficaciously and 
universally. Ninety-nine percent of households in the USA have television with an 
average of 2.24 TVs per household with one or more of them on for 6 hours and 47 
minutes per day. While the average American parents spend less than 10 minutes per 
week of tête-à-tête time with their children, the children spend on average 28 hours per 
week watching TV. In a year they spend 40% more time in front of a TV than they do at 
school (Herr 2007). It is estimated that in the typical North American family, each 
individual will have been spoken to by television figures more than they have been 
spoken to by each other (O‘Sullivan 1990: 27).  
 
In my experience, if parents are concerned at all with their children‘s TV viewing, it is 
with the content of what they are watching, for example, how much sex, profanity, and 
gratuitous violence there is. It never seems to occur to them that it surely must be TV‘s 
form, not its content, which threatens their children the most. During all of those hours 
they never have to sustain a visual perception for more than a few seconds. This 
constant shifting of scenes and camera angles must have an adverse effect on a child‘s 
capacity for sustained attention when they are in environments that are relatively static, 
classrooms for example. If information processing capacity in general suffers, this 
would not be surprising given that nothing in our evolutionary history is perceptually 
comparable. Even if prolonged TV exposure does have adverse effects on cognitive 
functioning, we would be unlikely to intuitively sense anything wrong. There are no 
evolutionary precedents for the sensorial barrage most of us subject ourselves to each 
day. The same is true of traveling at high speed in an automobile. It has been for less 
than two centuries that we have been able to travel at speeds above thirty kilometers per 
hour, not enough time to evolve the kind of built-in fear comparable to the fear of 
snakes and heights that people display the world over. 
  
 
Then and now 
 
Our lives as well as our environments are so radically different from those of our 
ancestors that we should expect a significant degree of dissonance between our innate 
psychology and the psychology that life‘s experience builds on it with the dispositions 
and abilities needed to negotiate the fast paced and infinitely more complex world of 
today. Walking across the campus of the university I work at, I am likely to encounter 
more people than my Paleolithic forbears would have encountered in a lifetime. 
Because I am literate and because of the media and communication means at my 
disposal, I can almost instantaneously experience other environments, times and 
cultures without having to physically occupy them. I do not need much in the way of 
survival skills beyond the ability to earn an income. I make use of and depend on 
technologies for which I have not even a clue as to how they are made, how they work 
or how they can be repaired. My survival depends on specialists, not on fleetness of 
foot, coordination, or visual and aural acuity.  
 
In many of the environments we find ourselves in, we are inundated with such a 
cacophony of disconnected and unnatural sounds that we become inured to audio 
stimulation generally. CDs malfunction in restaurants and no one notices. Silence is 
something almost impossible to experience and music is so ubiquitous that it has lost 
most of the wonder and significance it must have had in times where one either had to 




dominated by simulacra, representations, imitations, pastiches and other artificial, 
unnatural phenomena and it doesn‘t seem to bother too many people that their 
connection with the rest of the biosphere has been almost completely severed, in any 
spiritual or transcendent sense at least. Nature is boring and your mountain retreat had 
better damn well have satellite TV.  
 
 
Modern and postmodern discontent 
 
Ellen Dissanayake, a leading writer in Darwinian Aesthetics who I will be drawing from 
significantly in the next chapter, takes up the notion of the psychological dissonance I 
alluded to above and attributes to it the malaise in modern society that Marxian writers 
decades ago characterized with words like alienation, reification, commodity fetishism 
and one-dimensionality, words that still resonate even in postmodernity. However, 
Marxists and postmodernists share a certainty that the phenomena they name and shame 
are social before they are psychological and this is where they appear to part company 
with Darwinists (although the degree of discord, as will become evident I hope, is more 
apparent that real). For Marxists and postmodernists, our discontents or inner conflicts 
are due to social forces and conditions (e.g., the dominating ideologies and discourses) 
and these forces vary between different social, cultural and historic times and places. 
We obviously must have species-general characteristics that remain constant from 
context to context, that evolved to enhance the reproductive fitness of our ancestors. But 
for Marxists and postmodernists, this innate nature is of such negligible influence in 
determining how we end up that it can be left out of the discussion completely.  
 
 
Nurture vs. nature; blank slate vs. genetic automaton 
 
The Marxist/postmodernist position generalized in the last paragraph has been portrayed 
as the position of the social sciences generally, which in the 1990s were thought to be 
sufficiently of like mind that evolutionary psychologists started speaking of the 
Standard Social Science Model (SSSM), the set of assumptions about what it means to 
be human that Tooby and Cosmides29 (1992: 23) said ―should be jettisoned‖ when 
trying to discern the real psychological foundations of culture. It is worth presenting at 
least some of these assumptions given that educational philosophy seems to be so 
thoroughly grounded in the human/social sciences (including Psychology, Sociology 
and Cultural Anthropology) which purportedly claim autonomy from the natural 
sciences and hence from any serious Darwinian thinking. It should be noted that these 
assumptions are not axioms in some Social Science manifesto somewhere and I doubt 
that many social scientists abide them totally. They are what Tooby and Cosmides 
(1992: 31-32) synthesized from their reading of the Social Sciences at the time. Below, 
I have extracted and paraphrased what I find most relevant in trying to understand the 
distinct lack of Darwinian thinking in the human sciences and educational philosophy. 
 
                              
29  Their introductory chapter, ‗The Psychological Foundations of Culture‘, in The Adapted Mind (1992) 
sets out the Evolutionary Psychology project probably better than any other text. Steven Pinker (1997: 
1997: 23) credits the name ‗Evolutionary Psychology‘ to them and reckons they are the most 




 Human beings can be grouped together and identified as having ‗a‘ culture, that 
is, a set of common ―behavioral practices, beliefs, and ideational systems‖ which 
get transmitted from generation to generation. Some of these may be taken on by 
members of other cultures, but on the whole ―cultures are more or less bounded 
entities,‖ which is why we are able to name them (Zulu culture, for example). 
 Similarities and differences between people are the result of similarities and 
differences in the informational content of their respective cultures. All of that 
which ―is organized and contentful in the minds of individuals comes from culture 
and is socially constructed. What is given biologically is ‗content-independent‘ 
and ‗content-free.‘‘ 
 Humans are biologically endowed with general learning capacities that make 
possible cultural transmission. However, what is biological or innate, while 
obviously necessary, is of negligible importance in shaping what we become. We 
have been endowed with sufficient cognitive and behavioral flexibility that 
biology has ―been superseded by the capacity for culture.‖ Accordingly, what you 
learn is the dominant factor in determining what you come to be. 
 However complex our innate cognitive endowment may be (e.g. our genetic 
capacity for acquiring language) it does not ―impart any substantial character or 
content to culture.‖ 
 
If what one becomes is almost exclusively a matter of what one has ‗learned‘ (whether 
consciously or unwittingly) then it would be proper to describe a human being 
ontologically as a ‗blank slate.‘ The SSSM might accordingly be styled blank slate 
orthodoxy. But who actually subscribes to such orthodoxy, what I earlier styled as 
―errant nonsense‖? I did a quick survey at an academic conference in 2009 where I 
projected the following PowerPoint slide30 asking everyone to indicate where they stand 
on the nurture-nature issue by raising their hands at the appropriate time as I counted off 
slowly from 0 to 10.  
 


















                              
30  Going clockwise from the top left, the faces belong to Karl Marx, Charles Darwin, Steven Pinker and 
Noam Chomsky.  Pinker was placed at 9 by Cambridge Professor Simon Blackburn (2002) based on 
his reading of Pinker‘s The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature.  Noam Chomsky was 
portrayed as being in a dilemma because I wanted to show as erroneous the tendency to think that 
where you identify yourself on the nurture-nature issue reveals your political leanings between left 
and right.  Chomsky is famous for his stand against the corporate state and is the bane of the political 
right. Yet it was he with his ‗universal grammar‘ who dealt the fatal blow to Behaviorism , making 







My paper was attended by researchers in music including musicologists, 
ethnomusicologists and sociologists of music, many of whom I was acquainted with. 
Most, I was able to surmise, could be positioned in the Social Sciences in terms of their 
background and academic orientation.  And yet the first hand only went up as I called 
‗two‘ and the majority declared themselves between 4 and 5.  There definitely were no 
biomusicologists or sociobiologists among them, but at the same time no-one identified 
him/herself as a ‗blank slater.‘ Although hardly credible research, my survey did lend 
support to my hunch that the SSSM is a model with fewer adherents than Tooby, 
Cosmides or Pinker might think. How can one entertain such an ideal as ‗our common 
humanity‘ or account for how culturally diverse peoples come together and reach 
agreements like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights without according more to 
our common nature than a few instincts and a general learning capacity?  
 
There are those of course who do credit such things to a universal human nature, but 
one that humans were endowed with by a Creator, not one that evolved according to a 
mindless algorithm. As they see it, moral progress and social amelioration are possible 
because God has given us the ability to suppress our innate sinfulness and follow the 
path of love and righteousness. However, most social scientists of my acquaintance, 
even those with religious beliefs, accept natural selection as a law of nature and treat the 
Old Testament account of creation as metaphorical at best. Yet they will not accord to 
Darwinian Science any real explanatory power when it comes to cultural phenomena. 
Sadly, it seems that many resist Darwinism without having given the relevant literature 
a fair reading, if any reading at all. This is indeed unfortunate given that the Social 
Sciences are just as concerned as is Evolutionary Psychology with the question: What 
does it mean to be human? This could be variously paraphrased, for example: What is it 
that marks Homo sapiens as a species? Or: What are our essential attributes, that is, 
those characteristics without which the term human loses its meaning and applicability?  
But they are not precisely the same questions. Answers to the second and third, if they 
are to be ventured, must have universal validity and that means they must be 
characteristics instructed by genes and common to all humans. This is where things start 
to get problematic. 
 
The Social Sciences are generally thought to eschew essentialism,31 and postmodernists 
have a reputation for virulence in their opposition to it. While no one denies that 
communicating (a quintessential human trait) requires agreement on what words should 
be understood to mean, it is maintained that meaning is nevertheless context dependent 
and thus conditional and provisional. Moreover, words and the discourses that employ 
them inevitably have ideological and political meanings even if the majority of people 
                              
31  As a metaphysical theory going back to Aristotle, essentialism claims that a phenomenon has 
properties essential to it that can be distinguished from properties that are accidental.  In recent times, 
the term has been used in connection with ontological positions, like Darwinism, that regard various 
psychological and psychosocial traits as being innate and thus common to all humans.  This is 
problematic for social constructionists, particularly so when gender, race, or sexual orientation are 
being subjected to what they see as biological (or genetic) reductionism. As has already been 
intimated, there are misconceptions on both sides of the nurture-nature divide and some of these are 





fail to apprehend them. This, at least, is the case where human and social phenomena 
are concerned. And if I understand the postmodernist take on ‗discourse‘ correctly, the 
issue is not so much that language and other symbol systems express subjectivity but 
that they actually produce it. As with ideology, the subjects (i.e. people) are 
unconscious of the linguistic and other symbolic ways and means by which they are 
being constructed. 
 
Interestingly, Daniel Dennett, who I have already cited as a Universal Darwinist, would 
not have much to disagree with here. When asked what he believes but cannot yet 
prove, his answer was ―that acquiring a human language (an oral or sign) is a necessary 
precondition for consciousness – in the strong sense of there being a subject, an I‖ 
(Brockman 2006: 126).  ―Human subjectivity‖ he proposes as ―a remarkable byproduct 
of human language‖ (129). Consciousness is essentially the internal dialogue that is ever 
present when awake although we may succeed in quieting it down through meditative 
practices. It is this ability to talk to oneself silently that allows one:  
 
to muse, to rehearse, to recollect, and in general to engage the contents of events in one‘s 
nervous system that would otherwise leave no memories in their wake and hence contribute 
to one‘s guidance in ways that are well described as unconscious. (129) 
 
But whether talking to ourselves or to others, we do so with lexicons, syntaxes and 
pragmatics that we have learned and that have evolved in environments where different 
kinds of social and cultural influences and constraints are operative. In today‘s world we 
are no longer confined to one milieu and we often experience and even employ different 
discourses as we move from one sociocultural environment to another. With mass 
media like television and the internet, we do not even have to physically move. 
Nevertheless, there are discourses that for various reasons come to dominate an 
individual‘s consciousness and they employ words and concepts that are anything but 
neutral.  
 
No Darwinist that I‘ve come across would deny that language is the primary means by 
which we become socialized and by which we acquire most of the knowledge and skills 
needed for life in present day environments. Obviously, language is not just a collection 
of arbitrary labels we stick on things, rather ―a toolbox, the importance of whose 
elements lie in the way they function rather than their attachments to things‖ (Peregrin 
2003: quoted in ‗Semantics‘ on Wikipedia). 
 
Certainly there are plenty of words that are politically and ideologically charged to the 
extent that in written texts we often find them placed in inverted commas allowing the 
writer to use them without necessarily endorsing them, e.g., ‗third-world,‘ ‗primitive,‘ 
‗feminine‘. 32  But it could hardly be considered political or ideological to say that 
human beings are mortal and it would be ridiculous to suggest that the truth of this 
statement is contingent on time or place. But, as a social constructionist might be quick 
to point out, here we are referring to a physical condition of living organisms; death is 
an irrefutable fact of life. Obviously humans are physical entities with life spans and 
particular physiological characteristics, but what concerns social scientists, especially 
                              
32  It is not at all uncommon to find academics tweaking the air above their heads with the first two 




psychologists, are minds, not bodies.  And the prevailing position among them is that 
Darwinian Science is fine when the concern is with the physiological, but has next to no 





Educational philosophy, with never a mention of evolutionary theory, seems to share 
this perspective. Yet it grants credence to learning theories and theories of cognitive and 
psychosocial development that posit developmental processes that all humans are 
claimed to undergo regardless of their culture or language. Names that come to ‗mind‘ 
in this regard are: Carl Rogers (1961), Jerome Bruner (1960), Jean Piaget (e.g.1952), 
Erik Erikson (1950), Lawrence Kohlberg (1981), and Howard Gardner (1983). Even 
Lev Vygotsky, while he ―saw the growth of the mind as a process of constant social 
transaction,‖ ―well understood that the human mind must be located within an 
evolutionary framework,‖ its unfolding proceeding according to species-general 
psychological processes (Plotkin 2002: 275 & 274). The same could probably be said of 
Jerome Bruner, who has been significantly influenced by Vygotsky. The theories of 
these psychologists do not draw from Evolutionary Psychology, it is true, but this is not 
surprising given that all of their formulators are dead except for Jerome Bruner who is 
ninety-five. I am convinced that if they were working in the present, they would look to 
EP as an appropriate framework for developing, refining and validating their theories.  
 
 
Materialism and the mind-body fallacy 
 
It is convenient to have the pairings mind-body and mental-physiological, and I suspect 
that even evolutionary psychologists use them in everyday conversation. But given what 
is now known about the physical workings of the brain, it is untenable to see these 
dichotomies as descriptive of how things actually are, for example, that the mind is 
some kind of coherent, unified, bounded entity, separate from the body, that directs our 
thoughts and behavior but which has no substance; it is immaterial. Granted, this is how 
it seems to be, that there is a self inside us, a homunculus, which is supernatural in the 
sense that it is not made up of atoms and molecules. This makes it easy to believe that 
the self can survive physical death.33  
 
Because this immaterial you, your spirit, is thought to be your most important and self-
defining ‗part,‘ it means that ‗you‘ have eternal life. The Abrahamic faiths have pushed 
this line, rooting sin in the physical self  and thus being mistrustful of sensuous 
experience. But, as I discuss in Chapter Two (in connection with Damasio and 
Cognitive Neuroscience), feeling, is very much a physiological affair involving neurons 
firing in and across different parts of the brain, the release and uptake of 
neurochemicals, and the integrating of this with the whole body by various means such 
                              
33  Le Doux points out that the notion of a soul that is independent of the body, that survives death, only 
became a tenet of Christianity in the Middle Ages. Before that, Christians apparently abided the 
Judaic tradition of the resurrection of the body on the Day of Judgment. Le Doux quotes what Jesus 
was purported to have said by Mark (9: 47), ‗It is better for you to get into the Kingdom of God with 




as the endocrine system of hormone producing glands.  Feeling is ever-present in and 
indispensable to cognition (‗mental‘ activity). This would suggest that if there were an 
‗uncarnated‘ self that survives the body, it would be incapable of feeling and therefore 
incapable of rational thought.  
 
In the cognitive sciences, Materialism34 is the school of thought that makes no 
allowance whatsoever for our having any immaterial parts or dimensions. Everything of 
what we are is physical. However, very little is inert. Nearly every one of the trillions of 
cells that make us up is in its own right a living organism that in concert with other cells 
accomplishes some function in the vast complex of interconnected functioning that we 
call life as multi-cellular beings.35 In a very few organisms having highly evolved 
nervous systems and means of internal representation and storage, phenomena occur 
that we call thought and consciousness.  In humans, because we have developed symbol 
systems like language and are able to learn them, it is possible ‗to engage the contents 
of events in one‘s nervous system‘ (Dennett quoted in Brockman 2006: 129). Thought, 
and the assembling of thoughts (what consciousness by and large is) are processes 
where the bulk of what is happening never enters awareness (is unconscious). But these 
processes give rise to coherent thought patterns capable of being communicated to 
others. Words just bubble up as if by magic and coalesce into coherent patterns. An 
inner ‗voice‘ ‗speaks‘ and is ‗heard‘, and because we are disposed to believe that 
speaking always involves a speaker, one naturally assumes there to be some neural 
equivalent of a computer‘s Central Processing Unit (CPU) that coordinates all the 
processing and issues the silent formulations that comprise one‘s internal dialogue 
(which is not in reality all that coherent or dialogue like). And yet there seems broad 
consensus among neurobiologists/psychologists and evolutionary 
biologists/psychologists that the brain does not work this way at all.  
 
Even though explaining consciousness is not a project that many scientists or 
philosophers risk tackling [Damasio (1999) and Dennett (1995) are two that have], the 
mystery is unraveling as to how physical processes create the illusion of there being a 
discrete inner self at the control desk in some ‗Cartesean Theatre‘ where unconscious 
processing coheres into conscious experience and from where the self directs all of 
one‘s behavior. But, if the materialist theories of Damasio, Dennett (1995), Le Doux 
(2002) and Edelman (1992) are close to the mark, which I am convinced they are, 
neither self nor consciousness can be any kind of entity or thing. All that can really be 
said is that they are part of what the brain does in conjunction with the total organism. 
The brain is a massively parallel processor comprising relatively autonomous 
subsystems or modules36 that have evolved such that they process different kinds of 
information and achieve different functional results. All of this parallel processing 
somehow gets integrated, as it must do in order for the organism to function, survive 
                              
34  ‗Physicalism‘ is arguably a better word in that there are, according to Physics, entities that are 
physical but that cannot be easily described as material. 
35  We do carry around a substantial number of dead cells, yet it is negligible relative to the number of 
living cells. 
36  Pinker alludes to the problem with the term ‗module‘ with its suggestion of a detachable, snap-in 
component or as something that visible as circumscribed areas on the surface of the brain. By contrast 
to supermarket charts showing distinct meat types (rump. porterhouse, fillet, etc.) ―a mental module 
probably looks more like roadkill, sprawling messily over the bulges and crevasses of the brain … [or] 




and reproduce. It is likely that there is a succession of convergences occurring 
unconsciously at different loci in the brain, what Dennett would call ‗drafts,‘ before 
emerging as a coherent conscious thought. Certain parts of the brain may at times assert 
greater levels of control in achieving this integration, but this is not to suggest that any 
of these parts or regions possesses intentionality or is somehow in charge of operations.  
 
So what is the mind? If all that can be said is that, as with self, thought and 
consciousness, the mind is just what the brain does, then it is not something that can be 
shaped by environmental inputs, for the simple reason that it is not a thing. But certainly 
what the brain does, its manner of processing, can be and most assuredly is so shaped, 
and because of the brain‘s plasticity, it can be incredibly responsive and vulnerable to 
what comes into it via the senses, taking what is salient and encoding and ‗inscribing‘ it 
as patterns of neuronal connectivity (memories which can be later accessed without 
involving any of the senses). 
 
But to shape something is not to construct it.  If those of a blank slate orthodoxy were 
correct, that what we call the self or the subject is in all key respects a sociocultural 
construction, this would require that the neural inscribing that society accomplishes in 
the individual brain overrides the patterns of connectivity that are innate (inscribed 
according to instructions encoded in our genes). This logically cannot be what happens. 
When using a computer, the information we input gets encoded in the computer‘s 
memory and can be used to achieve tasks only by virtue of a Disc Operating System and 
the software that has been installed on the computer‘s hard drive. Because there is 
virtually no limit to the number of different informational inputs that can be made (even 
with just one software application such as MS Word), there is similarly no limit on the 
number of possible outputs, and there is little doubt that the nature of the outputs will in 
significant respects reflect the nature of the inputs. But this does not mean that any and 
all outputs are possible. They are constrained by the programs and their subprograms 
that have been installed on the computer. 
 
 
The synaptic self 
 
Very early on in life, a sense of individual self starts to emerge and take form. What 
makes it possible and inevitable apparently is the ‗theory of mind‘ that we are all 
genetically programmed to develop starting as early as 7 to 9 months of age when 
infants begin to attribute mental states to themselves and to others. – intentions, desires, 
beliefs, etc.37 But it cannot develop in the absence of others (at least not in ways that 
allow one to function socially) and how it develops depends very much on what one 
experiences socially and culturally. According to Le Doux (2002: 5):  
 
genes only shape the broad outline of mental and behavioral functions, accounting for at 
most 50 percent of a given trait, and in many instances for far less. Inheritance may bias us 
in certain directions, but many other factors dictate how one‘s genes are expressed.38 
 
                              
37   See, for example, Baron-Cohen, S. (1991). It has been suggested that autistic individuals lack a theory 
of mind due to some neurological malfunctioning. 







It is not only that nature and nurture both contribute to the development of such meta-
traits as self and personality; ―they actually speak the same language‖ (Le Doux 2002: 
3).  By this it is meant that they both make their contributions by ‗shaping the synaptic 
organization of the brain‘ (ibid). And, it seems, they employ and act upon the same 
neural structures or systems in effecting ‗mental‘ and physiological behavior. This is as 
would be expected given that evolution is naturally parsimonious. The brain is the most 
energy-hungry organ of the body and it is obviously more efficient if one neural system 
can process both genetic and learned information when inducing behavior. What 
experience and society inscribes does not override, negate, or side-step what genes have 
instructed. To respond to the outside world, the brain employs neural circuits that have 
been ‗evolutionarily fine-tuned.‘ Now they have to be employed in ways appropriate to 
life in the here and now, and genetic evolution is too slow to bring about the needed 
modifications. For that we rely on learning and the amazing plasticity of the brain. But 
many of the ‗buttons‘ that need to be pressed to succeed (what needs to be activated 
neurally) are the same as served the genetic interests of humans in the Paleolithic and 
their more distant hominid ancestors.  
 
There are various hypotheses that will be discussed in the next chapter that explain the 
arts and related cultural phenomena in relation to these genetic ‗buttons‘ (the 
evolutionarily fine-tuned circuits that invite activation with the promise of some kind of 
pleasure). The most famous of these (infamous for many) is Steven Pinker‘s take on 
music as ―auditory cheesecake‖‘ (1997: 534). Cheesecake, as Pinker puts it, ‗is a brew 
of megadoses of agreeable stimuli … concocted for the express purpose of pressing our 
pleasure buttons. Pornography is another pleasure technology … the arts are a third. 
(525) Like Le Doux, Tooby, Cosmides, Dennett and most other adaptationists, Pinker 
regards the brain as ‗a neural computer, fitted by natural selection,‘ but it is a ‗toolbox,‘ 
he says, that ‗can be used to assemble Sunday afternoon projects of dubious adaptive 
value.‘ (524)  Adaptive value, we are reminded, implies that whatever it is being 
claimed to have it in some way enhances one‘s prospects for producing offspring and 
thus fulfilling one‘s purpose as a vehicle for gene replication. As will come to light in 
the next chapter, there are several adaptationists who are not so dismissive of music and 
art as Pinker would seem to be, judging by the quotes selected for inclusion here.39        
 
 
Culture as pleasure technology 
 
What if it turned out to be true that much of what we value as culture is nothing more 
than ―pleasure technology‖, where a cultural practice such as music has no value 
beyond being ―a cocktail of recreational drugs that we ingest [through the senses] to 
stimulate a mass of pleasure circuits‖ (Pinker 1997: 528)? The neural underpinnings for 
these practices are what some Darwinian theorists have called evolutionary byproducts 
or ‗spandrels‘, regarded as having no ‗real‘ function, but which make use of neural 
                              
39  A closer reading of Pinker, as will come out in the next chapter, reveals that his antipathy is more 
apparent than real and that he has in fact made some compelling points that the Philosophy of Music 




circuitry evolved to function in our genetic interests. Put differently, they are ―causally 
coupled to traits that were selected for‖ (Tooby and Cosmides 2001: 6). They entail 
some kind and degree of pleasure, and we are thus innately inclined toward activities 
that stimulate them. As already intimated, the experience of pleasure (as with fear) is an 
evolved mechanism for inclining an organism toward ‗fitness‘ enhancing behavior. (We 
are certainly not the only species to experience it.) BUT, what is fitness enhancing in 
one environment may not be so in another40; and, as I‘ve already emphasized, the 
environments we now inhabit, which we have by and large created, challenge us with 
radically different selection pressures and constraints than those that confronted our 
hunter-gatherer ancestors. 
 
But what does it matter if music and a host of other social and cultural phenomena are 
not adaptations per se and hence do not enhance our reproductive capacity? Our innate 
inclination to ‗go forth and multiply‘ is making the extinction of our species almost 
inevitable. Even if we have no care for the rest of life on our planet, we simply can no 
longer afford to carry on fulfilling our (one and only) genetic destiny (i.e. REPLICATE) 
on a planet whose carrying capacity for a resource-hungry species such as we‘ve 
become should limit our number to under one billion.41 We are now close to 7 billion! 
But if we can have our cheesecake and eat it too, which birth control and masturbation 
make possible, should such practices be discouraged? If musical behavior (musicking) 
utilizes evolutionarily tuned neural systems (perhaps keeping them from atrophying) 
and satisfies our evolved appetites and predilections, is this not a good thing? And 
should we not accord value to practices that satisfy higher-order needs and help us to be 
not only happy, but fulfilled, or even morally righteous? It depends. If profit is the 
bottom line, there is much better value in growing a population of Homer Simpsons.42 
 
 
Something more than pleasure technology? 
 
I am here reminded of something the eminent philosopher of music and music 
education, Wayne Bowman, wrote in 1982 concerning the cognitive value of art. I have 
always found it thought provoking, even inspirational. In the light of so much that I 
have recently read in Darwinian Science, Bowman‘s words have taken on increased 
meaning and will be referred to again. Especially pertinent are Le Doux‘s observations 
on the ways and extent to which experience modifies innate neural systems and alters 
their functioning, such that they continue to have use and value in new and changed 
environments. Experience rewires us and particular kinds of experience must therefore 
rewire us in particular ways including how different neural systems from different parts 
of the brain get linked up and integrated in their functioning. With especially engaging 
experiences, such as the art experience Bowman has in mind, the result is some degree 
of existential transformation. Here are Bowman‘s words: 
 
As one attends to the art object, its powerful image serves to embody the diffuse 
constellation of tacitly held particulars from which he attends, conferring upon them a unity 
                              
40  Again, a good example is the Galapagos cormorants whose wings have atrophied and who longer can 
fly.  
41  A conclusion arrived at in the final episode of the BBC award-winning series: Planet Earth.  
42  If you have seen even just a few episodes of The Simpsons, you have probably concluded that there is 




they do not possess of themselves. It provides a focus for the myriad emotions, ideas, 
sensations, and impulses which constitute our being, such that through it they are 
"refashioned and amplified into something new."43 One's self is existentially transformed. 
One's tacit interpretive schemata, the lenses through which he defines his world, are 
dramatically realigned. Such realignment amounts to nothing less than the attainment of 
new realities, new perspectives from which to view the world. (1982: 79) 
 
What could ‗tacit interpretive schemata‘ be other than the neuronal systems that 
integrate incoming sense data with data already encoded in the brain, provided by 
previous experience and neurally inscribed by our genes, a process that for the most part 
happens without us being consciously aware of it? These are the data that comprise ‗the 
diffuse constellation of tacitly held particulars from which [one] attends.‘ A work of art 
summons forth particular ‗particulars‘ (data), particularly those that are emotionally 
resonant with the particulars from which the creator of the art work was attending when 
creating it, and which are in various ways and degrees embodied or somehow encoded 
in the work. This emotional resonance is surely dependent on congruence between the 
contents of the respective ‗constellations,‘ that is to say, what has been neurally 
inscribed in the brain of the artistic creator vis-à-vis that of the experiencer. How much 
of this relies on their sharing a common culture is difficult to gauge. Studies in 
Darwinian Aesthetics, as will be borne out in the next chapter, are founded on and make 
a compelling case for the precept that ―the arts in all their glory are no more remote 
from evolved features of the human mind and personality than an oak is remote from 
the soil and subterranean waters that nourish and sustain it‖ (Dutton 2009: 2). How else 
is it possible for an art work to be cherished by people across cultures, languages and 





Admittedly, existential transformation is a nebulous concept, but it nevertheless seems 
safe to say that in today‘s world, it is not a significant concern in the way most people 
‗attend‘ to art (if at all they do ‗attend‘ to it), even in countries with a long tradition of 
curricular art education. Everybody most likely possess whatever is needed by way of 
genetic endowment, but for various reasons, most seldom if ever really ‗tune in‘ and 
‗turn on‘ in their engagements with art. What I see as the main reasons, as suggested 
earlier in relation to music, is that the ubiquity of art, its commercialization and 
commodification, together with the overstimulation of our senses in a world of screens 
has dulled us to sensuousness generally, except when it is of the erotic, gastronomical, 
or macabre kind (where our Paleolithic pleasure buttons are still primed and ready for 
action). And it is not as if much is being done to counteract this. People want to be 
entertained, not enlightened or existentially transformed; and it is in the interests of the 
profit-driven entertainment industry to keep them that way. Because this industry 
creates the virtual worlds that the young inhabit for more and more of their waking life, 
the deck has become very much stacked against art educators, many of whom already 
feel they are flogging a dead horse. Moreover, the rank-and-file of humanity has, again 
largely thanks to the entertainment industry, come to believe that art is something 
                              
43  The quoted words are Polanyi‘s (1958: 194) whose ‗tacit knowing‘ knowing‘ is another theory that 





professionals do, that accordingly it is something for them to consume, not to make 
themselves. Artistic aptitude (talent) is regarded as something you either have or do not 
have. For a Darwinist, this is a patently absurd assumption. From Evolutionary 
Psychology and Evolutionary (Darwinian) Aesthetics is coming a realization that not 
only are the vast majority of people possessed of more than sufficient aptitude for rich 
and meaningful artistic activity, they have an innate need for it. Failure to gratify it 
could be a major cause of the psychosocial disjunction spoken of earlier and which may 
explain the malaise of global consumerism, where notwithstanding people‘s unwitting 
abidance of its workings, there is an unsettling awareness that something important is 
missing in life. 
 
As to which educational strategies might be successful in vitalizing art‘s transformative 
agency and helping people to make art a living praxis, this will be taken up in the final 
chapter though some ‗hints‘ will be dropped in the intervening chapters where, for 
example, they are found to be implicit in the findings, claims, assumptions, axioms, 
hypotheses, etc. under consideration. From what has been discussed in this chapter, it is 
reasonable to expect conclusions that challenge established and widely embraced 
philosophical ideals and curricular principles, policies and practices. Cherished beliefs 
must be accepted as fair game. It can also be anticipated that the most important 
conclusions will be of relevance to education generally. They will accordingly have 
significance for every kind of intervention that is truly educational, that contributes to 
the achievement of one or more of education‘s overarching goals. What these goals 
should arguably be vis-à-vis the ecozoic vision I embrace will be given more clarity in 
the final chapter.  Music education is the more specific focus in this study because it 
happens to be my profession and primary research interest. It is accordingly where the 
pedagogical relevance of Darwinian Science becomes clearest to me. Moreover, I am 
reasonably well read in the Philosophy of Music Education and hence better aware of 
existing theories and philosophical frameworks that are consonant and/or dissonant with 
Darwinian precepts.  
 
 
Education for social and ecological transformation 
 
Whatever ultimate educational goals one espouses, they should, as argued earlier be 
consistent with some vision of the kind of world that education should be tasked with 
the realization of. In that discussion, it was further argued that there already exists a 
vision that, in broad terms at least, has the support of progressive thinkers world-wide. 
It is the vision that is implicit in a myriad of constitutions, bills, declarations, protocols, 
charters, mission statements and other pronouncements of agreement on what is and is 
not acceptable in the conduct of people, interpersonally and as it affects the rest of life 
on our planet. Darwinism, as should be abundantly clear by now, offers no vision of 
how the world should be; but increasingly from the Darwinian Sciences are coming 
insights into our nature as a species that help us better understand how we got to where 
we are now in the early 21st century, how it was possible given what we are innately 
capable of and inclined to do including the innate proclivities that make us easy targets, 
that make us the ―suckers‘ that are ―born every minute‖ according to the phrase usually 
credited (erroneously it seems) to P. T. Barnum, of Barnum & Bailey Circus fame. 
 
Darwinian Science has put paid to any notion of there being any plan or design 




was meant to be, or that technological advance necessarily equals human progress. 
There is nothing inevitable, natural or obvious about how things have turned out and 
there is nothing to suggest that life in modern suburbia is qualitatively better than life in 
a clan of hunter-gatherers. We have an innate conformist bias and are thus naturally 
disinclined to challenge what is perceived as the status quo. Even where there might be 
some doubt, we tend toward a ‗better the devil you know‘ approach. We believe that if 
something is a tradition or a part of one‘s culture, it only came to be so because it is 
inherently good or true even if times and circumstances have changed and rendered 
such assumptions doubtful if not erroneous. Having many children is a good example.   
 
 
Our reliance on experts 
 
The rapid changes marking human history since the agricultural revolution, which have 
telescoped in the last few centuries, have not been the result of changes in the human 
genome. They have been the result of culture, that is, the amassing of information and 
ideas from which people generate new ways of thinking and behaving and come up with 
the technologies and social institutions that facilitate them and give them consequence 
on a wide scale. The problem in all of this is that the innovators and the experts are in 
the minority and do not necessarily act with the interests of others (human and 
nonhuman) at heart.  Our reliance on experts, as Pinker points out, ―puts temptation in 
their path‘ and ‗leaves us vulnerable to quacks, from carnival snake-oil salesmen to the 
mandarins who advise governments to adopt programs implemented by the mandarins‖ 
(Pinker 1997: 305). The marvelous plasticity of our brains is what allows us to learn 
from others, such that we do not have to individually come up with solutions to the 
myriad problems life presents us with on a daily basis. The ideational environments we 
inhabit have become far more relevant for us than the physical environment which we 
erroneously assume will remain stable and continue to provide for our ‗needs.‘ Even if 
it were to, we increasingly rely on experts to locate, extract, and refine the required 
natural resources, and more experts to transform them into goods that we believe and 
have been led to believe we need. (And there is a great deal of supporting infrastructure, 
like transportation, where we further rely on experts.) Cultural evolution, in this regard, 
has been disempowering in key respects. Should the infrastructure that cultural 
evolution has brought into existence (and which we take so much granted) fail and 
collapse, all but a few of us would be up the proverbial creek without a paddle in terms 
of our survival prospects. 
  
 
The burgeoning infosphere 
 
We speak of the information age because so much of our lives are now caught up in the 
production, communication, manipulation, promotion and consumption of information. 
Information, of course, is not like the continuous and unbroken flow of a river. 
Information is encoded in patterns of discrete informational units (letters, phonemes, 
syllables, notes, genes, neural representations, etc.) that get combined into larger 
informational packets (phrases, sentences, motifs, rhythms, instructions, narratives, 
theories, conscious thoughts). All of these units and packets of information have neural 
correlates, patterns of neuronal connections and synaptic firing that encode ‗essentially‘ 
the same information. This syntactic mutability of information will become an 





Whether encoded synaptically, verbally, iconically, in binary code, electromagnetically, 
or whatever, we can refer to these units/packets as ideas. Because we have evolved 
communicative capacities and invented media for the efficient transference of 
information, these ideas can spread through, among and between human populations 
just as do viruses. In both cases, they spread because they are entities that can and will 
replicate if environmental conditions are conducive. If these conditions are optimal, 
they will proliferate. Also, in both cases, copies of the information may be inexact and 
this may either increase or decrease the prospects of the information getting copied 
again and spreading within the environment. Changes in the environment will also 
increase or decrease these prospects. 
 
 
Memetic evolution and ideology 
 
The above recalls the natural selection algorithm set out earlier in this chapter, where 
Memetics was briefly introduced as a science which investigates how natural selection 
plays out where the replicating entities are ideas (memes) instead of genes. It is a new 
science that has yet to acquire wide support and does not attract much attention in 
journals these days. 44 Its fundamental proposition/axiom/tenet, is too hard a pill for 
many to swallow, including some eminent Darwinian scholars like Steven Pinker (1997: 
208-210) and Dan Sperber (2000). They accept that culture evolves, but not according 
to the same process as genetic evolution. Music colleagues of mine, who go quite far in 
their acceptance of Darwinian propositions and even look with interest to work being 
done in Biomusicology, emphatically draw the line when it comes to Memetics. Yet I 
have not found their refutations adequate and am convinced that Memetics has got 
things right in key respects, even though I do not regard it as sufficient for explaining all 
that is cultural. I will present my case for Memetics in Chapter Three under the broader 
rubric, Gene-Culture Coevolution Theory and discuss the challenges that it poses to 
existing educational philosophy and to music education philosophy more particularly.  
 
Of deep significance to both is the question: do we have ideas or do ideas have us? The 
latter proposition somehow sounds wrong, but it is one that Marxists and social 
constructivists should surely concur with, at some level at least. It is implicit in many 
discourse theories and in Marxian understandings of ideology. It is interesting, in this 
regard, that ideology actually means: the study of ideas. Of course, it is more commonly 
used in relation to tacit ideas which are potent in their effect on our behavior, but which 
we do not arrive at or reflect on consciously, let alone critically. Nevertheless, provided 
one is possessed of sufficient critical consciousness, these tacit ideas can be identified 
and explained in relation, for example, to socioeconomic realities and to the insidious 
machinations of the corporate state. In practice this has always required a vanguard of 
intellectuals to lead the masses who are deemed unready to decide matters for 
themselves, being too gullible and susceptible to the ploys of those who would exploit 
them. The assumption, which history has demonstrated to be erroneous, is that after the 
social-economic-political environment has been transformed (this usually necessitating 
                              
44  It has however proven useful to ornithologists studying the evolution of bird song, which apparently 





a revolution) the masses will in time come to embrace the values of an authentically 
socialist zeitgeist.  
 
 
Ideology and our evolved psychology 
 
As intimated earlier, a Darwinian understanding quite probably would be that free-
market capitalism has come to be the dominant economic arrangement because it more 
successfully exploits our evolved psychology. The ideas and assumptions on which it 
rests are readily internalized; they become neurally inscribed in such a way that they 
need not be consciously called forth; rather, environmental cues activate them 
whereupon they bias preconscious processing and hence the content of what bubbles up 
in consciousness and induces behavior. Capitalism can so easily be ideology in the 
Marxian sense because its assumptions feel right. With no trouble they become tacit 
assumptions that we abide unwittingly because they do not entail much rewiring of 
genetically inscribed neural circuits. We are so easily indoctrinated because of how 
evolution has predisposed us cognitively. It has not predisposed us to a socialist 
zeitgeist, however it has provided what is needed neurally in order for altruism, 
empathy and other socially positive traits to win out over our more selfish instincts. In 
other words, our innate psychology in no way precludes the possibility of socialism as 
praxis.  It is in fact what makes it possible. Why we can at times be so remarkably good 
to each other and why it feels right when we are (you don‘t think righteous, you feel 
righteous) are important questions for Evolutionary Psychology as will be discussed in 
the next chapter. And here we may recall remarks made earlier regarding self-
actualization and our genetic capacity for being more than ‗lowest common 
denominators.‘  
 
The Abrahamic faiths have us as being innately immoral, our sinfulness being an 
inheritance from Eve (and therefore from Adam by virtue of her having been made from 
him).  But we also have an innate capacity for virtue. The Bible is replete with examples 
of people (all the good guys) whose capacity was such that they were able to endure the 
worse kinds of ill-treatment and temptation. We have the capacities both for selfishness 
and selflessness and both capacities are innate. Selfish and selfless behaviors both 
induce feelings and feelingful states that we are genetically programmed to find 
desirable. But they are very different kinds of feeling qualitatively, in terms of their 
duration, and in terms of what we have to invest before savoring them. Selfish behavior 
provides immediate but short-lived gratification whereas selfless behavior involves 
sacrifice and often effort, submission and perhaps even discomfort. But the reward is a 
satisfaction of a deeper and more lasting kind. Most importantly, others benefit and 
social progress is made possible. 
 
We live in the here and now so we are naturally inclined to favour the quick fix and that 
is precisely the inclination that allows corporate capitalism to thrive while socialism 
limps along at best. It is the life-blood of consumerism and consumerism rules. 
Everywhere we turn, our selfish and ‗base‘ instincts (the four Fs) are being appealed to 
and we are led to believe that this is fine; just check out the covers of the magazines on 
the display racks at any supermarket (always positioned to catch the eye of consumers 
in the check out lines). Sadly it is rare that I encounter much real concern about this 
state of affairs during my face to face encounters with people. Most just choose not to 




‗how things are.‘ It is the devil we know and, after all, it has allowed us to acquire all 
kinds of cool stuff. Also, there is a great deal of resignation to the notion that we are 
helpless in the face of it all. But why should there be such resignation when the 
ideologizing means par excellence, education, has not been employed in any focused 





The upshot of this introductory chapter is hopefully by now clear, that Darwinian 
Science is deserving of close attention in discussions around education‘s purpose and 
means of achieving it. It cannot suggest where we should be going, what education 
should ultimately be achieving, but it does help us to better understand what we as a 
species bring to the table for education in all its forms and guises to work on and with. 
For an educational philosophy founded on an ecozoic vision, Darwinism clarifies the 
intimate connection we have with all that lives on this planet and reveals, for the vanity 
it inescapably is, the anthropocentrism that informs our dominant ways of being in the 
world and that has led us to this most precarious ecological state of affairs. For the 
Philosophy of Music Education, it offers grounds for a reconsideration of prevalent 
notions regarding music‘s functions, values and educational uses. The hypothesis that 
the ensuing chapters will hopefully lend credence to is that music, or at least certain 
ways of musicing, are optimal ways of exploiting our innate aptitudes and 
predispositions toward the achievement of worthy educational goals, the overarching 
goal being an Earth citizenry of people living lives of praxis, of informed, committed, 






Chapter Two: The Adapted Mind: What an adaptationist understanding 
of mind can tell us about music, art, education, and culture 
 
 
The nature-nurture dichotomy - a non sequitur 
 
As is probably already clear, a Darwinist is necessarily an adaptationist for the simple 
reason that adaptations are the biological attributes that result from natural selection and 
are what make possible whatever behaviors an organism is capable of. This obviously 
does not imply that all behavior is adaptive or that behavior relies on adaptations only. 
Neither does it imply that all features of an organism are the result of natural selection. 
What needs to be understood clearly, if it is not already, is that nature and nurture are 
not two different processes, in humans at least, and most certainly should not be seen as 
opposites or opposing forces. However useful a dichotomy may be as a conceptual tool, 
it can be misleading and in the case of the nature-nurture dichotomy, there is the risk 
that an essential point is missed, that is, that ―all behaviour requires evolved 
psychological mechanisms combined with environmental input at each stage in the 
causal chain" (Buss 2008: 58, my emphasis).  It is arguably nonsensical in this light to 
ask whether behaviour is 'evolved' or 'learned;' it is both, inextricably.  
 
 
Cognitivism and the logical necessity of in-built cognitive mechanisms 
 
Piaget, originally a Zoologist, conceived learning as a process of assimilation, 
accommodation, and, in the end, adaptation. It is not only that information has been 
taken in and made to fit with information already 'stored' in the brain, but that 
something has changed in the organism. This change is influenced, but not determined, 
by the information. After all, there must be something that actually changes (Piaget's 
schemas) as well as mechanisms capable of enacting the change. ―Simple logic says 
there can be no learning without innate mechanisms to do the learning,‖ as Pinker 
reminds us, and he extends that logic to conclude that ―those mechanisms must be 
powerful enough to account for all the kinds of learning that humans accomplish,‖ 
which is formidable (2002:101). To claim that something has been learned is saying 
nothing more than that a change in an organism has occurred as the result of 
environmental input being processed by one or more, usually many, of these 
mechanisms. If we are looking for an explanation "we have to identify the nature of the 
underlying learning mechanisms that enable humans to change their behaviour as a 
consequence of environmental input" (Buss 2008: 58). Here it is crucial to grasp what is 
a core position of cognitivism, the paradigm shift in how we understand learning that 
followed on Noam Chomsky‘s groundbreaking work in language acquisition. Imberty 
(2000: 452) has explained this cogently. 
 
In classical behaviorism, the subject‘s response to a stimulus is a reaction determined by the 
nature of the stimulus; in post-Chomskian cognitivism, the response is not a reaction to the 
stimulus, but the triggering of an adapted program, a response to an internal perturbation of a 
competence system that is provoked by information in a format that does not conform to the 
system. The program‘s effect is to render the object consistent with its own characteristics 
and to modify atypical variables: thus, it is not the traits of the object that provoke the 






The necessity of such mechanisms (competence systems, adapted programs) is yet more 
obvious when we consider that the number of inferences that can be drawn from a 
limited set of inputs is virtually infinite. Pinker (2002: 101) gives a linguistic example:  
 
The sentences heard by a child ... can be grounds for repeating them back verbatim, 
producing any combination of words with the same proportion of nouns to verbs, or 
analyzing the underlying grammar and producing sentences that conform to it.  
 
It would be impossible to make any inferences if the human brain was just a general 
purpose computational system waiting to be programmed by environmental influences. 
Without at least some built-in constraints on its operations, the result would be a 
combinatorial explosion. Tooby and Cosmides (2000: web article) explain this 
succinctly. 
 
[A]lternatives multiply with devastating rapidity in computational systems, and the less 
constrained the representational and procedural possibilities are, the faster this process 
mushrooms, choking computation with too many possibilities to search among or too many 
processing steps to perform. Marginally increasing the generality of a system exponentially 
increases the cost, greatly limiting the types of architectures that can evolve, and favoring 
… the evolution of modules only in domains in which an economical set of procedures can 
generate a sufficiently large and valuable set of outputs. 
 
If any learning is to take place there must be some mechanism or set of mechanisms that 
constrains the learner to draw certain conclusions, and not others from the input 
available, that allows her to make distinctions between, for example true and false, 
conditional and unconditional, past and future, experiential and imaginary, actual and 
potential. There must further be some kind of mental ‗language‘ that makes it possible 
for such distinctions to be marked, expressed, and retained thus allowing us to keep 
track of what is true or false, conditional or unconditional, etc.. All of this is necessary 
if we are be able to plan, reflect, anticipate, infer, synthesize, have language, or just 
about any other of the cognitive capacities that seem uniquely human including, 
perhaps, consciousness itself. 
 
 
On mentalese and innate conceptual structure 
 
In a 2005 TED talk, Pinker speaks to such constraints in his discussions of mentalese, 
the ‗language‘ of thought needed for verbal language acquisition and what makes it 
possible for a fairly limited number of innate concepts (schemas) to generate infinite 
word combinations communicating an unlimited number of ideas, including highly 
abstract ones, and to sequence them into discourses that are coherent, internally logical, 
and informative. Pinker speaks of mentalese as ―a level of fine-grained conceptual 
structure which we automatically and unconsciously compute every time we produce or 
utter a sentence - that governs our use of language.‖  The innate concepts that constitute 
this structure, and which constrain conscious thought and its expression in language, are 
fundamental concepts of space, time, causation, possession, containment and intention 




Kant‘s categories which he posited as the framework for thought.45  In support of this, 
Pinker points out that ―our unconscious use of language … doesn‘t care about 
perceptual qualities such as color, texture, weight or speed, which virtually never 
differentiate the use of verbs in different constructions.‖ Rather, it evokes more concrete 
‗metaphors‘ whereby, for example, ideas become objects, sentences become containers, 
and communication becomes a sending and receiving. Pinker gives this example: ―We 
gather our ideas to put them into words and if our words are not empty or hollow, we 
might get these ideas across to a listener who can unpack our words to extract their 
content.‖ That music, like language, has an innate generative grammar was theorized in 




On the neurological basis of innate concepts and mechanisms 
 
But what are these innate concepts and mechanisms in physical terms? It was intimated 
in the first chapter that evolutionary biologists and evolutionary psychologists are nearly 
all materialists, making no allowance for a nonphysical mind.  But does this make it 
necessary for Evolutionary Psychology (EP) to put the brain under a microscope in 
order to arrive at credible and useful conclusions about how the mind works? It would 
seem futile to try to isolate a concept or mechanism by examining a particular patch of 
the brain and expecting the concept or mechanism to somehow be displayed in the 
convoluted network of connectivity, as futile, Pinker suggests, as trying to grasp a 
movie by examining the patterns of magnetic charges on a videotape or the digital data 
on a DVD. Pinker makes another important point, that ―minute differences in the details 
of the connections may cause similar-looking brain patches to implement very different 
programs.‖  
 
Nevertheless, neuroscience has helped us to understand how it is that the brain gets 
wired in ways needed for cognition and behavior. In a nutshell, genes instruct the 
production of proteins that shape the way neurons get connected up and become 
functioning mechanisms encoded in patterns of connectivity. 
 
Some proteins are enzymes that trigger chemical reactions, others induce additional genes 
to make additional proteins, some form barriers that guide and restrict the many cell 
movements that take place, and still others provide adhesive surfaces on cells to which 





                              
45  In Homo Aestheticus (1992), Dissanayake remarks on the universality and ease of acquisition of our 
spatial abilities and, in keeping with Pinker, posits that ―spatial cognition begins (in a Kantian … 
manner) as internal ―structures‖ of the mind that are used to model ―reality,‖ constructing 
representations of objects, patterns, and events, including the self.  They are among the codes, 
categories, or initial states of the mind out of which more complex perceptions, conceptions, lexical 




Epigenesis by synapse selection, a crucial matter for education46 
 
The details of how this all unfolds such that a functioning brain results is coming to be 
understood better and better (LeDoux 2002: 68-9), but such understanding is not 
essential to adaptationist explanations of our evolved psychology as will hopefully 
become evident in the ensuing discussions. Nonetheless, how the brain develops is of 
critical interest and concern to education. Influencing this development is, after all, the 
essence of what education is. Education shapes environments, engages students in 
activity and uses different kinds of informational inputs to develop their brains in 
specific ways that allow them to do specific things. In this regard, the discovery around 
which neuroscience has theorized compellingly is the manner in which neural networks 
are apparently pruned and circumscribed in their functioning as a newborn grows 
toward adulthood.  
 
Cognitive development paradoxically entails a reduction in the number of neurons and 
neural pathways in the brain as we mature. As the neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux 
posited (1989), neural activity ―does not create novel connections but, rather, 
contributes to the elimination of pre-existing ones‖ (quoted in LeDoux 2000: 73). 
Gerald Edelman argued in his Neural Darwinism (1987) that a selection principle 
operates much as it does in natural selection. For synapses in the brain, as for 
organisms, there is competition. It was already pointed out in Chapter One that physical 
adaptations that do not get put to use, like the wings of a Galapagos cormorant, atrophy 
and may eventually disappear. This ‗use or lose‘ condition applies to synapses 
according to Edelman, and those that do not get used perish. Having the most profound 
educational implications is his conclusion that ―the pattern of neural circuitry  ... is 
neither established nor rearranged instructively in response to external influences‖ 
(quoted in LeDoux 2000: 73). Instead, the external environment influences changes in 
neural circuitry by activating particular existing synapses and reinforcing ‗selected‘ 
patterns of neural activity. Those that are not activated thusly are likely to be pruned 
away given the need for economy that characterizes any entity that relies on finite 
energy resources, the brain being especially voracious in this regard. The implication of 
this vis-à-vis early childhood education is staring us in the face as I see it, a matter to 
which I will return at various points in the ensuing chapters. 
 
 
On the „computational theory of mind‟ 
 
Adaptationist thinking about the ‗mind‘ is what evolutionary psychologists engage in 
and they are seemingly unanimous in regarding as fundamental to their thinking - as an 
unassailable given - that the brain is a massively parallel information processing system 
that works algorithmically. Neurons ‗fire‘ and connect up according to series of if-then 
kinds of processes the results of which, provided they fulfill the ‗if‘ conditions in other 
algorithms, will instantiate and inform ever more complex arrays of connectivity 
leading to ever more complex forms of cognition that become ever more inter-modular 
and cross-modal. This is computation and happens whenever one pattern of information 
                              
46  Encarta defines ‗epigenesis‘ as ―embryonic development by gradual change.‖ In key respects, it can 




induces another because between them is a relation that accords with some law of logic, 
statistics or cause and effect in the world.  
 
[M]ental life can be explained in terms of information, computation, and feedback. Beliefs 
and memories are collections of information – like facts in a database, but residing in 
patterns of activity and structure in the brain. Thinking and planning are systematic 
transformations of these patterns, like the operation of a computer program. Wanting and 
trying are feedback loops, like the principle behind a thermostat: they receive information 
about the discrepancy between a goal and the current state of the world, and then they 
execute operations that tend to reduce the difference. (Pinker 2002: 32)  
 
What is apparently difficult for many to accept is that when it comes to the workings of 
our brains there is nothing but algorithms. As Tooby and Cosmides see it ―The whole 
cognitive science game is to take the high level capacities that we intuitively grant to 
minds - such as consciousness, agency, flexibility, context-sensitive interpretation, and 
so on - and to see what programming steps they are built out of.‖ This sounds patently 
reductionist but is not any more so than pointing out that the experience of love is 
contingent on chemistry. What Tooby and Cosmides entreat us to accept is what I see as 
incontestable commonsense, something that we must accept unless we are to invoke 
some kind of mystic, supernatural explanation, that is: 
 
while consciousness and agency are not themselves ‗automatic‘ or mechanistic in the 
ordinary sense, their constituents must be, because within a scientific descriptive 
framework everything (including anything, like us, made out of molecules) operates on a 
micro level in terms of cause and effect. (Tooby and Cosmides 2001b: 199) 
 
 
On perception and its illusory nature 
 
As with a computer, the brain does not, obviously cannot, compute the actual objects in 
one‘s environment. Our senses interface with the external world but what the brain 
actually gets as information and computes are representations of some sort that encode 
properties of whatever is being perceived, whether visually, aurally, by touch or by 
smell. Pinker uses vision to make this point clearer, beginning by pointing out the 
incongruity of Hollywood portrayals of robot vision, where the audience gets to see 
what the robot is seeing, for example, a wide-angle view with cross-hairs and pull down 
menus in the case of the Terminator (Pinker 2005 – Online source). This begs the 
question: Who or what is it inside the robot that is seeing this? But the same question 
applies to human vision for it seems so ‗apparent‘ that there must be some kind of self, 
a homunculus inside one‘s head that peers out through the windows of the eyes. But 
then we are faced with the question: what it is using to peer with?  We are thus 
inescapably caught-up in an infinite regress conundrum.  
 
A better metaphor is a massive spreadsheet with millions of numbers each representing 
the brightness of light hitting one of the millions of photoreceptor cells in the retina of 
the eye, this varying according to the brightness of each point in the visual field. As 
light reflects off objects and gets focused onto the two dimensional retina, these cells 
transduce light energy into neural symbols registering different levels of light intensity 
like numbers on a spreadsheet can do. It then becomes the work of dedicated parts of 
the brain to do the necessary ‗number crunching‘ such that we perceive a three-




through sequences of interconnecting and looping algorithms as is the case with a 
computer. The neural mechanisms that make this possible, that are instructed by our 
genes, can be tricked if the brain is given a spreadsheet of light intensity values that are 
not the result of reflected light, but issue from an array of pixels of illuminated light 
whose intensity values result in a patterned spreadsheet that gets similarly processed 
and creates the illusion of looking upon an actual, natural scene. When we watch 
television, we are actually hallucinating a three dimensional world behind the screen. 
 
 
On aural perception 
 
With aural perception, the sensorial interface is the eardrum which is caused to vibrate 
in particular ways by oscillations of pressure in the air outside the ear, this caused by 
some sound source like a musical instrument. This acoustic energy must first be 
transduced into manageable mechanical energy which is accomplished by the array of 
tiny bones in the middle ear. These connect the eardrum to the cochlea, the organ of the 
inner ear wherein mechanical energy is tranduced into electrochemical energy and sent 
on into the brain. There, various mechanisms analyse the fluctuations in this energy that 
encode the same ‗information‘ as the waves of acoustic energy received through the 
outer ear. If the sound source is a CD player, the waves of acoustic energy have been 
structured by speaker cones moving in and out according to an electrical signal whose 
varying positive or negative values are instructed by the patterns of binary code on the 
CDs surface. These in turn encode the same information as the waves of acoustic energy 
captured by a ‗microphone‘ in some recording situation, perhaps long ago and far away, 
e.g. King Oliver‘s Creole Jazz Band playing ―Dippermouth Blues‖ around an acoustic 
recording horn in Richmond, Indiana almost ninety years ago. 
 
As with vision, the complex of processes we call ‗hearing‘ creates the necessary illusion 
that ‗you‘ (whatever that ultimately means) are directly experiencing whatever is being 
perceived and that the experience is necessarily the same for any ear attached to any 
brain. But of course this is not the case at all. Other species do not hear and see the 
world as do humans. Many bird species can see light in the ultraviolet range. As much 
as 75% of an elephant‘s vocal communication is infrasonic, that is, it employs 
frequencies below what humans are capable of hearing. Such communication can be 
extremely ‗loud‘ (reaching 110 decibels), carrying for more than 5 kilometers (Smithers 
2000: 134).  Bats unify sight and hearing in their uncanny ability to echolocate, where 
they are for all intents and purposes ‗seeing‘ with their ears.  
 
While it is no doubt true that there is more to be learned than what is reliably known, 
the myriad of mechanisms and processes involved in hearing is understood quite well. 
Lipscomb and Hodges (1996: 83 -132) make it reasonably accessible to a non-specialist 
readership and do so in detail far beyond what this discussion requires. From what they 
disclose, it is sufficient if we understand that the auditory information one receives gets 
analyzed in several localized processing centers in the brain, each ascertaining a 
particular feature in the information (e.g. relating to pitch, location, duration, etc.) and 
that the products of all these analyses get assembled into a coherent sound experience in 







On the feelingfulness of perception and our predispositions toward musical stimuli 
 
But of course it does not stop there. Becoming a meaningful sound experience 
necessarily engages other mechanisms in other parts of the brain, perhaps the most 
important for musical behavior being those that imbue the experience with emotional 
content, that make it feelingful and that incline us toward certain kinds of rhythmic, 
tonal and timbral organization over others. There can be no denying that these 
inclinations become shaped in different ways depending on what one experiences 
aurally while growing up, but it seems clear that what one experiences, and which 
constitutes one‘s personal or cultural soundscape, cannot negate what is innate; neither 
can it easily override it. One never hears and will probably never hear someone 
whistling a tune built on atonal principles (a 12 tone row for example) and it seems 
unlikely that serial compositions and works that consciously thwart innate expectations 
will ever enjoy the popularity of music that satisfies these expectations. My entire life 
experience of music and music making in different parts of the world has convinced me 
that there are species-typical predispositions that bias our experiencing of sound in ways 
that are pre-cultural. And yet, according to Pinker at least, many academics in the Social 
Sciences continue ―to cling to a theory of perception … that the sense organs present the 
brain with a tableau of raw colors and sounds and that everything else in perceptual 
experiences is a learned social construction‖ (2002: 412). Even one of my colleagues in 
Philosophy with a strong interest in Cognitive Science was wont to say in a matter of 
fact way, that there is nothing innate that predisposes tastes in music and that we are as 
naturally disposed to Schoenberg as we are to John Williams. I doubt that many film 
composers like Williams would concur although they also recognize and make good use 
of the ways culture has conditioned us to make certain associations between musical 
idioms and extra-musical phenomena. As regards atonality, David Huron ventured that 
Schoenberg‘s twelve-tone compositions are not so much atonal as they are contratonal 
(2007: 339). Dutton clarifies the point. 
 
If Schoenberg had set out with a randomizer to create his tone rows, tonal relations would 
now and again occur simply by chance. His tone rows, however, are built on a principle of 
reverse musical psychology: he wrote them precisely to avoid even as much tonality as 
would occur probabilistically with a throw of a composer‘s dice. (2009: 216) 
 
Huron quotes Schoenberg to make clear that the composer had himself surmised a 
natural tendency to hear tonal implications in pitch sequences, especially when there is 
pitch repetition, as this was what he deliberately sought to avoid activating. In line with 
Pinker‘s take on a great deal of contemporary art music (2002: 400-420), Dutton sees 
the failure of Schoenberg to garner much of a following with the musical public as a 
vindication of the claim that when it comes to music‘s tonal organization we are nothing 
like a blank slate, innately neutral and equally open to any pitch schema (2009: 217). 
For Dutton it is clear that music cannot have any real aesthetic effect if it fails to induce 
any sense of anticipation of what is coming next, if it is too unpredictable that is to say. 
That this kind of sensibility really is innate has been strongly indicated by research with 
neonates. Zentner and Kagan (1998: 483-492) have demonstrated that a preference for 
consonance over dissonance is already present in infants only four months old.  
Moreover, it appears that by the age of 4½ months, infants are already sensitive to 
phrase structure. A study by Krumhansl and Jusczyk (1990: 70-73) shows that neonates 
listen more attentively to Mozart minuets phrased normally than to renditions where 






Returning to the question of music‟s adaptive status 
 
Even if we are equipped by natural selection for music and innately biased in terms of 
our musical expectations, this does not make music an adaptation per se.  The 
mechanisms involved in auditory processing are obviously essential in musical 
perception, but this does not necessarily imply that they evolved and became integrated 
in their functioning because they made our distant ancestors more musically competent. 
To make that case, it needs to be shown that musical competence somehow served the 
reproductive interests for our predecessors in the Pleistocene. 
 
Steven Pinker would argue that it did not and it is worth considering his position 
further. His argument is grounded on a particular view of what actually constitutes an 
adaptation as well as a clearly limited notion of what music or musical competence is. 
He has in various places in the writings cited in this study emphasized that not all 
phenotypic traits are adaptive and he has used music as an example in this regard. Our 
capacity for making and perceiving music is a trait common to all humans, but so too do 
all humans have blood that is red. The redness is the result of the chemical make up of 
blood, more specifically the iron rich protein (hemoglobin) that was selected for as a 
mechanism for transporting oxygen to our organs and tissues. Blood‘s redness is a by-
product of something that was selected for by evolution, but is not in itself an adaptation 
as it does not fulfill any adaptive function. On the other hand the colour of human skin 
is adaptive. The photochemical properties of melanin provide protection against 
ultraviolet radiation, its dark color helping it to absorb UV-radiation. Humans whose 
ancestors inhabited higher latitudes where sunlight is more indirect and in shorter 
supply became genetically predisposed to lighter skin, because UV- radiation is 
nonetheless essential for the manufacture of vitamin D.  
 
 
Criteria for what qualifies as an adaptation 
 
As to what is or is not an adaptation, Pinker and other evolutionary psychologists by 
and large are in agreement with what George C. Williams (1966) posited as essential 
criteria. Simply put, the feature in question must be shown to: 
 
 develop reliably in all members of  a species (unless prevented from doing so by 
abnormal environmental conditions); 
 perform reliably the function(s) implicit in its apparent design; 
 function so as to solve an adaptive problem adequately without incurring 
unsustainable costs for the organism. (Buss 2008:16) 
 
 
On adaptations, by-products, and preadaptations 
 
Once again we are reminded that natural selection does not work according to any 
design or plan even though it is constrained by the laws of physics and chemistry. 
Hence we can only speak of apparent design and that means design which has been 
inferred and inferences are not always reliable. The feathers of most birds can be 
analysed functionally in relation to aerodynamics and hence it seems logical to conclude 




from scales and were selected for by natural selection, not because they made flight 
possible, but because they provided better insulation making those with ‗feathers‘ better 
able to tolerate temperature extremes. They continue to provide this benefit as well as 
providing waterproofing. It is just that flight is the big prize when it comes to enhancing 
survival prospects (although several bird species have lost their ability to fly and their 
feathers and wings have adapted to better serve the lives they live, e.g. ostriches, 
Galapagos cormorants, penguins).   Even a feather‘s capacity for reflecting and 
refracting light in different ways achieves a function that helped solve some adaptive 
problem at some point in the evolution of most bird species. The point that is important 
here is that every adaptation that can be identified in living things of present day Earth 
represent stages in evolutionary processes during which the trait in question functions in 
ways appropriate to the organism‘s needs in particular environments. Selection 
pressures change as environments change and an adaptation that serves an increasingly 
redundant function can become modified through natural selection to solve other 
adaptive problems. Dennett puts it thus: ―If you go back far enough, you will find that 
every adaptation has developed out of predecessor structures each of which either had 
some other use or no use at all‖ (1995: 281). But here it must be stressed that these 
predecessor structures were not ‗preadaptations.‘ Calling them preadaptations suggests 
that they were part of a design process with a ‗foreseeable‘ outcome and Darwin‘s 
natural selection does not make allowances for foresight or intelligent design of any 
kind. And this, as was emphasized in the first chapter, is for many the hardest pill 
Darwinism forces us to swallow.  
 
 
Does music qualify? 
 
Coming back to William‘s criteria and the question of music‘s adaptive status, Pinker 
nowhere to my knowledge contests the factuality of any of the following points 
(abstracted from Miller 2000: 335): 
 
 Music is found in all cultures present and past.  
 As with language, musical ability ‖unfolds according to a standard developmental  
schedule" (335). 
 Barring abnormalities that are congenital or have resulted from injury or disease; 
nearly all humans are possessed of musical aptitude sufficient for active 
participation in musicking without specific training. 
 Nearly all adults are able to quickly recognize and render a vast number of 
learned  melodies strongly suggesting a specialized capacity for storing and 
retrieving tonal and rhythmic sequences. 
 Certain cortical areas appear to have enhanced functioning beyond what language  
requires and different neuronal processes and systems are involved as indicated by  
studies of individuals with amusia. 
 Analogous behaviors in other species (birdsong for example) are clearly adaptive 
and the same selective processes are likely to have shaped, in part at least, 
humans' extraordinary capacities for acoustic and kinesthetic display. 
 Music evokes strong emotional responses and particular tonal and rhythmic 
configurations seem to have near universal appeal. 
 
Notwithstanding such apparent facts, music fails the ‗adaptation test‘ according to 




our distant forbears.  Of course, one cannot have a credible position in the absence of 
clarity as to what music is being taken to mean and encompass. Certainly there are 
phenomena that get subsumed under the term music that seem to belie any notion of 
adaptive function. I am here thinking of practices that while perhaps not being 
intentionally esoteric, nevertheless attract the interest and participation of but a relative 
few, as was earlier intimated to be the case with Schoenberg‘s serialism. Much of what 
falls into categories like ‗New Music,‘ ‗aleatoric music,‘ and ‗avant-garde music‘ fits 
this bill and it is nowhere expected that what one experiences aurally will push the same 
pleasure buttons as popular genres which generally are successful in grabbing the ears 
of people from diverse cultural backgrounds. Esoteric practices afford different kinds of 
pleasure such as intellectual stimulation; the experience is intriguing more than it is 
aesthetic or kinesthetic.  That in no way suggests that it is of less value, rather that its 
value – it‘s associated pleasure – is of a different kind and one that it is highly unlikely 
our distant ancestors pursued. It is music that fails, as Dutton puts it, ―to draw from the 
wellsprings of musical pleasure in the mind‖ (2009: 217).  
 
Just as it continues to be the case for the larger musical public, it is highly likely that our 
ancestors pursued experiences of aesthetic and kinesthetic activation and did so because 
such activation was pleasurable (as it continues to be). The fact that they might only 
have been aware of the pleasure of the experience and that it was this that motivated 
their participation does not mean that having the experience had no benefits of a more 
adaptive kind, that it was engaging one in behavior advantageous to the reproductive 
prospects of our ancestors.  Darwin certainly considered this vital point, i.e., that a 
psychosocial trait can function without any conscious awareness. Miller quotes from 
Darwin‘s The Descent of Man (1871: 881): 
 
The impassioned orator, bard, or musician, when with his varied tones and cadences he 
excites the strongest emotions in his hearers, little suspects that he uses the same means by 
which his half-human ancestors long ago aroused each other‘s ardent passions, during their 
courtship and rivalry. (Miller 2000: 332-3) 
 
Pinker seems to be stuck on the question of how our ancestors would have benefited 
reproductively by creating art, including music, given that what is created has no 
practical use and cannot justify the costs involved in its production. Pinker calls music 
―auditory cheesecake‖ and considers it to be like pornography, a ―pleasure technology.‖  
He goes further to claim that ―music could vanish from our species and the rest of our 
lifestyle would be virtually unchanged‖ (1997: 528). Actually, these provocative 
pronouncements, which have incensed many and have been invoked to discredit Pinker 
generally do not accurately portray Pinker‘s ultimate position on music‘s adaptive status 
wherein he recognizes how music engages cognitive systems that most certainly are 
adaptations (e.g. language, auditory scene analysis, emotional calls, motor control) but 
that music is a by-product of these capacities. The flaw in this thinking has already been 
intimated with the example of feathers above. Are flight feathers by-products of 
insulation devices? No. They are adaptations which like virtually all others have 
resulted from modifications to predecessor structures that were, in many cases, 
adaptations themselves but ones that served other functions. Ah yes, Pinker might be 
quick to interject, but being able to fly has clear survival advantages. The survival 
advantages of a musical capacity are admittedly not obvious, but this certainly does not 






Clearing up an apparent confusion: music as artifact vs. music as behavior 
 
The cheesecake metaphor is flawed in other ways.  Perhaps Pinker is trying to steer 
clear of hyper-adaptationism and he is warranted in saying that ―it is wrong to invent 
functions for activities that lack [adaptive] design merely because we want to ennoble 
them with the imprimatur of biological adaptiveness‖ (1997: 525). But, as Dutton 
(2009: 96) points out, the question that we should more concern ourselves with is ―how 
genuine adaptations might produce or explain capacities and preferences even for 
rarefied experiences.‖  We have an innate sweet tooth which cheesecake obviously 
appeals to and we have it because it predisposed our ancestors toward certain foods rich 
in sugar. Pinker‘s ascription of cheesecake as a by-product of Pleistocene tastes is 
misleading. ―Rather say that cheesecake directly satisfies those very tastes‖ (Dutton 
2009: 96). Music may be cheesecake, but musicality might well be an adaptation. 
 
A Darwinian account of food preferences (for fat, sweet, piquancy, protein flavors, salt, 
fruit aromas, etc.) need not treat as by-products the items on a present-day restaurant menu; 
those items directly satisfy ancient preferences. Similarly, a Darwinian aesthetics will 
achieve explanatory power neither by proving that art forms are adaptations nor by 
dismissing them as by-products but by showing how their existence and character are 
connected to Pleistocene interests, preferences, and capacities. (Ibid) 
 
Carrol (2004: 66) offers another critique of Pinker‘s cheesecake metaphor. 
 
Rich deserts offer a purely sensual stimulus. They appeal only to the taste buds. They have 
no intrinsic emotional or conceptual content, and they convey no information from one 
mind to another. In contrast, art, music, and literature embody emotions and ideas. They are 
forms of communication, and what they communicate are the qualities of experience.  
 
What seems a more promising approach with regard to music is to analyse it 
behaviorally and consider how engagement in musical behavior, musicking that is (and 
there are several varieties of this), could have helped solve adaptive problems in the 
Pleistocene. It seems more than likely that our forbears were more interested in the 
doing of music than in the product of this doing which until the advent of sound 
recording was ephemeral. In this regard, it seems entirely unlikely that our incredible 
capacity for remembering and being able to recall tonal sequences (tunes) over long 
periods of time, essential to most forms of musicking, would have evolved if this 
capacity had not served Pleistocene interests. Furthermore, researchers are coming to 
the conclusion that musical and verbal memory are encoded differently in our brains 
which would call into question Pinker‘s hypothesis that music is a by-product deriving 
largely from our capacity for language (e.g., Samson and Zatorre 1991). Adding more 
weight to the claim that we have special evolved neural mechanisms for processing 
musical information are studies of amusia, a disorder that may be congenital or the 
result of damage to the brain. Congenital amusia mostly affects pitch discrimination 
while acquired amusia may involve dissociations in music processing between 
rhythmic, melodic and emotional components.47  
 
 
                              
47  The Wikipedia article on ‗amusia‘ provides a very good list of references including what I would 




Musicking engages neural systems with clear adaptive functions 
 
The conclusion that more and more research such as that under discussion is placing 
increasingly beyond doubt is that humans are born musical.48 But this is not the same as 
saying that we are born for music, that is to say, that we evolved the mechanisms 
needed because they made possible the production and appreciation of the kinds of 
sound structures that we have come to think of as music. Our music-specific capacities 
and predispositions employ neural systems that most assuredly evolved to serve other 




Music and language 
 
Pinker suggests that because music employs systems also employed by language (e.g. 
prosody) and because language and music share common or analogous features (e.g. 
how phrases are constituted and grouped hierarchically), that music necessarily 
―borrows‖ language‘s ―mental machinery‖ (535).  This in turn suggests that our 
capacity for language preceded that for music in our evolutionary history. There are 
more and more theorists who argue compelling that Pinker has got it wrong in this key 
respect. Steven Brown (Wallin et al 2000: 271-300), for example, suggests that both 
capacities evolved from a common ancestor, what he calls ―musilanguage,‖ basing his 
theory on his analysis of their respective phrase structures and phonological properties. 
Like language, music is a ‗combinatorial system‘ with a hierarchical structure 
comprised of acoustic elements that can be combined variously, this often leading, as it 
does in language, to recursion where a limited number of elements can yield an almost 
infinite range of expressive possibilities by embedding them variously in phrases and 
longer structures. That the capacity for recursion is unique to humans has been 
convincingly challenged and recent research has substantiated my own surmise 
regarding the vocalizations of some bird species wherein recursive elements seem 
evident (Marcus 2006: 1117-1118). 
 
Steven Mithen agrees that music and language must have had a common ancestor and 
devoted his The Singing Neanderthals (2005) to substantiating John Blacking‘s 
insightful surmise that ―at the level of deep structures in music there are elements that 
are common to the human psyche, although they may not appear in the surface 
structures‘ (Blacking 1973: 108-9). In his How Musical is Man?, Blacking ventured that 
―what is ultimately of most importance in music can‘t be learned like other cultural 
skills: it is there in the body, waiting to be brought out and developed, like the basic 
principles of language formation (1973: 100).‖ Mithen marshals and interprets evidence 
from archaeology and the fossil record, from primate research, from work in child 
development, and from cognitive neuroscience. The ‗common ancestor‘ theories of 
Brown, Mithen, and others are compelling and have important implications for 
questions around the kinds of musical behaviours that should be prioritized in music 
education. They will accordingly be returned to further along in this chapter as well as 
                              
48  The number of studies that have placed this beyond dispute are many. Again, Wikipedia‘s article on 
―amusia‖ provides a succinct, well referenced summary of what are strong points of agreement as to 




in the concluding chapter. For now, let us return to Pinker‘s postulations about music as 
a by-product of other capacities. 
 
 
Auditory scene analysis 
 
After language, Pinker cites auditory scene analysis as another evolved cognitive 
system that was needed if our forbears, including those that preceded hominids, were to 
gain an accurate sense of what was going on in their immediate environments on the 
basis how their ear drums (or analogous structures) were being caused to vibrate by 
waves of compression and rarefaction in the surrounding air (or water). Few if any 
natural sound-makers produce anything close to a sine wave, that is, a pure sound of 
fixed pitch. Natural sounds, like the sounds of musical instruments, are complexes of 
pitches that the ear and associated neural mechanisms in the brain must fuse together 
such that our perception corresponds reliably with an external reality of simultaneous 
sounds from different sound-makers that it was in our ancestors‘ interests to be able to 
differentiate and recognize. In the total mix of frequencies, those that are multiples of 
some ‗fundamental‘ frequency get glued together by the brain because they most likely 
issue from the same source. Pinker points out how melodies employ fundamental 
frequencies that are harmonically related, that they are essentially ―serialized 
overtones,‖ and suggest that we find them pleasing, perhaps because, like symmetrical, 
regular, parallel, and/or repetitive visual patterns, they are linked to natural phenomena 
that for our ancestors were worth taking note of.   
 
Being able to fuse overtones into a composite tone is of course an essential capacity for 
language given the need to differentiate different vowel sounds where fundamental 
pitch and other sound properties may remain constant (as in singing e-a-i-o-u to a 
constant pitch). But surely the ability to fuse overtones into composite tones is common 
in other species, none of which have language even though they may have much of the 
cognitive machinery needed for language, and many of which are vastly superior in 
their capacity for auditory scene analysis. Bats are the exemplars as intimated earlier. 
The case for the ‗common ancestor‘ theory of language and music is strengthened by 
this realization, I believe.  
 
A universal penchant for harmonic consonance (not as defined by any culture but by the 
mathematical relationship of their fundamental frequencies) as well as marked 
similarities in the emotional connotations attributed to intervals has been strongly 
indicated by research.49 That these preferences and attributions have been entirely 
‗learned‘ (are socially constructed) is something that John Blacking doubted very much. 
 
I find it hard to accept that there has been a continuous musical tradition between England 
in 1612 and Russia in 1893, in which certain musical figures have had corresponding 
emotional connotations. The only justification for such an argument would be that the 
emotional significance of certain intervals arises from fundamental features of human 
physiology and psychology. If this is so, some relationship between musical intervals and 
human feelings ought to be universal. (Blacking 1973: 68-9, quoted in Miller 2000: 90-1) 
                              
49  Mithen cites a study by Oelman and Lœng (2003) that showed significant agreement in the emotional 
meanings attributed to particular intervals by individuals from markedly different musical, linguistic 






Music, proprioception and kinesthesia 
 
With mammals as with most insect species, precise movement is essential to survival 
and this involves some means of internally sensing motion, weight, posture, balance, 
and the location of body parts relative to each other.  The capacities involved have been 
given the names proprioception and kinesthesia even though they do not stand for 
separate, independent processing systems. Kinesthesia tends to be applied where overt 
movement is involved even though the covert manipulation of the larynx and vocal tract 
when singing and talking is clearly kinaesthetic. But both kinesthesia and 
proprioception involve feedback loops between proprioceptors (sensory nerve endings 
in muscles, tendons, and joints), the inner ear, and a host of neural systems in the brain. 
The vital point from an educational point of view is that while the phenotypic 
machinery required is encoded for in our genes, how this gets expressed in actual 
behavioural capacities is dependent on experiential factors, in short, they have to be 
shaped and fine-tuned through learning. This fine-tuning, as I will argue in the final 
chapter, is something that should command far more attention in music education than 
is generally given except in programmes with a strong eurhythmics component. 
 
 
Music and sentience 
 
Pinker remarks on the fact that people find synchronous and metrically grounded 
movement pleasurable and gives pushing a child on a swing as an example (1997: 538). 
He suggests that music and dance offer a concentrated stimulation of such pleasures and 
cites the theories of Jackendoff and other music theorists interested in the psychological 
underpinnings of musical behaviour and responsiveness, who attribute the 
feelingfulness of music to its activation of patterns of tension and release that we are 
innately predisposed to find pleasurable. It strikes me as incongruous that Pinker does 
not find here a basis for positing music as an adaptation which like play activity 
(common in many species) helps to shape, fine-tune and optimize proprioception and 
kinesthesia. The fact that musical behaviour is ‗aesthetically driven‘ (is pleasurable in 
other words) and the fact that it doesn‘t yield ―useful outcomes in the external world‖ is 
not problematic when, as Tooby and Cosmides point out, ―the system driving the 
behaviour is designed to produce adaptive internal changes,‖ and ―when the external 
price is not too great‖ (2001a: 16 - my emphases).  There are several potential systems 
in this regard: play, dreaming, fiction, and babbling being likely candidates. Their 
ontogenic importance is critical if we agree with Tooby and Cosmides that: ―the task of 
organizing the brain both physically and informationally over the course of the lifespan 
is the most demanding adaptive problem posed by human development,‖ one which 





Pinker interestingly makes the connection between sound productions that are natural 
and those that are contrived even though he doesn‘t speak to this connection in these 
terms. Many species communicate emotional states through calls that are not learned 




remarks that we can find many of these as inflections and expressive devices in the 
singing of popular vocalists. I have remarked elsewhere on the melismatic ‗moaning‘ 
that is a signature of most R&B and I have little doubt that it is erotic in intent even if 
unwittingly so.50 What Pinker does not appear to grasp is that the capacity for contriving 
and effectively ‗performing‘ a sound production could in itself be an adaptation if it is 
was successful in communicating information important to the reproductive interests of 
oneself and/or that of a prospective mate. 
 
 
Music and sexual selection 
 
Drawing from Dawkins and Krebs (1978), Miller (2000) emphasizes that it is essential 
to think of music as a ―set of signals emitted to influence the behaviour‖ of others. As to 
what is communicated, Miller is convinced that the most important Pleistocene message 
was: choose me as your mate!  This is an answer implicit in Darwin‘s own theory on the 
origins of music.51 Darwin theorized that human music evolved to serve the same 
purpose that bird song serves for birds, that is, as a courtship display. In developing his 
theory of the evolution of human music through sexual selection Miller takes up 
Darwin‘s idea which he feels has been ―dismissed too readily‖ (2000: 355), convinced 
that there are definite functional analogs between music and the ways a large number of 
other species use sound and movement in attracting and choosing mates. The core 
premise in his thinking is that the calls, songs and dances (as well as a host of visual 
stimuli such as bright plumage, size, skin quality, physiological symmetry, etc.) are 
fitness indicators, but they can only function as such provided that there are evolved 
psychological mechanisms in prospective mates that incline them toward those 
attributes most indicative of strong genes. A peacock‘s exorbitant tail is of no account if 
peahens fail to be impressed by it. As regards acoustic courtship displays, Darwin spoke 
to this seemingly obvious point in The Descent of Man: ―unless females were able to 
appreciate such sounds and were excited or charmed by them, the persevering efforts of 
the males, and the complex structures often possessed by them alone, would be useless; 
and this is impossible to believe‖ (1887: p. 878 quoted in Miller 2000: 332). 
 
As to the specific forms of fitness that musical behavior (including dancing) could 
provide an indication of, Miller posits several, some related to general physiological 
well-being (e.g. aerobic fitness, strength, motor control) but others more psychosocial 
(e.g. self-confidence, extroversion, creativity and the capacities for sequencing complex 
movements reliably and for automating complex learned behaviors). Miller does not 
speak of kinesthesia or proprioception, but they are fundamental to everything on his 
list (Miller 2000: 340). He concedes that what he posits in this regard is still speculative 
but is confident that any indicator hypothesis can be subjected to empirical testing.  
 
                              
50  Which makes ironic in a humorous way that the same vocal device has found its way into so much so-
called Gospel music, much of which strikes me as R&B but with different words about loving Jesus 
vs. loving what we got up to last night. 
51  Miller (2000: 329) quotes the following from The Descent of Man (1871) in which Darwin devoted 
six pages to human music: ―… it appears probably that the progenitors of man, either the males or 
females or both sexes, before acquiring the power of expressing their mutual love in articulate 




Sexual selection vis-à-vis natural selection 
 
Before exploring Miller‘s theorizing in more depth, it needs to be made clear that sexual 
selection is not something different from natural selection; it is merely one of the ways 
in which the natural selection algorithm presented in Chapter One plays out such that 
genes with sexually advantageous phenotypic results (like success in securing a quality 
mate) get replicated more often than those with less. But what is special about sexual 
selection is that it necessarily is relational (and hence social), involving as it does the 
reproduction interests of another member of one‘s species who is genetically alike in 
crucial ways, essentially sharing the same traits, but different in particulars that affect 





While a mate has just as much ‗interest‘ in genetic propagation as oneself, she or he is 
different in important respects as regards the innate cognitive biases that influence 
choice of mate, biases which entail different cost factors. This is for the simple reason 
that males and females have different investment interests, this because of differences in 
what reproduction requires of them, what it costs them in the expenditure of time, effort 
and resources as well as how it may affect their survival prospects (by becoming more 
vulnerable for example). The British geneticist, Angus John Bateman, advanced the 
theory which has for long been accepted as a principle in Evolutionary Biology and EP 
and which has been given his name. Bateman‟s principle holds that the 
disproportionate energy expended by females in having children is a limiting factor on 
fertility that leads naturally to a situation where males compete for females and are 
comparatively more promiscuous, and where females, the limiting sex, are more 
cautious and discerning when choosing a mate (Bateman 1948). This does not imply 
that males are not choosy. Both sexes are ‗looking for‘ many of the same attributes, in 
particular, those that signify health and vitality, such as skin, teeth and hair quality, 
anatomical symmetry, clarity of eyes, good posture and general behavioral traits that 
reveal cognitive normality or deficiency. 
 
Men may (but also may not) invest considerable time and effort in providing for, 
nurturing and protecting offspring, but when it comes to producing offspring, they have 
it comparatively easy. They have no direct participation in gestation, lactation or most 
of the rigors of infant care, here remembering that the cost of having the amazing and 
necessarily large brains we have was that children have to be born prematurely and 
remain essentially helpless for far longer than is the case in any other species.52 
Moreover, whereas a woman has only around four hundred eggs which reduce in 
number by one or two every month until menopause, men produce millions of sperm in 
a day and can impregnate almost any number of women, circumstances provided; and 
they are not forced by circumstances to provide for the nurturance, protection and 
material needs of their offspring. Neither do they have their sexual productivity arrested 
for extended periods following successful conception (gestation + lactation). Men vary 
in relation to their proclivity for parental investment and obviously a woman‘s success 
                              
52  It is in the foundational intimacy between mother and infant that Dissanayake (2000) roots her 




in getting her genes replicated is enhanced by having a mate who cares and provides 
though this is clearly less a necessity now than was the case in the Pleistocene. But we 
are all still innately disposed toward finding optimal mates, those with the ‗best‘ genes 
and accordingly we are innately biased toward and sensitive to whatever indicators of 
genetic fitness are available to the senses. But a man can clearly afford to be less 
discriminating and cautious, not to mention, less faithful.  
 
 
Add status and competitiveness to the mix 
 
Competition is a principal cog in the natural selection algorithm. With many species, 
including ours, females may and do compete with other females in efforts to secure a 
preferred male, but it is rare among mammals that females physically compete through 
fighting and demonstrations of strength and physical prowess. It is quite another story 
with males as is and always has been manifest in their behavior, especially when 
hormonally primed. In some species, males are particularly aggressive and may even 
fight to the death over who is to get access to females. Where physical conflict has for 
long enough been a significant selective force, physical traits that provided the needed 
edge evolved as secondary sexual characteristics, horns, antlers and extraordinary body 
mass being good examples. However, physical combat in which a male runs the risk of 
serious injury or death is what one would assume to be a weaker force in natural 
selection. And, as is easily confirmed by spending some time among mammals in the 
wild, sparring and other shows of bravado are much more the norm than fights to the 
death.  
 
Far better are traits that dissuade other males from attempting to thwart one‘s access to 
females, that accord one higher ranking in the ‗pecking order,‘ without engaging one in 
energy sapping, dangerous conflict. An impressive set of antlers need not get put to the 
test if other males defer to the possessor‘s status and allow him preferential access to 
females and food without challenge. And the indicators that serve to establish a pecking 
order need not be weapons like horns or antlers. Any trait that conveys superiority can 
‗impress‘ other males just as much as it can impress potential mates, and it is safe to 
assume that such traits can be behavioral just as they can be anatomical. Prowess of any 
kind can serve in this way.  
 
 
Music and machismo 
 
The dominance of males in jazz and its conspicuous elements of machismo come to 
mind in this regard. Even its parlance speaks to this: instrument = axe; virtuosity = 
chops; good/well = mean (as in ―He plays a mean axe.‖). Demonstrating one‘s 
improvisational chops and challenging established lions were the raison d'être of 
cutting sessions in Charlie Parker‘s time, which have their modern day equivalent in the 
emcee battles of Hip Hop, also a male dominated culture. Miller (2000: 337) notes 
Miles Davis‘s surmise that having sex before an important performance takes away the 
sexual ‗edge‘ needed by male musicians and athletes. In many Gangsta Rap videos, 
there is a bevy of scantily clad ‗bitches‘ moving seductively behind the rapper, 




deportment and gestures (including the ubiquitous downward sweep of hand assuming a 
gun shape), all say: ―Don‘t f..k with me!‖53  
 
 
Art and status 
 
One Darwinian understanding of the arts for which there is considerable support is that 
they came into being, to a significant degree, as a response to our innate need for status, 
what is undeniably one of the strongest motivators of human behavior. The acquisition 
of it brings satisfaction and the lack or denial of it brings disquiet and even despair. A 
great many commercial advertisements are designed as appeals to it and the mass media 
continuously reinforces what people, particularly the young, have for long been 
conditioned to believe, that status is critically dependent on having all the right stuff, 
those things which mark one as cool in the eyes of one‘s peers and hence increases 
one‘s popularity, e.g. name-brand clothes and particular models of cell phone. Many of 
them maintain this materialistic bent late into life kept unwittingly in line by a 
continuous barrage of messages coming from all sides that are all saying ‗Spot on! This 
is how life was meant to be.‘ No sensible capitalist would have it otherwise. 
 
Of the Four Fs, Feeding, Fighting, Fleeing, Fornicating, status is most closely allied 
with the last. In thousands of species including our own, passing on one‘s genes 
requires securing a mate and not just any mate will do. The genes with which one‘s own 
are to be mixed should be of the highest possible grade. Accordingly one intuitively 
seeks a mate who has the physical attributes most indicative of genetic fitness, e.g. 
smooth, unblemished skin, a certain hip-waist ratio, muscle mass, physical symmetry, 
hair quality, strong white teeth, agility, good hearing, good eyesight, good parents, and 
so on. Secondary (usually) to these are behavioral and psychosocial indicators, 
demonstrations of skill, talent, creativity and personality. To such physical and 
behavioral qualities are usually added material indicators (property, wealth, clothing and 
adornments). The relative importance accorded specific traits may and often does vary 
from culture to culture, but there is a great deal of overlap and the broad requirements 
seem to be common to all, e.g. tangible health, physical prowess and material wealth. 
Moreover, with globalization there is a steadily increasing homogenization of culture. 
Even though people may still identify strongly with an ethnic past and partake of some 
of its customs, most have fallen into step with the ideology of consumerism and regard 
material wealth as a key criterion in the determination of status. And it has happened so 
easily, it is as if people come prewired for it; we are born consumers just as we are born 
status-seekers.  
 
Throughout human evolution having high status has been the surest means of securing a 
mate and so evolution has given us a strong appetite for it, different to but just as 
intense and critical as the sex urge. (And so it is for many other species.) It has to be 
strong because the pursuit, acquisition and maintenance of status are expensive in terms 
                              
53  In The Stuff of Thought (2007), Pinker makes an adaptationist case for taboo words, positing that they 
―tap into deep and ancient parts of the emotional brain.‖ (331) One phenomenon that he invokes as 
evidence pointing to his theory (which seems so intuitively right for those like me who let loose 
occasional expletives) is that aphasics, while loosing the capacity for articulate language, more than 




of time, energy and material costs; but evolution determined it to be worth the price, for 
our ancestors at least. With a population of close to 7 billion and being such a resource 
hungry species, the propagation of our genes, no matter how powerful our innate 
inducements, cannot continue to run unabated.54 Neither can be sustained the excessive 
consumption that is driven by our craving for status. But our genes are not aware of this 
or care in anyway. They continue to instruct the development of organisms with the 
same ultimate purpose – reproduction - just as they did in the Pleistocene.  
 
 
Status vis-à-vis Maslow‟s needs 
 
Interestingly, Maslow did not include status as a need in his well-known hierarchy. It 
might be argued that he did accommodate it, in part at least, by the needs for social 
acceptance (love/belonging) and for esteem (including self-esteem and the respect of 
others), but it is clear Maslow wasn‘t thinking of the kind of felt need that drives the 
acquisition of such accoutrements of status as a luxury motorcar, bling jewelry, and 
Gucci shoes, which like a peacock‘s tail may be ―inimitably gaudy and intrinsically 
worthless, but are treated as if they were valuable and are valuable because everyone 
treats them that way‖ (Pinker 1997: 494).  Abraham Lincoln was right in saying that: 
‗You may fool all of the people some of the time; you can even fool some of the people 
all of the time; but you can‘t fool all of the people all of the time.‘55 But he failed to 
include the more evolutionarily pertinent axiom that you can fool most of the people 
most of the time. This is all that consumerism and capitalism actually require. People 
the world over follow fashion in their apparel, accessories and behavior, and they do so 
without question as to the rationale for such behavior; it is just how things are done, it 
feels natural and it supposedly makes people happy. For men, a suit and tie has almost 
universally become a marker of status, especially one‘s professional ranking and 
socioeconomic class. It is not however, as we must all realize, a reliable indicator of 
competence or moral integrity; the conduct of too many prominent ‗suits‘ in the 
political and corporate world (arguably one and the same) has mortally undermined any 
such supposition. 
 
Status belongs closer to the base of Maslow‘s pyramid where it is more about surviving 
and ‗getting laid‘ than about integrity or getting respect. Being near the bottom, 
however, is not in itself a denigration or devaluation of status, just an acknowledgement 
of its more fundamental adaptive value. Status is a need that must be gratified before 
other needs can become motivators of behavior.  
 
 
On music and gender 
 
In examples like those found in much Jazz and Gangsta Rap, the concern seems as 
much with establishing rank in some pecking order as it is with impressing females. 
And one might see the higher level of aggressiveness and competitiveness in male-
dominated musical practices to have some explanation here. Of course, there is a great 
                              
54  It took all of the hundreds of millennia up until sometime in the mid 19th century just to reach a 
population of 1 billion! 




deal of music that is not so conspicuously gendered and it seems clear enough that the 
production and reception of musical displays has comparable pleasures for both sexes. 
This might be expected given that whatever it is that is being communicated through 
musical behavior is usually being communicated intrasexually as well as intersexually. 
That there is a great deal of similarity in how men and women relate to music, that they 
both engage in its production for example, was not problematic for Darwin in relation to 
his theory of music‘s origins, having posited several sexually-selected traits present in 
both sexes. Miller (1998:    ) makes the important point that evolved courtship traits are 
relatively recent in evolution and that the dimorphism that is clear to see in the plumage 
of many bird species is most likely to be ―quantitative‖ which I understand to mean that 
the difference is more of degree than kind. In many bird species the differences in male-
female plumage is subtle if at detectable by human eyes. In some cases, like the 
peafowl, the difference is profound suggesting an acceleration of sexual selection that 
begs explanation.  The theory of runaway selection is taken up a bit further along. Here 
we need to consider in some depth at least, what it is that could be underlying 
psychosocial gender differences that seem so strongly suggested by the examples in the 




On sexual dimorphism 
 
Given such different investment interests related to reproduction, it seems logical, if we 
accept Darwin‘s and Miller‘s theories of music‘s origins, to expect at least some 
differences in how males and females relate to and engage in musicking in its varied 
forms. In considering this possibility, it helps to have some understanding of sexual 
dimorphism, i.e., evolutionarily driven differences between males and females in how 
genetic traits get expressed. This understandably is a controversial subject when it 
enters into theorizing about psychosocial differences between men and women.  
 
Given that a child inherits a copy of every gene contributed by both mother and father, 
the traits that it develops are a combination of those of its parents and this makes 
perplexing how it is that males and females diverge as they do giving rise to the 
dimorphism that is so obvious in the physiological differences between male and female 
gonads, genitalia, breasts, muscle mass, average height and body hair, to cite only the 
more obvious examples. The evolution of these differences requires that a common trait 
(a pelvis for example) be ―uncoupled‖ at the genetic level which happens if the trait in 
question is, in its ontogeny, under the control of genes located on sex chromosomes or if 
the gene has evolved such that how it is expressed depends on chemical triggers that are 
gender specific. Genetic correlation is the term applied to dimorphous traits with the 
same genetic basis, and, as Simons (2003) emphasizes, it is the ―evolutionary default.‖  
He makes this all much clearer in the following passage (with my emphases). 
 
The uncoupling of male and female traits occurs if there is selection for it: if the trait is 
important to the reproductive success of both males and females but the best or ―optimal‖ 
trait is different for a male and a female. We would not expect such an uncoupling if the 
attribute is important in both sexes and the ―optimal‖ value is similar in both sexes, nor 
would we expect uncoupling to evolve if the attribute is important to one sex but 
unimportant to the other. The latter is the case for nipples. Their advantage in females, in 
terms of reproductive success, is clear. But because the genetic ―default‖ is for males and 




genetic correlation that persists through lack of selection against them, rather than selection 
for them.  … In a sense, male nipples are analogous to vestigial structures such as the 
remnants of useless pelvic bones in whales: if they did much harm, they would have 
disappeared. (Simons 2003 – online article) 
 
Apropos the inference that sexual dimorphism is more the exception than the norm, 
Pinker reminds us that where gene propagation is the bottom line, being male or being 
female are, on average, ―equally good strategies‖ and natural selection thus tends 
toward an equal investment in the two sexes: equal numbers, an equal complexity of 
bodies and brains, and equally effective designs for survival‖ (Pinker 2002: 343). Miller 
is convinced that capacity for both the production and reception of music benefited both 
males and females in the mating game and he finds it not at all surprising that there is 
not a greater degree of sexual dimorphism in human cognitive capacities generally 
given ―the mutuality of mate choice, the interactiveness of courtship behaviors, and the 
overlap between perceptual capacities for judging complex behaviors and motor 
capacities for generating complex behaviors‖ (Miller 1998: 117). In this regard, I have 
yet to locate any credible research in musical aptitude that indicates any significant 
difference between male and female in such specific capacities as are ‗measured‘ by 
music aptitude tests.  
 
 
Sexual division of labor  
 
Mate procurement is not the only selection pressure that acted on our ancestors in ways 
different for male and female. Also having wide acceptance in Evolutionary Psychology 
is that sexual dimorphism was partly driven by a sexual division of labor that became 
exponential in its overall evolutionary impact when our distant ancestors acquired the 
means of hunting large game (Buss 2008: 82). In fact, it was the availability of quality 
protein that evolutionary psychologists such as John Tooby assume to have accelerated 
the increase in size and capacity of the human brain which made possible and which 
was driven by complex cognitive adaptations such as language and tool-making (Tooby 
and DeVore 1987). For Pinker this makes perfectly good sense and he supports the 
hypothesis with the observation that: 
 
Across the mammals, carnivores have larger brains for their body size than herbivores, 
partly because of the greater skill it takes to subdue a rabbit than to subdue grass, and partly 
because meat can better feed ravenous brain tissue. (Pinker 1997: 195) 
 
The assumption that is born out by studies of existing hunter-gatherer societies is that 
hunting was primarily the work of males who were and continue to be better suited to 
hunting by virtue of their larger size, higher level of upper body strength, increased 
running speed, and superior skill in throwing projectiles. Moreover, males unlike 
women are not diverted for extended periods by pregnancy, lactation and infant care. 
That this contributed to sexual dimorphism in psychosocial characteristics has been 
strongly suggested by research indicating sex differences in spatial abilities. The 
hypothesis that Silverman and others have tested empirically is based on the observation 
that hunting, which includes tracking, trapping, and ways of killing employs different 
kinds of spatial cognition than does foraging (Silverman & Phillips 1998) (Eals & 
Silverman 1994) (Silverman, Choi & Peters 2007) (Laiacona, Barbarotto, & Capitani 
2006). If indeed hunting was a principally male task while foraging was done mostly by 




spatial tasks where ability is key to success in hunting, e.g. being able to maintain one‘s 
orientation geographically while on the move (not getting lost) and to effect the mental 
transformations needed for accuracy in throwing projectiles. On the other hand, 
foraging is served by different spatial abilities which according to Silverman require 
superior peripheral vision as well as the ability to perceive and remember spatial arrays 
of objects that locate edible plants (Silverman & Eals, 1992: 489, 514-515) and one 
would expect women to perform better than men on tasks that employ these abilities. 
One would also expect differences in the way males and females might relate to such 
tasks as regard interest, confidence and the pleasures to be derived.  
 
 
Quantitative differences between the sexes 
 
Other psychosocial differences that Pinker considers to have been strongly indicated by 
research are discussed in his chapter on ―Gender‖ in The Blank Slate (2002: 337-371).  I 
have abstracted these as follows. Compared to women, men: 
 
 are more inclined toward ―no-strings sex with multiple or anonymous partners,‖ the 
clear evidence for this being ―the almost all-male consumer base for prostitution 
and visual pornography.‖56  
 are, even as young boys, more physical and violent in their pursuit of status and in 
competition and conflict generally.57  
 are much more prone to dyslexia, autism, learning disabilities, attention deficit, 
emotional problems, and certain forms of mental retardation.58 
 place more value on status and its material markers and are more willing to take 
risks and undergo discomfort in the pursuance thereof. 
 
Compared to men, women: 
 
 ―are more sensitive to sounds and smells, have better depth perception, match shapes 
faster, and are much better at reading facial expressions and body language‖; 
 ―are better spellers, retrieve words more fluently, and have a better memory for 
verbal material‖;  
 are far less likely to resort to violence in matters concerning personal status, tending 
rather toward ―derogation and other forms of verbal aggression‖; 
 are more solicitous toward offspring and sensitive to their discontents;59 
 with the possible exception of anger, experience emotions more intensely, are more 
intimate socially, feeling greater empathy toward friends; 
 tend more toward humanitarian involvements and toward academic programs in the 
arts, medicine, law, and the humanities over math, science and engineering where 
males evidence greater interest.60  
                              
56  refers to: Salmon & Symons (2001) 
57  refers to work by Geary (1998) and Maccoby & Jacklin (1987) showing that young boys give much 
more time than young girls to ―rough-and-tumble play.‖ 
58  refers to: Blum (1997); Geary (1998);  Halpern (2000); Hedges & Nowell (1995); Lubinski & 
Benbow (1992).  
59  refers to: Hrdy, S. B. 1999. Mother nature: A history of mothers, infants, and natural selection. New 





The fact that autistic males outnumber autistic females four to one is particularly 
significant.61 Autism, which is now understood to have a strong genetic basis, is the 
result of abnormal neural development resulting in deficits in ability to communicate, 
socialize and to engage in novel behavior.  As many as 10% of autistic individuals 
display unusual, even extraordinary talents.  Savantism is a related neurological disorder 
with at least half of savants being autistic, the rest usually having other cognitive 
disabilities. Male savants outnumber female savants six to one (Treffert 2009). Of the 
thirteen musical savants Leon Miller (1989) describes - all of whom had perfect pitch - 
ten were male. In noting the similar gender bias in respect of autism, Mithen (2005: 43) 
suggests that this ―may be a reflection of a general difference between male and female 
cognition which leaves the former particularly susceptible to deficits relating to 
language and the ability to empathize with other people‘s feelings.  
 
 
On sexism and feminism 
 
It cannot be doubted that definitions of what constitutes masculinity or femininity have 
changed through time and can vary in particular ways from one culture to another. But 
not to acknowledge the obvious commonalities or to not even consider an evolutionary 
approach to the issue seems irresponsible to me. Donald Symons is unequivocal in his 
conviction that female and male humans have psychological natures that ―are 
extraordinarily different,‖ because ―throughout the immensely long hunting and 
gathering phase of human evolutionary history the sexual desires and dispositions that 
were adaptive for either sex were for the other tickets to reproductive oblivion (Symons 
1979: 461).‖
62 Pinker has noted the tendency in the Social Sciences and Psychology to 
dismiss Symon‘s two human natures as ―gender stereotypes.‖ But, as Pinker suggests, 
even if they are, this provides no proof that they are false (1997: 461). The differences, 
if my reading of Symons is correct, are greater psychologically than behaviorally, which 
if true suggests strongly culture‘s capacity to homogenize and make compatible. As 
most would regard this in a positive light, it would seem incongruous that traditions of 
single sex education are maintained on the scale they are. My experience of South 
African boys schools points to a continued upholding of anachronistic Victorian ethos 
of ‗muscular Christianity.‘ 
 
At a theoretical level at least, it seems entirely plausible that there could be at least some 
degree of dimorphism when it comes to musical sensibilities; there is nothing that can 
adequately refute such a strong possibility even though the tendency is to attribute any 
and all apparent differences to social conditioning. There is a sense that any concession 
toward sexual dimorphism when it comes to psychosocial traits is inevitably 
retrogressive politically and socially, that acknowledgement of psychosocial differences 
between men and women is too easily co-opted to grant a biological sanction to human 
institutions and policies that sustain gender inequality and a sexist status quo in general. 
I have yet to come across any credible research on innate gender difference that has 
been so co-opted and it is significant that women feature so prominently in EP and the 
                                                                                      
60  refers to research done by Lubinski and Benbow (1992). 
61  Just search ―autistic males females four to one‖ with Google to confirm what is widely accepted. 




Neurobiology of Sex.63 The late sociologist and feminist, Miriam M. Johnson, 
acknowledged that research on sex differences in brain functioning made probable 
innate psychosocial differences. In her favourable review of Donald Symons‘ The 
Evolution of Human Sexuality (1979), she concluded with the following caveats. 
 
As the pendulum in the old nature/nurture dispute swings back in the direction of nature, it 
need not herald a new conservatism, but instead can allow for a more exact and 
sophisticated understanding of the complex ways in which biological factors are related to 
psychological and social ones. As research continues in the biological sciences, the problem 
is likely soon to become not one of whether differences in psychic functioning between the 
sexes exist, but of how we are to conceptualize both the nature and the meaning of these 
differences. While Symons himself is neither a sociologist nor a feminist, the implication of 
his analysis for those of us concerned with achieving equality and justice for both sexes 
may well be that nothing is gained by denying sex differences. Sexism is not a result of 
male/female differences so much as it is of what we make of them. (Johnson 1980: 792-3) 
 
Anne Campbell (1999), in her study of women‘s intrasexual aggression, is convinced 
that there are gender differences in this regard that are the result of natural selection and 
differing reproductive investment interests. But she is just as convinced that these 
evolutionarily based sex differences have been ―enhanced‖ in patriarchal society, where 
―men have held the power to propagate images and attributions which are favourable to 
the continuance of their control‖ and where any expression of aggression by females is 




Gender differences in music and music education domains 
 
While research has yet to show any significant differences in musical aptitude between 
the sexes, what has been suggested are differences in inclination toward and 
preferences for different forms of musicking.  A study conducted by Lucy Green 
(2007) is notable in this regard. It entailed a questionnaire survey of 78 secondary 
school music teachers from different parts of England as well as tape-recorded 
interviews with 69 students. In both cases the questions were designed to tease out the 
―implicit assumptions, values and expectations‖ underlying their responses. With 
substantial tracts of Green‘s article it is easy to do a mind shift and imagine it to be a 
validation of the notion of sexual dimorphism in musical sensibilities. If Miller, Pinker, 
Symons and other Darwinists were reading the article, I can imagine them nodding their 
heads from time to time. Yet Green does not even consider the possibility that the 
significant differences she noted in her research might be rooted in differential gene 
expression such as accounts for the afore-mentioned morphological differences.  In 
Green‘s view, femininity and masculinity in musical behavior and attitudes are social 
constructs with a long history and she regards common music education practices (in 
England at least) as complicit in their continued existence. Indeed, the purpose of her 
                              
63  In The Blank Slate (2002: 342), Pinker names over thirty and the number of woman authors cited in 
this study suggests a growing awareness that innate gender differences are not problematic nor are 
they grounds for sexism and gender inequality. But neither are their grounds for portrayals of 




study, as her title makes clear, is ―exposing the gendered discourse of music education‖ 
(Green 2002: 137). 
 
Green does not speculate as to the origin of these constructs and in this regard we are 
reminded of the extent to which traditional music making cultures the world over are 
gendered in terms of musical roles and modes of engagement.  There is no doubting that 
society and culture provide all kinds of stimuli that incline maturing males and females 
toward stereotypical dispositions and behavior. All learning requires innate 
mechanisms, as has been demonstrated, and it is clear that none of these are exclusive to 
one sex or dimorphic in the sense of one sex having it as a non-functioning feature like 
male nipples. But research in Evolutionary Psychology has shown to be highly likely 
that there are innate quantitative differences in proclivities and cognitive styles and it 
seems logical that they should manifest in differences in the ways in which male and 
female relate to and engage in behaviors that are interpersonal, which music so 
comprehensively is. If sexual selection has been the strong force in the evolution of our 
musicality, such differences are surely to be expected.  
 
What emerges from Green‘s article even though she doesn‘t address it directly is that 
music education practices, in England at least, favor performance activity that does not 
demand the kinds of demonstrativeness and creative spontaneity that jazz does, 
especially where the focus is on improvisation. Neither do other dominantly male 
popular forms like Hip Hop feature as far as I can tell. Green interviewed 78 secondary 
school music teachers and what she found most remarkable about their responses was 
that boys surpassed girls in composition and that this was characteristically attributed to 
their being ―more imaginative, adventurous and creative‖ (2002: 139). One of Green‘s 
arguments is that because girls have been stereotyped as more perseverant, obedient and 
committed to work, they have accordingly been ―constructed as failing‖ given that these 
attributes, Green argues, have been construed to imply a corresponding ―lack of 
autonomy, creativity and initiative.‖   
 
In her USA-based study ―Education, Gender and Participation in High School and 
College Instrumental Jazz Ensembles,‖ Kathleen McKeage (2004) found women to be 
significantly less confident with improvisation and generally less comfortable in jazz as 
opposed to other instrumental ensembles. Like Green, McKeage does not give any 
consideration to the possibility that such trends could be informed at least in part by 
biological predispositions. Indeed, as pointed out in Chapter One, I have come across 
very little in the Philosophy of Music Education that makes any allowance for 
adaptationist conclusions regarding our psychosocial commonalities and differences, 
and this, in the main, is the problem that I am most concerned with tackling in this 
study. In Chapter One I ventured to characterize a ‗blank slate‘ view of human nature as 
errant nonsense. I would not presume to categorize scholars like Green amd McKeage 
accordingly, even though it cannot be denied that the theoretical constructs that are most 
friendly to feminism and to social constructivism are: ―the Blank Slate – if nothing is 
innate, differences between the sexes cannot be innate - and the Noble Savage – if we 
harbor no ignoble urges, sexual exploitation can be eliminated by changing our 
institutions‖ (Pinker 2002: 339). Often coupled with the notion that psychosocial gender 
differences are entirely social constructs, is that the central and all-encompassing issue 
in our interactions with one another is power and how it is exercised by groups in their 
dealings with other groups, a thrust that is mainstream in postmodernism.  Such 




distinguishes from equity feminism, the difference being that the latter is concerned 
more with how women are treated than with how they are understood epistemologically. 
At its extreme, gender feminism holds that we are born without a sexual identity in any 
psychosocial sense, that patriarchal society quickly transforms us ―into male and female 
gender personalities, the one destined to command, the other to obey‖ (Pinker 2002: 341 
quoting from Sommers 1994).  
 
In her review of McClary‘s Feminine Endings, DeNora sums up the author‘s position 
and that of many social constructivists regarding music as social discourse. 
 
[B]eneath the technical consciousness of musicology, composers, analysts, and listeners 
share historically conditioned conventions of musical common sense - "semiotic codes" that 
are as much a part of the music that accompanies Saturday morning cartoons as they are of 
the symphonic repertoire. From here, her work develops the notion that musical habits 
provide structures within which experience-musical and otherwise - can be channeled and 
where, in other words, the work of social formation occurs. (1993: 117) 
 
 
On social constructivism and music 
 
It is noteworthy that she speaks of conventions as being historically conditioned (as 
opposed to constructed) and McClary offers cogent examples as evidence of the extent 
to and ways in which music is gendered. However, certain questions come to mind that 
EP and Gene-Culture Coevolution Theory would be, and in many cases, are concerned 
with addressing.  
 
It would be impossible to pin down when exactly the history of social construction 
began, when it was that social arrangements began to exert a significant influence on 
how people think, feel and act. Steven Mithen (1996) suggests that it was relatively 
recently, between 100,000 to 50,000 years ago, when our species acquired ―cognitive 
fluidity‖ meaning that different brain modules started accessing each other and working 
interactively, this prompting a blossoming of creative capacity as evidenced by the 
appearance in the archaeological record of tools requiring the assembly of parts as well 
as artifacts indicating spiritual belief and the capacity/inclination for elaboration through 
‗artistic‘ means. But it has to be assumed that whatever it was that comprised ‗society‘ 
at that point had to have something to work on in order to kick-start the historical 
process that led to the ―semiotic codes‖ that inform modern day musical sensibilities. 
The point that I find inescapable is that there must have been some initial, innate 
―musical common sense‖ that social conditions and contingencies subsequently worked 
with and shaped. In my discussion of cognitive adaptations which music taps into (e.g. 
language, auditory scene analysis, proprioception), it was suggested that musical 
perception is biased toward features in sound structures that are consonant with the way 
our hearing and psychomotor mechanisms have evolved as regards both tonal and 
temporal stimuli, these jibing with the physical attributes of sounds emanating from 
discrete sound sources (their overtone structure for example) and with the 
kinesthetic/proprioceptive mechanisms that allow us to be successfully bipedal and 
capable of tasks involving fine motor control, coordination, and the ability to 
synchronize movement. 
 
As I posited right at the beginning of Chapter One, society is not a coherent, volitional 




when there is some pattern of commonality in the doing that we can begin to speak of a 
society. Apropos this conception is the definition of ‗culture‘ given by Tooby and 
Cosmides, i.e. ―the serial reconstruction and adoption of representations and regulatory 
variables found in others‘ minds through inferential specializations evolved for the task‖ 
(Tooby &Cosmides 2000 – online source).  
 
If one is to insist that musical sensibilities are social constructs, it seems expected that 
one must account for our social sensibilities (which have been argued to be 
quantitatively different for males and females), especially if music is taken to be an 
expression of these as well as an important structure for channeling and mediating 
experience and thus for shaping these sensibilities. The importance of music in this 
regard can, indeed must, have evolutionary explanations and it seems incongruous not 
to consider what they might be if the ultimate concern is to understand how music‘s 
social function actually plays out and gets shaped by environmental constraints. Granted 
that it is still early days for Evolutionary Psychology (EP) and much is speculative, but 
an important caveat is that it is not speculation awaiting better speculation, but rather 
hypotheses that with increasing frequency and rigor are being subjected to empirical 
testing. 
 
The other confounding matter for social constructivist understandings of music is 
music‘s ubiquity. Differences from musical culture to musical culture do not obscure 
the commonalities, not only in the particulars of the sound constructions they produce, 
but in the ways people engage in music and the values they attach to it. Here I am 
thinking not so much of the rarefied realms of art music, but of music as it is and has 
been experienced and valued by the vast majority of people.  Here it is apropos to 
consider McClary‘s position on meaning in music. 
 
Like any social discourse, music is meaningful precisely insofar as at least some people 
believe that it is and act in accordance with that belief. Meaning is not inherent in music, 
but neither is it in language: both are activities that are kept afloat only because 
communities of people invest in them, agree collectively that their signs serve as valid 
currency. Music is always dependent on the conferring of social meaning - as 
ethnomusicologists have long recognized, the study of signification in music cannot be 
undertaken in isolation from the human contexts that create, transmit, and respond to it. 
(McClary 1991: 21 - my emphasis) 
 
Surely you don‘t have to believe music to be meaningful for it to be so, anymore than 
you have to believe honey to be sweet in order to experience its sweetness. Indeed most 
people probably do not give the matter much thought. They just enjoy music and 
through it experience feelingful states that are pleasurable and that may even be 
emotionally profound and socially significant. Making music is a way of making 
experience meaningful and in many if not most cases, the experience is social insofar as 
through it we orientate ourselves in relation to one another and celebrate our 
relationships. But if asked, most people will say that they believe music to be 
meaningful in the sense of being an important if not essential dimension of life.  How 
can it be that such a belief, even if tacitly held, is so evidently universal?  
 
The argument that ―meaning is not inherent in music‖ is for me a non sequitur for the 
simple reason that meaning cannot inhere in anything; it must be assigned by some 
assigning agent even if, as is most often the case, it is not done consciously. But are we 




experienced, largely according to the nature of whatever is being perceived. If it is 
something made by humans, its nature has been shaped so as to be meaningful, even if 
not in an explicit or even an intentional way. In any case, the point is that the experience 
is meaningful and one must expect some congruence in the ways people find it 
meaningful.  If there was no such congruence, music could not convey anything and 
would likely not exist. This congruence is especially to be expected when there is a 
great deal of commonality in terms of the kinds of music and musicking people have 
experienced and the contexts in which they have experienced it. But then, how is it that 
music can be meaningful for people outside of the culture and who are perhaps 
oblivious to the music‘s ‗original‘ context? Perhaps, it can be argued, that while 
meaningful to the outsider it is meaningful in fundamentally different ways. That may 
be true in respect of referential meanings associated with esoteric spiritual and 
ontological belief systems, but when it comes to the perception of ways in which tonal, 
timbral and temporal elements have been structured into aural and kinesthetic events, I 
believe we have more in common than not, as I intimated earlier when positing an 
innate musical sensibility.  
 
Different cultures provide different contexts for music making and its reception and 
hence there are differences in the meanings that are conveyed. But each and every 
context is firstly a human context whose very possibility rests on the capacities and 
proclivities that we share and with which we achieve purposes and functions that are 
also shared: eating, raising offspring, acquiring and demonstrating status, courting, 
securing alliances, worshipping, celebrating, story telling, gossiping, and several others. 
 
 
On „runaway selection‟ 
 
The peacock‘s tail is ridiculous in terms of its obvious costliness in terms of energy 
expenditure and survival prospects (making the peacock more conspicuous and 
cumbersome), but perhaps not so ridiculous as a fitness-indicator for peahens to take 
notice of.64 Surely evolution should select out traits disadvantageous to survival and 
thus to reproduction. But if a trait sufficiently increases a male‘s prospects for securing 
a mate, it may prove the stronger selective force. Moreover, males that can handle such 
costly extravagances and survive successfully are males that are most likely fitter and 
possessed of superior genes. Because the trait is heritable, a male offspring is likely to 
be similarly endowed and thus more successful in passing on his genes, half of which 
come from its mother who thus has her own genetic interests catered for by passing on 
her genes to such offspring. Over eighty years ago, the evolutionary biologist RA Fisher 
(1930) proposed that because assortative mating results when females favoring a trait 
become more numerous in the environment of selection than available males possessing 
the trait, a feedback loop is established that causes evolution to runaway with itself 
producing traits that seem anomalous from a survival perspective. This runaway effect 
will continue, according to Fisher‘s theory, until such time as the survival costs take 
                              
64  The tail of the Long-tailed Widowbird (Euplectes progne) is another example with which fellow 




over as the stronger selective force and an asymptote is reached (Miller 2000: 342).65 
For Miller: 
 
[t]he power of the runaway theory is that it can explain the extremity of sexual selection‘s 
outcomes: how species get caught up in an endless arms race between unfulfillable sexual 
demands and irresistible sexual displays.  Most relevant for us, the preferences involved 
need not be cold-blooded assessments of a mate‘s virtues, but can be deep emotions or lofty 
cognitions.  Any psychological mechanism used in mate choice is vulnerable to this 
runaway effect, which makes not only the displays that it favors more extreme, but makes 
the emotions and cognitions themselves more compelling.  Against the claim that evolution 
could never explain music‘s power to emotionally move and spiritually inspire, the 
runaway theory says: any emotional or spiritual preferences that influence mate choice, no 
matter how extreme or subjectively overwhelming, are possible outcomes of sexual 
selection.  (343) 
 
 
Artificial selection vis-à-vis natural selection 
 
Peafowl have been domesticated for at least two thousand years which suggests that the 
asymptote for the peacock‘s tail and the ‗turn on‘ the peahen experiences may have 
been pushed higher by virtue of having lived long-enough in environments less 
threatening than their natural habitat and thus more accommodating of such a 
spectacular but costly trait. This raises an issue worthy of at least a brief digression and 
concerns what is called artificial selection, which is generally construed as being 
something other than and apart from natural selection. For several millennia, humans 
have controlled the breeding of animals so as to produce offspring that are superior in 
some important way (e.g. more meat, milk, wool, docility, or even cognitive superiority 
in terms of hunting, tracking and shepherding as is valued in particular breeds of dogs) 
and this has over time brought about changes in the genome such that we have scores of 
domestic breeds that have to a large extent been engineered by humans.66 Darwin was 
intent on showing how functional complexity in organisms can come about without any 
intentional, goal-directed engineering, but this doesn‘t mean that a domestic breed is not 
the product of the natural selection algorithm. As Dennett points out: ―The short legs of 
dachshunds, and the huge udders of Holsteins are just as much products of natural 
selection as the wings of the eagle; they just evolved in an environment that included a 
particularly well-focused selective pressure consisting of human agents‖ (Dennett 1998 
– online source). The exponential encroachment into natural environments by invasive 
alien species of plants, fish and animals, a problem the world over, is a result of human 
activity and has certainly altered - in many cases transformed – environments and the 
selective pressures they bring to bear on whatever is living there. And of course, our 
species continues to destroy natural habitats at an alarming rate, driving to extinction 
species at a rate thousands of times nature‘s norm. 
 
 
                              
65  Though Fisher‘s startling idea was rejected for fifty years, it has recently been vindicated by 
mathematical models  (Kirkpatrick 1982; Pomiankowski et al., 1991). 
66  It is interesting that the first chapter of Genesis has it that cattle were created before humans when it is 
the fact of having been domesticated and made into property that gives these ungulates their name, 




Human „created‟ environments of selection 
 
What I see as most revelatory from Dennett‘s observation is that changes in the genome 
that produce significant changes in the phenotype can be accelerated through 
environmental constraints that influence who mates with who (as well as who survives 
long enough to do so). With dogs this happened with the domestication of the gray wolf 
in the Middle East less than 15,000 years ago. What is most significant is that eighty 
percent of distinct dog breeds that exist today evolved in the last few hundred years 
(Wayne 2010 – online source).  
 
The question that interests me is whether artificial selection is and has been shaping 
human evolution. Most would be quick to point out that artificial selection equals 
controlled breeding, and humans just don‘t do that with members of their own species. 
But this is too facile an answer remembering Dennett‘s point that the only real 
difference with artificial selection is that selective pressure is applied by human agents 
and this surely does not limit the possibilities to a deliberate pairing off of a particular 
male with a particular female. And it does not, to my mind at least, require that human 
changes to environmental conditions be consciously designed to influence which 
genetic variations get passed on and helped to proliferate. Let us use the matter of 
gender difference as an example.  Humans the world over have created environmental 
conditions that are gendered in ways that are both overt and covert. This is particularly 
evident in the ideational environments we call cultures. The ideas that dominate in a 
culture are selective forces in that they constrain human behavior (including sexual 
behavior) but it has generally been assumed that such forces are too mutable to have 
been able to influence natural selection at the genetic level. Yet, as I alluded to in 
Chapter One, there is growing evidence that this can happen.  There I mentioned smaller 
teeth and decreased jaw size due to dietary changes brought about by agriculture, as 
well as the increased lactose tolerance of populations in high latitudes (where there is 
less vitamin D available from sunlight) who have for long engaged in dairy farming. 
But these are physiological traits. What, if anything, can be said of culturally driven 
changes in the genome that are expressed cognitively?  
 
A study by the population geneticists Cochran, Harpending and Hardy (2006) posited 
that Ashkenazi Jews demonstrate higher levels of verbal and mathematical intelligences 
because the unique demography and sociology of Ashkenazim in medieval Europe 
selected for these intelligences. Scoring 12-15 points above the mean value of 100 was, 
according the authors, the achievement of less than nine hundred years of biological 
evolution, during which a fairly well defined population of Europeans were the victims 
of religious and racial apartheid; the only avenues for their socioeconomic mobility 
were in finance and trade, vocations needing higher levels of verbal and mathematical 
intelligences. Those who were more successful had more offspring according to the 
authors and hence the relevant genes67 spread within a population strongly constrained 
to ‗keep to their own kind‘ in marriage.68 
                              
67  This apparently is the result when the genes are inherited from only one parent. But when inherited 
from both parents the result is one of a range of congenital diseases that are more common to 
Ashkenazim than to any other population (e.g. Tay-Sachs, Gaucher‘s disease) and which have in some 
cases been correlated with higher IQ and increased neuronal connectivity.  
68  What seems incontestable, whether it is more attributable to nature or nurture, is the disproportional 





In this regard it is also worth noting a concern that Carroll raises regarding Pinker‘s 
postulates about music and arts‘ evolutionary origins, specifically the assumption that 
―only those functions that evolved in the distant evolutionary past have any particular 
adaptive status.‖ (65) This is coupled with the idea that the environment of evolutionary 
adaptedness (EEA) in which our innate psychology evolved was fairly stable. Carroll 
finds compelling Mithen‘s theory of ―cognitive fluidity‖ and its implicit assumption that 
cognitive evolution and the cultural evolution it spawned can be accelerated when 
already evolved cognitive adaptations begin to work together. Indeed, most 
psychosocial pathologies entail a breakdown somewhere in the neural networking that 
human brains are particularly adept at. 
 
The upshot of such studies is that culture itself is adaptive and brings about changes in 
the environments of selection that over time can bring about genetic changes, one being 
a fine-tuning of the cognitive architecture involved in the storage of cultural 
information. Blackmore (1999) theorizes that what was in fact the greatest stimulus to 
the rapid expansion of the human brain was the emergence of our capacity to imitate, 
something we take so much for granted but which is a highly complex cognitive affair. 
It is also basic to all forms of mental cognition as Bloom claimed in setting out his well-
known taxonomy. The adaptive value of being able to imitate is clear and Blackmore is 
likely correct in surmising that not only was there selection for it, but also ―selection for 
imitating the best imitators, as well as selection for mating with the best imitators.‖ 
Blackmore takes this further to suggest that brain encephalization may have been in part 
driven by ―memetic sexual selection‖. What is most relevant here is the distinct 
possibility that culture has and continues to present selection pressures that natural 
selection has been able to take account of. But it is a two-way process of geneculture 
coevolution, a concatenation of feed-back loops that accelerate the process and that 
could help us better understand the nature of social and cultural change. Could the 
complex musical compositions that people esteem so greatly be the outcome of a 
runaway process? Quite possibly, indeed most likely, I would argue. This would not 
negate the fact that they afford rich experiences that are considered edifying, but it 
might provide some insight into why ‗art music‘ (especially its more esoteric forms) 
fails to really catch on with the majority of people.  
 
 
Taking stock regarding gender differences 
 
The preceding discussions suggest that there are no apparent differences between men 
and women in musical aptitudes but that other psychosocial differences could quite 
easily manifest in differences in what I have referred to as musical sensibilities, which 
have more to do with inclinations, attitudes, and the attribution of value to particular 
forms of musical engagement. A theory of innate difference in this regard is well 
supported by sexual selection theory as espoused by Miller and others. But sexual 
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percent of partners in the top law firms. Their representation is similarly disproportional in the media 




selection is not the only adaptationist theory that can be evoked to offer explanations as 
to music‘s origins and adaptive values. We can now turn to what are the most 
compelling alternative theories, ones that don‘t in any way negate the strong possibility 
that sexual selection was a significant force driving the evolution of musicality, but ones 
that are perhaps not as suggestive of sexual dimorphism. But first there is another 
contentious issue that requires an adaptationist consideration. 
 
 
Cognitive fluidity, domain generality, cross-modality 
 
Steven Mithen‘s theory of cognitive fluidity (1996) has been challenged by Howard 
Gardner and others because of its suggestion of a general learning capacity resulting 
from a general-purpose evolutionary adaptation. It is a suggestion that blank slaters 
might find appealing, but it runs counter to most of what we know about evolution. As 
Merlin Donald points out: 
 
Adaptations always occur under specific environmental pressures, and within the 
constraints of very specific brain designs. This results in specialized modifications, rather 
than general-purpose ones. This rule applies to apes and humans, just as it applies to other 
species. (Mithen & Donald 1998 – online source).  
 
But, as Donald points out, this does not contradict the idea of ―domain-generality, the 
notion that some mental faculties have a much wider reach than others.‖ 
 
This is an unassailable structural concept. The human mind has exquisite structure. One can 
imagine it as a set of pyramids, each with its own hierarchy of modules, each of which 
mediates some special skill. At the base of the pyramid stand many of the most basic 
reflexive functions. These are the specialists of the mind, narrow-band modules designed to 
carry out specific functions, such as focusing the eyes, or tasting food, with maximum 
efficiency. The mid-levels of the mind contain somewhat integrative functions, for instance, 
spatial maps of the environment, or images of one‘s own body, both of which require 
synthesis across a few modules. And at the top levels, there are the most powerful 
integrative systems, some of which approach true domain-generality in their reach. 
Language is one of these. The fact that we can talk about what we hear, smell, touch, or 
feel, and also describe our cognitive maps of the environment, testifies that our language 
brain has broad general access to the knowledge gleaned by the specialized modules 
dedicated to hearing, smelling, touching, and feeling, as well as those concerned with 
spatial mapping. In that sense, it is a domain-general capacity. (Ibid) 
 
I should think it is quite clear that music is another of these powerful integrative 
systems which utilizes modules also used by other systems like language, auditory 
scene analysis and proprioception/kinesthesia. The multi-modularity of these ‗top level‘ 
integrative systems makes difficult their precise delineation as adaptations. The terms 
we choose are misleading to some degree; take language for example. Donald talks of 
―our language brain‖ and the fact that it has access to a range of specialized modules. 
But without such access, the language brain can obviously do little. It seems unlikely 
therefore that those brain areas and their neural systems that are language specific 
evolved on their own only to later acquire the capacity to integrate with others so as to 
achieve behavioral outcomes. So what are we talking about when referring to language 
as an adaptation: the dedicated brain areas or the whole system of interacting modules? 




of domain-general capacities like language and music, including the question of which, 
if either, came first in human evolution. 
 
 
Rethinking music as communication 
 
Nobody to my knowledge refers to communication as an adaptation. It is too broad, too 
all-encompassing and general-purpose a capacity. Nonetheless, the ability to 
communicate is vital to nearly all fauna and perhaps even to some flora.69 It is probably 
the dominant adaptive problem that drove the evolution of music as it most certainly 
must have for language.  Miller (2000: 335) claims that for music the adaptive problem 
was mate selection/procurement, but this claim is based on the premise that music is a 
―set of signals emitted to influence the behaviour‖ of others, a means therefore of 
getting across some kind of ‗message,‘ like ‗choose me!‘ Musical behaviors are fitness 
indicators, but are not ‗read‘ in some cold-blooded assessment, e.g. ―He dances well and 
from this I infer that his genes are more likely to contribute to offspring with high levels 
of innate proprioceptive, kinesthetic and aerobic capacity which means they are more 
likely to survive and produce similar offspring who also are more likely to survive … .‖ 
It is the emotions that are aroused that matter, and them alone, and the question, if in the 
unlikely event that one is formulated, would be: how does his dancing make me feel? 
And this would be subsidiary to the larger question: Does this guy turn me on? But 
surely the ability to manipulate the emotions of another, and thus to communicate had 




Once again, it is all about feeling 
 
In Chapter One I made the audacious suggestion that education‘s main purpose is to 
make people more successful in their pleasure-seeking pursuits. The point I was trying 
to make is the fact that pleasure, which encompasses a wide range of positive emotional 
states, is the omnipresent need motivating all behaviour, even behaviour that is not 
pleasurable in itself but that leads to outcomes that are and which make worthwhile the 
postponement of pleasure (the goals of Maslow‘s self-actualization for example).  Even 
those who erroneously equate pleasure with sin and choose to practice a strict 
asceticism do so because the pursuit of higher goals affords them some kind of 
satisfaction and there can be no kind of satisfaction that does not involve some positive 
emotional activation.70 They forgo pleasure because it feels right to do so.  The point is, 
as Mithen cogently puts it: 
 
[W]e don‘t have emotions for free or for fun: they are critical to human thought and 
behaviour, and have a long evolutionary history … without them we would be entirely 
stymied in our interactions with the physical and social worlds … we would be unaware of 
the complexities and subtleties of the social world around us, and would fail entirely in our 
social relationships.‖ (2005: 25, 87)    
 
                              
69  When certain species of acacia trees are being browsed they emit a chemical that causes others of their 
kind downwind to increase their production of tannin which makes their leaves unpalatable. 




What predisposes one to act in ways contrary to one‘s immediate self-interest, which is 




„Music and emotion‟ as an active interest in the Philosophy of Music Education 
 
I have and will continue to draw on the work of Antonio Damasio which is by and large 
an exploration of the mechanics and significance of what Mithen speaks to above. What 
bears pointing out here is that the key connections between music, emotions and the 
feelingfulness of lived experience no longer seem to get much discussion in Music 
Education fora. It was the cornerstone of Bennett Reimer‘s philosophy of music 
education as aesthetic education (MEAE) (1970), but little attention is given it in 
current scholarship aside from what are generally refutations of or challenges to some of 
Reimer‘s precepts. Sadly, I perceive what might be a case of throwing out the baby with 
the bath water, but I believe that research in Cognitive Neuroscience, such as Damasio‘s 
(1994, 1999), may and should provoke a reconsideration of Reimer‘s work, in particular 
his support of Susanne Langer‘s tenet that the arts, including music, ‗educate feeling,‘ a 
vital function assuming as true, as all three claim it to be, that feeling is the ―essential 
underpinning of consciousness and mind.‖ Quoting Langer, Reimer remarks: 
 
Over and over, in detailed language, she explains how feeling arises from bodily awareness 
and, at a certain point in evolution, enters a new phase: consciousness arises. ―That is why I 
make feeling the starting-point of a philosophy of mind,‖ she says. ―The study of feeling – 
its sources, its forms, its complexities – leads one down into biological structure and 
process until its estimation becomes (for the time) impossible, and upward to the purely 
human sphere know as ‗culture.‘ It is still what we feel, and everything that can be felt, that 
is important.‖ (Reimer 2002: 81) 
 
 
Emotional manipulation and internal organization 
 
The problem that many recent Music Education philosophers seem to have with 
Reimer‘s philosophy concerns what educating feeling actually means and entails, in 
particular what its imperatives for music education practice might or should be. The 
latter is an issue that I will take up in the final chapter. But as to what might actually be 
going on internally in the experiencing of music and art that may be adaptive needs 
some elaboration in the present discussion. For Mithen, the answer is fairly clear: 
emotions are being ―manipulated‖ in ways that induce reproductively advantageous 
behaviour either for the manipulator or the manipulatee. But perhaps emotion 
manipulation need not induce overt behaviour for it to be reproductively advantageous. 
As was suggested earlier, it could be enough that the experience of something human-
made may induce synaptic reorganizations in the brain that are fitness-enhancing just 
because they help the brain to work more optimally. Tooby and Cosmides theorize 
compellingly in this regard, convinced as they are that: 
 
the human mind is permeated by an additional layer of adaptations that were selected to 
involve humans in aesthetic experiences and imagined worlds, even though these activities 






But the manipulation of emotions certainly has a plethora of uses in the interpersonal 
realm as is so abundantly obvious when observing the behavior of other species. It is 
certain that the signaling that takes place when, for example, a bird issues a courtship or 
territorial call is not the sending of some kind of encoded message where fragments of 
the call refer to anything extraneous to the call itself, as words in sentences do. It is 
merely that the call induces neurochemical activations that predispose the recipient to 
particular responses. It is of course impossible to get any true sense of what any these 
kinds of activations feel like to the recipient bird, although given how much we share in 
respect of our nervous systems, brains and chemistry, there could well be some 
similarity in the subjective qualities (qualia) of experience, how a perception feels. The 
main problem is our seeming incapacity to have emotional experiences unmediated by 
conscious thought. Even when we ‗consciously‘ decide to suspend conscious thought, 
when, for example, meditating or experiencing a work of instrumental music, it is 




Communication, verbal and nonverbal 
 
Mithen distinguishes language from music on the basis that, while both are 
manipulative, language is also referential. But even if a bird‘s call is only manipulative, 
it constitutes communication nevertheless. Something is conveyed through inducing 
particular patterns of compression and rarefaction of air molecules that increases the 
likelihood that recipients will alter their behavior in a way beneficial to the one doing 
the conveying. Ah yes, but this is not communication one might argue; a response is 
stimulated but no information is conveyed. But such an argument rests on a very narrow 
concept of what information is. If someone is speaking to me in a language I have no 
knowledge of, the words she or he utters will fail to stimulate in my brain what it would 
in the brain of someone fluent in that language. But this by no means implies that 
nothing is being communicated that is comparable or that might be information 
important to take in. Prosodic elements (tone, inflection, modulation, pauses, intensity) 
make it possible to infer many kinds of information with confidence, e.g. the speaker‘s 
attitude toward me, her/his general mood, whether I am being asked a question, told 
something, berated, appealed to or perhaps even propositioned.  Personality traits might 
be revealed such as introversion, unctuousness, a tendency to dominate, and so on. And 
of course I might also get more precise kinds of information, especially if gesture is 
being employed as it almost always is even when people who speak the same language 
converse. I might for example infer that I am being asked to stop doing something, to 
hurry up, to be quiet, to speak louder, to come closer, to pick something up, to give the 
speaker something, or to ‗bugger off‘. And even without overt gestures, ‗body 
language‘ can be quite explicit (e.g. ―you are boring me‖). Even certain vocal sounds 
that are not words can convey much, e.g. grunts, sighs, whistles, coos, tch‘ing, shsh‘ing, 
and so on. The notion that how you say something is as important as what you say is a 
recognition that much of what you are communicating would not be able to be inferred 
from the words themselves if for example they were written down (although 




inverted commas – the ‗so-called‘ tweaks - can add a lot).71 The claim that 93% of 
communication is nonverbal is something I‘ve come across more than once and 
apparently is based on the misinterpretation of research that has in any case been shown 
to be flawed.72 It is enough to recognize what is indisputable, that when it comes to 
interpersonal communication where the reading of intention, attitude, trustworthiness, 
empathy, interest and so on is important (and such readings can be crucially important), 
we rely more on nonverbal than verbal information. Moreover, we apprehend it directly 
without too much need for language mediated thought; such information does not 
emerge as a cold-blooded assessment but as a sense, feeling or intuition we have. 
 
 
How much is universal? 
 
What is also significant is the apparent universality of much nonverbal communication. 
Darwin himself studied commonalities in the way people express emotions facially, 
questioning people who had spent time among aboriginal populations around the world 
with particular attention to those that had yet to interact significantly with Europeans. 
Pinker quotes from The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals in presenting 
Darwin‘s conclusion on the matter. 
 
The same state of mind is expressed throughout the world with remarkable uniformity; and 
this fact is in itself interesting as evidence of the close similarity in bodily structure and 
mental disposition of all the races of mankind. (Pinker 1997: 365)73  
 
Darwin also observed, according to Pinker (366), that ―children who are blind and deaf 
from birth display virtually the full gamut of emotions on their faces.‖ Pinker claims 
that, aside from some disagreement as to whether certain expressions are in fact 
universal, the corroboration of Darwin‘s surmise by subsequent research has brought 
wide acceptance of the fact that a great deal of our nonverbal communication is pre-
cultural. The best known research in this regard was that conducted by psychologist 
Paul Ekman in the 1960s in which he showed photographs of faces with different 
expressions to people from several cultures including the Fore of Papua New Guinea, a 
foraging group having had at that time little contact with outsiders. He also 
photographed the faces of Fore subjects as they acted out what their reactions would be 
to, e.g. meeting a friend, coming across a decomposing carcass or encountering an 
adversary where a fight is likely to ensue. What I find remarkable is the way his 
findings were received by academia of that time where it would seem that social 
constructivism was perhaps more an orthodoxy than it is all these decades later (or so I 
would hope). Pinker describes how it excited outrage and derision with one prominent 
anthropologist insisting that Ekman be stopped from continuing one of his presentations 
as his claims were ‗fascist.‘ On a different occasion he was called a racist for pointing 
out the commonality of facial expressions across races, where Ekman had expected his 
work to be seen as a vindication of our common humanity and as grounds for greater 
intercultural understanding (1997: 365-6). 
                              
71  I have seen academics giving lectures and papers who tweak the air above their ears with two fingers 
on each hand when compelled to use an un-PC or otherwise problematic term. 
72  See, for example, Borg 2008. The research in question was two studies conducted by Mehrabian and 
collaborators (1967).  






Coming back to emotional manipulation and communication 
 
Returning to the example of bird vocalizations, we can be confident that in their 
communicating there is in the recipient no internal dialogue processing the altered 
emotional state that has been induced thereby altering it yet further through conscious 
cogitation, reflection or the weighing up of alternative possible responses. The recipient 
just responds (instinctively we would say), perhaps even by not overtly responding at 
all. It all depends on the emotional valence of the neural activity that the vocalization 
has stimulated. The kinds of information that can be communicated are thus limited, 
such as: Here I am; come check me out; stay away; predator nearby; I am the one for 
you, and so on. There are other species that can communicate something more like what 
we usually think of as information, the example that comes to mind being the different 
dances performed by honey bees when returning to the hive that ‗inform‘ the others of 
the location of productive sources of pollen or the warning calls of Vervet monkeys that 
vary depending on whether the danger is a Leopard, snake or a Crowned Eagle.  
 
Language may be referential as well as manipulatory but it is never only one or the 
other. As important as is the ‗objective‘ meaning of a verbal utterance, its emotional 
valence is at least as important if not more so as has been shown in studies of subjects in 
whom injury or disease has caused a neural disconnection that prevents an utterance 
from meaning anything in any feelingful sense, and it is this feelingful quality of 
perception that is most crucial in terms of what kinds of cognition and behavior ensue.74 
The key point for education is that nothing is truly learned if significance has not been 
accorded it and significance is ultimately a matter of emotional valence. The same can 
be said of taking an interest in something. Waterhouse explains that ―emotional arousal 
enhances memory formation by positively influencing the period of neurobiological 
activity called consolidation that establishes a memory in the brain‖ (Waterhouse, 2006: 
215). 
 
The point that strikes me as inescapable is that our capacity for manipulating emotion 
through various expressive means such as vocalization, gesture, facial expression, and 
body language had to have preceded language in evolution as it provided a cognitive 
foundation without which language could not evolved. Once the mechanisms evolved 
necessary for the attribution of referential meaning to utterances and for grouping them 
into larger meaning structures, the abilities to name things and to form ideas would 
surely have induced a rapid burgeoning of language lexically, syntactically and 
semantically which would in turn have accelerated evolution in other cognitive 
domains, perhaps increasing the psychosocial need for expressive means that are more 
direct, unmediated, and emotionally manipulative.   
 
At a cognitive level, the key advantage of language is that it provides additional levels 
of meaning and thus affords the possibility of communication that is more than just 
                              
74  As a textbook case of this, Damasio gives lengthy treatment to the case of Phineas P. Gage (1994: 183 
– 186), a railroad foreman who survived seemingly intact cognitively after an iron rod was driven 





manipulative. With language there are at least three orders of intentionality, one being 
that an individual can know what she or he is thinking; two, that one can know what 
someone else is thinking; and three, that one can know what a second party thinks that a 
third party is thinking. Chimpanzees, our closest relatives, handle the first and perhaps 
in limited ways the second, whereas humans use three or four orders regularly in their 
social interactions. But in all orders of intentionality, successful communication 
demands that the stimulus at hand acquires an appropriate emotional weighting or 
valence, be it something linguistically mediated or directly apprehended. 
 
In a very real sense, music can be called the language of emotion in so far as it affords 
multiple orders of intentionality without the mediation of words and thus without need 
for referential meanings even though these can be and usually are in various ways part 
of the mix. Without words, music on a recording cannot tell one what a second party 
was thinking when composing, performing, or recording the music, but it can say much 
about how she/he was thinking when realizing intentions and emotional content in 
sound structures (even when not personally undergoing comparable emotional states at 
the time). The musician‘s own sense of how others have gone about doing this and what 
new can be made of it also comes through and connection with one or more traditions, 
styles or schools of practice and their associated milieus may be revealed. Most 
importantly, it could be argued, one has a virtual experience of what potentially (even if 
unlikely) one could oneself cognize and feel that amounts to some kind of an ideal, even 
if it is incapable of being verbalized explicitly. Improvising music is an amazingly 
complex act that engages the improviser on so many levels; and because it is open-
ended, it admits almost unlimited applications of creativity, knowledge and skill. But 
playing music that was carefully composed and crafted by someone else allows one to 
play beyond oneself and experience at least one additional order of intentionality. 
When, improvising music in an ensemble (or even playing composed music with 
others), all three if not more orders of intentionality come into play. 
 
 
Beyond sexual selection: music and socialization 
 
Such a multilevel form of communication and the possibilities for social intercourse that 
it affords (even in the absence of abstract signs such as words) suggest to me that for 
our ancestors‘ ‗musical‘ exchanges must certainly have served purposes beyond 
courtship and the provision of ‗information‘ about one‘s own genetic fitness or that of a 
prospective mate. What most likely was a key function or purpose of musicking in the 
Pleistocene is what remains as a key function of music to this day, that it is a social 
mediator, a means by which people orientate themselves in relation to others (Robinson 
1988), by which they establish bonds, mutual understandings and interpersonal 
hierarchies, in short, how they connect with one another. This is true of art generally, 
even that which purports to be ‗autonomous‘ or ‗abstract,‘ where personal statement and 
subjectivity of expression are considered all important as is the case with much so-
called ‗high‘ art. Its essential nature remains social; otherwise there would be no desire 
or need on the part of an artist to abide by any stylistic norms whatsoever and thus to 
make her productions accessible to others. As the Marxist aesthetician Ernst Fischer 
explained it: 
 
The social or collective element has become subjectivized in the ‗I‘, but the essential 




behalf of society.  By the sheer fact of describing feelings, relationships, and conditions that 
have not been described before, he channels them from his apparently isolated ‗I‘ into a 
‗we‘, and this ‗we‘ can be recognized even in the brimming subjectivity of an artist‘s 
personality. (Fischer 1963: 46) 
 
 
Music as social mediator 
 
The most conspicuous and revealing manner in which primates connect with one 
another socially is through mutual grooming. Strength of commitment (who an 
individual feels ‗closest‘ to) is revealed by how much time is devoted to it. 
Anthropologist and evolutionary psychologist Robin Dunbar (1996) devoted 
considerable time to observing primate grooming behaviors and what they reveal about 
how alliances are built and the role played by them in effecting compromises and 
reconciliations. Its positive emotional valence comes from the increased production in 
the brain of endorphins. Dunbar had already theorized that language is an outgrowth of 
vocal grooming which evolved as a trait in our ancestors because of the difficulties in 
establishing and maintaining alliance networks in the larger groups that were formed to 





Geladas (Theropithecus gelada), a threatened species of highland baboons found only in 
Ethiopia, seem to bear out Dunbar‘s assumption, a logical one, that an increase in group 
size will force a transition from physical to vocal contact as a means by which alliances 
are managed within the group. Not only are Geladas unusual in forming troops of up to 
400, but their vocal repertoire greatly exceeds those of all other non-human primates, 
not only in quantity, but in the complexity of the sequences they produce and the ways 
in which they entail synchronicity and attunement. The late Bruce Richman spent seven 
years studying these and was particularly intrigued by their rhythmic and melodic 
qualities and concluded that these served many of the same functions as they do in 
human speech and music, e.g. to indicate beginnings and endings, to make possible the 
parsing of a sequence into constituent parts as well as the development of syntax, the 
hierarchical arranging of elements in time into progressively higher and more inclusive 
levels of structure that make the gestalt meaningful in some or another socially 
significant way. They need not convey meaning in any referential sense, but need only 
be meaningful phatically in order to be socially efficacious as they so abundantly appear 
to be in Gelada community life which Richman describes as being ―immersed in sound‖ 
(1980: 235).75 Richman describes how in their interactions, geladas often engage in long 
vocal sequences combining several voices in rhythmically intricate patterns and regards 
these complex vocal productions as ―analogs to human coordinated singing‖ where 
voices are also most assuredly ― in intimate and continuous phatic contact with each 
other‖ (Ibid). It is in hocket singing such as practiced by some Pygmy groups that 
Richman finds the most salient analogue, where notes or small note groups are 
                              
75  A phatic expression is a kind of speech act meant to achieve a social purpose only and as such any 
referential content is by and large superfluous. Much human verbal communication is comprised of 




contributed by separate voices in rapid rhythmic sequences causing a melodic gestalt to 
emerge provided an adequate level of attunement. Although Richman makes no 
mention of it, the same kind of attunement is achieved whenever different rhythmic riffs 
are layered and variously integrated into grooves as happens in percussion and dance-
music ensembles the world over. It jibes with our innate kinesthetic predispositions and 
is hence eminently pleasurable, again remembering that whatever we find pleasurable is 
so because it induces neurochemical changes that have a positive emotional valence, 
and it does so because engagement in or with it was advantageous to our ancestors in 
some way related to survival and/or procreation (the former being the precondition to 
the latter).  
 
Richman describes what he calls ―the Long Series‖ which are ―long strings of 
alternations of expired and inspired sounds‖ that are commonly heard when the social 
context is friendly and relaxed, as when Geladas are engaged in the mutual grooming 
that occupies substantial portions of their day. These alternations are obviously what 
confer a rhythmic quality to the sequences produced. Nonhuman primates apparently 
lack the articulatory equipment needed for producing consonants, where the air flow has 
to be broken in various ways often involving precise tongue shape and motion, 
something we humans are superb at. But this does not in anyway imply that there is a 
corresponding ‗deficit‘ in primate‘s ability to cognitively parse strings of sounds into 
patterns that are meaningful. As important to auditory scene analysis as is the capacity 
to fuse overtones into single sounds is sensitivity to the way a sound begins, its attack or 
release, for this greatly impacts on how the whole sound is perceived and connected to 
some identifiable external source. As Dutton points out, it is what happens in the first 
tenth of a second that allows us to distinguish ―play‖ from ―bay,‖ ―ray,‖ ―stray,‖ ―day,‖ 
or ―stay‖ (Dutton 2009: 215), further pointing out that if one were to remove the attacks 
of recorded notes played by instruments (which can be easily done with available 
technology) it would be impossible to distinguish an oboe from a violin. What I find 
interesting is that the articulatory equipment humans are endowed with seems to be far 
more than arguably is needed by language. Its evolution must have benefited more than 





Mithen suggests that the analogues between human and Gelada vocal sequences are 
strongest in relation to the non-linguistic vocalizations of infant-directed speech (IDS), 
what he sees as one of the most compelling sources of evidence in support of Blacking‘s 
theory that language was preceded in evolution by a ―nonverbal, prelinguistic, ‗musical‘ 
mode of thought and action‖ (Blacking 1984 – quoted in Mithen 2005: 5). Anyone who 
has spent any time with infants is aware that long before they begin to acquire any word 
knowledge, they manifest a keen interest in and sensitivity to spoken language 
especially when its melodic and rhythmic elements have been exaggerated as they so 
evidently are in IDS (‗baby talk‘, ‗motherese‘) the world over. The most general and 
universal of these have been described by Fernald (1992: 391) as follows.  
 
Mothers, as well as fathers and adults who are not parents, speak consistently more slowly 
and with higher pitch … in smooth, exaggerated intonation contours quite unlike the 
choppy and rapid-fire speech patterns used when addressing adults. To praise an infant, 
mothers typically use wide-range pitch contours with a rise-fall pattern. To elicit an infant‘s 




soothing an infant, mothers tend to use long, smooth, falling pitch contours, in marked 
contrast to the short, sharp intonation patterns used in warning or disapproval. 
 
Even children of pre-school age adopt such prosodic exaggerations when speaking to 
infants and so do adults who have previously spent little or no time in the presence of 
infants. Fernald‘s research has further shown the distinct preference infants have to IDS 
compared to conventional speech as well their greater degree of responsiveness to voice 
intonation compared to facial expression (Fernald 1991: 43-60). 
 
The adaptive value of IDS should be obvious enough, especially bearing in mind the 
extended period of immaturity characteristic of ‗higher‘ primate species, humans in 
particular. Indeed, in all species where broods have to be cared for, parental behaviors 
have evolved that compensate for the general helplessness of neonates and hence 
improve their survival prospects. However, with longer periods of dependency during 
which different needs present themselves, parental behavior must be more flexible. 
Fernald refers to three studies demonstrating this flexibility in different primate species, 
e.g. where behavior modifications were called for because of infant disabilities.76 
 
Fernald argues that ―the use of prosodically modified vocalizations in early mother-
infant communication may have had adaptive advantages extending beyond the infancy 
period over the course of hominid evolution‖ (1992: 420-421) and in support of this 
refers to research pointing to a strong correlation between the quality of attachment in 
infancy and levels of social competence later in life (Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy 1985). 
The role of IDS in language acquisition is quite clear. For one thing, it helps children to 
acquire syntax, that is, a sense of how language is structured. In order to parse a 
statement and make sense of it, one first must be able to break up what is for the most 
part a continuous stream of sound into meaningful units. For this we rely on some 
inbuilt mechanism that extracts statistical regularities in this stream. Mithen refers to 
research done by the developmental psychologist Jenny Saffran to gain an 
understanding of how infants are able to identify discrete words in speech (Saffran, 
Aslin, & Newport 1996) (Saffran, Johnson, Aslin, & Newport 1999). What is of greatest 
significance for Mithen‘s theory of a common ancestor to music and language is the 
evidence that Saffran‘s research offers of a general ability to discern patterns in auditory 
as well as visual stimuli. What she found to be the case in her experiments where infants 
were subjected to continuous strings of artificial syllables containing repetitions of 
certain three-syllable sequences (e.g. pabiku in the string 
tibudopabikudaropigolatupabiku …) she also found when they were given a continuous 
sound stream of musical tones containing repetitions of three-note pitch sequences.  
What Mithen is convinced of is that this ability evolved not because it made language 
possible, but because of its broader value in making it possible for the very young to 
start to make sense of the world generally (Mithen 2005: 76). For him there is no more 
sense in claiming that it evolved for language only to be used incidentally for music (as 





                              




Laying the foundations for social competence 
 
That it is in the intimacy between mother and neonate that the foundations are laid for 
later forms of mutuality essential in social species like ours is the core premise of Ellen 
Dissanayake‘s thesis as she develops it in Art and Intimacy: How the Arts Began. 
 
Instilled as part of our biological nature, the rhythms and modes of infancy demonstrate and 
develop the psychological capacities that predispose humans to mutuality – the sharing of 
emotional states in patterned sequences with others. In the close early interactions between 
infants and their caretakers are the prototypes for what will become our later experiences of 
love, allegiance, art, and other forms of self-transcendence. (2000: 7) 
 
Regarding love as something far greater and more organic than sexual attachment, she 
proposes adult expressions of it to be outgrowths of the ―emotionally meaningful 
‗rhythms and modes‘ that are jointly created and sustained by mothers and their infants 
in ritualized, evolved interactions‖ (2000: xi). It is in this intimate emotional 
communion that Dissanayake proposes the arts to have their primary evolutionary root. 
In this regard it is important to note that she uses ‗rhythm‘ and ‗mode‘ in much more 
holistic and psychological senses than what the terms generally connote in relation to 
musical structures. They are ―general terms for the admittedly indescribable – literally 
unverbalizable – sense of intermingled movement and sensory overlapping that 
characterizes infant experiences, as it also characterizes subsequent experiences of love 
and  art.‖ (6) 
 
Rhythm has to do with an unfolding in time, the  patterned course of an experience; modes 
are qualities of  that experience – its sense of swiftness, solidity,  opening, closing, speed, 
forcefulness, fullness, barrenness,  lightness, and so forth, on a dynamic scale of moreness  
and lessness. One might say that rhythms are something like verbs, whereas modes are like 
adjectives, except the two usually interpenetrate, coalesce with other senses (sight, sound, 
touch, smell, taste, balance), and change from moment to moment. The words ―rhythm‖ 




The education of feeling? 
 
Dissanayake‘s elaborations on this broader, more psychologically rooted concept of 
rhythm recall Susanne Langer‘s portrayal of music as a ―tonal analogue of emotive 
life.‖ 
 
The tonal structures we call ―music‖ bear a close logical similarity to the forms of human 
feeling - forms of growth and of attenuation, flowing and stowing, conflict and resolution, 
speed, arrest, terrific excitement, calm, or subtle activation and dreamy lapses - not joy and 
sorrow perhaps, but the poignancy of either and both - the greatness and brevity and eternal 
passing of everything vitally felt.  Such is the pattern, or logical form, or sentience; and the 
pattern of music is that same form worked out in pure, measured sound and silence. (1953: 
27) 
 
In her earlier book, Homo Aestheticus (1992: 146), Dissanayake suggests that Langer‘s 
work anticipated that of later empathy theorists and regards it as capable of being 
―integrated smoothly into a biologically based view of aesthetic experience‖ (2000: 242 




(‗emotive life‘) has a pattern or form that can be construed as ‗logical‘ in the way that 
musical structures are. My own emotive life is what I would characterize as the near 
antithesis of this. Indeed, I would say that its fleeting and mercurial nature is what 
underlies the similarly erratic and illogical nature of my internal dialogue and what 
consequently makes sustained logical thought processes somewhat of an arduous affair, 
for me at least. It most assuredly is true that mental life is an unceasing interplay of 
tension and resolution in which there is ―continual conative effort directed toward 
satisfaction in a goal which carries within itself a new want demanding further conative 
effort toward .....,‘‘ but that is where its logic ends (Osborne 1984: 84).  
 
Where I believe the mistake lies in Langer‘s theory and in the ways that Reimer makes 
use of it is in its suggestion that the value of music and art lies in what it replicates and 
gives form to, where it seems to me all too obvious that it rather lies in what it is capable 
of inducing neurochemically that allows one to undergo feelingful experiences that are, 
in fact, unlike most of mental life and that are special and meaningful because of this.  
Undergoing such experiences, as I argued in Chapter One drawing on an article by 
Wayne Bowman, achieves to some degree, however minute, an internal re-organization 
of our ‗tacit interpretive schemata.‘ In Piagetian terms, the art experience is ultimately a 
learning experience in that, through a process of assimilation and accommodation, some 
level of cognitive adaptation is achieved.  
 
The art experience is accordingly a means of fine-tuning cognition and even though it 
may and usually does incite conscious thought and reflection, it can only do so because 
of what it is achieving at a pre-conscious level; it is tacit learning so to say.  Langer 
understood this clearly enough. Far more than just pushing pleasure buttons, as Pinker 
suggests (though I doubt actually believes), what the art experience does: 
 
... is to formulate our conceptions of feeling and our conceptions of visual, factual, and 
audible reality together.  It gives us forms of imagination and forms of feeling, inseparably; 
that is to say, it clarifies and organizes intuition itself. (Langer 1953: 397) 
 
 
Art and internal regulation 
 
In my earlier discussion of kinesthesia and proprioception, I introduced what I see as a 
crucial realization for any Darwinian aesthetics, that cognitive adaptations have evolved 
not only to make possible behavior crucial to the satisfaction of basic survival needs 
(the four f‘s - feeding, fighting, fleeing and fornication), but, as importantly, behavior 
that assists ―the task of organizing the brain both physically and informationally‖ 
(Tooby & Cosmides 2001a:14).  
 
[A] neurocognitive adaptation may operate in two different modes. The first is its 
functional mode, when it is performing its evolved function (e.g., the visual system 
performing useful scene analysis, the language system generating utterances for 
communicative purposes). The second is its organizational mode. This mode of operation is 
designed to construct the adaptation, to provide it with the correct weightings, information, 
and representations, and in general to develop a better organization for carrying out its 





It may even be that the intensity of one‘s emotional response to something correlates 
with the nature and degree of cognitive re-organization that takes place, a theory that 
Dissanayake attributes to psychologist Gerald Clore (1994).  
 
Clore points out that a musical or other performance, in which we are sufficiently involved 
to generate an elaborate model or expectancy of what is occurring and fully attend to it, 
progressively transforms its content, setting up and resolving ambiguities or problems and 
thereby restructuring the mental world of the perceiver. … Clore wonders whether intensity 
of feeling is the experience of cognitive reorganization itself, or the experience of 
physiological arousal triggered by such change. (2000: 217-218) 
 
As does Dissanayake, I too suspect that for all intents and purposes both are the one and 
same experience. 
 
It bears reiterating here that in human ontogeny, as is the case with other animals, the 
reliable development of an adaptation, how genes ultimately get expressed, is dependent 
on the organism‘s interactions with the environments in which it lives out its life.  As 
Tooby and Cosmides make clear: 
 
This means that information and structure necessary for the proper development of an 
adaptation may be stored in the world as well as in the genome, and that selection will 
shape developmental programs to exploit information-rich features of the world. This 
allows adaptations, such as the language faculty … to be far more elaborate than could be 
managed if all of the necessary information had to be supplied by the genome. What is 
genetically specified in adaptations is an economical kernel of elements that guides the 
construction and initialization of the machinery through targeted interactions with specific 
structures, situations, or stimuli in the world. (2001a: 15) 
 
 
More on intimacy, infant-directed speech and ontogeny 
 
The first and most crucial such stimulus is an infant‘s mother and it is now known that 
‗targeted interaction‘ with the mother begins prior to birth.  Before the end of the first 
trimester of pregnancy, prenates are actively hearing and responding to aural stimuli. At 
some point in the third trimester, they begin to discern their mother‘s voice. Using a 
specially designed ‗dummy‘ (nonnutritive nipple), DeCasper and Fifer (1980) were able 
to show that a neonate less than three days old can distinguish its mother‘s voice from a 
recording of it juxtaposed with recordings of other mothers (all of whom had been 
recorded reading the same prose). Not only that, they learn within minutes to initiate 
sucking patterns that prompt the playback device to switch from non-mother back to 
mother (DeCasper & Fifer 1980).  
 
It seems clear enough, as is the given upon which Dissanayake builds her theory, that 
intimacy between mother and baby has adaptive value beyond inclining the mother to 
attend adequately to her child‘s survival needs. Ultimately, it is the neonate‘s survival 
needs that are being attended to, but not the immediate needs of food and protection. 
Without being all that consciously aware of it, the mother or caregiver, through intimate 
interaction with the infant, is empowering her for later success in the survival game by 
guiding the unfolding and connecting up of foundational cognitive mechanisms. As the 
dominant element in the infant‘s psychosocial environment, she is engaging in the 




which all subsequent cognitive development will depend. A mother does so without 
needing to understand the neuropsychology of it; she intuitively does what is 
appropriate unless deficits in her own development or some psychological abnormality 
cause her to do otherwise. This is because such a sensibility is itself an adaptation that is 
believed to have been selected for as a result of the evolution of large brains 
necessitated (initially at least) by our becoming a bipedal species. Larger brains required 
modifications of the female pelvis and it is conceivable that this could have happened 
quickly in evolutionary time, caught up in a process of runaway selection until an 
asymptote was reached and female survival interests (e.g. locomotion) were 
compromised too significantly. This created a selection pressure for earlier than optimal 
birthing and hence also for females and males better equipped for the nurturance of 
premature offspring. We are reminded here that men and children of both sexes 
demonstrate natural competence in IDS. 
 
Intimacy is by definition a relational condition and necessarily a two-way affair. 
Newborns are anything but passive sensory-motor systems, reactive in rudimentary, 
involuntary ways. They ―are actively seeking for experience and for communication‖ 
and bring far more to the table cognitively than what Freud, Piaget or Skinner ventured 
to be possible without considerably more experience outside of the womb (Trevarthen 
2006: 20). But they require ‗conversational‘ intimacy for the mutuality that they are 
genetically equipped for to develop into the forms of interpersonal competence that 
adult life requires in a largely cultural environment. To say we are genetically 
engineered for culture means more than that we are possessed of the requisite 
computational capacities but that we are also emotionally predisposed to it.  
 
 
On the Mozart Effect 
 
The seemingly obvious and crucial importance of this conversational intimacy and its 
musical components lend support, on the surface at least, for two different but related 
cognitive theories that have garnered much attention in educational philosophy and that 
have informed a range of curricular reforms in the last two to three decades, they being: 
emotional intelligence (EI) (Salovey & Mayer, 1990) and the Mozart Effect (ME) 
(Rauscher, Shaw, & Ky, 1993).  Perhaps the most comprehensive and up-to-date 
critique of these is by Lynn Waterhouse (2006) who considers them (together with 
Howard Gardiner‘s theory of Multiple Intelligences) in relation to research in Cognitive 
Neuroscience and Evolutionary Psychology that clearly place all on shaky ground 
because of problems with their core assumptions about how the mind works. Here, I 
will only take up those of her conclusions that are pertinent to the present discussion 
and its concern with the ―rhythms and modes‖ of communicative intimacy that 
characterize a child‘s early encounters with the world of significant others. 
 
The original Mozart Effect theory was that listening to Mozart‘s music, or some of it at 
least, temporarily increased spatial IQ (Rauscher, Shaw, & Ky, 1993), this evidenced by 
tests done with university students in the USA.  Notwithstanding that the findings of 




several studies ―disconfirming‖ the Mozart effect (Waterhouse 2006: 215-216),77 the 
theory has been, largely due to the interest it sparked among educators and the general 
public, quickly transformed into a ―scientific legend‖ that claims much more for the 
effect of Mozart‘s music than ever was posited by the original researchers and that has 
spawned a plethora of popular texts and websites as well as a ―small CD industry 
claiming mental improvement through listening to classical music‖ (Waterhouse 2006: 
214). In The Mozart Effect: Tapping the Power of Music to Heal the Body, Strengthen 
the Mind, and Unlock the Creative Spirit (1997), Campbell suggests that an infant‘s 
mental development will be enhanced by having specially chosen classical music as a 
frequent feature in her or his aural environment.  
 
Waterhouse‘s conclusion, after a thorough reading of numerous studies, is that whatever 
positive effect that exposure to Mozart and other music may have on spatial competence 
is the result of emotional arousal and what might at best be the case is that ―cortical 
arousal stimulated by music can prime cortical circuits for spatial processing where the 
circuits for music and spatial processing overlap‖ (2006: 216). But this suggests only a 
temporary enhancement of a particular form of cognitive processing and no matter how 
important spatial intelligence is to human pursuits, this inordinate attention on it only 
serves a kind of music education advocacy that arguably does more harm than good 
when it is founded on pseudo-scientific works such as Campbell‘s. Certainly it makes 
sense to provide infants and children (everyone for that matter) with aural environments 
that help achieve emotional regulation that is conducive to cognitive effort and health 
generally. In this regard, it is in the positive effects that Mozart‘s music is reported to 
have in the treatment of various neurological disorders such as epilepsy or autism that 
should perhaps warrant more attention than its possible transfer value to improved 
academic skills.78 If music has therapeutic value, as it so evidently does judging by the 
ever growing field of Music Therapy, this is something that education should be 
exploiting maximally. Whatever positive effect it may have in treating neurological 
disorders, it can only have because there are neural mechanisms that can respond to it 
and enact processes that organize, regulate or otherwise improve neural function in 
some crucial way. My assumption, which I will pursue further in the final chapter, is 
that such beneficial effects have corollary effects in ‗normal‘ brains.   
 
 
Active musicking and cognitive development 
 
What has cast the greatest doubt on the claims that listening to Mozart has any long-
term benefits is a report produced by the German Federal Ministry for Education and 
Research in 2006 that followed an analysis of over three hundred studies whose results 
had been published in reputable journals and which confidently concluded that even 
where a transient effect was found, it lasted no more than twenty minutes and could be 
as effectively induced by a wide range of music, or even by the reading of a story.  But 
where the report found sufficient evidence and the need for further research was in what 
appears to be a definite positive correlation between practical musicking and IQ 
                              
77  Among others, Waterhouse cites: Chabris 1999, McKelvie & Low 2002, and Nantais & Schellenberg 
1999. 
78  A brief time spent at any of the websites of national and international ‗associations for Music 




development (Schumacher 2006). There is a significant body of research in cognitive 
neuroscience that shows conclusively that developing certain competences in music 
making effects structural changes in the brain, for example, increased gray matter in 
motor, auditory, and visual-spatial brain regions (Gaser & Schlaug 2003) and increased 
gamma-band responsiveness that positively affects oscillatory networks associated with 
the brain‘s executive functions (Trainor, Shahin & Roberts 2009). 
 
From an adaptationist perspective, it would be expected that developing skill in doing 
something so cognitively complex as making music would induce neural changes of far 
greater consequence than would be the result of only experiencing what others have 
produced, especially when we consider what singing, dancing or playing an instrument 
requires kinesthetically or proprioceptively.  But the suggestion coming from the 
research just cited is that there is enhancement of conceptual processing capacities such 
as spatial reasoning, propositional logic, abstract thought and scenario-building.  In 
modern environments, these capacities are more crucial than they would have been in 
the Pleistocene, and it is worth considering what might have driven their evolution such 
that they are unquestionable universals in human cognition. We have already considered 
sexual selection and the fact that many kinds of prowess can make one more attractive 
as a potential mate and hence be capacities that natural selection would favor. But this 
does not seem adequate to explain such extraordinary capacities which other species 
lack or have in but rudimentary forms even though mate selection is as vital a ‗concern‘ 
for them as for us. In the discussion of the sexual division of labor theory it was 
suggested that improved hunting skill provided more ready supplies of protein needed 
by a large brain.  But again, this does not suggest a need for attributes such as ‗theory of 
mind,‘ language, altruism, or a level of general intelligence that allows brain modules to 
work together (the ‗g‘ factor) although all of these would likely have facilitated and 
been promoted by cooperative hunting.   
 
 
It‟s all about living in groups 
 
Recalling the discussion around the grooming behavior of the gregarious Gelada 
baboons, one of the theories I find most convincing as regards what most stimulated the 
exponential increase in brain size and intelligence is the ecological dominance/social 
competition hypothesis (EDSC) initially formulated by Alexander (1989) and later 
developed by Flinn, Geary, & Ward (2005) among others. The success of our ancestors 
in mitigating the forces of nature (through, for example, securing food, shelter and 
clothing) allowed us to become ecologically dominant and together with increases in the 
size and density of populations, we became our own ―principal hostile force of nature‖ 
(Alexander, 1989, p. 469) and social competition became the primary impetus to the 
evolution of communicative and other psychosocial capacities that allowed for greater 
success in anticipating and influencing social interactions with other humans. Given that 
the exercise of such capacities brought changes to the sociocultural environment and 
hence to the environment of selection, an ―autocatalytic,‖ ―runaway‖ process was 
unleashed that caused a ―ratcheting up [of] the importance of social-cognitive 
competencies and supporting brain systems‘ (Flinn et al. 2005: 35). Evolutionary 
psychology has shown several of these competencies to be adaptations that evolved to 
solve problems presented by living in large groups, such as the forming of coalitions 




that our large brain is the result ―of a cognitive arms race set in motion by the 
Machiavellian intelligence of our primate forbears.‖ (Pinker 1997, p. 193) 
 
Being the ardent adaptationist he is, Pinker perhaps does not use the adjective 
‗Machiavellian‘ lightly. EP has demonstrated convincingly, that underlying our social 
interactions are evolved mechanisms that calculate, for example, how much altruism is 
appropriate vis-à-vis the degree of apparent genetic relatedness, a calculation that 
Hamilton was able to express mathematically.  Altruism was able to evolve according to 
Hamilton because the cost to the giver (c) was outweighed by the benefit to the receiver 
(b) multiplied by the degree of genetic relatedness (r); hence: c < r b (Buss 2008: 231).  
Nepotism is thus an evolutionarily sound strategy. No such calculation takes place at a 
conscious level and one‘s ‗calculation‘ of degree of genetic relatedness can be flawed 
(e.g. when a husband has been cuckolded). The algorithm is playing out with what data 
is available to it, but all that is offered up to conscious thought are intuitions and 
feelings of attachment. And when such intuitions and feelings begin to incline one 
toward a particular behavior they often (perhaps always in humans) must contend with 
intuitions and feelings issuing from other calculations taking into account other 
interests. As Pinker puts it: ―the different parts of the mind struggle to engage or 
disengage the clutch pedal of behavior.‖ (1997, p. 518). There are invariably other 
preconscious calculations of costs and benefits based on other kinds of data and 
survival/reproduction issues, many if not most being the multifaceted issues and 
contingencies of living in large groups which requires cooperation and collaboration. 
Again, as has been emphasized repeatedly, it is the emotional valence of a perceptual 
focus that is paramount, in this case, how an interpersonal connection feels. Pinker 
makes the point cogently in respect of the love a parent feels for her or his child, 
showing as effectively irrelevant the fact that what underlies it all are impersonal 
calculations of cost vs. benefit vis-à-vis the propagation of her/his genes following 
algorithmic rules of inference. After all, our ancestors knew nothing of genetics and 
neither do most living people. ―People love their children not because they want to 
spread their genes (consciously or unconsciously) but because they can‘t help it.‖ 
 
When an animal behaves to benefit another animal at a cost to itself, biologists call it 
alturism. When altruism evolves because the altruist is related to the beneficiary so the 
altruism-causing gene benefits itself, they call it kin selection. But when we look into the 
psychology of the animal doing the behaving, we can give the phenomenon another name: 
love [the essence of which] is feeling pleasure in another‘s well-being and pain in its 
harm.‖ (1997: 400) 
 
Concordant with the EDSC in many respects is the social contract theory developed by 
Tooby and Cosmides (1992) to help explain the evolution of our capacity and 
inclination for cooperative exchange, this being essential for cohabitation in large 
groups. Central to their theory is the hypothesis that we have an evolved mechanism for 
detecting cheaters, those who receive but do not reciprocate. Without such a 
mechanism, cheaters enjoy an evolutionary advantage over cooperators and they would 
have come to dominate in populations bringing about a selecting-out of any cooperation 
instincts. Reciprocal altruism could only have evolved if cooperators were able to detect 
and marginalize cheating and favor interactions with other cooperators. The empirical 
support that Tooby and Cosmides have been able to muster is considerable and 
compelling. One only needs to note the preponderance of news items exposing 
corruption and other forms of cheating (especially among high-profile offenders) to 




only matched by the morbid interest they take in the misfortunes of others, for which 
there is the German word schadenfreude. These of course are the psychosocial traits that 
the news media thrives on; they are what sell newspapers. Most pertinent to the present 
discussion is Tooby & Cosmides‘ identification of the cognitive capacities which 
keeping cheating in check and cooperation generally require and which I suggest are 
examples of the capacities that were ratcheted up in the autocatalytic process theorized 
by Flinn et al, cited above. Buss (2008: 271-273) has abstracted these as follows: 
 
 ―the ability to recognize many different individual humans‖. Buss cites a study 
showing as common a recognition rate of over 90 percent for individuals who 
have not seen for many, up to thirty-four years as well as research in 
‗prosopagnosia,‘ the loss of this ability in people who have suffered damage to a 
specific place in the right hemisphere of the brain;  
 ―the ability to remember the histories of interactions with different individuals.‖  
Although he is unable to cite any research that has directly explore this ability, 
Buss posits the necessity of some form of innate ―accounting system‖ for keeping 
track of the costs/benefits of one‘s involvements with others; 
 ―the ability to communicate one‘s values to others.‖  By ‗values,‘ Buss is referring 
primarily to our senses of dissatisfaction or satisfaction in relation to the behavior 
of others, for example, approval, distress, entitlement, and censure; 
 ―the ability to model the values of others.‖ In other words, we need to be able to 
detect and understand these same senses as they manifest in the behavior of others 
so that we can optimize the nature of our exchanges to bring the greatest personal 
benefit, this being perhaps most important where the benefit is not immediately 
realizable; 
 ―the ability to represent costs and benefits, independent of the particular items 
exchanged.‖ Buss, in agreement with Cosmides and Tooby (1989), argues that 
given vast array of things that people exchange (even in hunter-gatherer societies) 
necessitates a mechanism or system of mechanisms that allows us to intuit costs 
and benefits in respect of a variety of exchange ‗items.‘ 
 
 
Bringing music into the mix 
 
It is in communal activities that such abilities can best be exercised and most 
productively put to use and it is conceivable that this is why we have such a universal 
predilection for such activities.  If the activity demands cooperation, collaboration and 
mutuality, it ―manifests a relatedness for all to see‖ (Chernoff 1979, p. 144). Chernoff‘s 
surmise regarding this dimension of African musical traditions is worth quoting here.  
 
 Africans use music to mediate their involvement in a community, and a good musical 
performance reveals their orientation towards this crucial concern. As a style of human 
conduct, participation in an African musical event characterizes a sensibility with which the 
Africans relate to the world and commit themselves to its affairs. A cultural expression, 
music is a product of that sensibility, but, more significantly, as a social force, music helps 
shape that sensibility. The development of musical awareness in Africa constitutes a 
process of education.‖  
 
I would argue that this is a sensibility that informs and manifests in many if not most 
traditions of communal music making throughout the world, where becoming successful 




music making‘s socializing efficacy.  Remarks I made many years ago regarding 
making music in groups and our capacity for empathy bear repeating here.  
 
Music is most socially efficacious in situations of collective music making where the 
individual becomes an active participant, interacting with others in the pursuit of common 
goals and in a context where individuality must to some degree be circumscribed.  Music of 
course is not in any way unique as an activity that cultivates cooperativeness - the 
willingness to subordinate self interests to collective interests; team sport is at least as 
effective in this regard.  What group musical activity is especially effective in cultivating is 
empathy - the capacity to enter imaginatively into the feelings and thoughts of others.  
Empathy involves much more than the subordination of self interests; it involves self 
transcendence - ―a going out of our own nature, and an identification of ourselves with the 
beautiful that exists in thought, action, or person, not our own‖ (Shelly 1819) - the 
precondition to an authentic social conscience.  The extent to which empathy plays a role in 
collective music making varies from one context to another and is affected by the extent to 
which structural parameters … are imposed.  In group improvisation, for example, the 
participant is not provided with an explicit set of instructions to ensure that his contribution 
integrates successfully with what the rest are doing.  Rather he has to imagine intensely so 
as to successfully anticipate where others are going, to know when to take the lead, when 
not to, when to be silent, where and when to effect changes, etc. (Robinson 1988:      ) 
 
 
Why is music so often made in groups? 
 
That music is so often made in groups has presented a challenge to adaptationist 
explanations, and it is apropos to consider some of the ways it has been met given the 
present focus on innate social sensibilities and why they have evolved. The hypothesis 
that I infer to be implicit in the EDSC and social contract theories is that, as important 
as such sensibilities are, just as important are the means by which they are acquired. Our 
predisposition for group music making may be like or even linked to our predisposition 
for play activity and sport. With all of these, not only do we fine-tune kinesthesia and 
proprioception, but we practice our social skills and calibrate their underlying neural 
mechanisms in contexts that are comparatively safe.  
 
 
On group selection theory 
 
When approaching the question why a predisposition for group music making would 
have evolved and become a universal human trait, Miller makes clear the need to 
―distinguish between behaviors done in groups, and those done for groups‖ (Miller 
2000: 350). That what is good for the group is good for the individual seems like 
irrefutable commonsense and suggests that the evolutionary explanation for group 
music making is that it fulfills a group-level function as opposed to functions advancing 
the reproductive success of individuals, the latter being the case with sexual selection. It 
is however a theory which most evolutionary psychologists dismiss, at best only 
conceding group selection as a weak force in human evolution. The question that it does 
not seem able to answer is how it could work vis-à-vis the natural selection algorithm 
introduced in Chapter One, in which case there would need to be a replicating entity 
other than a gene. Groups do not replicate; they survive through generations (which are 
themselves constructs incapable of clear delineation) provided that environmental 
conditions are favourable. They could only be regarded as replicating units provided 




the sexual kind). Since the cultural revolution that followed upon our ancestors 
becoming competent at growing surpluses of food, it has become increasingly difficult 
to find populations of people that remain culturally insulated from other groups. In any 
case, group selection would require competition between groups within environments of 
selection where groups less successful in dealing with environmental pressures would 
be selected out as those better adapted would be selected in. At one level, this seems to 
be what has happened in the course of human history as evidenced by the almost 
complete disappearance of human communities that, by virtue of their isolation from 
others, could conceivably be regarded as discrete and cohesive units. Overexploitation 
of critical resources by ancestral groups whose members did not act in ways conducive 
to the interests of others and of the group as a whole quite likely would have perished, 
but then it seems implausible that such groups would have taken form to begin with, at 
least ones of any size.  What is far more likely and what has been observed in recorded 
history is that groups were absorbed into larger, more heterogeneous groupings 
(bringing their genes with them of course) that are difficult if not impossible to define as 
any kind of ‗tribe‘ where there is a high degree of homogeneity in how its members live 
out their lives. Even where people profess and genuinely feel a strong sense of ethnicity, 
this is really only an identification with a particular cultural ‗heritage‘ that beyond a 
shared language is difficult to demarcate or define in any categorical way; they are not 
claiming membership in some cohesive, unstratified, and exclusive population that is 
able or inclined to remain in isolation from others.  
 
Miller makes the salient point that other primates live in groups which, as was made 
clear in respect of Gelada baboons, are characterized by intricate and dynamic social 
interactions and yet primatologists have never to my knowledge ventured to invoke 
group selection in their attempts to explain their social behavior. Group music making is 
obviously social behavior and there can be no doubting that it benefits the group 
concerned, but presumably also those individuals who comprise it.  
 
If musical behavior has no individual-level advantage but does have individual costs [as it 
most certainly does], it would be difficult for group selection to have an effect on the 
evolution of music. The same holds true for any other ―altruistic‖ trait that has individual 
costs and only group benefits. No biologists ever made a good case for such an altruistic 
trait evolving in any vertebrate species, so it is not the kind of explanation one would wish 
to invoke for human music. (Miller 2000, 352) 
 
Even with honeybees, where the case for group selection seems to be strong, kin 
selection can still be argued to be the dominant evolutionary force in that all of the bees 
in a hive share at least 25% of the same genes. Selection among groups might be 
possible theoretically but the conditions it would depend on have not been convincingly 
shown to exist in respect of any vertebrate species at least, in particular the demand for 
a membership of genuinely ‗selfless‘ individuals that to a high degree are subject to a 
‗shared fate,‘ where the death of the colony would likely mean the death of any unique 
alleles in the genetic lineage that might have played a part in further genetic evolution.  
Pinker concludes that ―natural selection could select groups with selfless members only 
if each group could enforce a pact guaranteeing that all their members stayed selfless‖ 
(1997: 397).  
 
Humans are highly competitive within their respective groups where invariably one 
finds ‗cheaters‘ and ‗free-riders‘ who would come to dominate if the rest of the 




relocation to other groups through marriage, intergroup conflict or defection being 
common and this can logically be inferred to the case between hunter-gatherer groups in 
the Pleistocene. The possibility of group selection as a significant force in the evolution 
of our psychosocial traits is attractive as it seems to offer a ―kinder, gentler, more 
cooperative, more humane form of evolution than individual level selection, more suited 
to the production of positive, enjoyable adaptations such as language, art, and music,‖ 
even though it too depends on competition and willy-nilly ―replaces the logic of murder 
with the logic of genocide‖ (Miller 2000: 351 with reference to Williams 1966).  
 
 
On the „Baldwin Effect‟ 
 
The crucial point that needs to be made here is that there is no need for a theory of 
group selection in order to establish that group-level phenomena (behaviors) have been 
a critical factor in human evolution. Neither is it necessary for explaining the 
exponential ratcheting-up of the evolution of our psychosocial traits and the group-level 
behaviors that they have given rise to, including group music making. As has already 
been emphasized, living in a group dramatically alters the environment of selection in 
which its individual members survive and procreate. But there still needs to be some 
mechanism according to which behavior occasioned by living in groups brings about 
and expedites evolution at the genetic level.  
 
The early Darwinist that is generally credited with discovering this mechanism was the 
American psychologist James Mark Baldwin who in 1896 described what has come to 
be called the Baldwin Effect. In a nutshell, it describes a process where as a result of 
interaction with its environment, an individual organism acquires a trait that gradually 
gets genetically encoded for within the individual‘s group such that eventually in some 
generation down the line, all or nearly all members of the group are similarly able to 
acquire the trait because they are now innately predisposed for it. As Baldwin himself 
put it: ―social adaptation sets the direction of physical phylogeny and physical heredity 
is determined in part by this factor" (Baldwin, 1896: 553 cited in ‗Baldwin Effect‘).  
 
Despite appearances, the Baldwin Effect is nothing like Lamarckian evolution, which in 
its notion that traits acquired by a parent can be genetically passed on to offspring was 
long ago debunked. In 1987, Hinton and Nowlan were able to verify the Baldwin Effect 
by way of a computer simulation that put to the test the following thought experiment 
which succinctly captures Baldwin‘s theory. 
 
Imagine an organism that contains a neural net in which there are many potential 
connections. Suppose that the net only confers added reproductive fitness on the organism 
if it is connected in exactly the right way. In this worst case, there is no reasonable 
evolutionary path toward the good net and a pure evolutionary search can only discover 
which of the potential connections should be present by trying possibilities at random. The 
good net is like a needle in a haystack. The evolutionary search space becomes much better 
if the genotype specifies some of the decisions about where to put connections, but leaves 
other decisions to learning. This has the effect of constructing a large zone of increased 
fitness around the good net. Whenever the genetically specified decisions are correct, the 
genotype falls within this zone and will have increased fitness because learning will stand a 
chance of discovering how to make the remaining decisions so as to produce the good net. 
This makes the evolutionary search much easier. It is like searching for a needle in a 




argument is that the person who tells you that you are getting close does not need to tell you 
anything more. (Hinton & Nowlan 1987: 495-496) 
 
Thus, if an organism, as a result of a genetic mutation, has more connections innately 
placed in an ‗on‘ position, it will stand a better chance than others that the other 
connections necessary for the trait to become operational (e.g. using a stick to extract 
termites from their nest) will get turned ‗on‘ by what the organism encounters in its 
environment. The chances are increased exponentially as each additional connection 
comes under genetic control. Having half of the connections under genetic control 
increases the chances one-thousand-fold compared with an organism with no 
connections under genetic control or which does not have the capacity to turn ‗on‘ 
connections in response to environmental stimulation. In his discussion of Hinton and 
Nowlan‘s simulations, Pinker emphasizes that while networks did evolve more and 
more such connections, they never became completely ‗innate.‘ 
 
As more and more of the connections were fixed, the selection pressure to fix the remaining 
ones tapered off, because with only a few connections to learn, every organism was 
guaranteed to learn them quickly. (1997: 179) 
 
The key conclusion of this is that ―learning leads to the evolution of innateness, but not 
complete innateness.‖ (Ibid) 
 
The Baldwin Effect can only work however provided that connections not under genetic 
control are able to be placed into the ‗on‘ position by environmental stimuli, that there 
is sufficient plasticity in the network for this to happen. The capacity to learn is wholly 
dependent on such plasticity which humans sadly tend to regard as unique to our 
species, an absurd notion for anyone who has taken even a little time to observe the 
behavior of some of our fellow Earthlings, for example, tool using birds and primates. 
  
As regards the ratcheting-up of cognitive capacity that so evidently has taken place in 
species that have for long lived in groups, the explanations for this that I have found 
most convincing are those put forward by David Papineau in his article ―Social 
Learning and the Baldwin Effect‖ (online source – year of publication not provided). 
Most important of all is his explanation for how, with socially learned behaviours, ―we 
get Baldwin effects twice over.‖ When we live in groups we necessarily form a ‗niche‘ 
that changes selection pressures, the most important here being the increased likelihood 
of contact with one or more conspecifics who have already acquired the trait, this 
stimulating one to acquire it for oneself. Without social learning, every individual 
would be in the position of the first lucky one who ‗got it‘ by serendipity. But with 
social learning, only one individual need acquire the trait non-socially to get the ball 
rolling. Thus, for species that live in groups a feedback loop can come into play 
between ‗genetic assimilation‘ and ‗niche construction‘ that accelerates the rate at 
which the former occurs. Combining these two Baldwin effects produces an especially 
powerful mechanism that natural selection is bound to exploit.  
 
Neural plasticity is extraordinary in our species by comparison with even our closest 
genetic relatives, chimpanzees, as is the cognitive fluidity of our brains, both of which 
allow for more complex and sophisticated neural networks and a significantly higher 
level of inter-modularity and cross-modality in cognitive functioning. This is what has 
allowed us to evolve highly complex psychosocial adaptations such as underlie our 




become vehicles for learning that have sped up the feedback process yet further. 
Looking at it this way, cultural evolution can be seen as modifications of cognitive 
niches that necessarily must increase in frequency as culture accumulates.  As was 
pointed out in the first chapter, the event that more than any other caused cultural 
evolution to runaway with itself was the agricultural revolution that took place around 
twelve thousand years ago and which gave a whole new meaning to niche construction. 
Being able to grow a surplus of food such that not everyone had to occupy themselves 
with basic subsistence prompted social transformations though urbanization, trade, 
commerce, war, religion and rapid technological development. As if this were not 
enough, literacy and the later invention of media such as books, audio and visual 
recording, radio, television and the Internet caused an even more dramatic telescoping 
in the rates of cultural change and accumulation. How much of this remains adaptive in 
the sense of bettering the chances of survival for our species is very much in question. 
We no longer actually have to learn all that much to survive and procreate given the 
world as it has come to be where we can rely on ‗experts‘ to sort everything out and 
provide for our ‗needs‘ such that, provided even a modest income, we can have children 
and consume in blissful ignorance of where it all is inevitably leading given the 
exponential increase in our numbers, the exponential depletion of our planet‘s resources 




Covert processes of socialization 
 
In fact, activity that is not overtly social may nonetheless be efficacious in helping 
achieve an optimal expression of the social capacities that are encoded for in our genes. 
There are various kinds of experience that we find intrinsically rewarding, that afford 
pleasure without any apparent utilitarian benefit and that we seemingly pursue as ends 
in themselves (as implicit the cliché – ‗Art for Art‘s sake‘). These should be and are of 
interest to EP for the simple reason that such experiences ―would not be possible unless 
the mind contained elaborate reward systems that produced them in response to some 
stimuli and not others.‖ I quote here, as I have already, from what I consider a seminal 
work in Darwinian aesthetics, Tooby and Cosmides‘ 2001 article ―Does beauty build 
adapted minds?‖ (8). One of its central findings is that ―humans have evolved 
specialized cognitive machinery that allows us to enter and participate in imagined 
worlds‖ (9).  Tooby and Cosmides point to the obvious example of pretend play which 
―is now recognized as so fundamental an expression of the human cognitive architecture 
that its absence in a toddler is seen as diagnostic of a neurological impairment,‖ autism 
for example (9).  
 
Behaviorally, pretend play appears in all normally developing children in all cultures 
around eighteen months of age, about the time that infants become maturationally equipped 
to engage in sophisticated social activity that acknowledges the existence of other minds. 
The cognitive machinery underlying pretend play includes specialized forms of 
representation (metarepresentations), which decouple the pretense from one's store of world 
knowledge. These decoupling mechanisms appear to be adaptations, whose function is to 
protect our knowledge stores from being corrupted by the flood of false information 
("fictions") that the ability to engage in imaginative activities allows. (9, my emphasis) 
 
One of the things that mark humans as different from other species is that we can 




but not necessarily so in others) and which allows us, in those circumstances, to act 
propitiously, to improvise advantageous behavior. Social information is by its nature 
contingent and our capacity for making use of contingently true information allows us 
to access worlds that are seemingly inaccessible to other species. 
 
These are the … worlds of the might-be-true, the true-over-there, the once-was-true, the 
what-others-believe-is-true, the true-only-if-I-did-that, the not-true-here, the what-they-
want-me—to-believe-is-true, the will-someday-be-true, the certainly-is-not-true, the what-
he-told-me, the seems-true-on-the-basis-of-these-claims, and on and on. (Tooby & 
Cosmides 2001: 20) 
 
 
Adaptations for decoupling and metarepresentation 
 
Tooby and Cosmides give the name ‗scope syntax‘ to the specialized set of cognitive 
adaptations that allow us to navigate, negotiate and act in these worlds by ‗tagging‘ and 
tracking the parameters within which any given set of representations can reliably and 
safely be employed in making inferences and thus in considering alternatives, planning 
and taking action. Keeping track of the scope of the conditions in which the 
representations are ‗true‘ and applicable is essential to avoid data corruption and 
potentially harmful or fatal misapplications of the information outside of the scope of 
these conditions. Acquiring the computational machinery needed to extract and make 
use of information that is local, transient, and contingent marked a quantum leap 
forward for humankind and allowed our ancestors to become sole occupants of a 
―cognitive niche‖ (Tooby, L., & DeVore, I. 1987) which was a boon for our species 
though ‗anything but‘ for the rest of life on our planet. 
 
It is this ‗scope syntax‘ that is seen to operate in play activity, as suggested above, and 
which logically suggests why children of all ages are predisposed to play activity. It 
exercises and fine-tunes those essential mechanisms that allow us to ―cognitively 
quarantine sets of representations from each other, so that they do not interact with each 
other promiscuously – that is, without respect to the scope boundaries within which they 
are applicable‖ (Tooby & Cosmides 2001: 20). Without such mechanisms we would not 
be able, as was already pointed out, to plan, reflect, anticipate, draw conclusions, have 
language or any other sophisticated integrative cognitive system such as those that 
underlie music and the arts. 
 
The fact that we can distinguish and keep track of what is imaginary vs. what is real 
does not mean that the imaginary is less potent in terms of emotional valence and, 
hence, meaningfulness, rather that what is imaginary generally does not prompt overt 
behavior. It is nevertheless valuable as it may and mostly likely will prompt 
advantageous behavior at some point, perhaps behavior of a kind that is only in part 
related to a particular representation and which is more than just a response to it. It 
utilizes the same kinds of information and representations but is able to do so without 
having to undergo the actual experiencing of something, which may be dangerous or 
otherwise costly. 
 
A real lion actually lunging at us would evoke terror and flight - the emotion program and 
behavior are linked. But while a cinematic version of the lion may evoke terror, the flight 
behavior that terror is ordinarily designed to produce is disengaged: We do not run from the 




but these weightings express themselves in real behavior elicited by real situations 
subsequently, not in behavior directed toward the fictional event.  (Tooby & Cosmides 
2001: 9) 
 
How we perceive objects, their movement and their interactions is constrained by ―a 
rich set of interlocking principles‖ that are innate. We come wired with a ‗theory of 
bodies‘ (Leslie 1987 & 1994) that constrain both what we experience directly as well as 
our mental simulations of real situations, including the creation of scenarios that might 
or could be. What is critical of course is that ―simulations of objects and their 
movement are constrained in the same way as real objects‖ (Tooby & Cosmides 2000 – 
online source). But it is important to consider the computational mechanisms that 
simulation requires that perceptual representation does not. Tooby and Cosmides cite 
five of these which I have condensed below (Ibid). 
 
 “Decoupling.” This is required so that a simulation is not stored as something that 
actually happened but as something that could happen given how things do 
happen in the real world. 
 “Source tag.” A simulation is in effect ―an internally driven hallucination‖ whose 
source is in the mind of the individual concerned and which needs to be ‗tagged‘ 
accordingly. 
 “Credal [creedal] value and memory requirements.‖ A simulation is a potentiality 
that needs to be weighted as to its level of certainty or factuality to determine 
whether and how it gets encoded in memory. Where it corresponds with 
unchanging physical laws of cause and effect, or where its truth value is otherwise 
implicit (e.g. because it derives from experiential repetition or from something 
someone you trust told you) will get tagged with a high level of certainty, 
considered ―timeless‖ and not in need of a ―past, present, or future tag.‖ 
 Restricted scope inferences. Simulations ―depict hypothetical transformations of 
objects in space and time, and so sequential transformations are suppositions with 
ordered hierarchical relations, describing states of the system at various points in 
time.‖  
 Relationship to other representation systems. A simulation requires the retrieval 
of stored object representations and their placement into some form of working 
memory. Although the retrieving mechanism controls the simulation in terms of 
what interacts with what, it requires a mechanism such as the postulated ‗theory 
of bodies‘ to determine how the interaction proceeds.  
 
 
Bringing music back into the discussion 
 
The above remind me of what was discussed early on in this chapter, that mentalese, the 
‗language‘ of cognition, operates with a surprisingly limited set of innate ‗metaphors,‘ 
even where abstract and nondiscursive ‗thought‘ is concerned. Musical perception is 
clearly a cross-modal affair, drawing on and perhaps modifying  innate concepts that 
inform visual and physical experience, e.g. high/low, short/long, 
continuous/discontinuous, smooth/rough, light/dark, symmetric/asymmetric, 
light/heavy, thin/thick, homogenous/heterogeneous and so on. It is so very easy and 
worthwhile to re-read the above requirements for simulation as descriptive of what is 
required by musical cognition in many if not most of its myriad forms.  Certainly music, 




the most salient), employs, exploits and exercises simulation systems to the hilt and this 
must serve to modify them (advantageously it is assumed) and at some level achieve 
(recalling Bowman and Polanyi) an internal re-organization of our ‗tacit interpretive 
schemata‘ that realign the ‗lenses‘ through which we perceive and make sense of the 
worlds we inhabit. 
 
 
On „ somatic markers‟ 
 
The ‗tagging‘ of simulations is undoubtedly a matter of the brain assigning them 
particular emotional weightings. Without these, the entire cognitive system can be 
compromised as has been evidenced by studies of individuals in which there has been, 
due to injury, disease or congenital abnormality, some degree of disconnection between 
the ‗rational‘ prefrontal cortices and those more primitive parts of brain (e.g. the 
hypothalamus and the amygdala) that charge neuronal activations with emotional 
valences and accordingly ‗mark‘ them and in various ways ‗fix‘ them. These resulting 
‗somatic markers‘ are crucial to preconscious sorting whereby innumerable alternatives 
are reduced and conscious thought consequently biased by what surfaces for it to work 
on. Damasio‘s somatic marker hypothesis  (1994) provides an intriguing account of how 
this happens. Suffice to remark here that the emotional weighting of any representation 
is obviously in large part determined by how it was assembled originally and 
subsequently altered, this depending on the nature of the stimuli concerned and how 
intense they have been in their stimulatory effects. We may consider for example how 
the feelingfulness (and, hence, the meaningfulness) of a lyric and its long-term impacts 
on us can be dramatically enhanced by putting it to music. If we regard a perceptual 
stimulus as, for example, beautiful, profound, or even terrifying, it is because there has 
been a ―cognitive co-registration of deep valuation with the perceptual representation of 
the object of the valuation‖ (Tooby and Cosmides 2001: 18).  
 
“Beauty is in the adaptations of the beholder” 
 
This is the title of an article by Donald Symons (1995) and his use of the plural is 
noteworthy. It must be remembered that what constitutes fitness-enhancing behavior in 
a gregarious species such as ours is a vast and diverse set of behaviors oriented toward 
different crucial outcomes such as cooperation, collaboration, the detection and 
marginalization of cheaters and freeloaders, status acquisition and success in the mating 
game. Perhaps most important from an educational perspective is the complex and 
highly interactive process of nurturance required of human parents, for when it comes to 
complex social behaviors (language and music for example), the optimal expression of 
what is encoded in genes requires far more than just nutrition and protection.  
 
For an adaptation to be functionally efficacious at the behavioral level, it must be 
appropriately organized and this, as has been said, requires ‗targeted interactions‘ with 
information-rich features of the environment, this being most critically important in the 
first years of life, when the adaptation is operating more in an organizational mode than 
an overtly functional one, which it can be given that a young child is by and large not 
having to provide for its own needs.  Each adaptation must be provided with the 
appropriate weightings relative to different forms and sources of information and their 
representations. The neonate targets particular features in its environment because, in its 




such targeting. These are the ―motivational guidance systems‖ adaptations require if 
they are to develop properly. Optimal ontogeny demands that the young ―live according 
to behaviorally imperative aesthetic sensibilities in an aesthetics-drenched world‖ 
(Tooby & Cosmides 2001: 17). 
 
Initially, even prior to birth, this is the world of intimacy between mother and child with 
the former innately willing and able to ensure an environment that is ‗drenched‘ 
aesthetically, rich in the ‗rhythms and modes‘ Dissanayake speaks to and that 
characterize mother-child interactions. That we have arts like music could well be 
because they keep alive such a world and continue through life to contribute to the 
optimal organization of our cognitive architecture, especially where it promotes higher 
levels of social competence. But what must be emphasized again is that the 
environments we occupy in the modern world, which are largely of our own creation, 
often do not jibe with the kinds of information and stimulation our developmental 
adaptations evolved to target. 
 
Just as we now culturally engineer foods whose flavors signal the presence of nutrients that 
may have been artificially removed, it is certainly possible that many modem recreations, 
entertainments, and aesthetic activities do not actually improve or ready our adaptations - 
although many undoubtedly do. Moreover, the process emphasizes forms of preparation 
appropriate to the ancestral world, regardless of whether this prepares one for life in the 
modern world. This explains the overrepresentation in popular media of such things as 
attacks by predatory nonhumans, chase scenes, physical violence and blood revenge. 





We may also note the underrepresentation in popular media of productions aiming at 
‗higher,‘ ‗loftier‘ cognitions and ‗deeper‘ aesthetic sensibilities. Of course, a profit-
driven entertainment industry is not inclined to target such ‗esoteria‘ and gives us 
instead a world drenched in schlock. It presses innate pleasure buttons but does not 
cultivate them in ways that make possible pleasures that are more worthy and edifying 
by virtue of the internal processes they manifest with their higher levels of complexity 
and integration (how much, for example, they invoke and demand imagination).  What 
should be a matter of greatest concern is that the worlds the popular media and the 
entertainment industry construct for us are ones that children of tender years spend more 
and more of their time in. They also worlds that are negligibly interactive and the 
inordinate time children spend in them equals time not engaged in activity where they 
are active and interactive agents. This is not all bad given that children can be physically 
passive while still achieving beneficial internal adjustments at a neurological level, but 
on a psychosocial level it cannot compare to engagements with strong elements of 
mutuality and intimacy such as when parents hold their little ones on their laps and tell 
them stories.  
 
There is a short video that the South African Films and Publications Board has 
produced and which comes on before the main movie on many DVDs rented or 
purchased in this country that is outrageous in what it blindly conveys about what is 
sadly becoming the norm in home after home in South Africa (a society seemingly 
obsessed with appropriating the dubious indulgences of the ‗developed‘ world). It 




is playing, presumably one with disturbing content judging by the soundtrack. Still 
alone as the video finishes, he gets up and puts himself to bed. His mother later appears 
at the door, smiles at her already asleep darling and then just turns off the light and 
walks away. But the only point that the FPB video is trying to make is that we should be 
attentive to what videos/DVDs we allow our children to watch. That such lack of 
familial intimacy is widely the norm for the children of our global village is further 
suggested by the frequency with which I‘ve heard televisions euphemistically referred 
to as ‗American babysitters.‘ Dissanayake points out that ―modern children …  
 
most of whom have inoculations and antibiotics, safe homes, and more food than they can 
eat – may nonetheless suffer from parental neglect or abuse, a sense of meaninglessness, 
social vulgarity and violence, and general indifference from  the institutions that control 
and direct their lives. The simple fact that suicide is the third highest cause of death in 
American teenage youth (and that the teen suicide rate is 95 percent higher today than it 
was in 1970) is evidence to me that something is awry in the way we live. (2000: 13) 
 
It is undoubtedly true that Pleistocene ways of life selected for, or at least promoted, 
some psychosocial traits that are inappropriate in modern, pluralistic democracies, such 
as unthinking conformity, unmitigated allegiance to authority, nepotism, and 
xenophobia.  But as with sex differences, there is nothing to be gained by denying that 
we retain Paleolithic psychosocial presets and that they continue to bias our cognitions 
significantly, aided by a culture industry that understands their economic value and 
accordingly exploits them. What matters is what we make of and do with these presets. 
After all, our ability to transcend them and embrace loftier principles is only possible 
because our innate psychology comprises far more than base instincts; it also provides 
the computational systems that principled, socially ameliorative behavior relies on and 




Education as brain organization: to what ends? 
 
When Tooby and Cosmides portray ―the task of organizing the brain both physically 
and informationally over the course of the lifespan [as] the most demanding adaptive 
problem posed by human development,‖ they are in essence defining the overarching 
task of education as I believe Piaget might himself have conceived it. And once again, I 
am not referring only to what takes place in schools, but even more importantly to what 
happens, or should happen, in the years leading up to school. And as for schools: sure, 
they are engaged in organizing the brains of their charges, but to what ends? With their 
market-driven curricula, they very much remain ―reproductive organ[s] of a consumer 
society,‖ as Ivan Illich portrayed them four decades ago (Illich 1974: 77) and are 
pathetically inadequate in developing the critical consciousness the world now demands 
of its citizenry as it edges nearer the brink of ecological collapse. The Portuguese word 
that Paulo Freire used for this is conscientizacao, preferable perhaps because of its 
allusion to the fact that critical consciousness is more than cold-blooded assessments of 
what is wrong with society. It is nothing without a well-grounded social conscience that 
makes the best use of our innate capacity for moral reasoning (Hauser 2006) because it 
is a conscience that is empathetic and geared to mutuality and felt concern for the good 
of others, possible because such mutuality has been personally experienced. Critical 
consciousness can sometimes be a predominantly cerebral affair, but conscience is 





Persons deprived of mutuality or belonging, whose inborn tendencies toward affiliation and 
sympathy have not been answered and activated, easily become selfish, insecure, unable to 
make or sustain close relationships, perhaps violent and self-destructive, even sociopathic; 
they lack a sense of identity and self-esteem and are defective in the ―social emotions‖ … 
of love, shame, guilt, remorse, and sympathy with others. Conversely, persons whose 
mutuality and belonging needs are met will be more easily generous, sociable, sympathetic, 
and secure. It sounds simplistic but it makes sense, since we evolved to be one way and not 
the other. (Dissanayake 2000: 67) 
 
 
On human universals 
 
I have emphasized repeatedly the absurdity of the claim that, aside from basic instincts, 
perceptual apparatus and a kind of general learning capacity, humans are ontologically 
blank slates.  Nearly everything in this chapter has been in part meant to validate my 
dismissal of this ‗errant nonsense,‘ as I have styled it already. One method of approach, 
common among evolutionary psychologists looking for adaptive explanations for 
psychosocial behaviors, is to identify universal features in the behavior as it manifests 
across cultures and time. I have already presented the conclusions of some leading 
evolutionary psychologists and Darwinian philosophers regarding what appears to be 
universal across musical cultures as well as what seems evidently true worldwide in 
respect of gender differences. Indeed, every aspect of behavior, cognition and 
predisposition that I have explored is one I assume to be universal and for which there 
are compelling if not entirely convincing understandings of their adaptive 
underpinnings, some examples being language, body language, infant-directed speech, 
altruism, scope syntax and metarepresentation, and play.  Drawing from the work of 
several evolutionary psychologists,79 Dutton (2009) compiled a list of what he sees as 
―features and capabilities of the human mind‖ that seem incontestably universal. From 
that list, I have selected, paraphrased (to better connect them with discussions in this 
chapter) and elaborated briefly on the following, which I see as most pertinent in 
relation to what has been discussed in this chapter, particularly those discussions 
concerning music and the arts.  
 
 an “intuitive physics” that allows us to track and predict the movements of objects 
(earlier referred to as a ‗theory of bodies‘). We are certainly not the only species to 
possess this, but owing to our inter-modularity and cross-modal capacities, we 
employ its algorithms and innate concepts to cognize aural phenomena (like music) 
as well as ‗objects‘ of the mind (as when we imagine scenarios). 
 a “folk biology” (Pinker 1997: 323) consisting of intuitions about natural 
phenomena such as animals, plants, and minerals, based, according to Pinker, on an 
―intuitive essentialism.‖ (325) Again, thanks to our inter-modular and cross-modal 
capacities, these intuitions inform and influence our cognitions of phenomena that 
are not natural but which are organic in their constitution (including ways in which 
we cognize the products of imagination). 
                              
79  Dutton acknowledges Donald E. Brown (1991), Tooby and Cosmides (1990, 1992, 2001), Pinker 




 a „theory of mind,‟ i.e. intuitively grasping that others have minds such as one‘s 
own but with beliefs and intentions that often are different. 
 a spatial intelligence that allows us inter alia to do mental rotations and to 
construct and modify internal maps of our surroundings. As Pinker puts it, we come 
wired with ―a dead reckoner, which updates coordinates of the body‘s location as it 
moves and turns‖ (Pinker 2002: 220). 
 an innate number sense that is precise with small numbers but capable of useable 
‗guess-timates‘ with quantities that are large. 
 a probability instinct that works according to how frequently  events with 
consistent outcomes are experienced, again an attribute critical to musical cognition 
as it allows one to anticipate musical outcomes based on what one has already 
experienced. 
 an ability to read mental states in others on the basis of bodily, especially facial, 
expressions, as well as vocal intonation and prosodic elements (as has been 
evidenced by research on infant-directed speech. 
 an intuitive economics that we employ when exchanging goods and favors that is 
based on an innate understanding of reciprocity. 
 an innate array of logical and causal operators‟ that allows us to build up databases 
of mental representations and to make inferences from them applying operators 
such as: and, or, not, all, some, necessary, possible, and cause. Again, this is a part 
of our innate cognitive equipment that is vital to musical cognition. 
 a language instinct consisting of an innate grammar that provides the combinatorial 
rules with which we use vowels and consonants to form words and then organize 
these into phrases, sentences and other meaningful wholes. From what has been 
discussed earlier in this chapter, this most likely evolved out a precursor ability 
which was less ‗referential‘ in what it communicated though likely more 
emotionally manipulative, a kind of ‗musilanguage‘ such as Brown (2000) and 
Mithen (2005) have theorized. Logically, this instinct is what underlies our 
predilection for sequences of sounds organized tonally and temporally and perhaps 
musical cognition relies on a more ancient generative grammar. That there has been 
a process of co-evolution between language seems evident enough given their 
similarities as combinatorial systems with commonalities in their phrase structures, 
phonological properties and use of recursion, which as was pointed out already is 
what makes possible a limited set of elements to yield countless meaningful, 
communicative outcomes. 
 a proclivity for bodily adornment, e.g. ‗makeup‘ (body ‗painting‘), styling of hair, 
tattoos and jewelry. 
 
 
„Making meaningful‟: our universal proclivity for elaboration 
 
The last of these merits some discussion as it relates to a more general innate proclivity 
which Ellen Dissanayake (1992) has given comprehensive treatment and made central 
in her Darwinian aesthetics, that being our universal bent for elaboration, for making 
things and experiences meaningful even though there seems no utilitarian justification 
for doing so.  But first let it be emphasized that the above list is but a sampling of 
human attributes that are universal, universal because they, to some degree at least, are 
instructed for by our genes. Dutton addresses innate dimensions of human sociality, 
positing that people everywhere are ―curious about their neighbors, like to gossip about 




note, we must also acknowledge the universal human capacity for lying, for believing as 
individuals that we  are more competent and benevolent than we objectively are, for 
rationalizing and justifying our individual behavior, and for favoring one‘s ‗race‘ or 
‗ethnic group‘ over the rest of humanity. Also, we all seem to take pleasure in exposing 
false pretensions in others and mocking them. A penchant for games and sports is 
another apparent universal as are the pleasures people take in joke telling and the poetic 
use of language. And of course we all feel grief when we loose loved ones, feel chagrin 
when we fail at something or have been defeated by another just as we feel elation when 




The seven plots of fiction 
 
Our universal love of narrative fiction is also noteworthy, in particular the striking 
similarities in the kinds of stories that people favor the world over as regards their 
thematic content. The British literary critic Christopher Booker (2005) has posited the 
following seven basic plots abstracted from his investigations of stories from the 
folktales of preliterate peoples and the epic poems of the past to the novels, librettos and 
movies of more recent times. 
 
 Tragedy: a fatally flawed hero meets with a tragic end (e.g. Macbeth); 
 Comedy: stories with happy endings (usually of the romantic kind) that have fun 
with human foibles and interpersonal intrigues, Jane Austen‘s novels being good 
examples; 
 Overcoming the Monster: the stuff of James Bond films, where a hero undergoes 
all kinds of ordeals but prevails against and saves the world, nation or community 
from some kind of evil being, human or otherwise. 
 Rags to Riches: where somebody downtrodden but possessed of virtue or some 
special talent wins out against the odds and achieves fame and/or fortune (e.g. 
Cinderella, David Copperfield); 
 Voyage and Return: a protagonist leaves home, enters an alien and challenging 
world, and returns a changed person, most often after a harrowing escape (e.g. 
Robinson Crusoe, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, or Alice in Wonderland); 
 Quest: the hero, usually accompanied by one or more sidekicks, embarks on a 
danger fraught journey to defeat some evil entity or secure some priceless item like 
the holy grail or a kidnapped child (e.g. the myth of ‗Jason and the Golden Fleece,‘ 
and The Lord of the Rings); 
 Rebirth: the central character experiences some major kind of personal 
transformation, finding a new reason for living (e.g. Dicken‘s A Christmas Carol or 
the film It‟s a Wonderful Life). 
 
Booker invokes Carl Jung‘s theory of archetypes and symbolism to explain this 
universality of plots. This seems a sensible approach in that Jung believed his 
archetypes to be part of a universal human nature. As Dutton puts it: ―Against the 
prevailing social constructionist givens of the last few generations, Jung looks 
downright prescient‖ (2009: 129). While Dutton lauds Booker for providing strong 
evidence that the universal themes in storytelling cannot be explained by cultural 
transmission, he argues that Jungian theory is inadequate because it offers no 




that needs to be asked regarding Booker‘s plots and Jung‘s archetypes is: What 
motivates them?  ―A character‘s motivation … involves the expression of will, normally 
toward the fulfillment of a desire, and against resistance or obstruction of some kind‖ 
(131). Instead of Jung, Dutton invokes Aristotle who he claims understood clearly that a 
plot is a causal structure, ―an arrangement of motivations‖ that essentially are variations 
of ―desire against obstruction,‖ (131) and that when developing a plot around a 
character, there are only a relatively few logical alternatives if the plot is to have 
resonance with people. What resonates are themes and situations that issue from 
―fundamental, evolved interests human beings have in love, death, adventure, family, 
justice, and overcoming adversity‖ (132).  In fiction, our genetic imperative – reproduce 
and survive: 
 
… is translated straight into the eternal themes of love and death for tragedy, and love and 
marriage for comedy. Stories are populated with character types relevant to these themes: 
beautiful young women, handsome strong men, courageous leaders, children needing 
protection, and wise old people. Add to this the threats and obstacles to the fulfillment of 
love and fortune, including bad luck, villains, and mere misunderstanding, and you have the 





Because Pleistocene interests continue to be our interests, it is not surprising that there 
is also a marked degree of commonality from culture to culture in other forms of 
expression, in other arts that is to say.  For our Pleistocene ancestors, habitat choice was 
obviously far more a life-and-death issue than it is now. Orians and Heerwagen (1992: 
556) invite us to imagine what it must have been like to be on ―a camping trip that lasts 
a lifetime‖ where there was no possibility of buying supplies, where we would have had 
to find, gather or hunt them ourselves. What would have been advantageous if not 
essential on such a camping trip would have been predispositions for - and higher levels 
of sensitivity to - perceptual cues indicative of a potentially bountiful and comparably 
safe environment. Orians and Heerwagen theorize compellingly that our aesthetic 
reactions to landscapes derive, in part at least, from an evolved psychology that 
functioned to assist our hunter-gatherer forebears in deciding when to move and where 
to move to. Some of these cues would be for conditions that are transitory and needing 
urgent attention, evaluation and response (changes in weather, for example), while 
others signal more slowly occurring changes (e.g. seasonal changes) or relatively 
permanent features (e.g. geomorphological features such as topography and the 
presence of lakes, rivers, and streams).  
 
Again, it is a question of what motivates cognitions and their subsequent behaviors. The 
‗Savanna Hypothesis‘ advanced by Orians and Heerwagen is that ―natural selection 
should have favored individuals who were motivated to explore and settle in 
environments likely to afford the necessities of life but to avoid environments with 
poorer resources or posing higher risks‖ (557). The hypothesis gets its name because of 
the authors‘ perceived level of correspondence between what would seem optimal 
conditions and the savannas and mixed bushveld of East Africa where the splitting off 
of the Homo line took place as well as most of its subsequent evolution. Dutton has 





 ―open spaces of low grasses interspersed with thickets of bushes and groupings of 
trees; 
 the presence of water directly in view, or evidence of water nearby or in the 
distance; 
 an opening up in at least one direction to an unimpeded vantage on the horizon; 
 evidence of animal and bird life; and 
 a diversity of greenery, including flowering and fruiting plants.‖ (Dutton 2009: 
19) 
 
Dutton regards as strong support for this hypothesis the results of a research project 
done in 1993 where two artists studied the artistic preferences of people from ten 
countries (Komar, Melamid & Wypijewski 1997). The results showed an overwhelming 
preference for landscapes along side a pronounced dislike for abstract art. Not only was 
there a preference for landscapes but for ones composed largely of the elements 
summarized by Dutton above. The two artists, Vitaly Komar and Alexander Melamid 





It is worth giving at least some attention to a subsequent project Komar and Melamid 
undertook in 1996, in collaboration with composer Dave Soldier, even though its 
scientific credibility is far less secure. An Internet survey was conducted in which 
around 500 took part and indicated their musical likes and dislikes in respect of, for 
example, instrumentation, vocal range and quality, duration, and style. From the results, 
Soldier and Nina Mankin wrote music and lyrics for the ‗Most Wanted‘ and ‗Most 
Unwanted songs.‘ As Soldier sees it: 
 
This survey confirms the hypothesis that today‘s popular music indeed provides an accurate 
estimate of the wishes of the vox populi. The most favored ensemble, determined from a 
rating by participants of their favorite instruments in combination, comprises a moderately 
sized group (three to ten instruments) consisting of guitar, piano, saxophone, bass, drums, 
violin, cello, synthesizer, with low male and female vocals singing in rock/r&b style. The 
favorite lyrics narrate a love story, and the favorite listening circumstance is at home. … 
Most participants desire music of moderate duration (approximately 5 minutes), moderate 
pitch range, moderate tempo, and moderate to loud volume, and display a profound dislike 
of the alternatives. … The most unwanted music is over 25 minutes long, veers wildly 
between loud and quiet sections, between fast and slow tempos, and features timbres of 
extremely high and low pitch, with each dichotomy presented in abrupt transition. The most 
unwanted orchestra was determined to be large, and features the accordion and bagpipe 
(which tie at 13% as the most unwanted instrument), banjo, flute, tuba, harp, organ, 
                              
80  None of these landscapes actually resemble African savanna at all and call into question the aptness of 
the name Orians and Heerwagen chose for their hypothesis. The optimal environment for our African 
ancestors would not have been the wide open plains of the Serengeti even if it was this kind of 
environment where they would have ventured in search of game. Rather, the ideal habitat would have 
been (as per Komar & Melamid‘s paintings) where there was an abundance of water and this suggests 
a quite different topography, one that is hilly if not mountainous (where rainfall patterns are 
accordingly made more consistent and where runoff into natural depressions is made more likely). 
Africa has an abundance of such environments and it seems it had them in even larger supply during 




synthesizer (the only instrument that appears in both the most wanted and most unwanted 
ensembles). An operatic soprano raps and sings atonal music, advertising jingles, political 
slogans, and ―elevator‖ music, and a children's choir sings jingles and holiday songs. 
(Soldier 1997 – online source)  
 
Acknowledging that the project was more tongue-in-cheek fun than scientific research 
and that the majority of site visitors that took part were Americans, its ‗findings‘ 
nonetheless confirm what I am sure has been the experience of music educators the 
world over as regards the musical leanings of the majority of people, what they are 
inclined to give an ear to. In this regard, it is worth noting that the website concerned is 
not some populist site. The Dia Foundation is a highly respected and influential 
contemporary art institution that provides funding and infrastructure for a large number 
of ―visionary artistic projects that might not otherwise be realized because of their scale 




High vs. low art 
 
I draw attention to both of Komar and Melamid‘s ‗most/least wanted‘ projects mostly 
because of what they reveal relevant to our innate aesthetic sensibilities and the 
questions they force us to engage with around the age-old issue of high vs. low art. I 
have already entered into this issue in earlier discussions related to our innate musical 
proclivities and the supposition that musical works that challenge these too radically, 
even to the point of deliberately thwarting them, are unlikely to ever attract much of an 
audience.  Such works are esoteric in the truest sense of the word. The Komar-Melamid-
Soldier project suggests that we cannot even expect broad public interest in and 
affection for the ‗masterpieces‘ of pre-twentieth century European art music. In this 
regard, I find it quaintly ironic that so many of my colleagues who are music academics 
seem both perplexed and vexed by the reality that while they give so much attention to 
this music and the even more challenging oeuvre that followed it in the twentieth 
century, it features negligibly in the private listening activity of their students who study 
it so assiduously and even become proficient in its performance and/or composition.82  
 
 
Conspicuous consumption and status 
 
Being esoteric does not automatically imply that something is elitist, but it cannot be 
denied, indeed it should be expected, that art can and often does serve what is one of our 
oldest and deepest instincts, the drive for status. Apropos this, Pinker cites a conclusion 
arrived at by the late sociologist/anthropologist, Pierre Bourdieu (1984), that 
―connoisseurship of difficult and inaccessible works of culture serves as a membership 
badge in society‘s upper strata‖ (Pinker 2002: 407). This resonates well with the notions 
of ‗conspicuous consumption‘ and ‗invidious consumption,‘ the first of which was 
central to the theory of ‗institutional economics‘ developed by Thorstein Veblen at the 
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end of the 19th century as well as the critique of capitalism he presented in his classic, 
The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899/1979).  Conspicuous consumption is the term 
Veblen coined in reference to the acquisition of expensive goods and services motivated 
by our status instinct and having the purpose of displaying wealth as well as a capacity 
for squandering resources on extravagances that are seemingly pointless in any 
utilitarian sense.  What motivates invidious consumption is the pleasure of making 
others envious, again a human attribute that seems incontestably universal. In this 
regard, it is worth recalling what has been discussed regarding runaway selection and 
the extraordinary traits it has produced in other species, the peacock‘s tail being the 
example most often cited.  
 
In ―Pecuniary canons of taste,‖ the sixth chapter of his book, Veblen shows how one‘s 
estimation of the aesthetic worth of a work of art can be inextricably bound up with its 
monetary value. Apropos this, Dutton gives considerable attention to artistic forgery, 
discussing among others the case of Han van Meegeren (1889-1947), a Dutch painter 
famous for his Christ and the Disciples at Emmaus, which from its unveiling in 1937 
until 1945 was believed to be an early work of Johannes Vermeer, at one point selling 
for what would be four million US dollars in today‘s currency, not surprising given that 
it had been verified a genuine Vermeer by a leading authority on Dutch painting who 
praised it highly, remarking that ―in no other [Vermeer painting] do we find such 
sentiment, such a profound understanding of the Bible story – a sentiment so nobly 
human expressed through the medium of the highest art.‖ That it was a forgery might 
never have come to light had it not been for Van Meegeren confessing after being 
arrested, not for forgery, but for having sold a national treasure to the Nazis, in this case 
another of his Vermeer forgeries that was rescued from the personal collection  of none 
other than Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring (Dutton 2009: 177-180).  
 
Of course, Van Meereren‘s paintings lost nearly all of their monetary value once they 
were shown to be forgeries, but the salient point that Dutton does not address is that 
nothing had changed in respect of their artistic worth; they continued to present to the 
eye the exact same qualities they did when thought to be the work of a ‗master‘, and yet 
they almost overnight became worthless as far as art dealers and the cognoscenti were 
concerned. Indeed, I am perplexed when Dutton claims it to be ―the rare beauty of a 
Rembrandt portrait that causes it to be worth a lot of money, rather than its market price 
causing it to be beautiful‖ (160), perplexing given that much of his The Art Instinct can 
be read as a validation of Symon‘s aphorism: ―beauty is in the adaptations of the 
beholder‖ and not in the thing beheld. I do not doubt that most people would find a 
Rembrandt portrait beautiful without knowing who painted it, but probably no more 
beautiful than a portrait by one of his more gifted students.83 
 
Symon‘s aphorism is obviously a reworking of the old adage ‗Beauty is in the eye of the 
beholder.‘ But they say very different things. Symon has reworked the adage as a clever 
way to drive home the essential point (which much of the forgoing discussions have 
                              
83  A Dutch project in the late 60s subjected Rembrandt‘s supposed oeuvre to detailed analyses on the 
basis of which an initial tally of 630 paintings alleged to be by Rembrandt was reduced to around 300. 
For more on this and on the issue of market driven aesthetic values, I recommend Charlotte Mullins‘ 
article ―Real Good, Fake Bad (But Why?) article for the Financial Times (UK) (16 April, 2005, 




tried to make) that beauty is not entirely or perhaps even mostly an individually 
subjective phenomenon. As was made clear right at the beginning of this chapter, when 
we speak of adaptations we are speaking of biological mechanisms found in every 
normal human being. Some of these adaptations predispose us to find certain visual, 
aural and olfactory phenomena more attractive than others, and hence the experiencing 
of them more pleasurable and meaningful, but our preferences, especially when it comes 
to things made (or being made, as in performing art), are seldom based wholly on what 
is presented to the senses. Our interest and attention may be as much due to our 
awareness of something‘s value in the eyes or ears of others and this can fundamentally 
alter the motivational dynamics informing such experiences, for example, from aesthetic 
elevation to status enhancement. We need only think of how for adolescents, the music 
one is ‗into‘ can be as important as one‘s clothing, hair style or manner of dress in 
establishing status among peers. 
 
That the psychology of the arts is in significant measure the psychology of status seems 
obvious to the point of banality. Steven Pinker is surely right in suggesting that a great 
many people ―would lose their taste for a musical recording if they learned it was being 
sold at supermarket checkout counters or on late-night television‖ (1997: 522). And 
while many academics, intellectuals and artists might deny this connection, they would 
seem to validate it in their behavior, according to Pinker at least. 
 
In a gathering of today‘s elite, it is perfectly acceptable to laugh that you barely passed 
Physics for Poets and Rocks for Jocks and have remained ignorant of science ever since, 
despite the obvious importance of scientific literacy to informed choices about personal 
health and public policy. But saying that you have never heard of James Joyce or that you 
tried listening to Mozart once but prefer Andrew Lloyd Webber is as shocking as blowing 
your nose on your sleeve or announcing that you employ children in your sweatshop, 
despite the obvious unimportance of your tastes in leisure-time activity to just about 
anything. (1997: 522-3) 
 
Pinker cites no research in support of this claim and he is likely speaking from his own 
experiences in academia and in the social contexts academics tend to inhabit. It certainly 
jibes with what I have experienced and rings true with colleagues I‘ve spoken to in this 
regard. This form of status consciousness is harmless enough when it comes to personal 
tastes in music and leisure time activity, but it is another matter completely when it 
comes to an academic‘s ideological and ontological identity, where it influences, for 
example, one‘s position on human nature or one‘s willingness to seriously consider 
scholarship that is seen to be politically tainted, where one‘s academic identity (one‘s 
‗creds‘) could be jeopardized. We would be naïve not to acknowledge that the desire to 
be in-step with what is deemed de rigueur is as strong among academics as it is among 
society‘s rank and file, perhaps more so. It would be even more naïve not to recognize 
how potent a dynamic it is in the world of elite art.  
 
This brings to mind Hans Christian Andersen‘s classic children‘s story, ‗The Emperor‘s 
New Clothes,‘ in which a status obsessed despot who gives more attention to his 
wardrobe and accoutrements than to his subjects is duped by some clever shysters into 
buying and donning a suit of clothes they claim to have made that is invisible to anyone 
of dubious competence or who is just plain stupid. The emperor himself cannot see the 
garment but pretends to for fear of appearing unfit for his position, as do his ministers 
and his subjects except for a child in the crowd who, during a procession to show off the 




apparently took pleasure in presenting himself as such a naively precocious child and 
intended the story as an exposé of the hypocrisy, snobbery and pretentiousness he found 





What sadly seems to have underscored so much of the production of avant-garde art in 
the twentieth century and which plagues so much of the scholarship around it is a potent 
penchant for radical chic that perhaps finds its strongest expression in the 
unintelligibility of much postmodernist writing.  The following excerpt from page 50 of 
Felix Guattari‘s Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm (1995) is a case in point. 
Notwithstanding that it has been ‗taken out context‘ this surely is nothing other than 
deliberate obfuscation. 
 
We can clearly see that there is no bi-univocal correspondence between linear signifying 
links or archi-writing, depending on the author, and this multireferential, multi-dimensional 
machinic catalysis. The symmetry of scale, the transversality, the pathic non-discursive 
character of their expansion: all these dimensions remove us from the logic of the excluded 
middle and reinforce us in our dismissal of the ontological binarism we criticised 
previously. (quoted in Sokal & Bricmont 1998: 166 - my emphasis) 
 
Such inaccessibility seems an end in itself and one wonders who is supposed to get it 
(or pretend to get it?). A century earlier, when the trend against realism and widely 
accessible art was just taking off, Caulle Mendes (1841 - 1909), a French poet and 
critic, lamented its manifestation in literature, sensing its appeal to status and portraying 
the new aesthetic thusly: 
 
Today one writes for a ‗charming aristocracy.‘ To be a member of the charming 
aristocracy, you have to appreciate things that the great mass of your fellow citizens are 
unable to appreciate.84 
 
Radical chic such as Guattari seems to exemplify so convincingly, which Pinker 
suggests ―grew out of a militant denial of human nature,‖ finds its expression in art 
works that are deliberately ―ugly, baffling, and insulting‖ and Pinker cites as examples: 
Robert Mapplethorpe‘s photographs of sadomasochistic acts, Andres Serrano‘s Piss 
Christ (a crucifix in a jar of the artist‘s urine) and Chris Ofil‘s painting of the Virgin 
Mary smeared in elephant dung. These are instances of what Quentin Bell (1992), 
following on Veblen, has categorized as ―conspicuous outrage‖ (Pinker 2002: 414), 
where shocking the bourgeoisie has become the primary artistic concern. In the realm of 
‗music‘ Pinker refers to remarks by composer Karlheinz Sockhausen following the 9/11 
attacks which surely must win the prize for conspicuous outrage.  
 
''What happened there is -- they all have to rearrange their brains now -- is the greatest work 
of art ever. … That characters can bring about in one act what we in music cannot dream 
of, that people practice madly for 10 years, completely, fanatically, for a concert and then 
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die. That is the greatest work of art for the whole cosmos. … 'I could not do that. Against 
that, we, composers, are nothing. (Kershner & Landler 2001)  
 
Even when the possibilities of a genre have been far from exhausted, it seems the wont 
of people ‗in the know‘ to avail themselves of a new and different cannon of status, 
perhaps in part motivated by an awareness that conservatism in one‘s artistic ventures is 
taken to imply more than just a disinclination to abandon art that continues to satisfy or 
a reluctance to embrace something significantly different that simply does not satisfy. In 
the arts and the academic institutions that help sustain them there has been a conflation 
of aesthetics and notions of human nature with ideology and political philosophy, 
where, for example, one who eschews the radical chic of the avant-garde and 
postmodernism is assumed to be on the political ‗right‘ while those who laud it are 
presumably ‗progressive‘ and on the ‗left.‘ As has already been intimated, this 
polarizing is in varying ways and degrees found in academia with those in the natural 
sciences construed as conservative if not reactionary (or even fascist), while those in the 
Social Sciences are seen as politically progressive with their researches far more likely 
to be deemed politically correct.  
 
As with nature-nurture, we have here another simplistic and counterproductive 
dichotomy. I grant that if one were to quantify the political ethos of academics from 
both ‗sides,‘ and this can to some degree be done,85 the resulting bell curves would 
overlap substantially but not completely, and based on my readings, I would say it is 
almost a sure bet that the natural sciences curve would indeed be on the right (where 
right = right). If status (or anxiety about political identity) is genuinely not a concern in 
directing one‘s quest for understanding and truth, this cannot be a problem and the work 
of philosophers like Henry Plotkin (2002) demonstrates the substantial common ground 
and scope for research based on a well-founded understanding of how genes and culture 
co-evolve, as will be the focus of the next chapter. 
 
What the Social Sciences provide are insights into what is actually going on in people‘s 
interactions and their use of time that reveals what they share and what they do not. 
Where there are enough people having something in common, we can speak of a 
sociocultural phenomenon and we can then attempt to explain it. Here again the Social 
Sciences provide essential input by revealing the connections between sociocultural 
phenomena, particularly between what is going on at a micro level vis-à-vis what can be 
observed as broader and less transient (where we can, for example, speak of ideology) 
and from this, theories of cause and effect can be arrived at. This is obviously what is 
needed for all kinds of reasons and purposes and is what education, perhaps most of all, 
needs to take serious account of, BUT only provided the theorizing has taken stock of 
what is understood about our universal human nature and how it biases what is going on 
in people‘s interactions and use of time wherever one finds them. The upshot for me is 
that every phenomenon that is social is firstly and always psychosocial and we can only 
progress so far in our understanding of it without a psychology that can adequately 
explain human agency. In several places I have drawn attention to the myriad of ways in 
which commercial interests exploit our innate psychology and I really cannot believe 
that any social scientist would refute them, and yet there seems a reluctance to accept 
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that it also our innate psychology that makes it possible, with educational help, to 
become optimally free of profit‘s machinations, for our ‗better nature‘ to call the shots. 
 
 
Looking both ways? 
 
‗Retro Style‘would seem, on the strength of its name, to be something quite apart from 
the ‗conspicuous outrage‘ of the artists cited earlier. Yet its aesthetic seems fully 
postmodern and smacks of radical chic if we are to agree with Elizabeth Guffrey‘s take 
on it (2006). Retro, as she explains it, does look back and draw from the past but is not 
motivated by any yearning for aesthetic riches, for art that moves one emotionally and 
that, dare one say, is beautiful. Retro does not attempt to revive any style or tradition, to 
bring it back and build on what was previously successful. Its use of the past is 
informed by a kind of cynicism or angst, its intention being to ―demythologize‖ the 
past, drawing from modernism so as to challenge the notions of progress that are 
associated with it, for example, its ―positivist views of technology [and] industry.‖ As 
Guffrey sees it, Retro ―quotes past styles with an unsentimental nostalgia" (2006 - cover 
description). Such an oxymoron does not seem problematic for her (I can but shake my 
head.) and is in line with what I see as a postmodernist penchant for enigmatic, 
contradictory, even nonsensical formulations that we are supposed to believe convey 
real insight.  
 
If retro art really is as Guffrey portrays it, I cannot help but wonder what one is 
supposed to do with it beyond using it as some kind of ―membership badge,‖ yet 
another demonstration of radical chic that allows yet another cognoscenti to distance 
itself from art that satisfies more organic yearnings, yearnings which issue from a 
psychology that is ages old and universal.  If indeed it has the power to demythologize 
the ultimately suicidal notions of progress that drive the globalization of consumerism, 
who can but applaud it? But the question that must then be posed is: who is it that gets 
the message, or is likely to? Most likely it will be those who have already grasped it, 
that Retro is art that ‗preaches to the choir,‘ and the choir is not likely to gain in size and 
influence if it is art that fails to do more than provoke critical thought processes, as 
important as these may be.  
 
 
Trust the hippies! 
 
We need rather to get the message across to those who have yet to be nudged out of 
their comfort zones and made to confront the ―madness‖ ―that's goin' on around here,‖ 
that David Crosby suggested ―surely, surely won‘t stand the light of day‖ but with the 
caution: ―It appears to be a long time, such a long, long, long, long time before the 
dawn.‖86 These lyrics are from a song that reached millions and was one of the anthems 
of the Woodstock generation; and it was able to do so because of the eminently popular 
musical idiom that Crosby, Stills and Nash employed to convey them, music that rocked 
and that was nothing other than beautiful in its crafting and delivery, superb vocal 
harmonizing being what stands out the most, and music that drew upon and celebrated 
                              




traditions meaningful to a rank-and-file interested in something other than cynical 
savoir-faire. 
 
‗Long Time Gone‘ provided the soundtrack for the opening sequence of the 1970 
Academy Award winning film, Woodstock, which documented the massively successful 
1969 music festival, an event that encapsulated an ethos that was genuinely promising 
even if it ultimately failed to achieve the critical mass needed to really save a world 
gone mad (for which the Vietnam War and the proliferation of nuclear weapons were 
then seen as most symptomatic). Joni Mitchell captured this ethos in her tribute to the 
festival, a song that also reached millions and whose lyrics are worth quoting from here 
because, among other things, they underline humankind‘s unbroken connection with a 
primordial past and speak to an ecozoic vision consonant with what was discussed in 
the first chapter. Knowing Mitchell‘s lyrics as thoroughly as I do convinces me that she 
in no way was trying to invoke a ‗Noble Savage‘ ontology such as Pinker debunks in 
The Blank Slate. And, notwithstanding the confessional character of so many of 
Mitchell‘s lyrics, they are never about angst. They certainly explore her discontents and 
the darker sides of our nature, but always with an eye to how they can be mitigated 
when our better nature is activated and allowed to prevail.  
 
By the time we got to Woodstock 
We were half a million strong 
And everywhere there was song and celebration 
And I dreamed I saw the bombers 
Riding shotgun in the sky 
And they were turning into butterflies 
Above our nation 
 
We are stardust
Billion year old carbon
We are golden
Caught in the devil's bargain
And we've got to get ourselves




The author many years ago
 
(my own PowerPoint compilation) 
 
 
Adaptationism vis-à-vis socialist realism 
 
Even though he embraced a political philosophy that was fully blank slate and used it to 
justify oppression and genocide, Stalin did grasp that art which fails to connect with 
innate dispositions stands little chance of educating the masses in ways conducive to 
progress toward a utopian ideal. Indeed, he took exception to work that seemed more 




Shostakovich‘s modernist opera, Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk was hailed by the Soviet 
press as another ―success of Socialist construction, of the correct policy of the Party.‖ 
Labrecht (1982: 51-52) suggests that this never would have happened if it were not that 
Stalin only got to see the opera and, more importantly, to hear it quite some time later. 
Labrecht suspects, as others have, that Stalin wrote (or instructed the writing of) the 
newspaper piece that, two years after the premiere, denounced the opera as ―petty-
bourgeois formalist cerebration‖ and which no doubt contributed to its being banned for 
almost thirty years. 
 
The ‗correct policy of the Party‘ was in fact socialist realism and was in large measure a 
reaction against the departures from realistic art that abounded in the early twentieth 
century and which were seen as Belle Époque bourgeois indulgences and accordingly 
‗decadent.‘ More importantly they were regarded as having little prospect of being 
grasped by the proletariat and hence having little value as propaganda. It is claimed that 
Lenin himself eschewed the premise that what is beautiful should be rejected because it 
happens to be old, and admonished that art must call on and exploit its heritage. 
"Proletarian culture must be the logical development of the store of knowledge mankind 
has accumulated under the yoke of capitalist, landowner, and bureaucratic society‖ 
(quoted in Sopontsinsky 1978: 6).  
 
But then art must, through its content, instruct people, causing them to viscerally feel 
the values, ideals and conceptions of the human condition that it seeks to engender and 
cultivate, and it can only effect the required emotional manipulation if it is in a 
‗language‘ people understand and that resonates with their pre-cultural nature as well as 
with what they have experienced and come to value. In the view of the eminent cultural-
historical psychologist, Lev Vygotsky, whatever is going to succeed as learning must 
position the learner in a zone of proximal development, which in essence is the 
commonsense principle that education must work with a learner as she or he is, where 
the educational input must be such that the learner is able and inclined to make sense of 
and work with it. In this regard, it bears repeating what was said in the first chapter, that 
Vygotsky clearly understood that any attempt to comprehend the human mind must be 
located within an evolutionary framework and thereby must understand mind as 
something that unfolds according to species-general psychosocial processes. 
 
 
The Derriere Guard 
 
The ethos of breaking bonds and overthrowing orthodoxies may during the course of the 
last century have become orthodoxy in its own right. If so, it is one that could be loosing 
ground in the arts as well as in the discourses that attend them. In 1997 the widely-read 
novelist and social satirist Tom Wolfe shared his surmise that the world of art was in the 
waning years of a cultural epoch and that a ―regime shift‖ was imminent comparable to 
what took place in the years crossing the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. What the 
previous regime change required in the visual arts was a decrial of the sumptuousness of 
the Belle Époque that was under ―the near total cultural power‖ of an elite of realist 
painters who are now by and large forgotten, none of them having come to be hailed as 




1897 survey to be the most likely to still be giants of art in the year 1997.87 What is 
important in relation to the ongoing discussion is that the regime change that came with 
modernism was underscored, even if unwittingly, by a belief that humans are 
sufficiently pliant in their tastes to embrace forms that lack realism or that are 
significantly abstract (people who are blank slates aesthetically). The result was art that 
increasingly stood aloof from the ‗plebeian‘ tastes of the masses even if its creators 
professed a strong sense of identity with them.  
 
The festival at which Wolfe was speaking was staged by the Derriere Guard, ―a loosely 
organized group of painters, poets, and composers, founded [in 1996], who celebrate 
technique as artistically liberating, and beauty as a universal value.‖ The group‘s 
founder, Stefania de Kenessey (a classical composer) describes its membership and 
ethos in the following way. 
 
A new generation of artists are actively re-engaging history. … They neither regress to the 
distant past nor yearn for a now vanished world; instead, they strike out in an altogether 
different direction. By fusing tradition with innovation, the Western with the Eastern, they 
offer a radically new alternative for the art of the new millennium. (Limaye 1997 – online 
source) 
 
It is an alternative the notion of which predates the Derriere Guard by at least a decade. 
It has been provided a theoretical and historical argument in the writings of Frederick 
Turner whose words painter Steven Assael used in a debate with the director of the 
Whitney Museum of American Art following a protest by artists who reject the new 
orthodoxy which they accused the museum of embracing to the disadvantage of artists 
such as de Kenessey describes. Turner‘s explorations of art history have for him 
confirmed that while ―sometimes the present created the future by breaking the shackles 
of the past,‖ just as significantly ―sometimes the past created the future by breaking the 
shackles of the present‖ (the European Renaissance for example) (Turner1996: 32). 
Wolfe, Turner and the Derriere Guard sensed this to be happening as we were rolling 
into the twenty-first century. The problems bequeathed by modernism to artists like 
those of the Derriere Guard have been articulated by Turner as follows (27-28): 
 
 The human person had been denatured; we had been taught to reject our animal nature, 
our sex, our genetic lineage.88 
 As artists we were expected to dismiss the constraints of nature itself- this at a time 
when the planet urgently required human beings to accept their ecological 
responsibilities as part of a larger ecosystem not created by social fiat.  
 We had lost the great forms and disciplines of the arts, the biopsychic technologies of 
meter, representation, and melody, and were thus alienated from our own shamanic 
tradition.  
                              
87  The artists so rated were (1st) William-Adlophe Bouguereau, (2nd) Jean-Louis Ernest Meissonier, and 
(3rd) Léon Gérôme. Bourguereau‘s paintings are definitely worth checking out and there is a revival of 
interest in them, one of which is used as the backing for the logo of the Art Renewal Center on their 
website at http://www.artrenewal.org/ 
88  By genetic lineage, Turner is making no allusion to race. He is emphasizing our condition of 
connectedness with all life, back through an ancestral ‗Eve‘ to a common ancestor with chimpanzees 
and further back to less and less complex organisms to the very beginning of life on the planet or 




 The political separatism and cultural fragmentation that had been encouraged had 
dangerously attenuated that sense of human fellowship that is the womb of artistic 
creativity. 
 In a time of staggering and marvelous scientific discovery, when nonlinear dynamics 
and chaos theory were suggesting a vital rapprochement between the two cultures, 
avant-garde art and criticism were assailing science with a remarkable combination of 
malice and ignorance.  
 Hope, and all the other positive emotions that inspire the arts, were sneered at and 
dismissed; snideness and rage were the dominant signs of the artist.  
 
Turner is one of a growing number of mavericks in aesthetics who have turned to 
Evolutionary Psychology in their attempts to once again place human nature at the 
center of research into the arts and how people engage in and through them.89 For artists 
and arts educators with whom his conclusions resonate loudly (and I include myself 
here), Turner presents what could be a manifesto. I have extracted the following which I 
find most apropos the discussion at hand. 
 
 Art should direct itself to the general public, and should grow from and speak to 
the common roots and universal principles of human nature in all cultures. 
 Art should deny the simplifications of the political Left and Right, and should 
refine and deepen the radical Center. 
 The use of art, and of cheap praise, to create self-esteem is a cynical betrayal of 
all human cultures. Excellence and standards are as real and universal in the 
arts as in competitive sports. [my emphasis] 
 The long enmity between emotion and intellectual depth needs to be ended 
 Art must be reunited with science. … The experience of truth is beautiful; thus, 
the artist‘s experience and the scientist‘s are at bottom profoundly akin. (Ibid: 
31-32)90 
 
The claim that standards and the pursuit of excellence are universal concerns in artistic 
activity is one that cultural relativists might well be inclined to challenge, but I believe 
Dutton and others have adequately demonstrated its validity in so far as establishing that 
cultures everywhere engage in and esteem artistic activities where craftsmanship 
(proficiency, skill) is valued and aspired to. It is apropos to recall what was discussed 
earlier regarding our universal predilection for demonstrations of prowess. High levels 
of skill and virtuosity are a source of pleasure and are admired everywhere one goes and 
are sought in a range of regularized human activities, sports being the most obvious, 
where it can confidently be said to be the raison d'être. We are accordingly predisposed 
to set apart and elevate elites of especially skilled and virtuosic individuals and to honor 
their accomplishments.  
 
                              
89  That the appellation ‗maverick‘ is still apropos is suggested by absence of a webpage for Darwinian 
aesthetics at Wikipedia, even though it is a rubric, coined by Dennis Dutton I believe, that is being 
used more and more and that encompasses work that is over ten years old. Besides Dutton, other art 
historians and theorists for whom it is applicable include Mark Turner (1991, 1996), Nancy Easterlin 
(1993), Joseph Carroll (1995, 2004), Robert Storey (1996), Brian Boyd (1998), David Evans (1998), 
Patrick Hogan (1997), and Paul Hernadi (2001).  




But given our innate penchant for novelty, it is understandable that notions of 
excellence and virtuosity, and the standards that are to apply, change over time. When 
we consider the rapidity of change in the art world of fin de siècle Europe and America, 
it seems clear that it can happen quickly and the change can be radical. But the truth is 
of course that the sudden change in question took place, not in the, but in an art world. 
The art world is nothing other than that world in which art takes place, where it is 
created and experienced, and that of course is a huge - indeed, the whole - world 
comprising plebs, cognoscenti and the vast majority who occupy the middle ground, a 
world with more inertia than those esoteric art worlds more concerned with challenging 
or even overthrowing the status-quo.  It is albeit a concern that is in so many cases 
justified and necessary unless one is satisfied with or oblivious to all that is status-quo 
and content to just go with the flow.  Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong with a 
status-quo. Something that is widely shared by way of belief or behavior can be 
genuinely good and worthy and is so in many cases. Or it may be something of little 
consequence and not worth much fuss.   The statuses quo that certainly must be 
challenged, that constitute the ‗madness‘ of consumerism and globalization, are not the 
notions people have about art, but the notions of entitlement and privilege that 
underscore rampant, unsustainable consumption, exponential population growth and all 
manner of social injustice. Art can and should challenge such madness, but its best 





Whatever the content of art, its accessibility is clearly a matter of the form that conveys 
it; form is what ―raises content to objectivity in art‖ and much of its content may not be 
of the overt and discursive kind. The words in quotes are Christopher Ballantine‘s, from 
his Music and Its Social Meanings, a collection of texts that influenced me profoundly 
when first I read them in the 80s, and which demonstrate ways in which music without 
words or other clear referents can nonetheless be read as social texts.  Its intention was 
to provide what Ballantine saw as urgently needed, and which clearly still is, i.e. critical 
awareness of ―the choices, evaluations, and discriminations that we make about music, 
and objectively of why we make them‖ (Ballantine 1984: 27).  Ballantine‘s 
understanding was sociological and conspicuously Marxian.  The need for this kind of 
critical consciousness in relation to music is what many modernist and postmodernist 
composers and artists would say they are responding to, arguing that their art is their 
way of intervening in these choices, evaluations, and discriminations and helping to 
rescue them from ideology. This is all well and good provided one‘s theory 
acknowledges that these choices, evaluations, and discriminations are not entirely 
socially constructed, but are informed and biased by innate predilections and perceptual 
predispositions from which it is extremely difficult to be rescued were such rescue 
necessary or even desirable. Though prominent as a Frankfurt School social theorist and 
thus commonly thought of as Marxian, Herbert Marcuse clearly understood the 
absurdity of blank slate-ism, as he made clear in his The Aesthetic Dimension (1978: 
29). 
 
By virtue of its transhistorical, universal truths, art appeals to a consciousness which is not 
only that of a particular class, but that of human beings as ‗species beings,‘ developing all 






What is universal in art? 
 
That art embodies transhistorical and universal truths is difficult to substantiate because 
‗truth‘ is epistemologically problematic, i.e. what is truth? That which is transhistorical 
and universal in art is a set of qualities that mark particular kinds of doings and their 
outputs as art. In the absence of any such qualities, the word begins to lose its meaning.  
Sociologists and anthropologists use the term and have done so in respect of all human 
cultures, because in all of them can be observed doings that manifest certain qualities. 
Dutton (2009: 52-59) has identified twelve such universal signatures. As a way of 
concluding this chapter, each of these will be discussed in turn, drawing on and 
hopefully making more cogent the adaptationist theories and explanations that I have 
attempted to give credence to in this wide-ranging chapter.  
 
 
1. Direct pleasure 
 
The apprehension of the outcomes of artistic effort, be they art works, performances of 
works or improvisations, must excite an immediate experience of pleasure according to 
Dutton. I would concur but with the caveat that pleasure must be understood as 
something that can be far more wide-reaching than just the fact of having been 
entertained. I still favor Langer‘s term ‗significant import‘ and here recall what I 
pointed out in Chapter One, that pleasure: 
 
can take innumerable forms from subtle to intense, some ephemeral, some lasting, some 
libidinal or carnal, some intellectual or ‗cerebral,‘ some sadistic, masochistic or otherwise 
self-serving (e.g. status driven), while others entail empathy, compassion and self-giving, 
some are passive while others require engagement, commitment and effort, some are 
regarded as base, while others are esteemed as virtuous and edifying, some common, some 
esoteric.  
 
What this chapter has argued is that for any perceptual experience to be meaningful, the 
representations that are formed in the brain must be weighted emotionally (marked 
somatically) if they are to have any significant role to play further along. This means 
that whatever the object of perception, it must have something in its form that renders 
the brain‘s representations feelingful (that gives them emotional valences) and that sets 
about structuring and giving pattern to the experience of sentience that unfolds. It does 
so by activating neural mechanisms that have been instructed by genes but that have 
been expressed phenotypically and been shaped through one‘s interactions with the 
physical and sociocultural world one inhabits. In modern global society, I have argued, 
one ‗inhabits‘ several such worlds, each shaping one‘s sensibilities and cognitions in 
different ways, to the extent that describing one‘s own culture becomes difficult when 
culture is taken to mean the beliefs, norms and values that manifest in observable 
behavior as opposed to those that characterize an ethnic identity that one may profess 
identification with. Just as we have universal norms and values that speak to an innate 
moral sense, so do we have universal predilections in terms of the kinds of sensory 
experience we find pleasurable even though culture works on these in different ways 
giving rise to the rich diversity of artistic expression that constitutes the world of art (in 
contradiction to what people tend to regard as ‗the art world‘). Our universal 
predilections and biases kick in without conscious awareness and are no doubt most 




what is being perceived starts to be mediated through cognitive links with what has 
already been imprinted in memory through experience and learning. Through repetitions 
of features in what one experiences, these links get connected up and internalized as 
ideologies that bias which subsequent linkages are made and which are not and for the 
most part do so under the radar of conscious awareness. 
 
Dutton makes the important point that the experience of meaningfulness or significant 
import (the enjoyment of beauty for example):  
 
derives from multilayered yet distinguishable pleasures that are experienced either 
simultaneously or in close proximity to each other. These layered experiences can be most 
effective when separable pleasures are coherently related to each other or interact with each 
other – as, roughly put, in the structural form, colors, and subject matter of a painting, or 
the music, drama, singing, directed acting, and sets of an opera. (2009: 52) 
 
As to why we innately favor certain stimuli over others, taking more direct pleasure in 
them, several adaptationist explanations have been offered and differ according to the 
art form in question. Music provides experiences that are highly proprioceptive and 
kinesthetic, but only if its temporal organization is such that regularities can be 
perceived from which ever larger and more complex patterns of regularities can be 
apprehended and cognized in various ways, as patterns that are, for example, melodic, 
harmonic, timbral, textural or purely rhythmic. Expectations that innate mechanisms 
induce in response to what is happening in the moment can of course be met, delayed, 
ignored, tricked or thwarted depending on what the music presents to the ear; therein 
lies much of the explanation of how music achieves aesthetic effect.  
 
What is immediately apprehended very quickly undergoes  processing on many 
computational levels and involving different neurocognitive domains and accessing 
different memories, but always engaging older parts of the brain that imbue cognition 
with emotional content, without which even dryly rational thought is impossible. This 
develops the experience and makes it more meaningful. Structures in music that are 
most accessible are those that resonate neurologically because they are in some way or 
degree isomorphs of or in part analogous to structures already residing in the brain, 
structures that may be and probably are in most cases shared by different integrative 
systems and at other times employed toward different behavioral outcomes: language, 
mathematics, the other arts, courtship, grooming, and so on.  
 
The pleasure that motivates attention and participation in the arts are the results of 
reward mechanisms that evolved in the Pleistocene because of the value of particular 
behaviors in courtship, finding optimal habitats, not getting lost, avoiding danger, 
locating food, hunting cooperatively, the establishing and tracking of social 
relationships, the nurturing of offspring, or the acquisition of status and rank. There are 
also reward mechanisms that predisposed our ancestors‘ attention to and participation in 
activities that organize the brain both physically and informationally, but that do not 
place one in danger or demand too much energy expenditure (even though they may 
demand much in this regard as in play, sport and dancing). The brain demands such 
reorganization, of putting things where they belong, because of our unique capacity for 
processing information that is contingent, provisionally true, potentially true, or likely 
to be true depending on its source. And from Dissanayake we understand the 
omnipresent need for intimacy and its reassurances in modes of interaction that begin 




phenotypically such that the child becomes a socially competent adult capable of 
finding fulfillment, meaning and purpose in life. That musical events are such potent 
means of exploring, revealing and celebrating our intricate social connections has 
perhaps best been explained by Christopher Small in his celebrated Musicking (1998) 
and he has done so in ways eminently concordant with an adaptationist (Darwinian) 
understanding of music‘s social efficacy, such as Dissanayake offers, even though 
Small is identified so strongly as a sociologist of music (or music anthropologist) and 
does not ever invoke evolutionary explanations or draw from EP. 
 
 
2. Skill and virtuosity  
 
Artistic doing always requires skill at some level, usually a repertoire of skills that in 
the case of performing arts like music, must be integrated in time, and this requires well 
developed proprioceptive and kinesthetic ability.  Natural selection has provided for this 
amply because it so comprehensively advantaged our ancestors‘ survival and 
reproductive prospects. As importantly artistic doing demonstrates such skill or skills 
and we are innately predisposed to finding demonstrations of prowess and virtuosity 
intensely pleasurable. Not only can one learn from them in ways advantageous for one‘s 
own skill development, they provide ideals of what is and what might be possible. And, 
importantly, we gain from them in terms of what the experiencing of them can induce 
internally that promotes improved cognitive functioning without engaging one in energy 
sapping and possibly injurious activity.  
 
Sexual selection has predisposed us to such demonstrations because they are 
information rich fitness indicators and signal genetic quality in a potential mate or a 
rival suitor. Add to this the need for status that became a strong selective force when our 
ancestors started living in sizeable groups. That the pleasure of witnessing prowess can 
be so intense – that it ―can cause jaws to drop, hair to stand up on the back of the neck, 
and eyes to flood with tears‖ (53) - suggests a runaway process in evolution, where a 
feedback loop between selection for prowess and selection for finding prowess 
attractive fed an exponential increase in the speed of evolution at the genetic level. But 
it also suggests that there should be a degree of dimorphism in how males and females 
respond to such demonstrations, the nature of the pleasures derived, and what motivates 
interest in the first place. It has been explained, however, that such differences as there 
are will be quantitative and not qualitative.  That the psychology of art is in significant 
ways the psychology of status has also been discussed at length and is another 
dimension of an adaptationist understanding that suggests gender differences that 
manifest in one‘s inclinations for and responsiveness to different forms of artistic 
engagement. They also manifest in the gendered nature of so much of the world‘s 
musicking. This is problematic when exploited to sustain gender inequality or to 
rationalize sexist behavior, and sadly it continues to be so exploited in societies and 
cultures around the world.  
 
 
3. Style  
 
‗Style‘ can mean many things, but whether it is a reference to how an artist (or 
anybody) works, to the formal characteristics of what is being or has been created, or to 




mutuality and shared meanings. It also implies that among some group or groups of 
people, even if only a handful of cognoscenti, what is being produced, has been 
produced, or is being displayed is accessible (graspable) and has been determined to 
have value. In urban slang, to style or stylin‟ is generally a complement applied to 
someone who in their look or behavior is impressive. In the parlance of some Hip-hop 
emcees (rappers), it can also denote superiority in what one is able to verbalize 
spontaneously, as in the free-stylin‘ which is the focus of emcee battles. Not only does it 
imply skill and virtuosity but, just as importantly, a command of linguistic idioms 
(including prosodic and gestural elements) that are understood and identified with by 
those listening, those who ultimately decide who wins. 
 
Apropos the earlier discussion around modernism and postmodernism, Dutton remarks 
on the proclivity of much modern and postmodern art and scholarship to treat style ―as a 
metaphorical prison for artists, determining limits of form and content.‖ What a style 
does rather is to provide a familiar frame of reference within which artists meet their 
audiences and communicate with them. Without some such frame, there is little chance 
of much being accomplished as far as any real level of exchange or shared meaning. In 
this regard, the deliberate avoidance of form and style is in a sense just another style 
insofar as the exercise in avoidance is taking place in some kind of artistic act or 
production for which there is expected to be some kind of artistic audience, usually one 
that is in on what is going on and whose expectations have been accordingly prepared. 
In such an act or production, one might argue that there is less freedom precisely 
because of what one cannot or should not do. How ‗free‘ for example could a musician 
(or any performing artist) be if not allowed to employ a ‗language‘ in which she or he 
has acquired fluency and which others understand? Musicians ‗performing‘ 
Stockhausen‘s ―Es‖ (―It‖), for example, are anything but free even though no 
restrictions whatsoever have been placed on what they might produce with their 
instruments. According to the jacket notes of the 1971 Deutsche Grammophon 
recording of the ‗work,‘ ―Es‖  
 
... reaches an extreme of intuitive playing in the instruction to play only when one has 
achieved the state of non-thinking, and to stop whenever one begins to think ...  As soon as 
a player thinks of something ... he should stop, and only start again when he is just 
listening, and at one with what is heard. (Jacket notes) 
 
Style permeates human life to the extent that Dutton sees style and culture are ―virtually 
coterminous.‖  
 
Virtually all meaningful human activity above the level of autonomic reflexes is carried out 
within stylistic framework: gestures, language use, social courtesies such as norms of 
laughter or body distance in personal encounters. (54) 
 
 
4. Novelty and creativity  
 
Dutton does not clearly qualify his inclusion of novelty as a criterion. When we call 
something a novelty, including an experience, it is because it stands out as being new 
and original in ways that capture one‘s interest and, in many cases, induces pleasure. 
We, like so many other species, are innately wired to be on the look-out for and 
attentive to anything that has not been experienced and processed previously. Dennett 




evolution, which as we have seen has all the hallmarks of a runaway process, ―a 
positive-feedback escalator‖ as he puts it (2007: 88).  
 
Our predisposition for novelty is a Paleolithic button that media, advertising and 
commercial art have learned to push relentlessly and to ideologize as an ‗acceptable‘ 
means to personal status in consumerist society where it is just accepted that having all 
the latest stuff is important.  But no matter the delight we naturally take in novelty, I do 
not consider it a vital quality of art. After all, the art that we cherish is art that we revisit 
from time to time, if not frequently, and the richness of experience it affords is 
maintained even though there is nothing in it that remains novel even though there 
might remain riches yet to be discovered. Originality is another quality that ties in with 
the criterion ―expressive individuality‖ that will be taken up further along. It is part and 
parcel of the more complex quality: creativity, to which some discussion is necessary 
given the importance of its development through education. 
 
Creativity most surely is vital to art and is often argued to be what distinguishes art 
from craft even though they are substantially overlapping pursuits and a great deal of 
creativity can go into the making of something that others may hardly take note of. 
Creativity, in fact, is vital to the lives of all humans and is one of our most 
distinguishing characteristics as a species. Everyone has to solve problems that they 
have not solved before and that require cognitive divergence, where the problem 
induces a neural searching out of memory for what is potentially relevant. The solution 
is not found, only ‗information‘ that might be useable. The solution requires cognitive 
convergence, where the brain weaves together disparate threads of mentalese and an 
idea, if not the solution itself, emerges in consciousness. And if the actual solution is 
novel in its conception, clever or even ingenious, and works, the cognition of it brings 
immense pleasure and it can also do so for those who witness the result (and perhaps the 
process even).  It need not however be productive in the sense of some physical doing 
with an artifactual result. The problem could be entertained and resolved entirely as a 
process of mind motivated only by the pleasure afforded as, for example, when reading 
literature and trying to anticipate how the plot will unfold, or trying to make inferences 
regarding a character‘s or perhaps the author‘s intentions. Grasping the workings of a 
creative mind, I would argue, requires a creative mind. 
 
Technology, from stone axes to nano-technology, is the product of human creativity and 
is the means by which we have dramatically altered the environments of selection not 
only for our own species but for almost every other. What culture has accumulated is a 
vast store of creative outcomes, each providing material on which creative minds 
continue to work and from which new, more ‗sophisticated‘ outcomes ensue. The 
encephalization of the human brain, as has been already been theorized, was no doubt 
driven by and made exponential by gene-culture co-evolution such that it tripled in size 
with extraordinary rapidity by the standards of biological time (Buss 2008: 396). The 
next chapter will explore this further with particular attention to cultural evolution. 
 
Cognitive divergence and convergence are processes that evidence the inter-modular 
and cross-modal capacities of the brain and which make problematic Gardner‘s Multiple 
Intelligences theory. On the other hand, they provide support for the proposed existence 
of general intelligence (the ‗g‘ factor) that reflects overall brain efficiency and fluidity. 
The ‗theory of g‘ posits a unitary general intelligence that can be quantified by IQ tests. 




in formal education and in processes of selection in higher education and in the world of 
work. It has moreover been applied to posit differences in average intelligence between 
populations defined by race and gender, thus providing theoretical support to those who 
would use such differences to justify programs of social engineering that are morally 
problematic if not reprehensible. It is another discussion that the next chapter takes up.  
 
A question that is pertinent here is whether or not there is any correlation between 
general intelligence, as measured by IQ tests, and creativity, as measured, for example, 
by the Tests of Creative Thinking designed by Paul Torrance in 1966 (see Torrance 
1974). These tests have since then been taken by millions worldwide, administered in 
50 languages, and the resulting data scrutinized in several studies. Such a correlation is 
to be expected given that creativity and intelligence manifest the same cognitive 
processes. Creativity may be nothing more than intelligence that gives rise to novel 
outcomes. Torrance has hypothesized that there is a correlation between low creativity 
(CQ) and IQ but that it is unlikely to be found among those possessed of above average 
or high creativity. The most surprising findings have been those of Kyung Hee Kim 
after analyzing nearly 300,000 Torrance scores from over four decades of testing 
(Bronson & Merryman 2010). He found that up until around 1990, scores increased for 
both IQ and CQ in keeping with the ‗Flynn effect‘ whereby more enriched 
environments have led to an increase in IQ of as much as 10 points per generation 
(which is evidence in itself that IQ is not wholly innate) (Flynn 1999). From 1990, 
according to Kim‘s findings, creativity scores have been falling, in America at least.  
 
The July 2010 Newsweek article reporting on this purports that there are no conclusive 
explanations for why this is happening but cites as likely culprits the inordinate time 
kids spend in front of TV or playing videogames instead of engaging in creative activity 
as well as the inattention to creativity development that has come to characterize 
American schooling since the Reagan years with its focus on standardized curricula, 
rote memorization, and nationalized testing. Kim‘s findings are particularly disturbing if 
one believes, as I do, that critical consciousness is always and at once creative 
consciousness. Being able to ―read the world‖ (Freire & Macedo 1987) requires a 
capacity for problematizing it and then making the best use of what one knows and what 






Dutton claims that ―wherever artistic forms are found, they exist alongside some kind of 
critical language of judgment and appreciation, simple or, more likely, elaborate.‖ (54). 
The employment of such a language can be a creative performance in itself and my 
readings of art criticism suggest strongly that many art critics would wish their 
critiques/reviews to be so regarded. Dutton notes that Anthropology has found a culture 
of criticism to be at best rudimentary if at all existent in small, nonliterate societies, 
even those with developed art traditions, but he does not address this as an argument 
against including criticism as a universal attribute of art even if so few small, nonliterate 
societies remain. It is what can be observed in such societies that EP uses as primary 
data in many studies and if criticism is negligible in such societies, this challenges its 
being part of an innate artistic sensibility. My hypothesis is that the absence of a culture 




and straightforward, even more so when access to memory that has been externalized is 
circumscribed by not having the forms of literacy that access to such memory demands, 
being able to read for example. The mass media has created and made widely accessible 
other forms of literacy that are more easily and pleasurably acquired, but which 
nevertheless afford access to worlds upon worlds of externalized memory and which 
accordingly make some kind of critical culture inevitable even if it is limited and 
superficial in its purview.  
 
An adaptationist take on criticism seems fairly straight-forward even though it may not 
be adequate for explaining the complex cultures of criticism and critical discourses that 
we have in the 21st century. The ability to ‗read‘ and ‗rate‘ fitness-indicators and to 
‗assess‘ perceptual qualities is not unique to humans of course. However, the more 
thorough and penetrating the ability, the more successful an organism will be in 
negotiating its environment and meeting its needs. Living in large groups and 
negotiating different and changing environments, as has been discussed in this chapter, 
‗ups the ante‘ for competence in assessing what is going on given that so much more 
goes on in large collectives than in small. Managing complex social relationships 
requires complex cognitive machinery that makes it possible not only to assess, but to 
make inferences and arrive at judgments. Languages (including musilanguages) 
facilitate this by making available what has not been directly experienced that can better 
inform one‘s judgments but which at the same time radically increases all that there is 
for judgments to be formed in respect of, as does the accumulation of cultural 
knowledge that is ever increasing and which literacy and media make increasingly more 
accessible. Indeed, the declining scores in creativity Kim noted could also reflect the 
sensory and informational overload that is inescapable in modern global society and 
which no doubt dulls people to creative productions and disinclines them from creative 
engagement with them.  
 
Critical judgment is a skill (or cluster of skills) and there is pleasure to be taken in the 
proficient exercise of any skill. When the judgment is shared and made compelling to 
others, it becomes overt and can be admired, appreciated, envied, decried or otherwise 
contemplated and thereby has meaning in relation to status. Skill in critical judgment is 
important in most art traditions, obviously so for the artists who seek to learn from 
others (and perhaps thereby gain some competitive edge), but also for those who are not 
practitioners, for whom it affords a mode of engagement that is creative as it too must 
consider how materials may best be used to achieve artistic intentions and form 
judgments in respect of this, perhaps also in respect of the intentions themselves. A 
disposition for criticism might not manifest overtly in the artistic activities of small, 
nonliterate societies (and there could be several explanations for this) but the very fact 
of having developed art forms suggests correspondingly developed critical skills. And 
one must not overlook the likelihood of a social etiquette markedly different from that 
of modern, urbanized society in a global village of highly interactive citizens who never 
meet face to face. Internet blogs give would-be critics a chance to test their critical 
chops in a public forum without having to have been invited and with the option of 











Crediting Aristotle with having first observed it, Dutton points to the incontestably 
universal attraction that astute representations and imitations of real and imaginary 
experiences have for people. I have spoken to this indirectly in the earlier discussions on 
the ‗new realism‘ of the Derriere Guard as well as the ‗Most Wanted‘ projects of 
Komar and Melamid and what they suggest as being innate preferences based on 
Paleolithic interests. Dutton suggests that our delight in such imitations and 
representations constitutes two kinds of pleasure: (1) in how well the representation has 
been accomplished and (2) in what the representation itself portrays. The 
representations that for me have always been most absorbing are maps. They let me see 
what cannot be seen except from space. And even then, the image is not a smidgeon as 
informationally rich as a map. Old maps are especially absorbing because they represent 
such an awesome accomplishment considering what was involved in gathering all the 
necessary data, i.e. all of the meticulously recorded coordinates that allowed dots to be 
connected to reveal coastlines, the courses of rivers and the position, shape and size of 
land masses, their geographical features (lakes, mountains, etc.) and boundaries set by 
humans. Many old maps also reveal a captivating flair for elaboration with their 
portrayals of sea monsters, aboriginal peoples, exotic flora and fauna, weather 
phenomena, as well as a general sense that the map was meant to be more than just a 
factual representation.   
 
Of course a representation can be engaging because of what it does not show but rather 
suggests or anticipates, or the way it represents something such that depth and meaning 
is signified that one would likely have missed were it not for the representation. Such is 
the art of photography as I understand it. All art might be argued to be representational 
if only in the obvious sense that it is giving form to something. Giving form to 
something is not the same as representing it, or so it can be argued, but it has the same 
function of making it available for the consideration of others even though the ‗it‘ may 
remain obscure or ambiguous and may be something more in the way of a concept or a 
condition. Edvard Munch‘s expressionist painting The Scream gives us anything but a 
photograph, the figure on the bridge is sexless and mummy-like in its vague features 
aside from the elongated ‗O‘ of a screaming mouth. But as a representation of 
anguished exasperation, it is unexcelled.  
 
What can be said of music, particularly music without words? It can employ sounds and 
structures that resemble natural aural phenomena like bird calls, thunder, rain falling, 
the movement of waves, and so on, but when it does (infrequently according to my 
experience), it does not do so with the representation of nature as its aim. Rather they 
are means to other ends and it does not seem on the face of it that representation has 
much if anything to do with the intentions that inform music. There is certainly little 
value in making a case for it simply because Dutton includes it on his list of cluster 
criteria for art.91 But it is not problematic when a more general notion of representation 
applies.  
                              
91  The cluster concept is an intriguing philosophical device the intricacies of which do not warrant 
discussion here. What about it that appertains here is that a criterion is seldom hard and fast and it 
need not be ‗necessary‘ or essential when considering whether something should be included in a 





Because human cognition is cross-modal, music can represent a phenomenon or quality 
by offering something analogous. Ascending through the tones of a scale is like 
climbing a ladder. One example that comes to mind is the jumpy melody that 
accompanies the lyrics ―I‘m as jumpy as a puppet on a string‖ and is key to the mood of 
anticipation and impatience that characterizes ‗spring fever‘ in the Rogers and 
Hammerstein song ―It Might as well be Spring‖ (s1 . s1  │ s1 . m : s . d │ m . s1 : d . s1 
│ta1). The fact that particular sound configurations can stand for dimensions of lived 
experience in ways that are widely apprehended is obvious to film composers who 
probably make the most productive use of it. 
 
Even the most representational art has as its purpose to induce an experience that 
resonates emotionally and that hence makes special and aesthetically significant 
whatever might be considered its content. Representational art may succeed by drawing 
on images and metaphors we are innately disposed to find pleasing or otherwise 
significant, but it has to do more than just provide a facsimile of what the senses would 
perceive, which in many cases could never happen because the content is fictional or 
perhaps polemic and has to be accordingly constructed to get across the point with 
which it means to instruct. Whether or not it can be said to represent it, music provides 
an experience of patterned sentience through emotional manipulation which is achieved 
by the activation and connecting up of related neural structures or threads of mentalese, 
as happens with and which makes possible language and rational thought. Emotional 
resonance is experienced in most cases because, in how it structures time, music 
activates kinesthesia and proprioception in ways that we are wired to find engaging and 
pleasurable, often because of the way it creatively plays with anticipation and 
expectation. The explanations offered by Tooby & Cosmides for why we are so wired 
have been given ample consideration already. In disagreement with Langer, I do not see 
music as an analogue for emotive life as it is actually lived but for emotive experience 
as it can be imagined.  
 
We must also not forget the high likelihood that a strong force in the evolution of 
human musicality was sexual selection, where musical displays were courtship displays 
that had to impress and for which there needed to be a capacity for being impressed. Of 
course, one would not have been well served by presenting a display that was so new 
and different as to be inaccessible although some novelty could well have been 
important as a demonstration of the displayer‘s creativity. But a facsimile can also be 
impressive because of how closely it matches another‘s production, as this represents 
highly developed imitation skill. Anyone like myself with experience as a gigging 
musician is aware of what seems a universal love for ‗covers,‘ note for note 
reenactments of classic recordings and symphony goers can be markedly conservative 
in the kinds of departure from canonical performances they will tolerate.  
 
I have already made reference to the centrality of imitation in Memetics and in 
Blackmore‘s theories regarding brain encephalization and the favouring by natural 
selection not only of general imitative capacity, but also the ability to identify and 
imitate exemplary or extraordinary imitators. The acquisition of imitative capacity by 
our ancestors, as Blackmore, Dennett, Dawkins and others understand it, opened up a 
Pandora‘s box unleashing runaway processes in the evolution of beliefs, belief systems 
and customs that may well be maladaptive in the world of 2011. That this understanding 








7. Special focus  
 
Art achieves its effects and intentions when it has in some way been ―bracketed off 
from ordinary life, made a separate and dramatic focus of experience.‖ (55)  This may 
be more a philosophical ideal than a reflection of how people actually engage with art 
even though they may set aside and especially construct dedicated venues (including 
virtual spaces) where such separate and dramatic focus is made more likely (e.g. 
galleries, concert halls, broadcasts, recordings). But bracketing off art experiences in 
this way does far more than facilitate dramatic focus, it marks them as special and 
deserving of attention.  
 
Even where it fails to be an exclusive focus or where it takes place outside of such 
special places, art is always a way of ―making special‖ as Dissanayake puts it and she 
argues that ‗making special‘ is an evolved need and hence a universal need of humans. 
Art is only a special instance of this need finding gratification behaviorally. With art it 
has become rarefied and made especially worthy of attention and participation. There is 
of course no clear dividing line between what does and does not qualify as such a 
special instance and there need not be. Children‘s fantasy play is quintessentially artful 
and is every bit a special instance that involves nearly all of the qualities that Dutton 
speaks to: direct pleasure, skill, style, creativity (including imagination), representation, 
expressive individuality, intellectual challenge, and even criticism. Their predisposition 
for such play is innate because of its efficacy in achieving crucial forms of synaptic 
selection while the brain is still markedly plastic and aptitudes have yet to reach their 
full phenotypic expression and become essentially fixed.92 Play is not however where 
the need for making experience meaningful is first gratified; it is in the rhythms and 
modes of infancy that Dissanayake describes so well in Art & Intimacy (2000).  
 
The need for making special stays with one throughout life although obviously the 
artistic and other means we employ to gratify it change and are shaped by other needs 
that get fore-grounded at particular stages along the away, e.g. the need for status, for 
employment, for novelty, for attracting a mate, for knowledge, or for self-actualization. 
What remains constant throughout, however, are our needs for mutuality and cohesion 
within the social groupings we occupy, or at least within those we care most for and 
identify most with. There is of course art that ‗makes meaningful‘ (perhaps a way of 
perceiving or conceptualizing experience) but which is not motivated by any felt need 
for mutuality and social cohesion. Some is even an outright challenge to it or ostensibly 
so. Such art may gratify other needs, some of which have arisen in human society 
because of the challenges of living in large groups and in rapidly changing 
                              
92  The computer metaphor I would offer (crude perhaps) is that of a hypothetical disk operating system 
(DOS) whose design specifications require the input of data at every step in the operationalizing of its 
functional capacities. The DOS begins as a set of instructions and some rudimentary computational 
systems, but unfolds and becomes more complex in its functional possibilities, provided appropriate 
data is inputted. It only has so long to do this however and what it ends up with in terms of operational 
capacity is pretty much what the computer is stuck with even though ways can be found to make more 




environments, ones that point to the need for critical consciousness as it has been 
conceptualized along the way in this and the first chapter. Statuses quo in behavior 
become entrenched even where they are or become antithetical to real human progress 
and art can be a potent means of demystifying, demythologizing, refuting, or 
overthrowing them. But, as has been argued, it must make special and meaningful its 
purpose in ways that are accessible, that accommodate our natures not only as they have 
been shaped by life‘s experiences but as they have been equipped functionally and 
predisposed to function in particular ways by our genes, which is to say, by a process of 
evolution that began with the first replication event around four billion years ago.  
 
It is apropos that what are understood to be to the most essential brain systems for 
making and experiencing specialness are the oldest, those systems that mark neural 
representations somatically and give them relevant emotional content such that behavior 
is predisposed in advantageous ways, systems such as exist in the brains of so many 
other species. Male bowerbirds construct elaborate nests which they caringly make 
special with bright colored flower petals, beetle casings, berries, snail shells and such 
like.  They do not do so because they have consciously worked out that this is a good 
ploy for attracting a mate. It just feels right to do so and by happy coincidence the 
results manipulate the emotions of a female and induce her to stick around. For species 
that started living in groups larger than the immediate family, other needs came to 
inform and make advantageous ‗making special‘ behavior, foremost being the needs to 
cooperate, collaborate and communicate. What is so eminently clear is that natural 
selection has fed the evolution of our artistic sensibilities in myriad ways and it is 
difficult if not possible to accurately pin down what the motivational dynamics are 
informing instances of making meaningful. Dutton expresses this quite well: 
 
Our aesthetic tastes and interests do not form a rational deductive system but look rather 
more like a haphazard concatenation of adaptations, extensions of adaptations, and vestigial 
attractions and preferences. They evolved to delight and captivate human eyes, ears, and 
minds – not to form a logical system or make intellectual life easy for aesthetic theorists.‖ 
(219) 
 
There is one need that long ago became a powerful selective force in the evolution of 
culture and its arts that has not yet been considered from an adaptationist perspective, 
that is, the need for beliefs and systems of beliefs with which to make sense of and find 
purpose in lives that are full of mysteries. Religion and the means it employs to foster 
belief and to intensify it emotionally (to make it special and meaningful) are phenomena 
that have come under the microscope of Darwinian science, most productively in the 
framework of gene-culture coevolution as will be taken up in the next chapter.  
 
 
8. Expressive individuality  
 
No matter what form it takes, communication is always about externalizing what is 
within and making it accessible to others and this allows a window into who you are, 
who you would like others to think you are, or perhaps who you aspire to be. Its value 
in meeting the needs of a gregarious species such as ours has been the subject of much 
discussion in this chapter, such needs being: basic survival requirements (e.g. success in 
hunting, gathering, finding suitable habitats), acquiring status, attracting mates, 
assessing potential mates, experiencing intimacy and a sense of belonging, grooming, 




constructions of sounds, images and words, the experience of which is beneficial if not 
essential to a highly plastic and complex brain that has to work with information that is 
only contingently true. 
 
Language caused a quantum leap in terms of what could be communicated but it was a 
double-edged sword in that it engendered a consciousness so greedy in its 
neurocognitive demands that it dulls us to and impedes the direct apprehension of 
qualities that are informationally rich and significant or that at least ‗make special‘ 
experience unmediated by language. This sacrifice is captured in Robert Graves well 
known poem, ―The Cool Web‖ (1927).  
 
Children are dumb to say how hot the day is, 
How hot the scent is of the summer rose, 
How dreadful the black wastes of evening sky, 
How dreadful the tall soldiers drumming by, 
 
But we have speech, to chill the angry day, 
And speech, to dull the roses's cruel scent, 
We spell away the overhanging night, 
We spell away the soldiers and the fright. 
 
There's a cool web of language winds us in, 
Retreat from too much joy or too much fear: 
We grow sea-green at last and coldly die 
In brininess and volubility. 
 
But if we let our tongues lose self-possession, 
Throwing off language and its watery clasp 
Before our death, instead of when death comes, 
Facing the wide glare of the children's day, 
Facing the rose, the dark sky and the drums, 
We shall go mad, no doubt, and die that way. 
 
Perhaps here lies one of music‘s most salient values, that it is the communicative means 
least mediated by language (and least dependent on visual references), where significant 
import is embodied in the medium without need for clear referential meaning or direct 
representation. In its performance, the individuality of the performer is similarly 
apprehended directly and can be experienced vicariously unimpeded or distorted by 
discursive thought processes. Even in word art (especially performance poetry), it is its 
form and style, its use of metaphor, hyperbole, alliteration, pun and other means (which 
in performance poetry are many) that bespeak the expressive individuality of the artist 
more than her or his verbal explicitness.  
 
Art that ‗makes special‘ experience is often art that ‗marks as special‘ individuals 
(creators and performers), setting them apart on the basis of some prized capacity, be it 
extraordinary kinesthetic skills, aerobic capacity, fine motor control, vitality, mental 
dexterity, mind-eye coordination, imagination, creativity, problem-solving skill, know-
how, confidence, language use, mimicking skill,  and so on. Usually it is some 
combination of these. Expressive individuality arises inevitably in art because unlike 
activity with a defined output and set procedures for achieving it (such as is much 
vocational activity), what counts as achievement in art is open-ended and amenable to 




creativity or to expressive individuality. Successful lawyers, teachers, preachers and 
politicians are generally credited with both. 
 
 
9. Emotional saturation (56-57) 
 
Whatever its content, intention or psychosocial function, art only succeeds in realizing 
them (in raising them to objectivity) when it is successful in activating and manipulating 
emotions. Enough has been said as to the different ways in which different forms of 
artistic expression achieve this. What perhaps warrants reiteration here is that art does 
not communicate emotions as some kind of informational units or packets, it induces 
changes in one‘s internal milieu that are experienced emotionally even though the 
feelingful states that emerge may not and perhaps most often do not correspond neatly 
to basic emotion types such as fear, joy, sadness, anger, disgust, contempt or surprise. 
Rather it is the poignancy of such emotions that art captures and structures into 
experiences of sentience that magnify and deepen whatever kinds of discursive or 
representational content it may be intended to convey. The obvious point is that what 
we find most salient and memorable are experiences shot through with emotion. Our 
recollection of minutiae is extraordinary when they were attendant on an emotionally 
traumatic event. We can recall all kinds of particulars about where we were and what 
we were doing when first getting the news of the 9/11 events. 
 
Something can be informationally rich and emotionally bland or, conversely, something 
can be emotionally rich and informationally impoverished. Recalling what Tooby and 
Cosmides have theorized so compellingly regarding art‘s adaptive value, emotionally 
rich (aesthetically drenched) experiences can be beneficial and are most likely needed in 
order for the brain to achieve the neural reconfigurations needed for it to be efficacious 
cognitively, better adapted to environmental conditions, and better tuned for subsequent 
experiences and tasks. The emotional packaging of discourse is what distinguishes a 
best seller that is ‗impossible to put down‘ from the bulk of academic writing the 
reading of which requires high levels of discipline and perseverance, given what is 
almost a complete lack of emotional tone or suggestion that the author is actually a 
sentient being. In fact the deliberate and meticulous avoidance of ‗personality‘ (let alone 
‗expressive individuality‘) seems to be what is expected of academics in their writing. 
‗I’ have even been admonished not to make use of the first person in work such as this 
on the premise that I might thereby achieve more academic ‗distance‘ which is 
presumed to imply greater objectivity. I find this kind of pretentiousness in academia to 
be not only silly but counterproductive. Writers like Pinker get fobbed off as pop-
science even though they meticulously cite credible scientific studies in support of 
theories, suppositions and claims that they present cogently. Pinker, Dawkins, Dennett, 
Blackmore, Dutton, Dissanayake and so many other Darwinian writers, besides being so 
eminently ‗clear,‘ write with elegance and eloquence, not in the least reluctant to 
employ wit, irony, humor, the first person, or even some chutzpah in ‗making special‘ 
what they hope to get across to the reader. Radical chic is definitely not their bag. With 
postmodernist writing of the kind cited earlier (from Guattari‘s Chaosmosis), if I find 
myself smiling or chuckling it is only at the absurdity of what seems nothing other than 
intentional obfuscation and I fancy myself as the precocious child in the crowd who 
exclaims when the emperor parades by in his new clothes, ―But he isn‘t wearing 






10. Intellectual challenge 
 
Art, whether in its production or apprehension, is behavior that exploits a myriad of 
perceptual and intellectual capacities. Art that is profound is art that stretches these 
capacities beyond normal limits. Profundity, as has already been made clear, is but a 
special kind of pleasure, but one that because of what it requires cognitively, needs to be 
experienced in the acquisition of critical consciousness, which is really just creative 
consciousness that is principled. Profundity is an intense pleasure, but does not emerge 
from an apprehension of surface qualities only. There must be the meeting of some kind 
of intellectual challenge; a searching into and below, this involving the inter-looping of 
cognitive divergence and convergence such as was suggested earlier as being the 
essence of creative behavior. In this regard, profundity is enhanced when it is attendant 
on an insight of some kind, a realization of something not obvious but nevertheless of 
significant interest and valuable to future experiences and cognitions. Art makes 
intellectual application an aesthetic affair and increases the prospects for experiencing 
profundity. It is true that any exercise of intelligence and knowledge can be pleasurable 
and most often is, but one does not as a rule experience profundity in a game of Trivial 
Pursuit, a video game, a TV game show or in completing one‘s tax return. 
 
 
11. Art traditions and institutions 
 
I will postpone a more thorough consideration of this criterion until the next chapter on 
gene-culture coevolution. It is doubtful that we are genetically predisposed to 
establishing, maintaining and cherishing institutions and traditions in the sense of there 
being some special adaptation or integrated brain system dedicated to such, even though 
the proclivities and competencies that such cultural phenomena manifest are in large 
measure innate and genetically constrained. The traditions and institutions that have 
evolved around artistic activity, and that appear as being part and parcel of what art by 
definition is, are emergent phenomena and could well be examples of ‗positive-
feedback escalators‘ that take innate capacities and predispositions and create with them 
extraordinary and complex social customs and practices which we come to regard as 
natural, obvious or how it was meant to be even though the contingencies of life in the 
21st century raise serious doubts as to whether it is appropriate to sustain them 
unchanged.  The evolutionary psychology of what predisposes people to embrace 
traditions and schools of thought and practice has been explored in some depth in this 
chapter, as have possible adaptationist explanations for the thwarting or breaking of 
tradition such as characterizes much art of the 20th and 21st centuries. 
 
 
12. Imaginative experience  
 
Dutton‘s final criterion provides a welcome route to the conclusion of this long and 
somewhat convoluted chapter, where hopefully can be drawn together what might still 
be some loose threads. Let us begin by recalling the Baldwin Effect and its explanation 
for how learning is possible and how learning and culture can ultimately direct genetic 
evolution unleashing a myriad of ratcheting-up processes that account for the 
multifarious customs, institutions, traditions, arts, discourses and ideologies that 




From this and from earlier discussions on innate learning mechanisms, it seems clear 
that learning a skill or acquiring knowledge requires that some minimum number of 
constituent skills (sub-skills with their own mechanisms) and informational 
representations have already been installed neurally and can be accessed. However, the 
kinds of learning that humans are capable of requires much more than just having a 
series of neural networks in an ‗on‘ position, each performing its function independently 
and informing behavior without reference to the others. At the micro level, basic 
algorithmic structures function in precise ways but are linked up into larger structures 
that evolution over time put under genetic control because they made possible behavior 
or internal processes advantageous to our ancestors. Several of these became 
components (preadaptations) in yet larger structures that in turn came under genetic 
control but with increasing reliance on environmental stimulation in their ontogeny. 
Recall Donald‘s concept of the human mind as ―a set of pyramids, each with its own 
hierarchy of modules, each of which mediates some special skill‖ and each of which can 
be accessed and integrated into more complex structures such that ―at the top levels … 
are … powerful integrative systems, some of which approach true domain-generality in 
their reach‖ (Mithen & Donald 1998) 
 
As Dennett (1991) conceives it, the outcomes of integrative processes converge at 
different loci in the brain and coalesce into what he calls ‗drafts‘ which may ultimately 
emerge in consciousness and be experienced (in a split-second revision engaging 
language mechanisms) as a coherent thought, a kind of story we stitch together and tell 
ourselves that is ongoing even though it jumps around a great deal, veering off on 
different tangents, sometimes taking a rest, but generally capable of being 
spontaneously and instantaneously regimented and woven into streams of coherent 
discourse be it through verbal extemporization or some other communicative act such as 
making music. Apropos verbal extemporization, Donald reminds us of how our use of 
language testifies to an adaptation that has broad access to the workings of a number of 
more domain specific modules. Some of these handle the processing of different classes 
of sensory perception (hearing, smelling, touching and feeling) and some allow the 
brain to construct and work with spatial and other representations. The evidence is in 
the fact that ―we can talk about what we hear, smell, touch, or feel, and also describe 
our cognitive maps of the environment.‖ 
 
Let us also consider how memory feeds into all this using musical memory as an 
example. But first, what is meant by a memory? We know that it is not some discreet 
cluster of neurons arranged to be a precise isomorph of what induced the memory 
originally, be it a statement, scene, event, or sense perception. A memory is recreated 
every time it is recalled and obviously the brain cannot store every particular. Think of 
what would be required if every bit of information in even a short melody had to be 
meticulously recorded in mentalese and retained as a coherent unit. And yet we can 
remember a huge repertoire of songs, including their lyrics, and can even sing them 
matching closely the stylistic idiosyncrasies and vocal tone of the singer whose version 
we remember best. That we can and often do sing it in a different key suggest that the 
brain has not retained a spreadsheet detailing precise frequency values. Neither is it 
likely that there is an internal spreadsheet that has recorded values for every pitch 
interval, rhythmic relationship, or timbre. In other words, it is almost a certainty that 
nothing resides in the brain that could, provided a program for converting mentalese to 
digital code, be exported as an MP3 file. Or if it could, it would not sound anything like 




mouth when singing back from memory can be a very close approximation, even for 
someone without musical training. How this is possible has been theorized, but at best 
what we have is only a rudimentary understanding.  
 
Levitin (2006) provides such an understanding, stressing the need to ―reject the 
intuitively appealing idea that the brain is storing an accurate and strictly isomorphic 
representation of the world.‖ (115). Here let us recall what was discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter under the heading ‗Perception and its illusory nature.‘ With a 
memory as with perception, the brain actually computes a reality that is based only in 
part on data provided to it either through the senses or from what is stored in memory 
which can be quite amorphous, distorted, fragmented and patchy. It has to make 
inferences so as to fill in many gaps and get things in their right place and order and the 
brain can do so because it is able to employ logical inference systems that are innate 
although they have been shaped and given content by learning. It can employ some 
learned system (e.g. common practice music theory) but only if it jibes with and can co-
opt innate mechanisms that have been instructed by our genes, in other words, a system 
that can employ the innate concepts of space, time, causation, containment, etc. which 
are the ‗metaphors we live by‘ (to borrow the title of George Lakoff‘s 1980 book) and 
which comprise the ―level of fine-grained conceptual structure which we automatically 
and unconsciously compute every time we produce or utter a sentence‖ (Pinker 2005 – 
online source) or tune, or dance, or mime, or rhyme.  
 
I cannot but marvel at the complexity of design that all of this attests to and can easily 
appreciate people‘s seeming inability to grasp how it could have come together as the 
result of a mindless, purposeless, algorithmic process. What is crucially important is 
that everything that I have described here is what all normal human beings do naturally 
and with relatively little effort. But where we have the inclination, we can apply effort 
and go further in exploiting our inter-modular and cross-modal capacities and make it 
possible to come up with novel ways of conceptualizing and solving problems, of 
representing perceptual experience, of using words, sounds, or gestures, and of 
visualizing and conceptualizing things that have never been, may never be, and perhaps 
never could be seen or experienced directly. This is when we speak of imagination and I 
would agree with Dutton that it is likely the most important of all his criteria. In this 
regard, he invokes Kant‘s concept of art as ―a ‗presentation‘ offered up to an 
imagination that appreciates it irrespective of whether it corresponds to existing, ‗real‘ 
things.  Art can succeed in decoupling imagination from practical concern, something 
which an orthodox Marxist might denounce or decry as bourgeois mystification, but 
perhaps, as Tooby and Cosmides might well suggest, something that needs to happen 
fairly regularly if the massively parallel computer which is our brain is be optimally 
wired-up and rendered best able to keep track of, manage, and optimally utilize all that 
is available to it. 
 
Imagination is thus only an enhanced utilization of what is constantly and naturally 
going on in the brains of everyone when awake and when dreaming and there can be no 
clear demarcation point at which commonplace cognitive acts become acts of 
imagination. And yet all that we marvel at in terms of human cultural, scientific and 
technological achievement (even where we should rather feel disquiet) would never 
have come about without countless instances of such enhanced utilization. This can also 
be said of creativity which seems to me to be by and large coterminous with 




generate pleasure because natural selection has provided us with reward mechanisms 
that incline us to seek out such experience.  
 
The pleasure that most manifests imaginative and creative processes is profundity, that 
physically felt sense of awe, the sense that something eminently worthwhile has been 
grasped, that marks an experience as deeply significant, even if no benefit or explicit 
meaning has been gained in any practical or discursive sense. A work of art can evoke 
such a sense of deep significance because, again using Langer‘s words, it ―formulate[s] 
our conceptions of feeling and our conceptions of visual, factual, and audible reality 
together‖ making them inseparable internally and by doing so ―it clarifies and organizes 
intuition itself.‖ Even when it elicits no conscious reasoning, it can have ―the force of a 
revelation, and inspire a feeling of deep intellectual satisfaction‖ (Langer 1953: 397).  
 
As has hopefully been made clear, creativity and imagination encapsulate and integrate 
a host of cognitive processes and capacities that have been given names such as 
intuition, cognitive divergence/convergence, synthesis, empathy, mutuality, attunement, 
entrainment, proprioception, kinesthesia, emotional intelligence, and insight. These 
should be core concepts realized as action ideals in Education but sadly seem little more 
than peripheral concerns, perhaps not when talking to educational philosophers, policy 
makers and administrators, but when observing most of what is actually going on (and 
not going on) in classrooms, homes and the virtual worlds media provides us with and 
which people spend more and more of their lives inhabiting.  Art gives us virtual worlds 










Chapter Two was by and large devoted to setting out an adaptationist understanding of 
the human mind and how natural selection has equipped us for and predisposed us to 
music and other forms of artistic engagement. A great deal of Darwinian theory was 
discussed, this being necessary in terms of the overarching purpose of this dissertation, 
to demonstrate how this body of theory and the sciences it informs have relevance to 
questions that the Philosophy of Music Education is or should be concerned with 
answering, many of these being questions pertinent to education through the arts, and 
several concerning issues of broader educational significance. A theory cannot be of 
much relevance or use if its premises are flawed or if does not yield hypotheses that are 
testable. I accordingly was compelled to make the case for Evolutionary Psychology 
and the related sciences that I explored (e.g., Biomusicology and Evolutionary 
Aesthetics), to argue for the plausibility – if not the incontestable validity – of 
conclusions they have reached and to demonstrate that these have important 
implications educationally. Several points have emerged from this that deserve more 
consideration in educational thought including the Philosophy of Music Education, for 
example: 
 
 the adaptive importance of aesthetic experience in organizing the brain both 
physically and informationally (Tooby & Cosmides 2001); 
 the need for more attention to early childhood education and to how the extra-
curricular life of a typical child in a consumerist, media driven society is not only 
inadequate in meeting the requirements of optimal ontogeny set by natural selection, 
but is too often inimical, as indicated, for example, by a lowering of creative 
capacity in recent decades; 
 apropos the above, the need for education to attend more assiduously to kinesthetic 
and proprioceptive development; 
 the ways in which innate ‗reward systems‘ affect the motivational dynamics of an 
individual‘s participation in sociocultural life and how these change over the course 
of life, in particular, those related to sex and status (Miller, Pinker); 
 the scope that Evolutionary Psychology and related sciences have for productive 
reassessments of important theories of psychosocial development (Piaget, Kohlberg, 
Erikson, Vygotsky, Maslow) as well as theories of human cognition that have been 
influential in education (e.g.,  Multiple Intelligences, Emotional Intelligence and the 
Mozart Effect); 
 that natural selection has given us innate preferences that inform the ways we value 
different kinds of visual and aural experience and hence influence our tastes in art 
and music; 
 that natural selection has predisposed us in terms of how we think about artistic 
behavior and production generally, what it is that we esteem in art and what criteria 
we intuitively feel should be satisfied (Dutton, Pinker, Carroll, Dissanayake); 
 that there are quantitative differences between the sexes that should be expected to 




 the nature of the adapted mind as a complex and massively parallel computational 
system and how our increasing understanding of its workings and the mechanisms 
natural selection has equipped it with render erroneous a Blank Slate concept of 
human nature, as it does several of the premises that continue to have currency in the 
Social Sciences concerning mind and culture and that significantly inform 
educational philosophy and the Philosophy of Music Education (Dennett, Pinker, 
Tooby & Cosmides, LeDoux); 
 the primacy of emotion and feeling in everything cognitive (Damasio) and the need 
to reconsider work in Aesthetics (the Philosophy of Art) and the Philosophy of 
Music Education that has fallen out of favor in the last two or more decades (e.g., 
Langer, Reimer); 
 (especially relevant to this chapter) that extraordinary adaptations such as human 
intelligence, musical ability and language are, like the peacock‘s tail, the products of 
runaway evolution which has been accelerated by rapid changes in the environments 
of evolutionary adaptedness (EEAs) brought about by humans - that culture has 
created selection pressures that have affected biological evolution for our species as 
it has for domesticated species (Fisher, Miller, Dennett); 
 that we are not innately predisposed to critical consciousness, but that we have been 
empowered by our genes in ways that allow us to develop it in conducive 
environments. 
 
I also attempted to show how insights into our innate psychology that Darwinian 
Science offers can help us to better understand what we observe in our present world in 
the ways people relate to and involve themselves with music and the arts and to see how 
much of artistic behavior and culture generally might still be on the leash of genes.  We 
could assume it to be little given the exponential rate at which culture changes and 
accumulates, clearly a runaway process that genes could never keep pace with. Of 
course they do not need to keep pace with cultural evolution to continue to significantly 
influence how people think, feel about and involve themselves in music and the arts. 
There is truth in Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr‘s oft quoted epigram - "plus ça change, 
plus c'est la même chose" - "the more it changes, the more it's the same thing" (usually 
translated as "the more things change, the more they stay the same"). But Evolutionary 
Psychology can take us only so far in understanding how humankind has managed to 
become so culturally diverse given that we all share the same innate psychology. This 
does not mean, however, that Darwinian Science cannot have anything more to say on 
such matters. The fact is that culture evolves and evolution is what Darwinian Science is 
concerned with explaining. 
 
The Philosophy of Music Education is concerned with what music education should be 
doing to achieve educational and social outcomes in the here and now, in environments 
that are as ideological as they are physical. The Philosophy of Music Education is 
charged with providing music education with ideals to guide the work of music 
educators and ideals are only ideas that are judged to be appropriate and worth 
embracing. Many ideals have come and gone as to what should count as important and 
worth pursuing in music education and it may be that the falling into obscurity of some 
of them was not simply a matter of their having had their time or that it was the 
inevitable consequence of good ideas pushing out not so good ideas. Ideas are the 
currency of culture and if Darwinian Science has anything to offer to understanding 
how we come to have ideas it is incumbent on us to consider carefully what it has to 




that are counterintuitive and/or that conflict with what makes sense when one‘s view is 
ecozoic. 
 
I believe that Gene-Culture Coevolution Theory has much to offer and the main purpose 
of this chapter is to consider its main assumptions, assertions and hypotheses. As will be 
seen, some of its claims and hypotheses are ideological ‗hot potatoes‘ and are easily co-
opted to serve nefarious social and political agendas. And while there seems a growing 
openness to what Evolutionary Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience have to say 
about our universal human nature, there is still strong resistance to attempts to 
Darwinize culture; I might even say antagonism, based on some of my own experiences 
in trying to argue for it, especially where I have voiced support for the conclusions of 
Gene-Culture Coevolution theorists like Dennett and Blackmore.  
 
I will postpone discussion of what I see as the pedagogical significance of this body of 
theory and its relevance to matters of concern to the Philosophy of Music Education 
until after the case has been made. The final chapter is given over to weaving together 
the many Darwinian ‗threads‘ that have been followed in this dissertation and reaching 
conclusions as to how Darwinian perspectives might best be taken account of in 
deliberations around what we should be teaching, why we should be teaching it, and 
how best to do so.  
 
 
Darwin‟s dangerous idea revisited 
 
Let us begin by recalling what Dennett gives as ‗Darwin‘s dangerous idea‘: ―that all the 
fruits of evolution can be explained as the products of an algorithmic process‖ (1995: 
60).  Music and art, as we experience them in all their many forms, can certainly be 
called fruits of evolution if we consider culture as something that evolves, that grows 
out of and builds upon what has gone before, as obviously we must. Virtually every 
item we call cultural has a lineage although it may be difficult or impossible to trace. 
And given how much cultural intercourse has taken place since the Neolithic, most of 
modern culture has a very mixed heritage. I already alluded to the point in the last 
chapter that when someone refers to her or his culture; it is generally more to some 
idealized notion of heritage than to the beliefs, norms and values that actually manifest 




Music and art as fruits of genetic evolution 
 
We can even consider music and art as fruits of genetic evolution when we regard them 
not as cultural artifacts but as behaviors or capabilities. We are wired for both just as we 
are wired for nurturance and its expression in culture: education. Hopefully the previous 
chapter has made this clear, as well as the more likely reasons for why we are wired 
thusly and how, as powerful integrative systems in our brains, music and art (as does 
language) involve synthesis across a wide array of modules and subsystems, each of 
which evolved to meet a different adaptive need in a particular environment of 





Surely, the immeasurable variety of what has been produced through the exercise of 
these capabilities cannot be accounted for by the Darwinian ‗if, if, then‘ algorithm. Or 
can it be?  That is the question that much of this chapter will try to answer as it is a 
foundational question in Gene-Culture Coevolution Theory, particularly Memetics 
which gets a thorough going over because of its radical but compelling claims. The 
answers surely must have significance to our thinking in, around and through music and 
the arts, the institutions that sustain and shape them, and how they should best feature in 
the kind of ‗education for an ecozoic era‘ that was philosophized in Chapter One 




PART 1: Culture as an Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA) for genetic 
evolution 
 
Before giving full attention to considering how culture evolves, I feel it necessary to 
deal with the other primary research thrust in gene-culture coevolution theory, that is, 
how culture has and continues to shape genetic evolution, or put differently, how 
culture has created selection pressures that have resulted in changes to the genome and 
hence to our innate psychology. What is coming forth from research on this question is 
adding to what is already a minefield where one must tread with care because of how 
such findings can be and have been co-opted by and used to serve racist political 
ideologies and agendas that are morally reprehensible. Let me now tread at least some 
of this terrain so that certain clarifications can be made as to the conclusions of recent 
research and so that some possible misconceptions may be corrected. It is a discussion 
that is necessary to establish if there is anything in the findings of credible research in 
this area that could or should have any consequence in and for education. We can then 
direct attention to those gene-culture coevolution theories most germane to educational 
philosophy, those that help us understand how we have come to think the way we do 
about education and its purposes, how different ideas and beliefs have come to 




Hereditary lineages and genetic differences 
 
What makes this a minefield is quite simple. It is the undeniable fact that there are 
genetic differences between people from different hereditary lineages; and unless we 
hold to a Blank Slate conception of mind, we must accept that there are differences that 
are more than skin deep. Chapter Two demonstrated this to be the case with gender 
differences although with the important caveat that psychosocial differences between 
men and women are quantitative only.  The differences between men and women cannot 
of course be attributed to them having evolved in different EEAs. They co-inhabited the 
same natural and physical environments with the same resources and threats. 
Differences did arise however once there was a significant division of labor (as 
discussed in Chapter Two). This brought differences in the ways male and females 
tended to interact with the environment (hunting vs. gathering for example) and 
qualitatively different selection pressures (e.g. for the care of helpless neonates) that 
promoted the evolution of quantitative differences in various aptitudes, proclivities and 






Lineage and race 
 
What of differences between people from different genetic lineages? Even if true that 
around 140,000 years ago, there lived a woman (‗Mitochondrial Eve‘) and, around 
60,000 years ago, a man (‗Y-Chromosomal Adam‘) to whom all living humans can 
trace their ancestry, from that time there have been long periods during which different 
populations of ancestral humans lived in different EEAs and in varying degrees of 
isolation from other populations. This accounts for the phenotypic variations that are 
clear to see and which humans have used to generalize different racial groups, even 
though the criteria used to differentiate them has for the most part been scientifically 
dubious. For example, dark pigmentation of the skin only bespeaks evolution in 
equatorial and tropical EEAs where the protection from UV radiation afforded by 
melanin is a distinct advantage. All humans had dark skin before they began to migrate 
out of Africa between 50,000 and 45,000 years ago. Those that migrated further away 
from the equator evolved genes for skin with less melanin as dark skin blocked UV 
radiation too effectively in latitudes where it was in shorter supply and still needed for 
the manufacture of vitamin D. As such, skin pigmentation can only go so far in telling 
us about someone‘s ancestry. It can tell us that everyone who is ‗white‘ has a lineage 
that for at least 40,000 years evolved in EEAs outside of the African continent and some 
distance from the equator.  But of course, the UV index was but one of many selection 
pressures that were different in the new environments that humans migrated into in the 
Upper Paleolithic. Some of these could have influenced the evolution of psychosocial 
traits, though to what extent would depend on the nature and degree of difference 
encountered, here remembering that one‘s group itself constitutes an EEA and the size 
of the group is of great importance. I will come back to the issue of race further along 
where I consider whether it is a concept that, given its history, has any utility sufficient 
to justify its application in research and the discourses of educational philosophy. 
 
 
Size is important! 
 
When our ancestors began to live in larger groups, new selection pressures were 
introduced giving rise to a fairly rapid evolution of psychosocial adaptations such as 
those identified and discussed in the last chapter: a hunger for status, reciprocal 
altruism, cheater detection, imitation skill, grooming, information decoupling, and so 
on. Most important of all was the evolution of language and other communicative 
abilities. The importance of population size in this regard cannot be stressed enough. 
Human populations started increasing significantly around 50,000 years ago, an 
increase that became exponential when our species acquired agriculture. Since the 
industrial revolution, the entire human population has increased nearly seven-fold with 
over half of it living in urban environments.  Increasing the size of any population of 
sexually interbreeding members is going to willy-nilly increase the rate of new adaptive 
mutations. But they are not likely to be selected in and become widespread in the 
population if its members are already well adapted to a relatively stable environment.  
 
Here let us recall from Chapter Two the Baldwin Effect and in particular Papineau‘s 
explanation of how with living in groups, we get it twice over. This is for the simple 




learn from one another, will necessarily change and evolve and hence there will be 
changes in the environmental pressures that influence what mutations do and do not get 
selected in. Thus, a feedback loop comes into play between ‗genetic assimilation‘ and 
‗niche construction‘ that accelerates the rate at which the former occurs. The key 
question, of course, is: How fast? Many gene-culture coevolution theorists seem in 
agreement that it can happen remarkably fast and science appears to be bearing them 
out, even though this is at odds with what has for long been an assumption about 
evolution. Even though his own position on the matter may have shifted somewhat 
since, in a 2006 interview, Pinker stated that he ―would rather believe that significant 
human biological evolution stopped between 50,000 and 100,000 years ago, before the 
races diverged, which would ensure that racial and ethnic groups are biologically 
equivalent‖ (Douglas 2006).93 
 
 
„The psychic unity of mankind‟ 
 
Pinker‘s take on recent evolution and the unlikelihood of significant cognitive 
differences between different genetic lineages is in line with the ‗psychic unity of 
mankind‘ position taken by Tooby and Cosmides (1989: 34).  
 
[T]he complex architecture of the human psyche can be expected to have assumed 
approximately modern form during the Pleistocene, in the process of adapting to 
Pleistocene conditions, and to have undergone only minor modifications since then. 
 
Elsewhere, they claim that because innate psychological traits are complex adaptations, 
they necessarily are monomorphic in Homo sapiens, that is, they comprise an 
underlying architecture common to all members of our species.  With a sexually 
reproducing species such as ours, genetic recombination rules out any significant 
variation in the genetic basis of traits as this apparently leads to the corruption of 
favorable geneotypes. Tooby and Cosmides explain it as follows. 
 
The genetic shuffle of meiosis [cell division] and sexual recombination can cause 
individuals to differ slightly in quantitative properties that do not disrupt the functioning of 
complex adaptations. But two individuals do not differ in personality or morphology 
because one has the genetic basis for a complex adaptation that the other lacks. The same 
principle applies to human populations: from this perspective, there is no such thing as 
"race.‖ (1997- Online source) 
 
Tooby and Cosmides admit a slight difference in quantitative properties as they 
seemingly must do. There can be no doubting that people vary from one to another 
quantitatively in their aptitudes/talents (intelligences), appetites (e.g. hunger for status, 
sex drive) and innate dispositions (e.g. fear of heights, altruistic leanings). What is 
                              
93 Kenneth Krause (2009) regards equivalency as ―a concept better left to mathematicians. … In any 
other, less antiseptic context, … the notion is utterly bankrupt. That we have had to work so hard in 
recent centuries to construct and maintain political equality among individuals and classifications of 
individuals should tell us how persistent and pervasive inequality really is. We should never confuse the 
social construct with the scientific reality. Denial is the least mature and, certainly, the least progressive 





necessary is to determine what they would include as ‗quantitative properties‘ and what 
they regard as ‗slight.‘ It also would be necessary to ascertain how the ―same principle‖ 
would apply to populations between which there was little interbreeding. I would 
presume that they are using quantitative in the usual sense of relating to the amount or 
number (the quantity) of something, even where it may not be amenable to precise 
quantification (measurement). Elsewhere in their ‗EP primer‘ they point out how 
stomachs ―vary a bit in quantitative properties, such as size, shape, and how much 
[gastric acid] they produce.‖  
 
Just as we are unable to clearly delineate complex adaptations such as language and 
music, we are far from being able to break one down to an algorithmic level (though we 
can discern algorithmic processes such as Hamilton expressed mathematically in respect 
of altruism and kinship). This, as I see it, suggests that there can be no clear line 
between what is qualitative and what is quantitative when it comes to cognition. Two 
computer programs may be the same in terms of their ―underlying architecture‖ but one 
may be considerably more ‗powerful‘ in its functioning because of what it is able to 
access and incorporate informationally, or perhaps because of the speed at which it can 
do so. We again may recall that complex cognitive adaptations are built up of many 
parts just as is the eye, which itself is part of a larger integrative system: vision. And it 
is not as if the content a mental adaptation is given by environmental input in its 
ontogeny is kept apart from an unchanging underlying architecture in some kind of 
database or external hard drive. The underlying architecture develops by assimilating 
and accommodating the input such that it effectively becomes part of the architecture. 
 
Quantitative differences manifest in differences in how efficiently and effectively a 
biological/cognitive adaptation functions, for example, in how well it achieves 
behavioral ends, what conditions (environmental stimuli) activate it, how successfully it 
integrates subroutines and makes use of information, and ultimately the benefits that 
may be derived through its functioning. Whether there could be significant differences 
when it comes to complex psychosocial adaptations, Tooby and Cosmides considered it 
to be unlikely given complexity as a limiting factor. Complex adaptations require more 
genes and it would seem logical to assume that they would require far longer time 
frames in order to coordinate the evolution of the many genes involved. Canadian 
anthropologist, Peter Frost (2008) points out the flaw in this line of thinking by 
reminding us that ―complex traits do not arise ex nihilo.‖ They have developed out of 
predecessor structures and arise as a coherent trait through modifications, deletions, or 
additions to them. ―And such changes can occur through a single point mutation at a 





As to the time frames involved, Frost quotes Harpending and Cochran (2002). 
 
Even if 40 or 50 thousand years were too short a time for the evolutionary development of a 
truly new and highly complex mental adaptation, which is by no means certain, it is 
certainly long enough for some groups to lose such an adaptation, for some groups to 




timing of that adaptation to evolve. That is what we see in domesticated dogs, for example, 
who have entirely lost certain key behavioral adaptations of wolves such as paternal 
investment. Other wolf behaviors have been exaggerated or distorted.94 
 
John Hawks, professor of Anthropology at the University of Wisconsin (Madison), is 
convinced that at least ten percent of human genes have been modified by natural 
selection in the last 40,000 years. This is his conclusion after conducting ‗genomic 
surveys‘ the findings of which were published in 2007 in the Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences (Hawks, Wang, Cochran, Harpending, & Moyzis). 95 The 
conclusion of Hawks and his fellow researchers is entirely consistent with Papineau‘s 
double Baldwin effect as it would be expected to play out in larger, denser populations.  
 
Larger populations generate more new selected mutations, and we show the consistency of 
the observed data with the historical pattern of human population growth. We consider 
human demographic growth to be linked with past changes in human cultures and 
ecologies. Both processes have contributed to the extraordinarily rapid recent genetic 
evolution of our species. (20753) 
 
Forty thousand years is a very short period in evolutionary time or so was for long 
assumed. In this regard we should recall from Chapter Two the study by three of the 
population geneticists who later collaborated with Hawk: Cochran, Harpending and 
Hardy (2005) which concluded that in less than one thousand years, genes for higher 
verbal and mathematical intelligences (12 – 15 points above the mean) were selected for 
in a lineage of Jews (Ashkenazim) in Europe who were discriminated against, isolated, 
forced into vocations needing high levels of such intelligence, and who, because of 
religious beliefs, were in any case disinclined to marry outside the fold (the downside of 
which is an increased incidence of highly debilitative and fatal congenital conditions 
such as Tay–Sachs disease). We should also recall what Dennett had to say about 
artificial selection as it makes clear that although there must be variation through 
genetic mutation, it is the pressures that are confronted in a population‘s EEA that 
determines what mutations take hold and spread through the population. Humans have 
for millennia been a primary selective force in the evolution of domestic species, even 
where it has not always been intentional or done with any knowledge of the 
mechanisms involved beyond a folk biology that understood that traits get passed on to 
offspring. The point which once more bears reiteration is that humans have also been a 
selective force in their own genetic evolution. For the most part, they have not exerted 
this force deliberately or with foresight as in controlled breeding (except perhaps in the 
case of royal lineages).  
 
 
What is a race? 
 
One does not have to investigate the literature too intensively to conclude that race is a 
concept that does not correspond with any discrete biological entity. There are in fact 
many species that are not easy to delineate precisely. Homo sapiens happens to be a 
                              
94  We may remember from the last chapter that the differences between a Chihuahua and a Great Dane 
are the result of less than 15,000 years of evolution. 
95  Hawks has a website (http://johnhawks.net) and blog that is the quickest and most fecund route to a 




distinct species because of the extinction of other Homo lineages for which there seems 
little consensus as to whether they were separate species or, as seems quite certain with 
the Neanderthals, a ‗subspecies‘ or ‗race‘ with which there was interbreeding with out-
of-Africa Homo sapiens before the former became extinct about 22,000 years ago. This 
has been strongly suggested by research on genetic material that was able to be 
extracted from 38,000 year old Neanderthal bones (Callaway 2010).96  Even if we are to 
take modern day Africans whose lineages have not crossed with any out-of-Africa 
lineages, they in no way comprise a distinct population that could be called a race 
without the term having limited meaning. The evidence for this is in the phenotypic 
variation visible for all to see, for example, between a Khoisan and the other African 
peoples of southern Africa who migrated down from the north during the last 
millennium and whose lineages mostly trace back to a population that was confined to 
an area in West Africa (modern day Cameroon and Nigeria) and spoke a language that 
later diversified into the many Bantu languages of present day Africa. At least one study 
has suggested that the Khoisan were the first population to diverge from the most recent 
common ancestor of all humans and is thus the one that best preserves ancient lineages 
genetically (Soodyall & Jenkins 1998).97 And yet, nowhere have I found the Khoisan 
denoted as a race.  
 
 
The utility of the concept 
 
The problem of clear delineation does not negate the usefulness of a concept and we can 
note that people, including academics, do not refrain from talking about societies and 
cultures, concepts that also do not correspond neatly or in any clear-cut way with 
discrete phenomena in the real world. To say that race is a social construct does not say 
much for the simple reason that nearly every concept we employ discursively is a social 
construct, in some way or at some level at least. Words like race, species, culture, art, 
music, and so on, may better be regarded as cluster concepts. Dutton certainly regards 
art as such. With a cluster concept there is some weighted list of criteria where no 
individual criterion can be considered absolutely necessary or sufficient for 
membership. And yet when it comes to race, it does seem that there is at least one 
criterion for who is who, that being, where in the world most of the genetic variation 
has taken place since groups of Homo sapiens started moving away from the EEAs of 
‗Mitochondrial Eve‘ and ‗Y-chromosomal Adam.‘  
 
The fuzziness of racial definitions does not negate their utility. To define terms, based on 
genetic analysis, roughly speaking, Blacks (Africans, Negroids) are those who have most of 
their ancestors from sub-Saharan Africa; Whites (Europeans, Caucasoids) have most of 
their ancestors from Europe; and East Asians (Orientals, Mongoloids) have most of their 
ancestors from Pacific Rim countries. Although he eschewed the term race, Cavalli-
Sforza‘s (2000: 70) maximum likelihood tree made on the basis of molecular genetic 
markers substantially supports the traditional racial groups classification. Of course, in 
referring to population or racial group differences we are discussing averages. Individuals 
                              
96  This and other research has contributed to Neanderthals being reclassified from Homo 
neanderthalensis to Homo sapiens neanderthalensis. 
97  Mark Schoofs (2000) gives an overview of the study in question as well as a thoughtful and apropos 




are individuals, and the three groups overlap substantially on almost all traits and measures. 
(Rushton & Jensen 2005: 237-238) 
 
Racial categories such as these are used in medical research. Mathew Herper reported in 
Forbes in 2005 that: ―A flood of studies has emerged showing racial differences in how 
patients suffer from disease - or benefit from drugs - in ailments ranging from 
osteoporosis to cancer. And several more have looked at the effects of drugs on 
particular racial groups‖ (online source). Again, the differences seem to be quantitative, 
but they are nevertheless significant at least in relation to medical research and progress 





When it comes to differences between different populations of humans, no matter how 
they have been delineated, one has to work with averages and percentages based on data 
collection and calculation procedures, methods, tests, surveys and so on, and 
disagreements invariably arise as to their validity. Perhaps the most controversial and 
yet widely used is the Intelligence Quotient (IQ) which has been used to posit 
differences in  intelligence between different populations identified as races, the most 
famous instance (or infamous perhaps) being the 1994 ‗bestseller‘ The Bell Curve by 
Charles Murray and the late Harvard psychologist Richard J Hernstein. Their data on 
differences between African-Americans, Asian-Americans and European Americans 
vis-à-vis certain socioeconomic indicators98 have not been challenged. But what was 
and what continues to be hotly contested is the extent to which the authors appeared to 
support a genetic explanation for the differences, that is, that the average African-
American is by nature less intelligent than the average European-American who is less 
intelligent than the average Asian-American as evidenced by their scores on the Armed 
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery which includes measures of cognitive aptitude 
comparable to standard IQ tests. The authors attempted to appear equivocal on the 
nature-nurture question saying in the introduction to Chapter 13, that ―the debate about 
whether and how much genes and environment have to do with ethnic differences 
remains unresolved.‖ While true, this says nothing as to where they stand/stood 
(Hernstein died before publication of The Bell Curve) in the debate. Where they were 
unequivocal was on the correlation between IQ and socioeconomic success. Putting 
aside whether or not IQ tests are measuring what they purport to measure; the statistical 
correlations cannot summarily be dismissed as meaningless.  
 
As to racial differences in IQ, the question of why research in this area has been pursued 
needs addressing, even if only briefly. The work of Hernstein, Murray, Jensen and 
Rushton is clearly tainted by association and for three of them at least, there seems little 
concern about who funds and/or takes the most interest in their research. Rushton 
currently heads the Pioneer Fund, an American non-for-profit foundation ―to advance 
                              
98  For different IQ ranges (<75, 75-90, 90-110, 110-125, >125) percentiles were calculated according to 
the following indicators: married by age 30; out of labor force more than 1 month out of year (men); 
unemployed more than 1 month out of year (men); divorced in 5 years; percent of children with IQ in 
bottom decile (mothers); had an illegitimate baby (mothers); lives in poverty; ever incarcerated (men); 




the scientific study of heredity and human differences.”99 While it claims that it ―is 
neutral on political and social issues and avoids grantees with social agendas to push,‖ it 
does not appear ever to denounce or disassociate itself from such agendas, such as are 
so blatant in the contents of American Renaissance, a website and magazine. Even a 
cursory visit to AmericanRenaissance.com will reveal its strong racist leanings and 
Rushton has been a keynote speaker for at least one of their annual conferences.100  
 
What is perhaps the most oft-heard ‗evidence‘ of the intellectual superiority of 
particular races are the racial demographics of civilization and technological advance. It 
bears noting in this regard that the treatise on the spread of civilization that I have found 
most compelling and most often cited positively in Darwinian Science is Jared 
Diamond‘s classic, Guns, Germs and Steel (1998), e.g. Pinker (2002), Dennett (2007) 
and Blackmore (1999). Diamond explains differences in cultural and technological 
advances as not having anything to do with differences in innate aptitudes and 
proclivities, but everything to do with the serendipity of certain populations having 
come to inhabit environments in which there were a variety of domesticables, that is, 
species of plants and animals that could be domesticated. Being able to do so meant that 
a surplus of food could be grown and/or raised and this meant that those not farming 
could give their time and effort to doing and making things that had value for others and 
with which one could ‗make a living.‘ How this led to cities, states, nations, culture 
(including technology) and religion is well understood and need not be elaborated here. 
The point is that civilization grew and spread among certain populations, not because of 
their having higher levels of innate intelligence, but because of what was available in 
the natural environment. Moreover, the spread of agriculture was not a matter of pre-
agrarian cultures appropriating an idea (we all have an innate drive to adopt the 
innovations of others) so much as the vicissitudes of geography and climate that 
allowed the translocation of crops and domestic livestock to some but not other regions. 
Climate and geography also were the main determinants of how much inter-population 
interaction took place and explains the rapid growth of civilizations across the huge 
landmass of Eurasia. As Pinker points out: 
 
Eurasia conquered the world not because Eurasians are smarter but because they could best 
take advantage of the principle that many heads are better than one. The ―culture‖ of any of 
the conquering nations of Europe, such as Britain, is in fact a greatest-hits collection of 
inventions assembled across thousands of miles and years. The collection is made up of 
cereal crops and alphabetic writing from the Middle-East, gunpowder and paper from 
China, domesticated horses from Ukraine, and many others. But the necessarily insular 
cultures of Australia, Africa, and the Americas had to make do with a few homegrown 
technologies, and as a result they were no match for their pluralistic conquerors. (2002: 68-
69) 
 
The work of those who style themselves as race realists, Rushton and Murray being 
most noteworthy, has unfortunately inclined many to paint with the same tar brush other 
work in population genetics and intelligence that is undeserving of being so associated 
                              
99   From the foundation‘s website at http://www.pioneerfund.org/ 
100  To get clearer notion of its agenda, it is worth checking the program for the American Renaissance 









On Multiple Intelligences 
 
Howard Gardiner developed his theory of Multiple Intelligences (MI) in part as a 
refutation of a unitary general intelligence, the „g‟ factor that IQ tests are designed to 
measure. As first set out in his Frames of Mind (1983), Gardner postulated the existence 
of seven distinct intelligences: linguistic, musical, logical-mathematical, spatial, bodily-
kinesthetic, intrapersonal, and interpersonal. He later added two more: natural and 
existential.  The particulars of these need no discussion here. The enthusiasm with 
which MI theory was received is well understandable and I was for long similarly 
enthused and made it a cornerstone in my teaching.101 For me, and for others I presume, 
it offered a broader view of human agency and challenged the inordinate attention to 
particular abilities in formal education as well as its tradition of inflexibility in 
accommodating different learning styles. It also seemed concordant with a 
multimodular understanding of the mind and suggested the way forward for education 
to become more holistic and attentive to cognitive dimensions that have been 
marginalized in curricula. Perhaps best of all, it suggested an educational context in 
which more learners could experience success and have their achievements 
acknowledged. Unfortunately, MI theory has very little empirical support, both in 
respect of the soundness of the theory itself as well as its success as a curricular and 
methodological framework in education (Waterhouse 2006). 
 
 
Support for the „g‟ factor 
 
On the other hand, there has been increasing empirical support for the ‗g‘ factor 
although there is a lack of consensus on how ‗unitary‘ it is. It has been suggested, for 
example, that it has two forms: ―a fluid intelligence that reflects mental ability 
independent of culture and a crystallized intelligence that reflects both fluid intelligence 
and learning‖ (Waterhouse 2006: 210). Whatever the ‗g‘ factor consists of at the 
neurological level, it does seem evident that there is something which accounts for 
overall brain efficiency in the handling of cognitive tasks, such efficiency being a matter 
of making connections and then making sense of them. What seems most crucial in this 
regard is what is called working memory, the capacity for holding information in the 
mind such that it can be worked on in tasks requiring higher-order cognition: 
comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis and evaluation (cf. Bloom‘s 
Taxonomy). This entails some level of executive control in maintaining task-relevant 
representations against irrelevant information and distraction although this does not 
necessarily suggest some specialized adaptation for this control. However, it may be 
that ‗g‘ is working memory, ―a function of the frontal lobe of the brain that maintains 
and manipulates information in a limited timeframe‖ (Waterhouse 2006: 210).102  
                              
101  Waterhouse (2006) did a comparison between the increase in education (.edu) websites representing 
MI and the increase of professional journal articles on MI between 2003 and 2005. Whereas websites 
increased almost ten fold, journal articles increased by only 22%. 





Waterhouse cites the research of Toga and Thompson (2005) and McDaniel (2005) 
which shows a significant positive correlation between brain volume and IQ scores. 
McDaniel‘s study indicated a higher correlation in the case of women which may be 
linked to differences in male and female brains. While men, on average, have larger 
brains, women have larger volumes of white matter. One study claimed that, in respect 
of brain matter associated with general intelligence, men have around 6.5 times as much 
gray matter as do women who have nearly ten times as much white matter. 
 
Gray matter represents information processing centers in the brain, and white matter 
represents the networking of – or connections between – these processing centers. This, 
according to Rex Jung, a UNM neuropsychologist and co-author of the study, may help to 
explain why men tend to excel in tasks requiring more local processing (like mathematics), 
while women tend to excel at integrating and assimilating information from distributed 
gray-matter regions in the brain, such as required for language facility. These two very 
different neurological pathways and activity centers, however, result in equivalent overall 
performance on broad measures of cognitive ability, such as those found on intelligence 
tests. (U of California 2005) 
 
Differences in the average brain volumes of different races has been indicated by 
research (something Rushton has given particular attention to), but I refrain from saying 
more on the matter here because, besides serious concerns regarding the purpose or 
value of such research, I cannot see it as relevant for reasons that will be given 
presently. My interest in general intelligence, or whatever capacity that allows for 
―integrating and assimilating information‖ from distributed brain systems, should 
require little explanation here given all that I have hitherto had to say on the subject of 
critical consciousness and the cognitive capacities it assumes. About this, I will have 
more to say in the last chapter. 
 
 
What to make of this? 
 
What was quoted in the last chapter that bears repeating here is Miriam Johnson‘s 
remark regarding the psychosocial differences between men and women that Symons 
argued to be innate in his The Evolution of Human Sexuality. 
 
[T]he implication of his analysis for those of us concerned with achieving equality and 
justice for both sexes may well be that nothing is gained by denying sex differences. 
Sexism is not a result of male/female differences so much as it is of what we make of them. 
(1980: 792-793) 
 
The same might be said in respect of racial differences. One thing that we can and must 
make of them, in both cases, is that they do not have - and can never have - any bearing 
on how we go about educating people. The main reason why was made clear in the last 
sentence of the extract from Jensen and Rushton above: ―Individuals are individuals, 
and the … groups overlap substantially on almost all traits and measures.‖ The 
placement of the bell curves on the author‘s graph show how substantial is the overlap 
and accordingly how insubstantial would be any assumption based on race as to an 
individual‘s potential or her/his suitability for particular kinds of employment and 
educational provision. Just as important is the fact that the differences portrayed are in 




could well give a different picture. Two things are problematic, however: (1) that global 
society generally accords greater status and higher remuneration to professions 
requiring higher levels of verbal skill, logic, spatial intelligence, numeracy, analogical 
reasoning, propositional thinking, cognitive synthesis and so on, abilities for which IQ 
has been shown to be a reliable indicator, and (2) that there seems such a strong 
correlation between IQ and how well people function interpersonally in heterogeneous 
social contexts such as more and more people willy-nilly find themselves.   
 
The crucial point that is found again and again in the literature (and which Hernstein & 
Murray‘s graph makes eminently clear) is that the differences in the average intelligence 
of different races is inconsequential vis-à-vis the differences that exist within any 
racially defined population. In this regard, what might more justify concern is the way 
that societies tend to stratify ‗intellectually‘ even though, and perhaps to some degree 
because, they have become more just, egalitarian and integrated. Pinker (2002: 106) 
takes this up in a discussion around a 1971 article in the Atlantic Monthly by Hernstein 
(who later collaborated with Murray on The Bell Curve). It is worthwhile quoting 
Pinker at some length. 
 
Hernstien‘s argument … should have been banal … that as social status becomes less 
strongly determined by arbitrary legacies such as race, parentage, and inherited wealth, it 
will become more strongly determined by talent, especially (in a modern economy) 
intelligence. Since differences in intelligence are partly inherited, and since intelligent 
people tend to marry other intelligent people, when a society becomes more just it will also 
become more stratified along genetic lines. Smarter people will tend to float into the higher 
strata, and their children will tend to stay there. The basic argument … is based on a 
mathematical necessity: as the proportion of variance in social status caused by nongenetic 
factors goes down, the proportion caused by genetic factors has to go up. It could be 
completely false only if there were no variation in social status based on intellectual talent 
… or if there were no genetic variation in intelligence. (106-107. my emphasis) 
 
It may also be banal to again point out that there is a strong correlation between 
socioeconomic ‗success‘ and general intelligence. Moreover, for there to be no genetic 




Ontogeny makes the nature-nurture dichotomy a non sequitur 
 
In my view, what complicates everything is that every biological adaptation is 
ontogenetic; how completely and optimally functional it becomes in its phenotypic 
expression is crucially dependent on the environmental conditions encountered in life, 
particularly in the ‗formative years,‘ when the brain is comparatively more plastic and 
innate aptitudes capable of being enhanced in their functioning. That the ‗g‘ factor is 
crystallized intelligence (and in part ‗learned‘) seems to be an implicit assumption in the 
design of many IQ tests judging by how much they rely on assimilated knowledge and, 
perhaps more importantly, cognitive orientations and predispositions that different 
cultures value and promote in different ways. What also suggests this strongly is the 
Flynn Effect (Flynn 1999): the substantial increase in IQ scores that has been noted 
worldwide, as much as ten points per generation, a phenomenon that simply cannot be 





The crucial role of working memory in higher order thinking was highlighted earlier 
and research (Kail 2007) has shown that a child‘s information-processing speed and 
capacity for retaining information in working memory increases as they develop, this 
increase being the strongest predictor of inductive reasoning capacity later in life. An 
earlier study (Gathercole et al. 2004) investigating the structure and development of 
working memory in children between four and fifteen years of age indicated ―that the 
basic modular structure of working memory is present from 6 years of age and possibly 
earlier, with each component undergoing sizable expansion in functional capacity 




Child development and Evolutionary Psychology 
 
The above is the title of an article by Bjorklund and Pellegrini (2000) which investigates 
the relevance of EP to an understanding of how ‗epigenetic programs‘ get expressed 
over the course of ontogeny. What may be most pertinent here is the support they give 
to the developmental systems approach which has as its core premise that all 
development in an organism is the product of epigenesis and hence of processes of 
interaction between biology and environment. Someone inclined toward biological 
determinism might argue that while it is true that genes are expressed differently in 
different environments, all humans (all organisms actually) develop in a species-typical 
pattern. But the simple explanation for this is that during hundreds of millennia, our 
ancestors inherited ―not only a species-typical genome but also a species-typical 
environment. … To the extent that an organism grows up under conditions similar to 
that in which its species evolved, development will follow a species typical pattern‖ 
(1691). Can it not logically be argued from this that: to the extent that an organism 
grows up under conditions different to that in which its species evolved, development 
will follow an environment typical pattern?  Only to a degree of course; After all, 
epigenesis is about how genes get phenotypically expressed and that must always be in 
significant measure constrained by the information they encode - constrained but not 
determined.  
 
For virtually every other species, development in an environment too dissimilar to its 
EEA is unlikely for the simple reason that the survival prospects of its members are too 
severely compromised and they are not sufficiently able to adapt; they become extinct. 
The intelligence that allows us to adapt to different environments surely cannot be an 
intelligence that is under total genetic control. Its epigenesis is necessarily far more 
dependent on environmental stimulation, something which again points to the vital 
importance of early childhood education, in particular, the quality of parental 
investment that characterizes it. This is doubly important in the first years of a child‘s 
life where, beyond sustenance and protection, the quality of this investment is (or 
should be) realized in intimate interactions between caregivers (parents most 
importantly) and the child, the ―rhythms and modes‖ that Dissanayake (2000) has 
explored so productively. It is the nature and quality of this intimacy that matters most 
in terms of how the child‘s potential unfolds thereafter. Here it should be noted that a 
child‘s brain more than triples in size in the first few years of life (Blackmore 1999: 71). 
If key sensory-motor experiences do not acquire appropriate emotional weightings (get 
somatically marked), the optimal unfolding of all one‘s psychosocial capacities 




one for life and it is in contexts of intensified mutuality that our cognitive potentials 
unfold most easily and naturally. This is where the arts play what is perhaps their most 
important role. 
 
All of our psychosocial adaptations came about because of fitness benefits they 
conferred on ancestors, which means ultimately that they in some way enhanced the 
prospects for their genes getting replicated in succeeding generations. The last chapter 
made clear that such adaptations do not always manifest in overt fitness-enhancing 
behavior (e.g. securing food, shelter, or a mate or avoiding injury and death). Some 
evolved to serve internal functions related to emotional regulation and the organization 
of information in the brain needed to make it optimal in its functioning. The article by 
Bjorklund and Pellegrini also highlights the often overlooked fact that the survival 
needs of a sexually immature human are different in significant ways from those of an 
adult and that certain adaptations evolved to serve adaptive functions specific to 
different stages in an individual‘s life history. Certainly, further research into this will 
allow us to make more productive sense of the developmental theories that were 
advanced before EP began to offer explanations for this. In the stage theories of Piaget, 
Erikson and Kohlberg is implicit the understanding that the efficacy and scope of 
psychosocial functioning in subsequent stages is crucially dependent on the 
achievement of similar levels of functioning in earlier, more foundational stages. 
 
The understanding of human psychosocial epigenesis that EP and Cognitive 
Neuroscience are building up has, I believe, already demonstrated that measures of 
human intelligence (and of more specific aptitudes such as music, spatial intelligence, 
etc.) are only in part measures of genetic endowment. Further research will undoubtedly 
bring more clarity in this regard, but the research that has the most importance to 
education is that which helps us to better understand what is needed by way of 
nurturance to ensure the most optimal expression of this endowment. But let us not 
forget that what may now be regarded as the most optimal expression is something quite 
different from what it would have been in the EEA in which the relevant genes evolved. 
Parental investment strategies that served well in the Paleolithic may not, and in many 
cases, will not deliver what is needed for a child growing up in modern global society. 
While there are differences in genetic endowment that may be accounted for by 
differences in the EEAs encountered by different ancestral populations, they are 
quantitative and when it comes to intellectual endowment, the differences within 
modern day populations are far greater than any differences between groups based on 
average levels of intelligence. Moreover, the explanation for the latter may well prove 
more ontogenetic than genetic. I suspect that it will. Where decency and equity are 
living ideals in a society, these differences cannot in any case be considered of 
consequence, a point well made by Noam Chomsky, the theorist most responsible for 
launching the cognitive revolution in the 1950s that laid the groundwork for the 
cognitive sciences including Evolutionary Psychology. 
 
Consider … the question of race and intellectual endowments. … [I]n a decent society there 
would be no social consequences to any discovery that might be made about this question. 
An individual is what he is; it is only on racist assumptions that he is to be regarded as an 
instance of his race category, so that social consequences ensue from the discovery that the 
mean for a certain racial category with respect to some capacity is such-and-such. 
Eliminat[e] racist assumptions, the facts have no social consequences whatever they may 
be, and are therefore not worth knowing, from this point of view at least. If there is any 




from the scientific significance of the question. It is difficult to be precise about questions 
of scientific merit. Roughly, an inquiry has scientific merit if its results might bear on some 
general principles of science. One doesn't conduct inquiries into the density of blades of 
grass on various lawns or innumerable other trivial and pointless questions. Likewise, 
inquiry into such questions as race and IQ appears to be of virtually no scientific interest. 
Conceivably, there might be interest in correlations between partially heritable traits, but if 
someone were interested in this question he would surely not select such characteristics as 
race and IQ, each an obscure amalgam of complex properties. Rather, he would ask 
whether there is a correlation between measurable and significant traits, say, eye color and 
length of the big toe. It is difficult to see how the study of race and IQ can be justified on 





PART 2: The case for Memetics 
 
We can now turn our attention to the other and more pertinent thrust of Gene-Culture 
Coevolution Theory, its attempts to identify and explain the mechanisms by which 
culture evolves, mechanisms that in turn can explain cultural diversity as well as how 
complex social and cultural institutions have come to dominate how people think and 
live out their lives in the EEA that is modern global society, such understanding having 
important implications for how we might best go about transforming society through 
education. This transformation may ultimately be to our genetic advantage, but the more 
particular and urgent concern lies with the ideational environments with which our 
innate psychology interacts and which incline us to believe the things – and behave in 





The belief that cultural evolution is in part - or even wholly - a playing out of the natural 
selection algorithm is being embraced by an increasing number of theorists whose work 
can be subsumed under Gene-Culture Coevolution Theory. Here I will give the greatest 
amount of attention to Memetics, the nascent science which posits units of culture (ideas 
roughly) as replicating entities that mutate and evolve in the cognitive environments of 
evolutionary adaptedness (EEAs) provided by human brains and culture.  As Memetics 
has it, these informational units, like genes, replicate not because they should, but 
merely because they can. This is not to suggest that humans exercise no control over 
which units get selected and often the information in question is beneficial. As in the 
artificial selection of breeds and varieties of animals and plants, humans are foci of 
selective pressure and through intentional acts (controlling which sperm fertilize which 
ova) influence the direction of genetic evolution giving rise to breeds/varieties that are 
superior in some ‗profitable‘ way. But as was made clear in Chapter Two, the genes of 
domesticated species are nonetheless evolving according to the natural selection 
algorithm.  
                              
103  Chomsky, Noam (1978) Language Development, Human Intelligence, and Social Organization. In 
Walter Feinberg (ed), Equality and Social Policy, Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Available 





Memetics argues that the same is the case with memes, the name Richard Dawkins 
(1976) coined for these units of culture.104 Ideas certainly can be considered 
informational units even if it is difficult or impossible to be explicit as to the 
information that comprises them. But the problem with explicitness is only because we 
rely on the information acquiring some perceptible form to get at the information itself. 
Before we were able to isolate the gene-form as a sequence of DNA, the same problem 
confronted but did not confound work in Evolutionary Biology. It was well understood 
that there had to be unit of selection for Darwinian evolution to work, but the inability 
to pin it down to something with a perceptible form did not prevent a great deal of 
important scientific work getting done laying the basis for current Darwinian Science in 
all its incarnations. 
 
Memes replicate in human brains, according to Memetics, and this is how they spread. 
For this to happen, there must be some way whereby the informational kernel that 
defines the meme gets from one brain to another. There are innumerable ways in which 
this can happen thanks to the many information transmission media we have at our 
disposal, including what is surely the most important and extensively used medium, 
language. The fact that we can externalize information in materials that last (books, 
recordings, databases, art works, and other ‗artifacts‘) accounts for the incredible 
breadth and depth of information that has accumulated and that is so easily available 
now that we have the Internet. But of course we do not need language or information 
transmission technologies to move information around from brain to brain. You need 
only observe what someone else is doing to get information and if she happens to be 
doing something that strikes you as a good idea (e.g. a way of building a mousetrap), 
you can, in most cases at least, copy her behavior and achieve the same outcome, or 





Our ability to imitate is perhaps the most underrated of human capacities even though it 
is so fundamental to human intelligence, knowledge acquisition and communication, 
perhaps because we do it so easily and are not alone among species in being able to do 
it. Dawkins and Blackmore use ‗imitation‘ in the broadest sense to cover any act (overt 
or covert) whereby one acquires a representation of an informational whole because 
someone else or some group of people have done something that communicates it, 
whether deliberately or not, whether directly or indirectly, whether in the moment or at 
an earlier point in time, whether verbally, iconically, gesturally or through other means 
of demonstration. When it comes to something spoken or written you do not have to 
recount it word for word for the idea of what was said or written to have taken hold and 
induced processes in your own brain that capture the idea‘s essential informational 
content. If you are able to remember the gist of what you heard such that you can pass it 
on, there has been imitation in the broad sense that something has been copied. Getting 
the gist means that in whatever was said or written you have isolated what is essential 
and comprises its informational kernel. This like imitation is a vastly underrated ability. 
                              
104  Lumsden and Wilson (1981) later coined the term ‗culturgen‘ but it did not succeed well as a meme in 




A computer can easily ‗remember‘ a twenty digit number while we struggle to, but a 




Sociobiology vs. Gene-Culture Coevolution Theory and Memetics 
 
In Chapter Two I presented my understanding of Adaptationism and how it helps us to 
understand our capacities and predispositions for artistic behavior. I also tried to use 
some of the insights of Evolutionary Psychology and related disciplines to better 
understand how we learn and develop cognitively and what predisposes us genetically 
in this regard. Appropriately, three of the most eminent proponents of ‗the adapted 
mind‘- John Tooby, Leda Cosmides, and Steven Pinker – feature prominently in that 
chapter and elsewhere. When it comes to culture, however, they manifest what can be 
considered a sociobiological stance which places culture very much on the leash of 
genes.105 All three have made clear what they are ‗against‘ and have set it out explicitly 
in what they style as the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM), the defining premises 
of which I elucidated in Chapter One. The SSSM characterizes what Pinker calls a 
Blank Slate orthodoxy, a dogma that I have rarely come across in my academic 
experience even though I have more colleagues than not who either downplay or just 
somehow ignore that we have an innate psychology that is complex and multitudinous 
in how it influences thought and behaviour. They tend to see genes as being on the leash 
of culture. To a significant degree, I believe they are correct. They must be correct if we 
are to account for two things: cultural diversity and the extraordinary pace of cultural 
change.  
 
My take on gene-culture coevolution is consistent with what Dennett articulates as his 
model in Darwin‟s Dangerous Idea (1995) and he does so in a way that shows both the 
SSSM position and the sociobiological stance to have valid premises which I believe 
Gene-Culture Coevolution Theory  and Memetics take account of and employ 
productively.  What Dennett does first is to quote from Pinker‘s portrayal of the SSSM 
(1994: 406):  
 
Whereas animals are rigidly controlled by their biology, human behavior is determined by 
culture, an autonomous system of symbols and values. Free from biological constraints, 
cultures can vary from one another arbitrarily and without limit. … Learning is a general-
purpose process, used in all domains of knowledge. (quoted in Dennett 1995: 490) 
 
Dennett then amends this to present his ―Only Slightly Nonstandard Social Science 
Model‖ which is the model for which his book is by and large an argument. The 
italicization is his. 
 
Whereas animals are rigidly controlled by their biology, human behavior is largely 
determined by culture, a largely autonomous system of symbols and values, growing from 
a biological base, but growing indefinitely away from it. Able to overpower or escape 
biological constraints in most regards, cultures can vary from one another enough so that 
important portions of the variance are thereby explained. … Learning is not a general-
purpose process, but human beings have so many special-purpose gadgets, and learn to 
                              




harness them with such versatility, that learning often can be treated as if it were an entirely 
medium-neutral and content-neutral gift of non-stupidity. (491) 
 
Dennett will continue to feature in this discussion as he offers what I have found to be 
some of the most compelling arguments for Memetics and in his Breaking the Spell 
(2007) demonstrates how valuable it can be in understanding ―religion as a natural 
phenomenon‖ (the subtitle of the book). A religion is more than just a set of beliefs that 
a group of people embrace. It is a complex social system or institution composed of a 
diversity of phenomena, emerging from different circumstances and influencing thought 
in multitudinous ways, many not specifically related to belief in a supernatural agent. 
The institutions that sustain and promote the arts are similarly complex social systems 
in which certain ideas have proliferated and come to be status quo ideas that inform arts 
institutions around the world, some of which, in what they communicate and how they 
communicate it, help to promote and sustain the institutions themselves. An institution 
might rightly be considered a memeplex, an assembly of ideas that is robust as a 
coherent informational whole. So also is the case with education and the memeplexes 
we identify with words like curriculum, methodology, ‗the university,‘ philosophy, 
policy and so on. But, before considering a memetic take on such entities, a more 
thorough and convincing case for Memetics must be made.  
 
 
The selfish gene vs. the selfish meme, similarities and differences 
 
A key point regarding biological evolution that was made in Chapter One is that the 
organisms that comprise life on Earth are not inevitable outcomes of genetic evolution. 
What now exists biologically is not as it was meant to be according to some design or 
natural unfolding process where it is possible to predict evolutionary outcomes. It is the 
result of innumerable chance occurrences and even though the laws of physics and 
chemistry can be assumed to have remained constant throughout Earth‘s history, the 
evolutionary outcomes could have been very different. Another key point was the fact 
that it is genes that replicate, not organisms. Genes are the units of selection. They work 
together to build survival machines that in the case of humans happen to be constructed 
so as to have a perspective that ascribes purpose to things including themselves, when 
the only real purpose they have is to ensure that their genes get passed on. Genes have 
no volition of course and the idea of the selfish gene is misleading to a degree. Genes 
are only selfish in the sense that whatever they bring about phenotypically has a 
function (or functions) that increases their fitness, i.e. the likelihood that they will be 
copied in offspring. Could it be the same with memes? What would be the meme 
equivalent of a phenotype? A phemotype? 
 
Distin (2005) points out that memes ―do not build survival machines. Their replicative 
mechanisms, and the means of their variation and selection, lie in genetically 
determined human faculties, not in vehicles that they themselves build.‖ Moreover, 
―memes are not bundled up in a comparable way,‖ rather, ―they are peppered freely 
throughout the cultural environment.‖ (206) This is true to a point, but what Distin 
seems to overlook is that ‗the means of their variation‘ also lie in what has already been 
taken on board, the memes one has already acquired, many of which constitute one‘s 
notion of self (one‘s selfplex). I would also contest her view that our ‗faculties‘ are 
genetically ‗determined.‘ What has been genetically instructed interacts with what has 




aspects of their functioning in key ways. The ‗idea‘ that the interests of one‘s offspring 
are always paramount is, like the incest taboo, less an idea than an expression of 
something genetically instructed. Nepotism, on the other hand, is an idea that in its 
formulation and application is generally intended as a challenge to this innate idea and 
the term is always used pejoratively. The idea of fairness, which is also in part rooted in 
our innate psychology, calls for behavior preferential toward offspring to be named and 
shamed when it compromises the interests of others or of the collective to which one 
identifies, one‘s community or nation. That we could come up with such a 
counterintuitive notion is remarkable, but even more remarkable is that it can become 
widely shared and realized as a principal enshrined in all manner of artifact 
(constitutions, declarations of human rights, employment policies, etc.). Natural 
selection working on genes alone cannot adequately account for this, or such is the firm 
conviction of memeticists and gene-culture coevolution theorists generally. 
 
 
Hard-line Memeticists: Dennett and Blackmore 
 
With good reason, Distin identifies Dennett and Blackmore as memeticists that take 
Universal Darwinism to the limit. Disten‘s claim that memes do not build survival 
machines is one they challenge and if we concur with their lines of reasoning, we must 
conclude that ―there is no conscious self inside,‖ a conclusion that accordingly must 
influence how we think about human agency. The title of Blackmore‘s book is clear in 
suggesting that a human brain is as much a meme machine as it is a gene machine. 
Instead of a conscious self, there is only ―a complex interplay of replicators and 
environment‖ (Blackmore 1999: 246).  Distin thereupon makes what is surely an 
erroneous assumption in saying that Blackmore and Dennett are thereby claiming that 
this ―is all there is to life‖ (2005: 206). What Blackmore actually says is something 
quite different. 
 
Memetics thus brings us to a new vision of how we might live our lives. We can carry on 
our lives as most people do, under the illusion that there is a persistent conscious self inside 
who is in charge, who is responsible for my actions and who makes me me. Or we can live 
as human beings, body, brain, and memes, living out our lives as a complex interplay of 
replicators and environment, in the knowledge that that is all there is. Then we are no 
longer victims of the selfish selfplex. In this sense we can be truly free – not because we 
can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators but because we know that there is no 
one to rebel. (1999: 246) 
 
We became meme machines when we acquired the capacity to imitate. But we are not 
meme machines in the sense that we have no say in what we choose to imitate 
(appropriate, believe, be influenced by, act upon), that our genes have instructed an 
organism that can only work with ideas in a mechanistic way even though it involves 
mechanisms at every step of the way. But these mechanisms are not cogs in a machine, 
rather they are processors whose outputs may or may not have much to say in what 
emerges as a choice. People make choices that are counterintuitive, that fly in the face 
of ideology even where it is one embraced readily by those with whom one shares much 
the same artifactual and informational world.   
 
What Blackmore presents us with is an epistemology that may well be correct, but even 
if so, can this make any difference in how we understand human agency? If free will 




illusion? Who is being deceived? The fact that we are discrete, physically independent 
organisms, that make decisions, even counterintuitive ones, is the only fact of value. 
That we tend not to employ our ‗faculties‘ fully to the enterprise, that we rather ‗go with 
the flow‘ or ‗follow our instincts‘ does not mean that we cannot act in ways that run 
counter to these, that we are prisoners of our ideas or our genes. The sad reality is that 
we allow ourselves to be prisoners (some of the time at least) by not subjecting our 
ideas to rigorous interrogation.  Instead of treating ideas as hypotheses, we treat them 
(often unwittingly) as indicative of how things really are, how things should be, or how 
they were meant to be. Critical consciousness may also be an illusion, but is certainly 
one that people (as complexes of brains, bodies and memes) can use to put both genes 
and memes on a leash. But we still haven‘t answered the question posed at the 
beginning of this paragraph.  I am utterly convinced that the understanding of 
consciousness that Dennett and Blackmore have elucidated, if properly grasped and 
embraced, must alter one‘s notion of agency in fundamental ways. It also makes much 
more plausible the memetic theories they espouse. 
 
 
„The Grand Illusion of Consciousness‟ 
 
For both Dennett and Blackmore, consciousness and agency are not two separate 
entities. They are epiphenomena resulting from countless memes (Dennett would say 
meme-effects) engaged in collaborative interplay that generates the illusions that 
naturally give rise to the notion of mind as a coherent entity existing apart from the 
physical brain and its electro-chemical activity, a mind that is the cause of the activity 
(not the activity itself) and which controls one‘s behavior. This is how it certainly 
seems, but the evidence is overwhelming in showing that it is not like this at all. Over 
twenty years ago, Benjamin Libet devised an ingenious experiment whose findings have 
been corroborated by more recent studies, the key finding being that the neural 
activations (readiness potential) giving rise to a deliberate behavior begin more than a 
third (as much as half) of a second before the conscious decision is taken (and one 
stands up, for example).  In other words, it is not the conscious decision that initiates the 
neural activation. We perceive it as being otherwise because the illusion works so well.  
 
In this regard, it is crucial not to think of an illusion as something that does not exist or 
that is contrived to deceive. Websters offers what is perhaps the most apropos definition 
of illusion to be found in a standard English dictionary: ―the perception of something 
objectively existing in such a way as to cause misinterpretation of its actual nature.‖ 
Indeed, our visual sense relies on an illusion, that being of a detailed and accurate 
representation of what is before our eyes that has been assembled in the brain and is the 
equivalent of a photograph or film clip. Blackmore (2005) demonstrated the illusory 
character of vision brilliantly in a lecture/demonstration given at Caltech where through 
visual exercises she conducted with the audience she leaves no one in doubt as to how 
much of what is clearly there before our eyes we do not perceive. She also explores 
some of the most plausible theories for how the illusion of ‗seeing all that is to be seen‘ 
is achieved. I already made the point in Chapter Two that when watching television one 
is actually hallucinating a three dimensional world behind the screen. 
 
It is hard to think that we could conceive deliberate behavior as having to be under the 
control of conscious thought when so much of our behavior is kinesthetic and thus 




would regard the behavior itself as deliberate). If someone jumps out of the bush as I am 
walking by, I can hardly consider the response it would provoke to be the result of a 
conscious thought, not initially at least. But that cannot be considered a deliberate 
behavior, one might contend. The argument here is that there is no conscious, deliberate 
behavior that is not the result of pre-conscious processing and that therefore whatever 
initiates the process cannot be a conscious decision. The only thing that can be said is 
that what one becomes consciously aware of can and obviously does influence what 
happens next, but this does not mean that there is, nor does it require, a central 
controller in the brain that is a coherent self with free will. What does often happen is 
that when conscious thought kicks in, the readiness potential can be vetoed, stopping the 
process such that no behavior ensues. In this regard, there may be a lot of truth in what 
the psychologist Richard Gregory suggested with tongue-in-cheek, that there is no free 
will, only ―free won‘t‖ (Blackmore 2005). 
 
For any true cognitive materialist there should be nothing striking about what Libet 
discovered and which has been validated by subsequent studies (Blackmore 2005). It is 
only striking because it is counterintuitive or because one still holds to the notion of an 
internal self (homunculus) that takes conscious decisions. When there is no such 
homunculus, there exists nothing to take a decision; rather it is just what happens when 
our cognitive machinery is stimulated in a particular way. A representation that is 
formed in the brain does not require ―a little man in the head to look at it.‖ Pinker 
remarks on how metaphors are commonly used by computer programers and others 
working in Artificial Intelligence when talking about the workings of computers, 
metaphors that intuitively makes sense but which are inaccurate and misleading as 
regards what is actually going on. 
 
Data structures are read and interpreted and examined and recognized and revised all the 
time, and the subroutines that do so are unashamedly called ―agents,‖ ―demons,‖ 
―supervisors,‖ ―monitors,‖ ―interpreters,‖ and ‗executives.‖ (Pinker 1997: 79) 
 
We obviously need to have ways of talking about processes be they in a computer or 
brain and I made a point in the last chapter about how language relies on metaphors 
even when talking about the most mundane things. If it helps us to think that there is 
something inside a computer or a brain that does the reading, interpreting, etc., then we 
should rather think in terms of a host of homunculi with no-one in charge. What 
Dennett has said in this regard is insightful and worth quoting in total. 
 
Homunculi are bogeymen only if they duplicate entire the talents they are rung in to 
explain. … If one can get a team or committee of relatively ignorant, narrow-minded, blind 
homunculi to produce the intelligent behavior of the whole, this is progress. A flow chart is 
typically the organizational chart of a committee of homunculi (investigators, librarians, 
accountants, executives); each box specifies a homunculus by prescribing a function 
without saying how it is accomplished (one says, in effect: put a little man in there to do the 
job). If we then look closer at the individual boxes we see that the function of each is 
accomplished by subdividing it via another flow chart into still smaller, more stupid 
homunculi. Eventually this nesting of boxes within boxes lands you with homunculi so 
stupid (all they have to do is remember whether to say yes or no when asked) that they can 




scheme by organizing armies of idiots to do the work. (Dennet, 1978d, pp. 123-124. Quoted 
in Pinker, 1997: 79)106 
 
Consciousness only kicks in after things are already in motion and it probably never can 
be known where precisely it is in the brain that the process actually begins. Portraying 
the brain as a massively parallel computer is not only a way of saying that the brain is 
complex but that it comprises multiple streams of information processing that are going 
on simultaneously and  largely independent of each other. Let us try to understand this 
analogy in more detail. 
 
 
A massively parallel computational system 
 
Imagine a system of many interconnected computers, directly connected (wired to each 
other) and/or indirectly connected via intermediary computers that pass along data with 
or without effecting changes in it. There is a high degree of interconnection and joint 
processing between the computers in the system though this obviously does not involve 
any kind of mutual awareness. Some work more independently, perhaps handling some 
specific function vital to the system as a whole (e.g. temperature regulation). The kinds 
of processing that each computer in the system is capable of is mostly hard-wired, i.e. 
based on how it was made, including its essential operating programs. Some are more 
‗plastic‘ in this regard and their processing capacity can be enhanced depending on how 
active they are in coextensive processing involving other computers in the system. The 
increase in possible outputs for the system may be rapid because of the establishment 
and refining of feedback loops that build up new, more complex informational wholes 
that can be stored, accessed and processed variously.  
 
Different computers in the system may receive the same information but work on it in 
different ways specific to their respective functions without necessarily looping it 
through any other computers where it can be edited. Nonetheless, the results of their 
independent processing become data that others in the system can access. Indeed, others 
may or will be accessing it on a continuous or near continuous basis, using it to update 
existing informational ‗drafts‘ that can become the primary data for coextensive 
processing involving all or nearly all the computers in the system. Being computers, 
they are not in any way aware of what they are doing so, or aware of the extent to which 
the accessed data has been put to use in their own processing activity, influencing their 
outputs. They are not even aware of the system itself even though the processing they 
accomplish independently may be vital to the working of the whole, and hence its 
survival as a functioning system. 
 
Some of the computers in the system are able to receive and decode information from 
outside the system. They can then send it on to other computers in the system after they 
have processed it and represented it some system of symbols (code) that the other 
computers can ‗read.‘ How optimal the whole system becomes in its functioning is 
dependent on information that it is able to take in from outside. But not all of this 
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information is salient vis-à-vis the functioning of the system. A data set may be entirely 
superfluous but something in how it encodes information causes one or more of the 
computers in the system to process it, even though it is not and might in fact be 
injurious to the system (a computer virus for example). Though superfluous, this 
information can become active in processes and their outcomes and thus influence the 
outputs of other computers in the system including those with the capacity to pass it 
along to computers in other systems which can then become similarly ‗infected.‘ (This 
last point is germane in meme theory.) 
 
The last and perhaps most salient characteristic of the system needs careful attention for 
it is what allows the whole system to function as an integrated whole, as a parallel 
system whose outputs are outputs of the whole even though there is no single computer 
in the system that coordinates everything. A problem with the computer analogy is that 
computers as we know them are serial systems that do one thing at a time (despite 
appearances) whereas brains are parallel systems doing innumerable things at the same 
time.107 Consciousness emerges as a serial phenomenon of one thing after another. How 
are the computers in our imaginary system able to work together such that the whole 
system functions as a single computer that appears to have agency rooted in some 
executive center that makes sense of, stitches together and serializes the varied outputs 
of its component computers? One thing for sure: it is impossible that there be a single 
computer in the system that puts everything together and issues commands as it would 
have to be a parallel system itself and this leads to an infinite regress conundrum (as we 
encountered with the homunculus myth in Chapter Two). Dennett has offered a way out 
of this as well as a plausible explanation for consciousness itself. 
 
Just as you can simulate a parallel brain on a serial … machine [as in a computer], you can 
also, in principle, simulate (something like) a [serial] machine on parallel hardware … 
Conscious human minds are more-or-less serial virtual machines implemented – 
inefficiently – on the parallel hardware that evolution has provided for us. (1991: 278) 
 
It is these virtual machines that make it possible for the data structures constructed by 
different components of the system to be assembled into the more complex data 
structures that we call ideas and which we can call memes if they are able to maintain 
their informational integrity when their syntactic form changes and they take the form 
of words, actions, melodies, recipes, instructions, or whatever is capable of being 
transmitted to other brains. That the brain requires some kind of symbol system that 
makes possible its inter-modular behaviors seems evident and it was suggested in 
Chapter Two that we have such a language of thought, the mentalese that Pinker speaks 
to. More will be said about this further along. 
 
 
Chasing the elusive meme: a musical example 
 
The biggest problem with a meme is that it can and most often does acquire multiple 
forms, forms that in most cases encode information superfluous to what might be 
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considered the core idea, its informational kernel. It is this kernel that is, in fact, the 
meme.  Let us take as an example a musical meme, the phrase from ―It might as well be 
Spring‖ that was quoted in the last chapter and notated in Curwen‘s tonic sol-fa as:  
 
s1 . s1  │ s1 . m : s . d │ m . s1 : d . s1 │ta1. 
 









But are these two representations of the same meme? With the second the notes have 
specific pitches, and, provided you are conversant with tonic solfa notation, you might 
also have noticed that the rhythm has been altered. So if we are looking for a meme, 
what information is essential and what is superfluous? Firstly, ‗musical meme‘ is too 
broad a denotation.  More specifically, it is a melodic meme and this implies that we are 
looking for a series of ‗notes‘ that assume a pattern by virtue of two kinds of 
relationship: pitch and duration.  
 
The sequence of pitch intervals are the same in both examples and while there are 
differences in the series of note durations, the disbursement of the notes metrically 
(where they fall relative to ‗downbeats‘) shows the two renditions to be essentially the 
same rhythmically. The fact that the staff version specifies the pitch of the notes is of no 
consequence. If I were playing it on my alto saxophone I would get a different set of 
pitches than what I would get playing it on my clarinet (as they are both transposing 
instruments), different still from what I would get playing on my flute (a non-
transposing instrument). But the intervals would stay the same and that is what matters 
informationally and which allows one to hear all three as the same melody but in 
different ‗keys‘.108 The sol-fa version presents the rhythm as it is probably most often 
notated (with even eighth-notes) even though the staff version might be closer to how it 
is more likely to be performed because of other ideas coming into play (e.g. a concept of 
and feeling for ‗swing‘). But the informational kernel stays the same for the most part. 
We might say that the differences are phenotypical (phemotypical), that both are 
expressions of the same informational kernel. The example here is simple and 
straightforward. Stephen Jay takes the identification of musical memes to many 
different levels in his The Memetics of Music (2007) which is well worth reading if one 
wants to better understand the evolution of compositional ideas (forms, structures, 
styles, etc.). 
  
While we have isolated a melodic phrase with a particular tonal and rhythmic pattern, it 
can only really be considered a meme if there is something in the phrase‘s informational 
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kernel that could cause its replication. The information that a gene encodes induces 
gene-effects (protein syntheses) in chemical environments that through a long, complex 
and cumulative process bring about phenotypic results (e.g., a physiological or 
cognitive organ in some organism) that increase the likelihood of that gene getting 
copied (e.g., the organism survives and produces offspring). So it should follow in the 
case of a meme: the information it encodes must induce meme-effects in its 
environment (the neural-chemical environment of a brain) that through a cumulative 
process brings about phemotypic results that influences it chances of getting copied, for 
example, that its informational kernel gets instantiated neurally and stored, latter to be 
reconstituted and employed in behavior that gives the informational kernel a form 
external to the brain (e.g. a visual or aural representation as in the notating or 
performance of the phrase). This in turn makes it possible for the kernel to be 
transmitted to another neural-chemical environment (another brain) where similar 
phemotypic outcomes may ensue.  
 
The informational kernel must be marked as salient if it is to stand a chance of being 
replicated and this will depend in large measure on information that attends it and that 
weights the informational kernel by virtue of its inclusion in a larger informational 
whole, a memeplex. With the example at hand, the range and complexity of memeplexes 
is seemingly unlimited. If I was trying to get the ―It might as well be Spring‖ meme to 
take hold in your brain, I could do any of the following.  They are approaches which 
vary considerably in how informationally rich they are and how successfully they might 
predispose you (your brain that is) to marking the informational kernel as salient, worth 
remembering and making use of.  
 
1. I could make my notation of the meme richer by, for example: 
 writing out the entire melody 
 adding chord symbols 
 adding accompanying parts on additional staves 
 providing the words of the song 
 adding expression symbols and other instructions (e.g. play with a swing feel). 
 
2. I could perform for you: 
 the entire melody 
 the melody with some accompaniment 
 singing it with the words 
 as part of an ensemble playing an arrangement of the song 
 
3. I could let you hear the meme in contexts where I have no active part. For example, 
I could play you a recording of a great singer backed by a great band/orchestra 
performing a great arrangement of the song. Perhaps even better, I could show you 
a DVD of the 1945 film musical State Fair and let you experience the beautiful 
Jeannie Crain singing it wistfully while gazing out of her bedroom window.109  
 
4. Lastly, I could treat you to a short seminar on the song in which I highlight, among 
other things, how that particular phrase captures the idea of ‗jumpiness‘ in its 
                              




intervallic construction as is metaphorically appropriate given the words: ―I‘m as 
jumpy as a puppet on a string.‖  
 
But perhaps none of these ploys are necessary. After all, the phrase has other qualities 
than jumpiness. Even someone without musical ‗training‘ would be likely to sense the 
poignancy of how the phrase ends, intuiting without consciously apprehending the 
effect of making a tonic triad (s … m s d m s d s) into a dominant seventh by ending the 
phrase on a lowered leading tone (ta instead of ti). I have heard others – and have 
myself – employed this meme in improvisations; and given how prominent the 





Of course, what you would get from a DVD or CD is information that has been encoded 
in the digital sequences on the surface of the disk. In the case of a CD recording of ―It 
might as well be Spring,‖ this representation, when decoded and made to move speaker 
cones in specific ways, realizes an audio event homologous to what was originally 
recorded. The point that is important here is that somewhere in the megabytes of data 
inscribed in the ridges and gaps read by the player‘s laser is a pattern that encodes the 
same, or nearly the same, pitch and duration relationships as I represented in my basic 
notations above. Of course, what the listener actually gets is a stream of informational 
bits that her or his brain must divide up in particular ways if anything salient is to be 
perceived and this process involves arrays of representations and mechanisms for 
working with them that are already on board in the brain, that have been ‗inscribed‘ 
there on the basis of both genetic and epigenetic information (genes and memes). 
 
With an MP3 player you could listen to the same recording as you could on a normal 
CD player as you could on a device that plays analog recordings (a record or tape 
player). That there is only a negligible loss of sound quality when going from the CD to 
the MP3 player is remarkable given that the amount of information being read by the 
MP3 player has been reduced by something like 90%. The missing information (or a 
substantial amount of it) is ‗resurrected‘ by virtue of a clever algorithm that preserves 
enough of the essential structure of the original wave pattern that speaker cones are 
induced to vibrate in virtually the same way and what reaches the ear is virtually the 
same series of compressions and rarefactions. The information has been copied with 
sufficient fidelity to make the realized aural event a close enough facsimile, at least 
close enough to make worthwhile the substantial saving of disk space that the MP3 
format makes possible. 
 
Our vision system allows us to do an analogous ‗filling in‘ when we perceptually blend 
an array of pixels of illuminated light into a coherent, seemingly seamless scene, as we 
do when watching television. As will be discussed further along, there is a great deal 
that is missed in visual perception and much has to be supplied by the brain to create the 
illusion of looking out on the world through the windows of the eyes. What makes this 
possible are algorithms working on neural-chemical data, that is, representations of light 
intensity (or acoustic energy in the case of auditory perception) that have to be 
assembled into bigger, more complex representations that ultimately produce illusions 
that are consistent with the data originally provided. In other words, the illusions are 




oneself in. And thanks to technologies such as a CD player, the illusion can be 
congruent with what happened decades ago in a recording studio somewhere.  
 
 
Memes and the „culture‟ of songbirds 
 
With something as precise as a short melodic phrase, it seems entirely plausible to call it 
a meme. In the calls of numerous songbirds are distinct patterns (that can be isolated 
and treated as memes) that others learn by imitation and employ variously. There are 
several bird species that copy memes from the calls of other species, even non-bird 
species.  I have heard an Australian Lyrebird (Menura novae) that renders perfectly 
(like a tape recording) the sound of a camera with motor drive as well as chainsaws 
firing up, axe blows and other sounds it at some previous time came across when in the 
vicinity of some lumberjacks busy destroying its habitat. Indeed, it is in the study of 
bird calls that Memetics has perhaps best demonstrated some real scientific value.110  
 
The Red-capped Robin Chat (Cossypha natalensis) in my garden not only can mimic 
forty or more other bird calls (plus a few other sounds like dog yapping and a car alarm) 
but can build these into long improvised strings of slurred whistles. In the case of the 
Lyrebird, the male‘s incredible vocal productions are clearly a type of courtship display. 
That its prowess is so extraordinary relative to other bird species suggests, as with the 
peacock‘s tail, that it is the product of runaway evolution as was discussed in Chapter 
Two. This is what Blackmore (1999) theorizes happened when our ancestors started to 
become good imitators. Genes for imitative capacity and genes for a predisposition for 
good imitators produced a feedback loop that she argues to be the explanation for our 
extraordinarily large brains and our language capacity.  
 
 
Words as memes 
 
Through memetic analyses of their calls, ornithologists have been able to map the 
interactions and movements between and among populations of different species, much 
as the linguist Joseph Greenberg did in his studies of African languages, finding that 
Africa‘s approximately 1500 different languages fall into just five main language 
groups spoken by racially distinct peoples (Diamond 1997: 381).  In Guns, Germs and 
Steel (1997), Diamond uses language as one of the ways he traces the spread of 
humanity and civilization arguing, for example, that the almost complete disappearance 
of a Pygmy tongue was the result of the Pygmies having been overwhelmed by 
migrating farmers and pastoralists from other parts of the continent. The speed with 
which languages are becoming extinct throughout the world indicates that this was not 
an atypical phenomenon. Nowhere has Diamond, to my knowledge, considered a 
memetic take on the phenomena he explores, considering, for example, that words and 
other linguistic elements are replicators evolving as per the Darwinian algorithm. It 
seems evident to me that the spread of musical and other artistic culture should avail 
itself well to memetic analyses.  
 
                              




Darwin himself may have pointed the way forward for Memetics when he remarked in 
the Descent of Man (1871: 59): ―The formation of different languages and of distinct 
species, and the proofs that both have been developed through a gradual process, are 
curiously the same.‖ He further along concluded that: ―The survival or preservation of 
certain favoured words in the struggle for existence is natural selection‖ (quoted in 
Dennett 2007: 341-342). Words are perhaps the most obvious examples of memes. 
Dennett points out that virtually all of the billions of words spoken every day are 
replicas of words that have been heard or read. 
 
Replication is not perfect, and there are many opportunities for variation or mutation in 
pronunciation, inflection, or meaning (or spelling, in the case of written words). Moreover, 
words are roughly segregated into lineages of replication chains; for instance, we can trace 
a word‘s descendants from Latin to French to Cajun. Words compete for airtime and print 
space in many media, with words going obsolete and dropping out of the word pool, while 
other words spring up and flourish. (342) 
 
 
What is information? 
 
Given that both genes and memes are informational units, it is worth considering what 
should be understood by the elusive term information (which has already appeared over 
sixty times in this chapter). It is one of the most widely used words in the English 
language and yet no one seems to be able to say what it actually is. I believe, and hope 
to show, that in getting closer to the root of the problem by taking it to the neural-
chemical level, the plausibility of Memetic theory becomes more strongly indicated. 
Standard English dictionaries do not assist much, the relevant entries tending to portray 
information as knowledge acquired or supplied about something. Sometimes the term is 
used to denote one or other kind of signal or code that represents data. But then, data is 
really just another name for information (as is knowledge) and we are really no closer to 
defining what it is. Richerson and Boyd define ‗information‘ as ―any kind of mental 
state, conscious or not, that is acquired or modified by social learning and affects 
behavior‖ (2005: 5). This is not any more helpful. A ‗mental state‘ is presumably the 
result of – or the effect produced by - some synaptic activation that in its patterning 
instantiates a representation of information, but neither the representation nor the mental 
state is the information itself anymore than a gene is the information it encodes. 
Moreover, one cannot acquire mental states; they must be constituted neurally and 
chemically even though the result will be very much influenced by the input in question. 
This point was made clear in respect of visual and audio perception in the last chapter. 
The data that the brain gets to work on in both cases is not the raw data of light and/or 
sound; what it gets, rather, are values for different intensities of light and acoustic 
energy that have been ‗digitized‘ as patterns of synaptic firings between neurons, 
representations analogous to the number values in a spread sheet.  
 
Merriam-Webster Online points us in what may be a more profitable direction by 
defining it (among other things) as an ―attribute inherent in and communicated by‖ how 
something is arranged that produces specific effects. Information, as I conceive it, is a 
condition of relatedness or interconnection that manifests in some kind of organization, 
a pattern that, potentially at least, can influence the formation of other patterns, perhaps 
in other substrates. Pinker makes this even simpler by defining it as ―a correlation 






We say that the rings in a stump carry information about the age of the tree because their 
number correlates with the tree‘s age (the older the tree, the more rings it has), and the 
correlation is not a coincidence but is caused by the way trees grow. Correlation is a 
mathematical and logical concept; it is not defined in terms of the stuff that the correlated 
entities are made of. (1997: 65, my emphasis) 
 
Pinker is making a key point about information, that being what might be called its 
syntactic mutability and which is evident even at the level of two connected neurons 
where the smallest units of information are being processed. 
 
The axon (the long output fiber) of a neuron is designed, down to the molecule, to 
propagate information with high fidelity across long separations, and when its electrical 
signal is transduced in a chemical one at the synapse (the junction between neurons), the 
physical format of the information changes while the information itself remains the same. 
… [T]he tree of dendrites (input fibers) on each neuron appears to perform the basic logical 
and statistical operations underlying computation. Information-theoretic terms such as 
―signals,‖ ―codes,‖ ―representations,‖ ―transformations,‖ and ―processing‖ suffuse the 
language of neuroscience. (Pinker 1997: 83) 
 
Information inheres in matter itself and it is the decoding of such information that is in a 
sense what Chemistry and Physics are all about. It can be something as specific as a 
chemical bond that causes molecules to arrange themselves in particular ways (as in a 
crystal, snowflake or nucleotide) or it can be something far more complex and 
particulate, such as the information according to which nucleotides are organized into 
strings of DNA. According to physicist Jacob Bekenstein, there are a growing number 
of scientists who are coming to regard the physical world as being comprised of 
information ―with energy and matter as incidentals.‖ 
 
Ask anybody what the physical world is made of, and you are likely to be told "matter and 
energy." Yet if we have learned anything from engineering, biology and physics, 
information is just as crucial an ingredient. The robot at the automobile factory is supplied 
with metal and plastic but can make nothing useful without copious instructions telling it 
which part to weld to what and so on. A ribosome in a cell in your body is supplied with 
amino acid building blocks and is powered by energy released by the conversion of ATP to 
ADP, but it can synthesize no proteins without the information brought to it from the DNA 
in the cell's nucleus. Likewise, a century of developments in physics has taught us that 
information is a crucial player in physical systems and processes. (2003 –online source)  
 
Information may also inhere in the ‗behavior‘ of matter, when an object is in motion for 
example. Our innate capacities for apprehending and computing such information are 
uncanny and do not require any knowledge of Newtonian physics although they, like 
many of our innate capacities, need to be exercised through interactions with the 
environment to develop optimally. As was pointed out in the last chapter, one of the 
adaptations which natural selection has provided us with (as it has many other species) 
is an innate intuitive physics that allows us to track and predict the movements of 
objects. It almost defies comprehension in its sophistication when we consider what is 
required computationally in order to catch a ball that someone has thrown and yet we 
can do this so easily and without thought. Dogs do it particularly well. Bats are even 
more impressive in the speed with which they compute the trajectory of a flying insect 





What is remarkable about the human brain is that it can work with information that has 
not come to it through direct sense perception (personally acquired) but that has been 
conveyed by some communicative, representational means, by something spoken, 
written, or otherwise created that encodes the information (e.g. a photograph or video 
clip). This allows us to transcend time, place and perceivable reality itself (e.g. to gain 
knowledge about things you will never nor ever could see, smell, hear, taste or touch). 
The human brain can work with information that is only contingently or provisionally 
true and information not based on anyone‘s direct experience. And as can the brains of 
many animals, it can work with information already stored in the brain, either abstracted 
from sensory experience or which has been ‗inscribed‘ genetically (e.g. the innate 
concepts described as metaphors of the mind in the last chapter and which are encoded 
in mentalese). Most importantly, it can assemble different informational units into a 
cohesive amalgam such as we call an idea and thereafter give it representational form in 
something that can be shared, a spoken utterance, a series of gestures, a demonstration 
(playing a musical phrase for example), a written text, an illustration, or a string of 
binary code transmitted across the world in a few seconds that allows a representation to 
appear on any number of computer screens that is virtually identical to what was on the 
screen of the computer from which it was sent. And of course it is possible for another 
brain to make sense of what has been communicated such that the idea is once more 
constituted neurally. Whether it dissipates, gets stored, gets broken down with some but 
not all of its constituent information retained, or modified into something different or 
new depends on its salience (emotional weighting) in relation to existing ideas in the 




So what is an idea? 
 
An idea is a mental construct, a pattern of representations in mentalese that constitutes 
an informational whole and may be used as such. It may or may not emerge and inform 
a conscious thought and it may or may not get encoded in some form external to the 
individual, an utterance or artefact of some kind.  We may here recall Dennett‘s surmise 
about consciousness that was highlighted in Chapter One, that without language (and 
here I suspect he might include other symbol systems like music and art) there would be 
no consciousness ―in the strong sense of there being a subject, an I.‖ Such 
representational systems are necessary to ―engage the contents of events in one‘s 
nervous system that would otherwise leave no memories in their wake and hence 
contribute to one‟s guidance in ways that are well described as unconscious‖  
(Brockman 2006: 126, 129, my emphasis). That an idea consciously apprehended and 
formulated in thought can influence subsequent thought without it being consciously 
invoked is a fact of great importance in understanding how ideas spread. It is what 
makes it possible and fruitful to speak of ideologies and provides a means to better 
understand how they shape humans psychosocially and thereby influence cultural 
evolution in particular ways and in particular directions. What strikes me as a key 
question is how it might be possible that an idea that initially had to be articulated in 
words could become something ‗tacit‘ and nondiscursive that can influence subsequent 
thought without us being consciously aware of it. If an idea is anything other than a 
conscious idea (thus couched in some externally derived symbol format), it must employ 








The term mentalese was introduced in Chapter Two where it was defined as the 
―language of thought,‖ the ―level of fine-grained conceptual structure which we 
automatically and unconsciously compute every time we produce or utter a sentence – 
that governs our use of language‖ (Pinker 2005).  It is crucial to the present discussion 
that we explore the matter further. Firstly, we should note that Dennett‘s surmise about 
consciousness being dependent on some kind of learned symbol system was in no way a 
suggestion that ‗thought‘ itself requires language. If language is dependent on 
something like mentalese, which I believe has been established beyond doubt, this has 
huge implications for how we understand ideas and how they move around from brain 
to brain. Also, it surely must follow that music too is dependent on something like 
mentalese. I had much to say in Chapter Two in support of this, citing, for example, 
Jackendoff & Lerdahl‘s generative theory of tonal music. I am convinced, largely based 
on my own experiences of different musical traditions, that there are ways in which we 
process sound and are inclined to organize it temporally that are species-typical and 
hence pre-cultural. The inter-modular sophistication of our brains allows the 
computational structures of mentalese to be employed cross-modally. I am also 
convinced that language and music (which so often intermingle) have a common 
ancestor, as are a number of theorists as noted in the previous chapter. If this is true, 
music must in large measure employ algorithmic structures homologous to those 
employed by language, even if they reside in different modules in the brain (as 
suggested by studies of amusia). These algorithmic structures are what can be called 
innate ideas or concepts and are what to some degree keep culture on the leash of genes.   
 
―Mentalese‖ is the title of Chapter 3 in Pinker‘s The Language Instinct, this chapter 
providing the most cogent and digestible account of the concept that I have come 
across. The following is a much abbreviated version of those of Pinker‘s assertions and 
explanations that appertain here. The overarching purpose of his chapter, which he 
achieves skilfully, is to demonstrate that thought is not dependent on words, that 
thought instead is the algorithmic processing (computation) of neural patterns 
representing different categories of information: procedures (e.g., if-then conditions), 
classes of things, and information that has been assembled into chunks that can be used 
in further computation without the need for recalling the particulars that have been 
chunked together. Pinker doesn‘t employ the chunking concept of information 
processing but I see it as implicit in what he refers to as a ―co-reference.‖ 
 
Say you start talking about an individual by referring to him as the tall blond man with one 
black shoe. The second time you refer to him in the conversation you are likely to call him 
the man; the third time, just him. But the three expressions do not refer to three people or 
even to three ways of thinking about a single person; the second and third are just ways of 
saving breathe.  Something in the brain must treat them as the same thing: English isn‘t 
doing it. (79-80) 
 
In his modelling of mentalese as the language of thought, Pinker not only challenges, 
but shows as ―wrong, all wrong,‖ theories that place thought under the control of the 
language or languages one has learned and which one speaks. Such theories are 
ostensibly plausible given how ideologically loaded many words and word 




substitution even when the referent remains constant. Such is the stuff of euphemism 
which politicians use adroitly to ‗adjust‘ their peoples‘ thinking in particular ways.111  
 
There is no doubt that language influences many kinds of cognitive processes in ways 
that are anything but trivial. Words are linked to ideas and make them efficiently 
available for conscious thought so that it becomes possible for one ―to muse, to 
rehearse, to recollect, and in general to engage the contents of events in one‘s nervous 
system.‖ Pinker does not challenge what is so obviously unchallengeable, it is just that 
he is concerned, as we need to be here, with what it is that makes it possible for words 
to work in such ways. This is important given that languages are the representational 
systems that are most used in communicating ideas and most responsible for the 
exponential evolution of culture. A word is a meme supreme. 
 
 
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis 
 
Linguistic relativity was formalized as a theory in the well-known Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis which asserts that people‘s thoughts are strongly influenced by the cultural 
and cognitive categories that language encodes and that people who speak different 
languages think differently in significant ways. Pinker is clearly dismissive of the 
hypothesis and gives over several pages in his chapter to unpacking it and showing how 
its premises derived from erroneous inferences based on data that was questionable to 
begin with (Pinker 1994: 59-67). However, that there is a degree of relativity in how 
people think that can be attributed to the lexicons, syntaxes and pragmatics of the 
languages they use has been indicated by research (as if such research were necessary to 
establish what is so obviously true).112 However, this research only lends support for 
weak versions of the hypothesis and I doubt that Pinker would challenge their findings. 
Pinker uses Whorf‘s own words to convey the assumptions of the strong version of the 
hypothesis which he finds insupportable. 
 
We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and types 
that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do find there because they stare every 
observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of 
impressions which has to be organized by our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into 
concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an 
agreement to organize it in this way – an agreement that holds throughout our speech 
community and is codified in the patterns of our language. The agreement is, of course, an 
implicit and unstated one, but its terms are absolutely obligatory; we cannot talk at all 
except by subscribing to the organization and classification of data which the agreement 
decrees.  (Whorf/Carroll 1956 quoted in Pinker 1994: 59-60) 
                              
111  Former South African president, Thabo Mbeki, came up with ‗quiet diplomacy‘ for what was virtually 
the same approach to diplomacy as the ‗constructive engagement‘ pursued by the Reagan 
administration in the 1980s in its relations with apartheid South Africa. The referent in both cases was 
the principle that there should be no aggressive intervention (e.g. sanctions) to change an 
undemocratic regime with a despicable human rights record (South Africa before 1994 and Zimbabwe 
more recently) when such intervention was perceived as not being in the interests of one‘s own nation. 
Mbeki needed to make palatable what was reviled a decade earlier when the beneficiary or such 
diplomacy was the Pretoria regime. 
112  The Wikipedia article on ―Linguistic Relativity‖ cites, among others, the following articles: Casanto 






No word for „music‟ 
 
The essential idea of linguistic relativity is attractive in that it seems to offer an 
explanation for the apparent differences in the ways people think about things. The 
same might be said about music of course. Musical ‗relativists‘ would have it that 
different musics (approaches to and systems for creating sound structures) not only 
manifest different ways of thinking in and through sound but are in different ways and 
degrees responsible for epistemological differences. For example, we could reword one 
of the sentences above as follows: ―We organize sound into music, and ascribe 
significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in 
this way – an agreement that holds throughout our music community and is codified in 
the patterns of our music.‖ Whorf surely assumed that those hearing/reading his words 
understood that the ‗agreement‘ to which we are a ‗party‘ is abided by unwittingly most 
of the time. But as regards both language and music, the argument seems circular: The 
people of population ‗A‘ speak/make music differently, so they must think differently. 
And the evidence that they think differently is manifest in how they speak/make music.  
 
That there has been an inclination to take linguistic relativity more than a bit far is 
indicated by Pinker in his discussion of ―The Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax‖ (1994: 
64-65). As he tells it, it began in 1911 as an observation of anthropologist Franz Boas 
that ‗Eskimos‘ have four distinct word roots for snow. Whorf subsequently inflated the 
number to seven and suggested that there were more. Whorf‘s claims became widely 
known and stimulated the evolution of an urban legend that now has the number as high 
as 400.  Talk about runaway memetic evolution! 
 
Of interest to me is the question of what motivates linguistic relativity of this kind. I 
have to admit to previously finding it inviting because of the wish to believe in and 
come to appreciate epistemological differences, for example, that there are people and 
cultures who maintain a more organic connection with the world around them, who are 
more in touch and capable of perceptual experience far richer than what is available to 
someone like me whose perceptual acuities have been dulled by the sensory overload 
characterizing life in modern global society. This may have in part informed my interest 
in African musical traditions and influenced my decision to go to East Africa in 1975 as 
a Peace Corps volunteer. It struck me as extremely poignant when I came to learn that 
‗many African languages have no word for music,‘ thinking this to suggest a whole 
different epistemology, at least in respect of musical and artistic behaviours. But the 
lack of a term that has precisely the same meaning as another does not automatically 
imply the absence of a concept of the phenomenon in question. Perhaps I should have 
asked myself why it is we tend to employ words from other languages as much as we 
do, obviously because they more effectively capture the concept we have in mind. There 
is not an English equivalent for the German schadenfreude, but all English speakers 
have a concept of the smug pleasure people often take in the misfortunes of others. And 
all Africans that I have talked to about ‗music‘ understand the concept in much the same 
way as people everywhere. In fact, I have not always found it easy with my African 
students to get them to conceptualize music not as a product (a thing created) but as 
behavior or process. This seems ironic given that African languages apparently have no 






Nothing but algorithms 
 
What is now incontestable is that a vast range of information can be represented in the 
brain without need of externally derived symbols like words. Other species manage a 
great deal of information processing without the need for language. And language is not 
required for the brain to engage in reasoning, even human reasoning. This was 
demonstrated by the British mathematician and philosopher, Alan Turing (1912-1954) 
who hypothesized a device that could deduce new pieces of information (ideas) from 
old ones by applying a set of rules to the manipulation of symbols on a strip of tape. 
Any symbols can be used provided they are used consistently. While elegantly simple in 
how it works, it can handle virtually any algorithm and provides an explanation for the 
functions of a computer‘s Central Processing Unit (CPU).  
 
It is beyond the scope of this discussion to take the reader through the steps of a typical 
Turing reasoning process. Pinker does this in a clear and eminently accessible way 
(1994: 73-78). The point here is that there is a great deal of reasoning going on in the 
mind that we are at best only vaguely aware of and this is because the brain forms and 
works with representations that  are nondiscursive and not reliant on an externally 
derived symbol system. This is mentalese and it is a ‗language‘ common to all normally 
functioning human brains. Working out the kinds of representations and processors that 
the brain comes hard-wired for occupies many research programs in Cognitive Science 
and Neuroscience, all of which, according to Pinker have to follow the same ground 
rules if it is to accord with a computational theory of mind: ―no little men inside, and no 
peeking.‖ 
 
The representations that one posits in the mind have to be arrangements of symbols, and the 
processor has to be a device with a fixed set of reflexes, period. The combination, acting all 
by itself has to produce the intelligent conclusions. The theorist is forbidden to peer inside 
and ―read‖ the symbols, ―make sense‖ of them, and poke around to nudge the device in 
smart directions like some deus ex machina. (1994: 78) 
 
It is pertinent here to recall the assertion made in Chapter Two that everything cognitive 
is algorithmic.  ―The whole cognitive science game is to take the high level capacities 
that we intuitively grant to minds - such as consciousness, agency, flexibility, context-
sensitive interpretation, and so on - and to see what programming steps they are built 
out of.‖  This is how Tooby and Cosmides see it (2001b: 199) as must anyone who 
endorses the computational theory of mind discussed in the last chapter. Taking account 
of all that has been said thus far regarding mentalese and how the brain represents 
information, the definition of ‗culture‘ that Tooby and Cosmides give elsewhere is 
apropos: Culture is ―the serial reconstruction and adoption of representations and 
regulatory variables found in others‘ minds through inferential specializations evolved 
for the task (Tooby & Cosmides 2000 – online source). That they speak of 
‗reconstruction‘ instead of ‗replication‘ could be seen as significant and it might be 
argued that they are not the same thing, although in my understanding of the terms, if a 
reconstruction of a representation is to be successful, it must replicate some substrate-









Sperber‟s critique of memetics 
 
The issue of what qualifies as replication is one that Memetics has been taken to task 
on, most notably by Dan Sperber (2000). In his view ―most cultural items are ‗re-
produced‘ in the sense that they are produced again and again – with, of course, a causal 
link between all these productions – but are not reproduced in the sense of being copied 
from one another.‖ (164)  Nonetheless, Sperber suggests that there are ―clear cases of 
actual memes‖ and gives chain-letters as an example. 
 
The very content of these letters, with threats to those who ignore them and promises to 
those who copy and send them, contributes to their being copied and sent again and again. 
Chain-letters do not benefit the people who copy them, they benefit their own propagation. 
(163-164) 
 
I would argue that a chain-letter itself is not a meme, but yet another kind of replicating 
entity that can evolve according to the Darwinian algorithm. My experience of chain-
letters is that most do not contain information that stands much chance of becoming 
instantiated as ideas and taken on board in the minds of the recipients or that has much 
consequence in what they might subsequently think or do. The idea of a chain-letter 
(which uses the prospect of good or bad fortune to get itself passed on) is the meme as I 
understand it, one that e-mail has proved a boon to the propagation of. What should be 
of interest is the kind of psychology that induces so many people to pass the letters on.  
There are a few chain-e-mails that contain something potentially noteworthy, often a 
spiritual or religious message that could be considered a meme, one that has the 
advantage of riding along with an effective replicator, the letter itself.  
 
The crucial question concerns what we mean by replication. Sperber argues, 
erroneously I believe, that when memeticists speak of replication, they necessarily mean 
that information has been copied from one brain to another. In most cases, he argues, 
what happens is that the information triggers the production of an idea in the receiving 
brain where ―the information provided by the stimulus is complemented with 
information already in the system.‖  This seems a non sequitur considering that the 
same could be said of the replication of genes, where something has to happen whereby 
atoms and molecules get commandeered and connected up in ways that result in a 
replica (‗B‘) of the source gene (‗A‘). But strictly speaking, it cannot be said that all of 
the information required was taken from ‗A.‘ ‗A‘ is a stimulus that triggers the 
production of ‗B‘ making use of information that inheres in the chemical environment 





                              
113  If by chance it is an environment where there is a significant amount of gamma radiation, the result 
may well turn out to be something other an exact replica. It may bring about a mutation that makes it 
virulent and which produces cancerous cells. The difference is not the result of chance mutation, but 
of replication in an environment that is informationally different; its energy dynamics are different in 





Are prions replicators? 
 
We should also consider the case of prions? A prion, like a virus, is an infectious agent, 
but a virus contains DNA or RNA which encodes information needed, though not on its 
own sufficient, for replication.  A prion is composed of protein that has assumed a 
three-dimensional structure that is not biochemically functional but which takes up 
space nevertheless. This would not be a problem were it not for the fact that its protein 
structure induces functionally normal protein forms to rearrange themselves such that 
they replicate the rogue form. In the environment of a healthy organism, a chain 
reaction is triggered that leads to an exponential increase in prion population. This is a 
disaster when it takes place in a brain and is the cause of BSE (‗mad cow disease‘) in 
cattle and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in humans, both invariably fatal (which does 
at least help to keep its spread to some degree in check).  
 
Sperber gives as another condition that true replication must satisfy, that in order for B 
to be a replication of A, ―the process that generates B must obtain the information that 
makes B similar to A from A‖ (2000: 169).  In the propagation of prions a functional 
protein becomes a nonfunctional prion because of a change to its informational state but 
strictly speaking it has not ‗obtained‘ the information from prion A, and yet replication 
has been achieved. Fortunately it is not every normal form of protein that will do this; 
there must be something in its own informational state (its structure or pattern of 
organization) that is necessary to the replication event.  For prions to be subject to 
natural selection, there of course needs to be mutation or something equivalent that 
produces a variant form (thus setting the stage for competition between variants). Prions 
do vary slightly in their structures and thus comprise a number of strains. And while 
they tend to replicate with total fidelity, they are subject to occasional epimutation 
(‗Prion‘ on Wikipedia). 
 
The crucial point for me is that something in one structure induces changes in another 
structure that brings about the replication of some informational whole. The particulars 
of how the information got from ‗A‘ to ‗B‘ is not really of importance. All that matters 
is that there has been informational replication. Memes, like prions, replicate in the 
brain by inducing changes in what is already there such that the information encoded in 
the meme gets encoded in another entity and replication is thus achieved. In the case of 
a prion, this is another protein whose structure has been induced to assume the precise 
same form. It becomes a prion. In the case of a meme it is a pattern of neural activity 
that ‗realizes‘ the essential data of an informational whole.  
 
If we think of an artifact as a meme, as Dennett (e.g. 1995, 2007) and Benzon (2001) 
do, this can be problematic in so far as an artifact is likely to encode information that 
could induce more than one idea. Even the simplest ideas that the mind can give form to 
in most cases comprise yet more specific ideas. Take for example the simple 
formulation: ―Plato was a man.‖  Understanding the idea requires that the symbols 
employed (letters and words) are understood in terms of what they represent, i.e. a 
name, a condition of being (of having existed but no longer around), and a category of 
being – the kind of thing that Plato was.  The statement: ―Plato was full of shit!‖ is far 
richer and more complex informationally and yet we can call it a coherent idea even if 
we might choose to render it more diplomatically, e.g. What Plato professed as truth 
was in fact false. Of course, I am not suggesting anything of the kind. Plato proposed 




available to our senses is constantly in a state of flux and thus imperfect and transient 
instantiations of these forms. [True.] Real knowledge is not knowledge of the 
instantiations, but knowledge of the forms. [True to a point.] Plato‘s student, Aristotle, 
challenged his teacher‘s notion that these Forms were beyond human understanding, 
suggesting rather that they are manifest in nature and discoverable therein. Since then, 
science has been able to penetrate layers of form down to the subatomic level and have 
developed models ever closer to the essential forms underlying everything in the 
universe. And yet, what information ultimately is remains a mystery and we are 
resigned to working with its instantiations. Perhaps all that there is ultimately are 





But while arguably a non sequitur as regards what constitutes replication, Sperber‘s 
point about ‗triggered reproduction‘ challenges meme theory in another more 
potentially serious way. Each brain presents a different EEA comprised of different 
information acquired through different life experiences. This is not problematic; it only 
means that the chances of memetic transmission may be affected (positively or 
negatively) and that the ways in which a meme is assimilated and accommodated by the 
brain will be different as will be the ways in which it is invoked and employed in 
conscious thought and action. The problem lies in the fact that the natural selection 
algorithm requires more than just replication. There must be mutation (variation) and 
Sperber would argue that the complementing of received information with what is 
already in the system causes mutations to be absorbed and corrected, the upshot being 
that the mutations do not get passed on. I would in fact see this as support for meme 
theory in that the ―proofreading‖ a meme usually undergoes when being replicated in 
someone‘s brain may help to maintain the fidelity of the meme, fidelity being another 
essential attribute of a replicating entity if the algorithm is to work. Willy-nilly 
mutations occur that do get selected in. Dennett gives the example of a cooking recipe 
containing an error: ―Separate three eggs and beat the yolks until they form stiff white 
cones‖ (2007: 352). Such an error is almost invariably going to be corrected. But other 
mistakes might not be so obvious and may not give rise to a problem fatal to the 
recipe‘s outcome (as would beating egg yolks). It might even produce a superior 
outcome and get ‗selected in‘. Many culinary innovations are probably the results of 
mistakes or misreadings of recipes. 
 
It is perplexing that Sperber elsewhere suggests that in cultural transmission the 
mutation rate is so high that ―the very possibility of cumulative effects of selection is 
open to question‖ (Sperber 1996: 102). This is what for long kept me in doubt as to 
whether memes are evolving according to the natural selection algorithm. But, as Distin 
(2005) makes clear, memes leave genes in the dust when it comes to their respective 
replication rates. As such they can accommodate a far higher mutation rate than genetic 
evolution. She also points to a seemingly overlooked point apropos the meme-gene 
analogy. 
 
Mutations may indeed be rare in relation to the rate of genetic replication, but the variation 
that arises through recombination is not. Indeed, sexual reproduction results in the 
recombination of genetic material every time that it is replicated, and yet genetic content is 
still replicated ―well enough to undergo effective selection.‖ (Distin 2005: 103, quoting 








Closing the case for Memetics 
 
I could easily continue the debate on the validity of meme theory as embraced by 
Dennett, Blackmore, Distin and others, each of whom have their own particular takes on 
the theory, each with its own idiosyncrasies and ways of applying the theory to explain 
cultural phenomena as arising from interactions of genes and memes. I have taken as 
long as I have hoping to have given sufficient substance to my position in favor of 
Memetics. It has also been an opportunity to explore and delve deeper into what the 
computational theory of mind has to say about the mechanisms with which our brains 
process information which at root are hosts of algorithms inducing representations that 
other algorithms act on. They do so in computational systems (modules) that are to 
varying degrees independent in their functioning, but that together comprise a parallel 
system with a remarkable ability to pull out and make coherent sense of the myriad data 
drafts issuing from separate data streams and does so without the benefit of a central 
processor.  I hold to this as the most probable explanation for how brains work and how 
it is that brains are such superlative meme machines.  
 
 
How far can Memetics take us? 
 
One might be prepared to concede that Memetics has some truth value and can be put to 
use where memes are clearly discrete units of information that have a chance of being 
tracked in the ways they spread, as for example can be done with specific musical 
patterns and patterns that can be isolated in the calls of songbirds. But what value can it 
have with more complex, abstract and mutable ideas? The other question that confronts 
us is whether being able to trace the origins and spread of an idea has any consequence 
when it comes to judging its merits and its potential as an ideal to guide praxis. Perhaps 
both questions can be dealt with in a way that points to a potential place for Memetics in 
addressing questions more germane to the Philosophy of Music Education. 
 
 
Bringing Memetics into the Philosophy of Music Education 
 
In 2002, Marie McCarthy wrote a discussion paper as a contribution to the ―Sociology 
Session‖ of a colloquium of the Institute for Music Teacher Educators  entitled ―Re-
forming Music Teacher Education: Recent trends and new directions for foundations.‖  
She offered the following regarding her particular interest in the session and what it was 
that gave rise to her discussion paper ―Sociological Perspectives in Music Education.‖  
 
As a historian interested in the evolution of ideas and practices over time, I began to 
wonder why philosophy and psychology and history were so well established as 
foundations for music education, but that sociology had never really gained that status or 
found a similar role in our professional discourse. Was it not an important perspective for 
music educators to help them deepen their understanding of music teaching and learning? 
Did nobody think of making those connections? That led me on a journey through 
numerous sources back to early twentieth-century American music education. (2002 – 





The history of sociological perspective in music education that she assembles is one of 
ideas competing against other ideas in environments of evolutionary adaptedness 
(EEAs, meme-pools) in which different selection pressures influenced what took hold 
and with whom. She identifies as significant pressures various research agendas and 
theoretical and philosophical schools such as Dewey‘s pragmatism, the philosophy of 
music education as aesthetic education (Mursell, Earhart, Reimer), Ethnomusicology 
(Blacking, Merriam, Nettl), the Sociology of Music (Shepherd, Small), Social 
Psychology (Farnsworth, Hargreaves), Functionalism (Durkheim), Structuralism, 
Marxism, Interaction Theory (Mead), Praxialism (Elliot, Regelski), Critical Theory 
(Habermas, Marcuse), and others.114  These of course are not memes but instead vast 
memeplexes (theories) as well as meme-pools (‗schools‘) in which they evolve and 
change, giving rise to new memeplexes (theories, philosophies, paradigms). But each 
has some idea or set of ideas that it takes as founding premises and these are what hold 
the memeplex together. Being given phemotypical expression in theories and 
philosophies obviously increases the salience of these core memes by making them 
ideals, theorems, maxims, and so on and setting them down artifactually in published 
treatises, mission statements, regulatory ideals (e.g. those of the MayDay Group) and 
other methods of improving the survival of these memes by getting them into more and 
more meme-pools.   
 
McCarthy‘s paper is available at the MayDay Group Website and even a perusal of it 
will show that she does not take anything like a memetic approach to answering her 
question. Neither does she ultimately come up with an answer as to why the meme-
pools of Psychology and History have been more successful in getting their constituent 
memes replicated in the meme-pools of music education philosophy and practice. As to 
their replication in the minds of music teachers and the realization of this in what they 
do in their teaching, it seems clear that McCarthy understands (even if she does not say 
so directly) that the problem with bringing theory and practice together lies in the kinds 
of selective pressures for memes that obtain in the EEA of music teacher education. 
Working out how best to change that environment ideationally is surely what the 
colloquium was about and the upshot of the session of which she was part was that 
teacher education programs need to give over more curricular attention to what 
Sociology has to offer ideationally.  
 
This study is arguing for the same as regards Darwinian Science and the many ideas it 
has to offer, including the ‗meme‘ meme. These ideas have not featured at all in the 
meme-pool of the Philosophy of Music Education and some possible reasons for this 
have already been suggested, namely that the theories (memeplexes) that have taken 
hold have memes that help to sustain them in the face of competition from memes that 
are incommensurate with them. Dennett gives several examples of memes that fortify a 
memeplex and help ensure its survival. These are the survival memes that feature 
commonly in religious dogmas, perhaps most common being some kind of prohibition 
or effective entreaty against questioning the dogma. Dennett gives what seems an 
absurd proposition, but one that is an effective survival meme for many Abrahamic 
religions nonetheless. 
                              





If anybody ever raises questions or objections about our religion that you cannot answer, 
that person is almost certainly Satan. In fact, the more reasonable the person is, the more 
eager to engage you in open-minded and congenial discussion, the more sure you can be 
that you‘re talking to Satan in disguise! Turn away! Do not listen! It‘s a trap! (2007: 207) 
 
Other survival memes for religions that come to mind include: 
 
 the idea that particular individuals and texts are to be entrusted as caretakers and 
diviners of ultimate truth and that what they proclaim is sacrosanct; 
 a belief in eternal damnation for transgressors of the dogma; 
 a belief in an afterlife that is only available to keepers of the dogma; 
 the belief that adherents of the dogma are a ‗chosen‘ and favoured people. 
 
Belief in free will is something that nearly all religions must espouse given their 
common belief that we are and will be held to account for our choices and actions, but 
free will is a belief with wide currency in the non-religious world as well, even if its 
neurobiological status is so very uncertain. Perhaps the only beliefs that are more 
strongly embraced are that life has a purpose (beyond gene propagation) and that things 
really do matter (beyond what matters in the solving of life‘s problems). In Chapter One 
and in other discussions along the way, it has become evident that if we accept 
Darwinism‘s bottom-line, that natural selection is the playing out of a mindless, 
purposeless algorithm, we have to see these beliefs as ultimately groundless. I attempted 
to show why this does not naturally lead Darwinists to nihilism (or suicide), that, no 
matter what we ultimately know to be true, we continue to sustain these illusions 
because they make it possible for us to have lives worth living, or that at least feel that 
way. We really have no choice but to. 
 
I would argue that beliefs in free will and purpose to life are not memes any more than 
are the beliefs that incest is wrong or that the human mind is a blank slate. Rather, we 
are talking about conclusions people naturally and independently arrive at because of 
how we are wired by natural selection and because of what perceptual experience seems 
to make so incontestable (e.g. that the sun orbits the Earth). We do not come by these 
beliefs through learning or other forms of memetic transmission even if beliefs that we 
acquire reinforce what are essentially innate ideas. Indeed it takes powerful memes (e.g. 
ones backed by a whole lot of empirical evidence) to get us to let go of our natural 
intuitions or cherished ideas, and humans are not disposed to let go of them without a 
fight. Consider the ‗inquisitions‘ that the Roman Catholic Church embarked on in times 
past to prevent such memes from posing a threat to its dogma. And consider also how 
the conclusions of Darwinian Science have from time to time been received in the 
Church of the Humanities as has been remarked on in the course of this dissertation. 
 
 
Reductionism: a survival meme? 
 
Reductionism can mean different things, but the term is seldom used to express 
approval even though its core idea seems commonsensical if one is trying to get at an 
understanding of something, i.e. simplify it by analysing it into simpler parts. But it is 
usually used as an accusation that a theorist or theory has gone too far and 




phenomenon in question. Pinker may be accused of oversimplifying reductionism (as 
well as overstating his case) in the following excerpt from the Blank Slate, but he does 
strike a note of truth as to the resistance that Darwinian thinking has encountered in the 
Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences. The excerpt comes after his having made a point 
about the difference between the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM) and 
Evolutionary Psychology in how they explain the varied fortunes of human societies. 
Both offer explanations that are ‗cultural‘; the difference lies in seeing culture as ―a 
product of human desires‖ as opposed to culture as ―a shaper of them.‖  It seems evident 
to me that Gene-Culture Coevolution Theory and Memetics finds truth in both positions 
and offer real opportunities for consilience in this regard, recognizing as they do that 
every branch of knowledge studies a subset of reality that depends on factors studied in 
other branches. Chapter One made clear my belief that such consilience is urgently 
called for in our philosophizing around questions of what education should be achieving 
and why, and it is the quest for this that has forced this study to be so wide-reaching in 
its purview. But such consilience is nonetheless resisted because of a fear as to where it 
could lead and ‗reductionism‘ is the meme that is invoked most often in arguments 
against it. With such consilience : 
 
[h]istory and culture … can be grounded in psychology, which can be grounded in 
computation, neuroscience, genetics, and evolution. But this kind of talk sets off alarms in 
the minds of many nonscientists. They fear that consilience is a smokescreen for a hostile 
takeover of the humanities, arts, and social sciences by philistines in white coats. The 
richness of their subject matter would be dumbed down into a generic palaver about 
neurons, genes, and evolutionary urges. (Pinker 2002: 69) 
 
What is in fact feared is what both Pinker (69-72) and Dennett (1995: 80-84) have 
called ‗greedy reductionism‘ and they demonstrate more than amply that Evolutionary 
Psychology and Gene-Culture Coevolution are in no way guilty of it, that the greedy 
reductionist is in reality a straw man. 
 
 
Wrapping things up 
 
In my discussion of McCarthy‘s history of sociological perspective in music education, 
I pointed out that the ‗schools‘ of thought that she highlights are memeplexes held 
together by core memes (often helped along by survival memes). In the next and final 
chapter I will engage with some of these memeplexes and the memes that comprise 
them and will subject them to the Darwinian perspectives that have been argued for in 
the body of this dissertation. What McCarthy shares as to her hope and intention for 
sociological perspective ―in the large scheme of things‖ is precisely what I believe 
should happen with Darwinian perspective, that it will ―develop across all areas of study 





Chapter Four: Darwinizing the Philosophy of Music Education 
 
 
It is all about ideas 
 
What is Philosophy beyond an interrogation of ideas so as to arrive at ‗better‘ ideas? 
This study has been such an interrogation, primarily of ideas coming forward from the 
range of sciences that I have collectively termed Darwinian Science. My hypothesis is 
that these ideas provide a perspective with which to engage ideas central to the 
Philosophy of Music Education, many of which are pertinent to Arts Education and 
Educational Philosophy generally. In the course of the research for - and the writing of - 
this dissertation I have gone beyond believing such perspective to be useful, to seeing it 
as crucial. 
 
The logic is simple. We are the agents and catalysts responsible for society and culture 
as we know it in its innumerable forms; we are the ones who realize ideas cognitively 
and behaviorally. Surely any interventions aimed at guiding this ‗self‘-realization 
should be grounded on the best possible understanding of human agents, not as 
products of society and culture, but as makers, shapers and doers of them. One cannot 
change what is past and what is past significantly shapes who we are here and now.  But 
the ideas that have accumulated and which comprise culture and society as we normally 
conceive them do not write themselves on blank slates. As much as we are shaped by 
these ideas, so also are we shaped by our genes, far more profoundly than the Social 
Sciences have yet been willing to concede. How much we are on the leash of ‗selfish 
replicators‘ is a question of how far we are willing to go with ‗Darwin‘s dangerous 
idea.‘ The upshot of the last chapter on gene-culture coevolution was that biological 
evolution has equipped us such that we have brains that can access and process 
information of many kinds and that are thus environments of evolutionary adaptedness 
(EEAs) for the ideas and complexes of ideas, memes and memeplexes, which come to 
define us in key ways. 
 
The acquisition by our ancestors of capacities for formulating, communicating and 
assimilating ideas cracked the lid of a Pandora‘s box that agriculture opened further and 
which was flung wide open by communication technology (writing, printing, 
photography, sound recording, and all the many forms of telecommunication). We 
might question the appropriateness of this metaphor given that, as the story goes, it was 
evil that was unleashed when the first woman, Pandora, disobeyed Zeus (‗God) by 
opening the ‗box‘ (eating from the tree of knowledge) and that it is to that original sin 
that can be attributed all that is wrong in the world. (Myths are memes and the obvious 
similarity between this and the ‗Eve and the apple‘ myth may suggest that they are 
branches off the same memetic lineage.) The point is that in gaining imitative capacity, 
our ancestors set in motion something that can never be undone and which seems to 
have a life of its own. It spawned cultural evolution by releasing a new replicator – the 
meme.  
 
We embrace ideas because they make sense to us and seem appropriate according to 
some standard or set of criteria; but many - probably most - of these criteria we apply 
without being consciously aware that we are doing so. Ultimately we embrace an idea 
because it feels right. Even though we may subject it to rigorous interrogation, taking 




objectively as possible, this only explains why one now feels secure in its truth value; 
evidence and the application of reason have led one to believe with confidence that it is 
right; it is no longer just a matter of intuition. But this does not mean that it is right in 
any intrinsic sense, that it is consistent with some transcendent purpose or design. If like 
genes, ideas are replicators caught up in the natural selection algorithm, they can have 
no purpose or meaning in some ultimate, cosmic scheme, only in schemes of our own 
making.115 It is these ‗schemes‘ that need to be subjected to rigorous scrutiny, to 
become the foci of critical evaluation not only for philosophers and sociologists, but for 
everyone. Music education is one such scheme as is ‗the school,‘ schemes we take for 
granted and treat as obvious and natural even though they have such a short history 
relative to the time since our distant ancestors became a distinct species – Homo 
sapiens. Indeed, all of the ‗institutions‘ that we tend to unquestionably uphold as 
beneficial and important to the greater social good need to be so scrutinized. Some of 
these are clearly in the throes of a legitimation crisis and critical engagement is urgently 
needed if we are to reform or transform society and bring the world into an ecozoic era. 
 
Even if one is not convinced by Memetics‘ radical thesis, there is nonetheless value in 
treating an idea as a free-floating, intrinsically neutral entity that will replicate if 
conditions permit. Indeed, we might consider the maxim that ‗ideas replicate only 
because they can‘ as something of a non sequitur. Putting aside the question of whether 
ideas are copied or are recreated (an inconsequential question as I tried to argue in the 
last chapter), there is no doubting that they spread from brain to brain. So obviously 
they can and do get ‗replicated,‘ this ‗replication‘ being necessary if they are to survive. 
What seems the only significant point is that we are the means by which this happens. 
What we bring to bear on the process is the real issue.  
 
The key question that I have returned to repeatedly is whether we bring free-will to the 
process, an ontological and epistemological category that I have explored in some 
depth. I have been convinced by Dennett and Blackmore that free-will, like 
consciousness, is an illusion. But I do not consider this a problem even though it has 
important implications for our understanding of mind; and I would never argue that 
someone should not be held accountable for their actions on the basis of free-will‘s 
illusory nature. Having said that, it occurs to me that what makes dire the straits we are 
now traversing is precisely that people are not being held, or more importantly, not 
holding themselves accountable for their actions beyond what is legally required and 
socially acceptable in a world governed by corporate interests. In the ‗60s we blamed all 
of this on the ‗system‘, a loose amalgam of interconnected ideas and values that people 
abided and which they continue to abide without ever really considering their 
                              
115  I have thus far in this chapter used the term ‗idea‘ (or ‗ideas‘) seventeen times and this might seem 
inordinate given the idea that long ago became established in the meme-pools of English literature and 
academic writing, that words should not be repeated unless one is doing so for rhetorical effect. But 
this may not be just some antiquated idea that somehow has survived and that writers embrace 
unnecessarily. As was made clear in the last chapter, many ideas feel right because they resonate with 
something in one‘s innate psychology. The ‗don‘t repeat‘ meme survives perhaps in part because it is 
a ‗convention‘ and we tend to stick with status quo ways of doing things. But perhaps it became a 
convention for a good reason, because repetition causes semantic satiation with the result that 





consequences and ultimate validity vis-à-vis some vision of a better world and of a 
more organic, ecologically sound notion of what constitutes ―good life.‖ 
 
I have delved deeply into some of Dennett‘s key works, but surprisingly it was only 
when putting together my thoughts for this final chapter that I happened to end up on 
the Wikipedia Daniel Dennett webpage.  There under the subheading ‗Free will‘ the 
author(s) quoted from Brainstorms, Dennett‘s 1978 collection of essays he wrote that 
comprise a comprehensive theory of mind. It is clear from this that Dennett had already 
worked out that his theory, despite what it shows to be illusory, is not problematic or 
intrinsically disposed to nihilism. 
 
The model of decision making I am proposing has the following feature: when we are faced 
with an important decision, a consideration-generator whose output is to some degree 
undetermined produces a series of considerations, some of which may of course be 
immediately rejected as irrelevant by the agent (consciously or unconsciously). Those 
considerations that are selected by the agent as having a more than negligible bearing on the 
decision then figure in a reasoning process, and if the agent is in the main reasonable, those 
considerations ultimately serve as predictors and explicators of the agent‘s final decision. 
 
The fact there is no central controller, no inner agent (homunculus), or no center of 
narrative gravity does not alter the fact that the organism as an integrated totality arrives 
at decisions and develops beliefs about things. So what can it matter whether there is a 
control center or if there is only some kind of ―serial virtual machine‖ running on ―the 
parallel hardware that evolution has provided for us‖ (1993: 218)? Dennett was 
speaking to the making of moral choices when he set out his model above, going on to 
suggest that,  besides providing an ―account of our important intuition that we are the 
authors of our moral decisions,‖ this model … 
 
… points to the multiplicity of decisions that encircle our moral decisions and suggests that 
in many cases our ultimate decision as to which way to act is less important 
phenomenologically as a contributor to our sense of free will than the prior decisions 
affecting our deliberation process itself: the decision, for instance, not to consider any 
further, to terminate deliberation; or the decision to ignore certain lines of inquiry. 
[Gregory‘s ‗free won‘t?] … These prior and subsidiary decisions contribute … to our sense 
of ourselves as responsible free agents, roughly in the following way: I am faced with an 
important decision to make, and after a certain amount of deliberation, I say to myself: 
―That‘s enough. I‘ve considered this matter enough and now I‘m going to act,‖ in the full 
knowledge that I could have considered further, in the full knowledge that the eventualities 
may prove that I decided in error, but with the acceptance of responsibility in any case. 
(my emphasis and insert) 
 
 
Educating for praxis 
 
The last sentence in the above quote is apropos a key point that I have emphasized from 
the very first chapter. It is a cornerstone of my educational philosophy which I have 
encapsulated in the formulation: education for praxis. The sad but inescapable reality is 
that most people do not take decision making to the level of consciousness Dennett 
alludes to, what I spoke to in Chapter One as critical consciousness and what I posited 
as the sine qua non for meaningful social reform and for the achievement of the ecozoic 
vision that is so urgently called for. The sad truth is that people do allow ideas to have 




memeplex), but seldom is it the result of a rigorous exercise of critical consciousness. 
Rather, it is implicit in socioeconomic realities and something people acquire and abide 
unwittingly in what Engels coined ‗false consciousness.‘ What he wrote in a letter to 
Franz Mehring in 1893 has a decidedly memetic ring to it.  
 
Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, indeed, but with a 
false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown to him, otherwise it 
would not be an ideological process at all. Hence he imagines false or apparent motives. 
Because it is a process of thought, he derives both its form and its content from pure 
thought, either his own or that of his predecessors. He works with mere thought material 
which he accepts without examination as the product of thought, he does not investigate 
further for a more remote process independent of thought; indeed its origin seems obvious 
to him, because as all action is produced through the medium of thought it also appears to 
him to be ultimately based upon thought. 
 
Where Marxists and memeticists part company is in respect of the ―remote process 
independent of thought‖ that Engels spoke to. Marx‘s bottom line was that ―it is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social 
existence that determines their consciousness" (Marx, in the Preface to A Contribution 
to the Critique of Political Economy, 1869). Memeticists would agree up to a point. But 
what Marx claimed could only be true if humans are essentially blank slates. The fact 
that we are not blank slates does not, however - by any stretch of the imagination - 
imply that we are innately possessed of or disposed to critical consciousness. We are 
anything but.  
 
If we are the meme machines that Blackmore claims us to be, then critical 
consciousness is but a particular kind of ―interplay of replicators and environment,‖ 
(Blackmore 246) involving a self-plex comprised of memes that are largely 
counterintuitive and thus not easily assimilated. The problem with consumerist society 
is that profit is the main driver of memetic evolution, a condition that would 
undoubtedly be overthrown in a population of critical, ecologically intelligent thinkers. 
Humans are on two leashes – one of genes and one of memes. When they are pulling in 
the same direction, there is less internal dissonance to be sure, and the world of mass 
media and advertising try to keep things this way; their profits are more secure with a 
population of torpid consumers. Critical consciousness connotes a different scenario; 
memes and genes are firmly on their respective leashes, sometimes pulling in the same 
direction, sometimes pulling in opposite or oblique directions, but with the human 
subject well in control. Critical consciousness is what empowers us thusly. As Richard 
Dawkins put it: ―We have the power to defy the selfish genes of our birth and, if 
necessary, the selfish memes of our indoctrination … We are built as gene machines 
and cultured as meme machines, but we have the power to turn against our creators‖ 
(1976: 215). 
 
It warrants mention here that the title I originally mooted for this study was ―Educating 
for praxis through the musical arts.‖  What concerned me then remains the concern 
informing this study: that the Philosophy of Music Education suffers from a kind of 
misorientation and insularity evidenced by a failure to engage adequately with the 
‗bigger picture,‘ to properly consider the implications of Dewey‘s maxim that society 
should be a function of education rather than the other way around. Accordingly, it was 
and remains my view that the Philosophy of Music Education needs to position itself 




intention was to infer on the basis of a critical reading of key works in these areas what 
would be appropriate ‗action ideals‘ for music education where the paradigm is 
education through music (instead of in or for music) and where critical consciousness is 
assiduously cultivated. What prompted the change-of-course leading to this dissertation 
was a growing awareness that the bodies of theory under consideration are rooted in a 
conception of human nature that I find inadequate, which seems to be missing the points 
that (as I put it in Chapter Two) every phenomenon that is social is firstly and always 
psychosocial; and that we cannot progress far in our understanding of it without a 
psychology that can adequately explain human agency. Thus I turned to Evolutionary 
Psychology and Gene-Culture Coevolution Theory, but the paradigm remains the same: 
music education must always be a context of effort wherein all that takes place is 
accountable to overarching, interdisciplinary educational goals which in turn are 
accountable to social and ecological needs and goals.  
 
I am frankly in doubt as to the degree that other music education philosophers share my 
despair with how inadequately education is achieving the function Dewey set for it, 
taking account of the current state of affairs on Planet Earth, in particular its social 
injustices and precarious ecological state. I agree with Elliott, as undoubtedly does any 
music educator, philosopher or musician, that music matters, at least in the sense that 
different forms of musical involvement – musicking – engage us in ways that make 
possible richer, more meaningful lives. But for quite some time now I have felt an 
unsettling diffidence when advocating for music education on this basis alone, more and 
more feeling like I am Nero playing his ‗fiddle‘ while Rome burns.  
 
 
Regelski on „education for praxis‟ 
 
Thomas Regelski is a music education philosopher for whom I have great respect and I 
have derived tremendous value from his contributions to the literature. Of particular 
value to my teaching of the Philosophy of Music Education has been a five-part article 
he wrote in 1998 and which has been required reading for my senior students for some 
years now: ―Critical Theory and Praxis: Professionalizing Music Education.‖ Apropos 
Dennett‘s earlier remark, Regelski entreats music educators to consider every idea 
concerning what and how to teach as a hypothesis to be tested in action and evaluated 
according to the ethical criterion: phronesis. This, in Regelski‘s view, is what is 
required for one‘s work as an educator to qualify as authentic praxis thus deserving to 
be called a profession. 
 
Professions, properly understood …, are not just specialized or skilled types of 
employment. A profession is a praxis and, in distinction to just any 'practice' or 'doing', a 
praxis is characterized and guided by a condition Aristotle called phronesis. This is the 
ethical criterion for "good results" that guides a professional practitioner to a primary 
concern with the pragmatic benefits experienced by the typical client. In the case of music 
education, individual students in music classes and ensembles are the clients served (i.e., 
not the class or ensemble as a collectivity). (1998 – Online source) 
 
For Regelski, music education satisfies Aristotle‘s criterion only if good results are 
achieved at the individual level and the only evidence for this that Regelski regards as 
valid is that students ―want to and [are] able to engage themselves in musical praxis in 
ways and to a degree they find rewarding and empowering in life outside and after 




failure to take account of this common sense that has undermined music education the 
most. The benefits that music education programs seem too often concerned with are 
ones accruing more to the teacher/director and her program than to the students who are 
- in perhaps unconscious ways  - seen as means to ends rather than ends in themselves, 
ends such as prize winning choirs/bands or classrooms of seemingly content, 
behaviorally unproblematic students.  These are the measures of ‗what works‘ that 
Regelski rightly has a problem with given that graduation seems in most cases to be the 
point at which students become musically disengaged.  Of course, not everyone can be 
expected to remain musically active in overtly practical ways, as performers or 
composers. Is it not enough if someone has acquired understandings, sensitivities and 
aesthetic predispositions that allow them far richer engagements as listeners, such that 
listening to music becomes praxis and is pursued avidly whenever the chance arises? 
Perhaps, but there seems little evidence that music education has succeeded in achieving 
this to any significant degree.   
 
As pointed out in Chapter Two, Reimer‘s philosophy of music education as aesthetic 
education  (MEAE) (1970) which was so influential in the ‗70s and ‗80s, now gets short 
shrift and not a few music education philosophers have made a point of trying to 
discredit it. Regelski argues that any philosophy needs to be subjected to a process of 
―immanent critique‖ (a concept he derives from Critical Theory), where it is evaluated 
vis-à-vis its own claims. Regelski contends that MEAE fails to pass muster in this 
regard judging by what he perceives a negligible level of ―aesthetic responsiveness‖ 
among those who have come through MEAE based programs, … 
 
whose musical tastes and habits remain virtually unaffected by such musical schooling. It is 
not even clear that graduates of school-based ensembles have received an "aesthetic 
education" since few remain musically active after graduation and since the listening tastes 
and habits of most have not been turned in more aesthetic directions. 
 
I have argued (Chapter Two) that the MEAE philosophy is grounded on epistemological 
assumptions that are eminently plausible according to the understanding of mind that 
Evolutionary Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience affords us and I will argue this in 
more depth further along. What Regelski does not seem to consider is that the failure of 
any educational intervention to achieve the goals implicit in its underlying philosophy 
does not in itself render the philosophy invalid and citing such evidence is not sufficient 
as an ‗immanent critique‘. As I took pains to argue in Chapter One, a utopian ideal is 
not any less valuable because it has not been nor is likely to be fully realized. I have met 
comparatively few people in life who are true self-actualizers as portrayed by Maslow, 
but this does not render his ideal invalid or inappropriate. The same is true of 
Kohlberg‘s ‗principled conscience‘ and Freire‘s ‗conscientizacao‟.   Similarly, Illich‘s 
‗deschooled society‘, Dewey‘s ‗embryonic community,‘ and O‘Sullivan‘s ‗ecozoic era‘ 
continue to have value as articulations of what we should be striving for. 
 
I have already made clear my surmise regarding education‘s failure to achieve such 
goals, namely that the school (formal, institutionalized, curricular education) has lost 
too much of its potency as a shaping force in the lives of youth and society generally. 
Perhaps the forces that schools are up against render just as unlikely the achievement of 
the musical praxis that Regelski has in mind. And yet formal schooling seems to do so 
little to exercise what agency it has toward challenging the statuses quo of the world 




even more so the ―reproductive organ[s] of a consumer society‖ than he found them to 
be four decades ago (Illich 1974: 74).  
 
I find it not a little perplexing that Regelski has rooted his notion of praxis in Critical 
Theory and yet seems only concerned with the degree to which students are empowered 
and predisposed musically. Even if students, as a result of educational interventions, 
remain active as musical doers after completing their ‗schooling‘ and even if they are 
more aesthetically responsive, is this enough? Could music education have any function 
or responsibility beyond this? Perhaps not, but I would argue (as I have already) that the 
musical praxis that Regelski and others esteem (myself included) must be shown to 
have value beyond providing for what Regelski terms ―good time‖ and ―good life.‖  The 
―pragmatic curriculum‖ that he argues for is one … 
 
… guided by a phronesis of "personal action" with music. Music in this praxial sense is 
"for" personal praxis or agency -- that is, for creating or experiencing "good time" in life 
through music. "Good time" is well spent -- the expression "worthwhile" literally means 
"good time" -- and thus musical agency is an important means by which humans make a 
life worth living. In other words, a curriculum for musical praxis is first and foremost 
concerned to insure that students want to and are able to avail themselves of a wider and 
altogether richer variety of musical choices for enriching their lives than would have been 
the case without formal schooling. For Critical Theory, then, the ethical criterion of 
successful, professional teaching praxis in music education -- i.e., the phronesis of a 
curriculum predicated on authentic praxis -- will be to empower students to improve the 
quality of their lives through music.  
  
Regelski does not say, in this article at least, how students thus empowered contribute to 
making society better. Perhaps Nero was a paragon of musical praxis even if his reign 
as emperor was one of tyranny, extravagance and corruption. 
 
 
Enter the Mayday Group 
 
The need for a greater degree of sociological perspective in deliberating music 
education‘s purposes and values has for some time been a concern to music education 
philosophers and the Mayday Group is testimony to this. Founded in 1993 by Regelski 
and Terry Gates, the group functions: 
 
as an international think tank, connected through email, the Internet and by regular mail. 
They are concerned to identify, critique, and change taken-for-granted patterns of 
professional activity, polemical approaches to method, and social, musical and educational 
philosophies, educational politics and public pressures that have threatened effective 
practice and stifled critical and open communication among music educators. The ongoing 
debate about these matters resulted in a more formal two-fold purpose: [a] to apply critical 
theory and critical thinking to the purposes and practices of music education, and [b] to 
affirm the central importance of musical participation in human life and, thus, the value of 
music in the general education of all people. (www.maydaygroup.org) 
 
 
Woodford on education for „social intelligence‟ 
 
While much of the Mayday Group‘s work has been directed toward making music 




attempted to articulate - and position its work within - a broader philosophy of 
education. One Mayday Group member who has tried to move things in this direction is 
Paul Woodford who invokes Dewey‘s ―social intelligence‖ and posits it as an essential 
goal for music education.  As do I, Woodford senses that discussions around music 
education goals and the ideals that should guide them do not sufficiently address the 
question: ―to what end?‖ (80). If social intelligence is to be an important end, music 
education must be more than ―the pursuit of musical knowledge and skills.‖ As 
important is ―inculcating in children and music education majors moral imagination and 
those kinds of personal skills, dispositions, virtues, and attributes needed to mindfully 
engage in public criticism of musical values" (86).  It is these last three words that I find 
to some degree problematic. As I expressed myself in Chapter One:  
 
[T]he ‗social intelligence‘ that music education needs to foster should be of the broadly 
applicable kind, not limited to musical values, but concerning ideology generally, that is, 
the assumptions that people accept as ‗how things are and should be‘ and that inform ‗who 





Woodford is particularly concerned with what is lacking in the pre-service education of 
music educators. One does not want to over generalize and I have not investigated the 
matter in any systematic way, but I am nonetheless confident in my surmise that ‗social 
intelligence‘ and ‗critical consciousness‘ are not matters of serious concern in teacher 
education and I am absolutely convinced this is the case with ‗ecological intelligence.‘ 
Our concept of what constitutes educatorship needs to be radically revised and I am in 
full agreement with Woodford that much music teaching (most I would say) ―has more 
in common with training than with education" (80). In Chapter One, I intimated what I 
see as a status quo in formal education, that teachers see their profession: 
 
… firstly as teaching a subject or discipline as opposed to teaching students, i.e. helping 
them to become ‗better‘ people. They are drawn to the profession more by their passion for 
the subject/discipline than by their commitment to education or social amelioration. The 
standard line one hears from Music Education majors is that their curricular choice is an 
insurance policy, something to fall back on if they don‘t crack it as a professional musician. 
 
And sadly, the teaching profession does not tend to attract the most ‗switched-on‘ 
individuals. Estelle Jorgensen (2003) says the following regarding the situation as she 
finds it in the United States. 
 
Despite the fact that teachers face some of the most urgent and important challenges in 
society, the field draws relatively few intellectuals, lovers of wisdom, or outstanding 
practitioners of their particular specialties. Instead of attracting the best and brightest 
students, education often interests those who cannot get into other fields. In the university 
at which I teach, the academic achievement of incoming future teachers is among the 
lowest of the incoming undergraduate population, and this is all too common. A pervasive 
anti-intellectualism in education manifests itself in such problems as lack of interest in 
scholarship, uncritical acceptance of ideas and practices, idolizing of science, and obsession 






I fear that this problem is even more pronounced in South Africa. Most of the student 
teachers I have worked with over the years come from grossly deficient educational 
backgrounds where they were seldom if ever engaged in learning activity aimed at 
higher order cognitive processes such as analysis, synthesis, evaluation, or creativity.  
The first task that I give incoming Music Education students (2nd and 3rd year university 
students) is to compose a one-sentence definition for ‗education‘ without referring to a 
dictionary or other text. The results have been telling. In the several years that I have 
done this, perhaps only two or three students have offered anything suggestive of an 
educational ideal such as self-actualization, citizenship, critical thinking skill, moral 
conscience, creativity, etc. In but a very few of the definitions offered do the words 
‗process,‘ ‗skill,‘ or ‗develop(ment)‘ appear. In most cases, education is defined either 
as a condition of having ‗information‘ or ‗knowledge‘ or as a situation where someone 
who has information/knowledge imparts it to someone who does not. As to what they 
seek to get from my course, the prevailing expectation can be summed up in one word – 
methods. What they get instead is a protracted subversion of this ideology, which 
Regelski rails against with terms like ―what works‖ and ―methodolatry.‖ But I try not to 
merely supplant it with just another ideology. Developing critical consciousness is more 
about engaging people with questions than it is with supplying answers. Socratic 
teaching is something it seems my students generally have had little experience of, and 
my penchant for it is something they initially are uncomfortable with and even find 
threatening.  
 
Without reluctance I admit that I frequently take my students outside of the scope of  
the typical course in Music Education and that I do not refrain from allowing my 
‗ecozoic vision‘ some prominence in discussions and tasks in which I engage them.116 It 
strikes me as irresponsible not to do so if my educational ideal is as per Dewey‘s, where 
in ‗music education,‘ education (the noun) is the end for which music (the modifier) is 
the means and where education is in all instances accountable to some broader vision of 
a better world. I had enough to say about this in Chapter One. Where I see it as relevant 
to the present discussion is in relation to the insularity that so often seems to manifest in 
the writings of prominent music education philosophers. Symptomatic of this is their 
seeming resistance to interdisciplinary and integrated arts approaches in education. This 
matter will be pursued in depth further along, but for now let us give more consideration 
to the issue of educatorship, for it is the lack of true educatorship in the teaching 
profession that more than anything confounds education‘s prospects for bringing about 
a critically conscious world citizenry.  
 
Regleski and Elliott (also a Mayday Group member) are very much on the same page 
when it comes to their understanding of teaching as praxis as a particularly demanding 
form of thinking-in-action. A good lawyer may be seen as an exemplar in this regard.  
She must come to court well prepared in terms of evidence to be presented, cases to be 
cited, and familiarity with whatever documentation and other evidence the opposing 
                              
116  Raising their almost non-existent awareness of the environmental crises we face is something I feel 
obliged to do given that nowhere else are they being encouraged to become aware of and confront 
them. It is generally done parenthetically in discussions, but I do arrange viewings  of video material 
(e.g. An Inconvenient Truth, The Story of Stuff, Eleventh Hour, Crude, Home) and draw their 
attention to matters of crucial environmental concern within South Africa‘s borders (e.g. its inordinate 
carbon footprint and the complicity of multinational corporations in this regard, the infestation of 




legal team has ‗discovered.‘ But it is the capacity to think-on-one‘s-feet that matters the 
most given that what comes forth from a witness during questioning cannot be easily 
predicted and planned for. Elliott‘s remarks regarding educatorship are apropos in this 
regard. 
 
Educatorship … is not a skill, nor a habit, nor a knack, nor a science, nor a collection of 
facts about educational psychology or philosophy. Educatorship is the flexible, situated 
knowledge that allows one to think-in-action in relation to students‘ needs, subject matter 
criteria, community needs, and the professional standards that apply to each of these. … 
Music teachers are not merely intermediaries in an educational delivery system. They are 
reflective practitioners who can think-in-action and know-in-action in relation to highly 
complex and fluid teaching-learning situations.  (1995: 252) 
 
Appropriately, Elliott emphasizes the improvisatory nature of teaching as praxis. 
 
[E]xpert teaching is much closer to improvising over ―changes‖ than rendering an accurate 
reading of a score (a step-by-step lesson plan). Teachers ―trade‖ feedback with students in a 
kind of call-response pattern characteristic of jazz improvising. An expert music teacher, 
like an excellent improviser, deals with moment-to-moment problems and opportunities on 
the fly. These problems and opportunities are both musical and educational in nature. The 
professional music educator is well prepared to solve musical and educational problems in 
action because he or she possesses two complementary forms of expertise: musicianship 
and educatorship. (251-252) 
 
In Music Matters, Elliott does not have much if anything to say about the extra-musical 
kinds of knowledge that a music educator should be possessed of. In a critical review of 
Woodford‘s book (in which Woodford takes Music Matters to task on various points), 
Elliott states that educatorship, in his view, implies ―several forms of knowledge: for 
example, philosophical, sociological, psychological, historical, and other forms of 
liberal education‖ (2008: 52).  
 
I agree fully and through my professional life have become increasingly appreciative 
that I was able to do my BMus degree at a university that embraced a liberal arts ethos 
and required that a substantial proportion of credit hours be given over to courses 
‗outside‘ of music and music education; and while I was able to choose specific courses, 
I had to ensure an adequate disbursement across major academic domains, e.g. 
Psychology, Philosophy, Anthropology, Sociology, Literature Studies, Science, and 
other Arts. Environmental Studies was not yet a course offering but I was able to take 
one elective – ‗Critical Issues of Human Ecology‘ - that planted many of the seeds that 
later blossomed and informed my environmental activism as well my deep interests in 
nature and its protection.  
 
Such a grounding in the ‗liberal arts‘ sadly does not seem to be considered important in 
the pre-service education of teachers in South Africa and this I believe makes not only 
more justified, but more urgent the interdisciplinarism that characterizes my work as a 
university ‗lecturer‘. My caveat regarding Elliott‘s concept of educatorship is that it 
demands more than knowledge in and of these ‗subjects‘; it requires genuine 
sociological/philosophical/ecological/psychological/etc. perspective. In other words, 







What about Darwinian perspective? 
 
Demonstrating the critical importance of Darwinian perspective in the discourses of 
Education has been the raison d'être of this study. Here I will go further to propose that 
such perspective should be actively cultivated in students and people generally. If 
natural selection is accepted as being a law of nature (as it generally is), it is not enough 
that it be left at that - just another scientific fact to be learned and likely forgotten 
without consideration of its implications for matters of importance. If it is accepted that 
human beings are products of evolution by natural selection, surely we should consider 
what this suggests about why we are the way we are, why we have the aptitudes and 
predispositions that we do, and how these can help us understand how culture and 
society have evolved and continue to evolve.  
 
No one contests the crucial relevance of Psychology to Education, but the situation is 
quite different as regards the relevance of Evolutionary Psychology to Educational 
Psychology. Though still in its infancy, Evolutionary Psychology has already delivered 
penetrating insights into the nature and workings of mind and of human ontogeny that 
are supported by credible research and experimentation and yet these insights have 
negligibly if at all taken hold in Educational Psychology as it features in teacher 
education programs. And so it is not surprising that students down the line graduate 
from High School without any informed understanding of the nature they share with one 
another and that shapes how they think and feel about things and how they come to 
embrace the ideas and ideals that they do. How grateful I would have been to have had 
teachers who could and would have helped me in this regard; how greatly it could have 
lessened my anxiety about urges and impulses I felt alone in my contestations with.   
 
That any significant level of Darwinian perspective has yet to inform teaching praxis is 
understandable but not acceptable. Cultural evolution has been a continuous series of 
ideas and beliefs being challenged, modified and in many cases overthrown in the face 
of new discoveries and theories. Nowhere in public education does one find students 
being taught that the Earth is flat, that it is the center of the universe, or that epileptic 
seizures are the result of demonic possession, and yet the law of nature most pertinent in 
understanding what being human means, natural selection, is almost nowhere thus 
considered in public education. If the acquisition of such understanding throws up 
challenges to existing ideas and beliefs, is this not what education should be promoting? 
If we are teaching for praxis and critical consciousness, are we not obligated to provide 
students with the best available tools with which to ‗read the world‘? 
 
Many would answer ‗yes‘ to both these questions, but would draw the line at 
introducing through teaching ideas that run counter to deeply held religious and/or 
cultural beliefs. We can agree that one must be respectful of and sensitive to the beliefs 
people hold, but it is possible to teach an idea, not as a refutation or decrial of another 
idea, but as something to be considered on its own merits, leaving the individual to draw 
her own conclusions. Dennett is a great believer in religious education and feels that it 
should feature prominently in everyone‘s education. But it should be an exploration of 
―all the world‘s religions, in a matter-of-fact, historically and biologically informed 





Let‘s get more education about religion into our schools, not less. We should teach our 
children creeds and customs, prohibitions and rituals, texts and music, and when we cover 
the history of religion, we should include both the positive – the role of the churches in the 
civil-rights movement of the 1960s, the flourishing of science and the arts in early Islam … 
- and the negative – the Inquisition, anti-Semitism over the ages, the role of the Catholic 
Church in spreading AIDS in Africa through its opposition to condoms. No religion should 
be favored, and none ignored. And as we discover more and more about the biological and 
psychological bases of religious practices and attitudes, these discoveries should be added 
to the curriculum, the same way we update our education about science, health, and current 
events. (2007: 327) 
 
As an environmentalist, what I find particularly valuable about Darwinian thinking is 
how it challenges the vanity of our selfish anthropocentrism which Abrahamic religions 
have sadly encouraged to the disadvantage of all other life on our planet, teaching that 
humans have been divinely favored and entitled to subjugate and exploit all else that 
lives. The evolutionary tree of life connects our species to every other species that exists 
or has existed on this planet, taking everything back to a single replication event in the 
early history of Earth. Grasping this is a boon to the cultivation of ecological 
intelligence and biophilia. We have progressed far in ridding the world of racism and 
sexism and it is arguably time that specie-ism should become a cause of disquiet and a 
target for activism. That we may find such a notion so counterintuitive (many would say 
ridiculous), is explicable in terms of how natural selection has made us. Most people 
just can‘t get their minds around such an idea, but the same was once true regarding 
sexism, racism, and ethnocentrism. They, like specie-ism, ‗intuitively make sense‘ and 
seem natural according to our evolved psychology, but we have succeeded in 
transcending our innate insularity and predisposition for ‗sticking to our own kind‘ and 
this could be achieved with specie-ism I would argue. Just as we must contest with the 
selfish-genes of our birth, so also must we contest with the selfish-memes of our 
indoctrination, that have exploited our innate proclivities and produced a kind of 
‗civilization‘ that cannot be sustained. 
 
As I hope this dissertation has placed beyond question, Evolutionary Psychology and 
Memetics provide valuable insights into the human condition and implicit in these are 
explanations for why we are such easy prey in the ‗memosphere‘ of consumerist global 
society. The ideals that people must take on and actualize behaviorally if there is to be 
much hope for the future are in large measure memes that are counterintuitive as far as 
our evolved psychology is concerned (e.g., Consume less!); and if in the curricular and 
extracurricular worlds youth inhabit the memes are more resonant with what is intuitive, 
they are naturally going to win out. How can they not if each of us is nothing more than 
―a massive memeplex running on the physical machinery of a human body and brain – a 
meme machine‖ as Blackmore claims (1999: 235)? 
 
 
Critical consciousness revisited 
 
Critical consciousness, a capacity for ‗reading the world,‘ is what is required and is 
arguably what is not being developed in our schools. I fear that too few educators are 
themselves possessed of it. Of course, it is not just a matter of transmitting laudable 
ideas to students. Teaching for praxis requires that students are regularly engaged in 
activity that is praxial by nature, where they have to formulate ideas as hypotheses to be 




them to the same. It is not so much the specific ideas that get entertained that matter as 
what one makes of and does with them, how they are processed and assimilated, and 
ultimately the extent to which they inform praxis. Critical consciousness is not a matter 
of having (or being had by) the right ideas; it is a developed capacity for engaging with 
ideas generally. In Chapter Two I posited that ―critical consciousness is always and at 
once creative consciousness. Being able to ―read the world‖ (Freire & Macedo 1987) 
requires a capacity for problematizing it and then making the best use of what one 
knows and what one can access such that the solutions are products of a complex 
process of synthesis,‖ a process that actually defines what creativity is. If such a process 
does not underpin one‘s assimilation of ideas, they never can really become one‘s own 
as important constituents of one‘s self-plex. As such, it is unlikely that they ever come 
to inform real praxis. 
 
 
Darwinizing the Philosophy of Music Education 
 
To conclude this dissertation I will consider some of the precepts and ideals espoused 
by established philosophers of music education and see how they hold up in light of 
what has discussed in this dissertation. These relate to certain matters that I believe most 
to be in need of critical examination if not contestation, for example, how we conceive 
and theorize: 
 
 the nature of the praxis that music education should be teaching for; 
 the positioning of the Philosophy of Music Education within a broader philosophical 
framework that makes music education accountable to social and ecological needs 
and goals;    
 what is unique or at least preeminent in different forms of musicking that makes 
them worthy of curricular provision; 
 the advantages vs. the disadvantages of interdisciplinary education through music; 
 forms of creative, holistic praxis that are musical only in part but worthy of greater 
curricular attention; 
 forms of musical praxis in popular culture and how they engage participants as 
‗reflective practitioners‘; 
 the nature of aesthetic experience and the philosophy of music education as aesthetic 
education (MEAE); 
 what is universal and what is contextual in musicking and the relevance of this to 
music education. 
 
While it is by now clear that I have found the Philosophy of Music Education to be 
insufficiently outward looking in its considerations of music‘s nature and value, I have 
also found much that is insightful as regards the possibilities music education offers to 
an education for praxis.  I recently re-read key texts in the field to see what more I 
could make of them equipped with the ‗interpretive schemata‘ that have been developed 
and modified through my explorations of Darwinian Science, but also evaluating them 




espoused.117  What was an encouraging revelation is the extent to which many of the 
theories, claims and conclusions of the authors jibe in significant ways with the 
conception of ‗the adapted mind‘ that has emerged from Evolutionary Psychology and 
Cognitive Neuroscience.  But it also became evident that while there seems 
considerable scope for consilience, none of the authors have considered what an 
adaptationist and/or memetic understanding of the mind and of human agency can 
contribute to answering questions such as: why do we have music and the arts? This is 
not the same as asking why music and the arts are important; all of these writers have 
had much to say in this regard. More so it is a question of how it is that we have music 
and the arts to begin with, a related question being: how have they come to be deemed 
important in the ways that they have? For absolute certain, none of the authors have 
even entertained the idea that the importance of music and art has perhaps been 
overstated.  One thing that seems incontestable is that music does not need music 
education. The question that the Philosophy of Music Education must treat as primary is 
whether education really needs music. 
 
Chapter Two made abundantly clear that we come wired for musicking. Evolution has 
provided all that is necessary by way of mechanisms and predispositions. But this is not 
evidence that we still need music or that what ‗music‘ has come to be satisfies genuine 
human needs and here we must again remember that what we come hard-wired for are 
adaptations that were selected for in Pleistocene and Paleolithic environments. They 
became part of the massively parallel processing system which is the brain because they 
somehow enhanced the reproductive prospects of our distant ancestors. The fact that 
culture has evolved complex and elaborate ‗arts‘ and arts institutions is no evidence that 
the behaviors concerned, musicking for example, are still vital to our lives. If they are, it 
is for reasons other than gene propagation. It is also entirely possible that other cultural 
productions and practices have come to more efficiently and effectively satisfy our 
innate yearnings and psychosocial needs. And we must not forget the distinct likelihood 
that what we now enjoy and that we have professionalized and institutionalized, are 
products of runaway evolution and that are perhaps excessive in relation to our ‗real‘ 
psychosocial needs. 
 
What is more, the over-stimulation of our aesthetic sensibilities in a world of media has 
inured us to what would have held our attention easily even just one hundred years ago. 
Apropos Regelski‘s conclusion regarding the success of MEAE as measured by 
people‘s extracurricular musical lives, let us consider the aesthetic responsiveness of 
typical Americans as suggested by an  intriguing (and discouraging) experiment 
organized by the Washington Post in 2007.118 What happened was that the WP engaged 
a violinist to busk for about 45 minutes in a bus/train station in Washington DC (where 
most of the commuters passing through are employees of the U.S. Federal government).  
While over a thousand people passed by, only six stopped to listen for a short while.  
About 20 put money in the busker‘s open violin case, this totaling $32. Weingarten 
                              
117  In Chapter One I quoted O‘Sullivan in this regard. ―The fundamental educational task of our times is 
to make the choice for a sustainable planetary habitat of interdependent life forms over and against the 
dysfunctional calling of the global competitive marketplace‖ (1999: 2). 





(2007) makes a telling point as to the demographics of who it was who paid any heed to 
the performance. 
 
There was no ethnic or demographic pattern to distinguish the people who [paused to 
listen/watch], or the ones who gave money, from that vast majority who hurried on past, 
unheeding. Whites, blacks and Asians, young and old, men and women, were represented 
in all three groups. But the behavior of one demographic remained absolutely consistent. 
Every single time a child walked past, he or she tried to stop and watch. And every single 
time, a parent scooted the kid away. 
 
What made the experiment particularly interesting was that the busker was Joshua Bell, 
ranked as one the world‘s best concert violinists. He was playing recognized 
masterpieces for solo violin on a Stradivarius worth $3.5 million and three days earlier 
had played to a packed house at Boston‘s Symphony Hall (where $100 secured merely 
―petty good seats‖).  This is not in itself evidence of a lack of aesthetic capacity, that the 
commuters are unsophisticated ‗boobs‘. I am certain things would have been different if 
the year was 1900, when music still could be experienced only by making it oneself or 
by hearing someone else doing so. Whatever becomes too persistent in our soundscapes, 
we become inured if not oblivious to. Ubiquity has become music‘s worst enemy and its 
value now lays more and more in what it can help to sell than in how it can edify. When 
music is encountered outside of contexts designed and set aside for attentive 
engagement, it fails to command our focus because of what has neuro-cognitively been 
‗turned-off‘ by the sensory overkill of modern global society. 
 
 
Interdisciplinary and integrated arts approaches to music education 
 
I earlier intimated my endorsement of interdisciplinary and integrated arts approaches to 
music education, a position which is seemingly at odds with prevailing thinking in the 
Philosophy of Music Education. Elliott (1995) is quite clear as to where he stands 
regarding integrated arts approaches, claiming that the assumption underlying them 
(which he sees MEAE as championing) ―is not only philosophically invalid, it is 
practically and politically counterproductive‖ (248-249). His firm belief is that 
education in the arts should be domain specific: 
 
For each performing and nonperforming art is a specific kind of human practice that rests 
upon an independent form of situated thinking and knowing. Hence, each kind of artistic 
knowing needs to be taught and learned in its own context through active involvement in 
artistic making. Musicianship, for example, involves an entirely different kind of cognition 
than the knowing required to understand visual art, dance, or poetry. Learning to notice the 
qualities of visual textures in painting will not advance one‘s ability to compose, improvise, 
or listen for musical textures any more than learning to watch hockey will help a person 
understand cricket. The development of musicianship depends on inducting children into 
musical practices and on targeting their conscious powers on progressively more subtle 
aspects and dimensions of musical works. Neither condition is present when the attention of 
learners is being directed to nonmusical matters such as balance and focus in painting or 
gesture in dance.  (249, my emphases) 
 
This take on the arts is inconsistent with my experience and certainly is not congruent 
with an adaptationist understanding of music among the arts. I can to some degree 
sympathize with Elliott‘s concern about an integrated arts approach being politically 





as soon as administrators suppose that music is being taught and learned along with all the 
other arts, or that something called aesthetic sensitivity exists and can be developed by 
teaching any art whatever, then music educators will become dispensable and music 
education will be removed from the program. (250, my emphasis) 
 
Regarding the situation in North America, Elliott tells of ―many directors and 
supervisors of music education‖ having been replaced by ―interdisciplinary arts‖ 
teachers and music education programs being supplanted by multi-arts courses. It is no 
doubt true that the amount of time available for developing high levels of performance 
skill and knowledge specific to music will be reduced with such curricular changes of 
emphasis. But how much time does it deserve? And is it not possible that such 
interdisciplinarism is productive in ways that Elliott fails to or is not inclined to 
recognize? 
 
Elliott advocates for music education as a domain-specific enterprise on the basis of his 
assertion that ―music making and music listening are unique forms of thinking and 
unique sources of the most important kinds of knowledge human beings can gain‖ (14, 
my emphasis). It does not ever become clear to me what these ‗most important kinds‘ 
are. Nevertheless, Elliott does an excellent and thorough job of examining how music-
making involves different modes of knowing – formal, informal, impressionistic, and 
supervisory – all of which feed into activity - musicking – that is ―essentially a matter of 
procedural knowledge‖ (53, my emphasis).   
 
 
On procedural knowledge 
 
What for Elliott makes musicking procedural in essence is that it is a kind of practical 
doing in which language-mediated thought is very much in the background if at all 
present.  
 
During the continuous actions of singing or playing instruments our musical knowledge is 
in our actions; our musical thinking and knowing are in our musical doing and making. 
Thus, it is entirely appropriate to describe competent musical performers as thinking very 
hard and very deeply (but tacitly) as they perform (or improvise) – as they construct and 
chain musical patterns together; as they vary, transform, and abstract musical patterns; as 
they judge the quality of their musical constructions in relation to specific criteria and 
traditions of musical practice; and as they interpret the emotional expressiveness of musical 
patterns. In other words, a performer‘s musical understanding is exhibited in the quality of 
what she gets done in and through her actions of performing. (56) 
 
But I could just as easily say that a speaker‘s linguistic understanding is exhibited in the 
quality of what she gets done in and through her actions of talking. Linguistic 
understanding is not revealed by what one says but in how well one says it. Quite 
rightly, Elliott eschews ―the old dualistic view,‖ where ―actions follow from verbal 
thoughts,‖ but seems to overlook the fact that every kind of doing is underpinned by and 
begins with neural processing that does not employ externally derived symbols like 
words, but rather employs the language of mentalese (see last chapter).  When I am 
extemporizing, the words just bubble up and take their place in series of words that 
make sense (most of the time at least) without having to have been worked out 





Even when reciting someone else‘s words, a poem for example, what Elliott says 
regarding an artistic performance holds true just as much as it does in a musical 
performance. In both cases it: 
 
… requires many forms of thinking and knowing, ranging on a wide continuum from the 
most convergent to the most divergent, from the most tacit to the most verbally explicit, 
from the most practical to the most abstract. [Also] Performing musically [linguistically] in 
relation to the standards and traditions of a musical [linguistic] domain engages a person‘s 
entire system of conscious powers: attention, awareness, cognition, emotion, intention, and 
memory. [Lastly] although competent music making [talking] demands many types of 
thinking and knowing, it is nonverbal and procedural in essence. (60, my emphasis) 
 
Talking is obviously verbal! But the ‗thinking‘ it requires is not. It is just that in the 
case of talking, words are the informational output whereas with music it is patterns of 
‗notes‘. Procedural knowledge is undoubtedly the most important kind of knowledge for 
human beings, but this is just as true for sheepdogs who also must ‗think-in-action‘ if 
they are to keep sheep from running amok. By and large, procedural knowledge is not 
something that we ―gain,‖ but rather something that we are innately capable of but 
which needs particular kinds of environmental stimulation (learning) to develop in ways 
such as are required by highly evolved ‗domains of effort‘ such as music and the arts 
have become. The ‗procedural essence‘ of linguistic ability, like that of musicianship, 
has been provided for by natural selection (as Chomsky made clear decades ago). This 
should come as no surprise given that music and language so evidently share the same 
evolutionary root and make use of many of the same cognitive mechanisms. Music 
making is obviously not ―unique‖ in having a procedural essence. If in referring to it 
thusly, Elliott means that it is unique in terms of what it brings into the mix of a 
thinking-in-action process, then he needs to be more explicit.  
 
 
The experience of „flow‟ 
 
It surprises me that Elliott has nothing directly to say about the neuro-cognitive capacity 
that is core in music making and which such doing-in-action is particularly well-suited 
to the development of, what was discussed in Chapter Two as kinesthesia and/or 
proprioception. And this surprises me even more given the attention that he 
appropriately gives to Flow Psychology as developed by Mihály Csíkszentmihályi.  
 
In Chapter One I made clear my contention that pleasure is life‘s bottom-line and that 
education‘s real purpose is to help people to be more successful in their pleasure-
seeking pursuits. This is not some hedonistic philosophy, but rather a commonsense 
recognition of the primacy of feeling in everything we can call cognitive. There are 
innumerable pleasures that range from the immediate and ephemeral, that come from 
the gratification of our most basic needs and the satisfaction of our most basic and 
oldest reward systems (those that I associated with the Four Fs in Chapter One: feeding, 
fleeing, fighting and fornicating), to those that are longer lasting and more complex, but 
also more demanding of concentration and focused effort. In Chapter Two, much 
discussion was given over to another reward system which natural selection provided us 
with because it inclined our ancestors to invest time and effort in activities that ―appear 
to be nonfunctional and even extravagantly nonutilitarian‖ (Tooby & Cosmides 2001a: 




that most needed to be functionally optimal in ancestral environments was bodily-
kinesthetic ‗intelligence‘.  We thus find pleasurable activity that is kinesthetic in 
essence. 
 
Csíkszentmihályi gave the word ‗flow‘ to the satisfying mental state that accompanies 
activity in which there is optimal engagement, where one is intrinsically motivated, 
highly focused and completely absorbed in what one is doing to the extent of self-
forgetfulness. Csikszentmihalyi has identified several conditions characterizing typical 
flow experiences. 
 
 A goal that is clear and appropriate to one‘s ability. The experience of flow is more 
likely where both the challenge and skill level are quite high. 
 A high level of concentration focused on a limited field of attention. 
 Action and awareness seem to merge and one‘s feeling of self-consciousness 
recedes. 
 One‘s sense of the passing of time is altered or distorted. 
 One is aware of how things are progressing and behavior is adjusted accordingly. 
 The activity presents an appropriate level of challenge vis-à-vis one‘s abilities. (One 
is in what Vygotsky called the ‗zone of proximal development‘.) 
 One feels in control, without anxiety or self-doubting. 
 Though being challenged, there is a kind of effortlessness in one‘s actions and the 
process seems more important than the product. 
 The activity is absorbing to the point that one loses awareness of other bodily needs 
and states such as hunger or fatigue. (abstracted from ―Flow Psychology‖ at 
Wikipedia.com) 
 
Such conditions characterize what musicians and others have styled as ‗being in the 
groove‘, ‗in the moment‘, or ‗in the zone‘.  For Elliott, flow is more than just pleasure; 
it is enjoyment; and he is keen that the two should not be conflated. (The citations are 
for Csikszentmihalyi 1990) 
 
When biological and social needs intrude into consciousness, the result is disorder. Order is 
restored in consciousness by satisfying these needs. When consciousness tells us that our 
biological needs or social expectations are satisfied, we experience pleasure (1990: 45). 
Pleasure can occur with little or no conscious effort; enjoyment cannot. Pleasure can be 
stimulated electrically and chemically in the brain; enjoyment cannot. Enjoyment results 
not from satisfying basic biological and social needs but from moving forward in 
psychological growth and complexity. Enjoyment arises only from unusual investments of 
our conscious powers (1990: 46-47).  (Elliott 1995: 115 – my emphasis) 
 
Firstly, there is never an instance where ―biological needs‖ do not ―intrude into 
consciousness‖ and even though a need is something always felt, it does not necessarily 
have to be intrusive in a disruptive way. We find flow experiences pleasurable and/or 
enjoyable precisely because of a biological need, the need for activity that engages the 
brain in ways conducive to its optimal reorganization; and this most definitely entails 
the stimulation of electro-chemical systems in the brain whether one is really enjoying 
oneself or just experiencing a transient pleasure. Secondly, consciousness does not tell 
us when our biological needs are satisfied. If consciousness is telling me something, it 
must be a volitional entity of some kind, which it most assuredly is not. There is no 




any case, to whom is it communicating? Rather, we just intuitively ‗know‘ when needs 
have been satisfied because of how we feel. What our internal dialogue has to say about 
things can be quite beside the point or even misleading. 
 
In contrast to Elliott, I see the difference between pleasure and enjoyment as being 
quantitative rather than qualitative; they are different in degree, not kind. Enjoyment, 
flow or any other state we find pleasurable, we do so because of innate reward systems. 
Genes have instructed the ontogeny of an organism that finds pleasure in activity where 
there is a ―moving forward in psychological growth and complexity.‖ If there is no 
conscious awareness of the pleasure, there nevertheless are motivational mechanisms at 
work in the brain. The ‗administrative‘ organization of the brain, getting information 
appropriately tagged (e.g., vis-à-vis its truth value) and stored, is as vital a biological 
need as are the biological needs that I assume Elliott to be thinking of, our need for 
status and the sex drive for example.  
 
One such motivational mechanism activates our brains while we sleep and we have 
dreams. It has been estimated that an individual spends about six years of an average 
lifespan in dreaming. It obviously performs some vital function in organisms with 
complex brains.119 Here let us recall (from Chapter Two) Tooby and Cosmides‘ 
assertion that ―the task of organizing the brain both physically and informationally over 
the course of the lifespan is the most demanding adaptive problem posed by human 
development‖ (2001a: 14). They claim that ―humans have evolved specialized cognitive 
machinery that allows us to enter and participate in imagined worlds‖ (9).  Dreams are 
such worlds, as are the worlds of children‘s imaginative play, as are the fictional worlds 
of novels, plays and movies. Dreaming may well be employing the same ‗scope syntax‘ 
that in waking life allows us to deal with information that is only contingently true by 
‗tagging‘ and tracking the parameters within which any given set of representations can 
reliably and safely be employed in making inferences. This is essential to avoid data 
corruption and potentially harmful or fatal misapplications of the information outside of 
the scope of these conditions.   
 
Even though the difference is also quantitative, I often make a distinction between 
entertainment and enjoyment and, apropos the last sentence in the quote from Elliott 
above, what distinguishes enjoyment is the level of ‗investment‘ in the activity at hand 
and we would both agree that the greater the level to which one is really ‗engaging‘ in 
what one is doing, the greater the level of ―psychological growth and complexity.‖ 
Elliott has it that ―enjoyment arises only from unusual investments of our conscious 
powers.‖  Aside from the problem with what might be meant by ―conscious powers,‖ I 
do not agree that one enjoys oneself only when there is a cognitive investment that is 
―unusual.‖ If a behavior is motivated by an innate reward system, there is nothing 
unusual about it, even if different kinds of thought-in-action vary in how they stimulate 
these systems such that enjoyment is achieved.  
 
                              
119  Other mammals dream, no doubt for the same reason. A study by Louie and Wilson (2001) which 
demonstrated that temporally sequenced firing patterns in a rat‘s hippocampus while awake are 
reproduced during REM episodes lasting the same amount of time, this suggesting to the researchers 
that multineuronal activity suggestive of episodic memory traces are reactivated during REM sleep. 




When I consider the flow factors in the list above, I find that they obtain in a wide range 
of activities, some which educators might be expected to eschew as candidates for 
curricular attention. Playing ‗video games‘ (e.g., on a SONY PlayStation) is an example 
that comes to mind. There is generally a clear goal (winning) and most games are 
designed to accommodate different skill levels so that one is always appropriately 
challenged. Playing requires a high level of focused concentration and one becomes 
absorbed and is ‗in the moment‘, and though challenged, there is a kind of effortlessness 
in one‘s action. Winning seems important, but it is in the playing of the game itself 
where the real pleasure lies.  
 
It can be argued that playing a video game represents an unusual investment in-so-far as 
our Pleistocene and Paleolithic ancestors had nothing comparable to test their skills on, 
but the same would then have to be argued for those flow experiences that we favor and 
consider worthy of curricular attention. I might go further to suggest that many popular 
video games more than amply fit Elliott‘s portrayal of musicking as ―a 
multidimensional form of thinking‖ that is ―procedural in essence‖ and that engages 
formal, informal, impressionistic and supervisory knowledge.   
 
 
Darwinian perspective in Music Matters 
 
Music Matters was published in 1995 and it is quite conceivable that Elliott has since 
updated his concept of consciousness and has clarified what he had in mind when 
speaking of ―conscious powers.‖ I am inclined to believe that the differences in our 
understandings as intimated here are more semantic than epistemological. It was only 
when rereading Music Matters recently that I picked up on just how much Elliott was in 
touch with Darwinian understandings of consciousness and culture when they were still 
relatively new and not widely known. He certainly seems to embrace cognitive 
materialism and cites Dennett‘s fundamental tenet that ―the mind is the brain‖ (51). But 
Elliott seems to have misunderstood Dennett when it comes to what consciousness is. 
Elliott claims that ―human consciousness is parallel and distributed; consciousness 
consists in many simultaneous streams of processing that operate throughout the brain‖ 
(51). It is the brain‘s processing that is parallel and distributed. Consciousness is an 
illusion, an epiphenomenon that comes after the fact, a kind of story we tell our‗self‘. It 
is not and cannot be an entity with agency and volition, which is capable of telling the 
self (another illusion) something. Elliott eschews Cartesian dualism and yet seems to 
invoke it unawares. 
 
Another thing that evidently didn‘t stick with me when first reading Music Matters 
several years ago was Elliott‘s apparent support for Memetics. His treatment of it was 
brief and he said nothing to indicate whether he subscribes to its core premise – that 
memes are also selfish replicators caught up in a mindless, purposeless algorithm and 
thus having no intrinsic value or meaning. Nevertheless, what he has to say is entirely 
congruent with the understanding of Memetics I presented in the last chapter. 
 
Because of its predilection for information of all kinds, and because of its marvelous 
plasticity, human consciousness [should perhaps rather have said ‗mind‘] grows and adapts 
in relation to memes. As Dennett suggests, memes are what turn brains into minds. Memes 
cohere and replicate in the brains of humans by being taught, learned, and passed around 
via languages, schools, books, artifacts, performances, and tools. Human beings grasp, 





The last sentence is only true to a point. At some level, every human being comes up 
with original ideas or modifications of existing ones. But for the most part, we rely on 
others to do the work in this regard and many of the memes that get replicated in brains 
and passed on are never really ‗grasped‘ in the sense that they have been consciously 
engaged with and evaluated. Critical consciousness is far from being a social norm. And 
even when we have considered an idea thoroughly and think we really grasp it, the 
possibility remains that we have overlooked something vital, perhaps because of what 
has fed into the preconscious processes that we are unaware of but that nevertheless bias 
our cognitions. I frankly sense a degree of a priori reasoning in the Philosophy of Music 
Education. Most music education philosophers, it can be assumed, are individuals who 
feel, as do I, that their lives have been enhanced through intimate experiences of 
musicking. They intuitively ‗know‘ that music is important and then attempt to explain 
this importance so that others can grasp it. The same, of course, can be said of religious 
philosophers, most of who take the existence of an omniscient, Supreme Being as self-
evident.  
 
Let us recall Pinker putting the cat among the pigeons with his assertion that music is 
―auditory cheesecake‖ and ―pleasure technology‖ (like pornography) and the incredulity 
and derision that this provoked. How could someone say such a thing? Yet when we 
take the time to dispassionately consider his arguments, we find some measure of truth 
or at least assertions that cannot easily be dismissed. Because the capacities that we 
employ in musicking (including listening) are adaptations, this does not mean that the 
activities themselves are adaptive. They afford us great pleasure and enjoyment, but this 
is not evidence that they are necessary, that the Paleolithic reward systems they excite 
(the buttons they push) can not just as successfully be gratified by other means or that 
such gratification is still vital given the environments of evolutionary adaptedness 
(EEAs) that we currently occupy and that are consummately un-Paleolithic.  
 
Whether or not a flow experience moves one ―forward in psychological growth and 
complexity‖ it does afford enjoyment and that on its own is sufficient to justify 
indulgence in activities where flow is experienced, provided that there are no significant 
costs to others. If life has no ultimate purpose beyond gene propagation, it is still worth 
living if we are enjoying ourselves enough of the time, if we are finding satisfaction and 
fulfillment in life‘s activities. Our health and cognitive well-being depend on it and that 
should be reason enough to ensure that our students are experiencing happiness, 
satisfaction and fulfillment in the activities we engage them in during their school years. 
In this regard, it is unfortunate that therapy is so commonly considered as something for 
people to undergo only when there is something ‗wrong‘ with them. Most parents and 
teacher would scoff at the suggestion that time should be given over in the school day 
for therapeutic activity: yoga, meditation, T‟ai Chi or drum circles for example. Kids 
are in school to learn! But when learning and all else that is educative is conceived as an 
optimization of brain function, the experience of flow, which is so conspicuously 





Elliott speaks to such optimization as ―bringing order to consciousness‖ and holds that 




experience, ‗flow‘ or enjoyment‖ (116). I have argued that bringing order to 
consciousness is a matter of what is achieved in the fine-tuning of preconscious 
processing. For me, it is the manner in which one is engaged kinesthetically that is the 
most crucial of ―the conditions necessary‖ to attain flow through music.  And it is such 
engagement that I suggest as the mechanism according to which most music therapy 
achieves its beneficial effects. Even where activity does not involve overt movement, 
the body-in-mind is engaged proprioceptively, ‗reading‘ and adjusting to internal, 
bodily states. 
 
I do find it surprising that Elliott makes no mention of Eurhythmics in Music Matters. 
The originator of Eurhythmics as a methodology, Emile Jacques-Dalcroze, gets but one 
parenthetical mention in the short paragraph extracted below. It appears in a critique of 
MEAE and its perceived prioritization of listening over actual music making in music 
education. 
 
[I]f the body is in the mind, then it makes perfect sense (as Dalcroze, Orff, and Kodàly 
specialists maintain) that the kinds of moving involved in music making … are essential to 
improving musical understanding … (103) 
 
I heartily agree. Dalcroze made clear that authentic musical understanding requires 
musical concepts and processes to be physically internalized to the extent that they can 
be realized intuitively and effortlessly, involving the physical self holistically and 
without conscious awareness. In developing his methods he was motivated by his 
concern that, while many of his students intellectually understood music, they did not 
really grasp it at a kinesthetic or proprioceptive level (Robinson: 2005: 3-7). Where I do 
not agree with Elliott is in his implicit suggestion that ‗musical understanding‘ is the 
ultimate end for which kinesthetic development is but a means.  I believe he has it the 
wrong way around. Musicking should rather be a means to kinesthetic ends. It is a 
means to other ends as well, but it should not be regarded as an end in its own right 
when curricular time is given over to it, not according to the philosophy of education 
through music that I have espoused and which I have argued to be implicit in Dewey‘s 
educational philosophy.  
 
An adaptationist perspective on the matter has it that our capacities for music evolved 
because of how they advantaged the reproductive prospects of our ancestors for whom 
kinesthetic prowess was a vital survival need; and demonstrations evidencing the 
possession of such prowess would surely have featured prominently in courtship (cf. 
Chapter Two on ‗sexual selection‘). This can only in part account for the evolution of 
musical aptitude, but whatever else may have contributed, we are all innately inclined 
toward activity that fine-tunes kinesthesia and proprioception even if we are not 
consciously aware of what is being achieved neurologically and even though we no 
longer need the level of psychomotor coordination and prowess that for our ancestors 
was a matter of life and death. 
 
Indeed, if it were somehow possible to go back to the Paleolithic and closely observe 
our ancestors, I am certain we would find in them levels of perceptual acuity and 
general kinesthetic capacity way beyond what remains to us now. We might recall here 
the claim made by Harpending and Cochran (2002) that 40 or 50 thousand years is 
ample time for a population to lose an adaptation which means that even less time is 




version of it because of particular selection pressures in its EEA. Anyone who has seen 
the 2008 animated film WALL-E must find disturbing the thought that our species might 
end up like the obese and almost totally incapacitated humans the film portrays, who 
live in space in fully automated starliners having had to evacuate Earth after mass 
consumerism had left it covered in trash and lifeless.  
 
Eurhythmics education is important in general education, not because it produces more 
rhythmically stable musicians, but because it activates and helps to optimize 
kinesthesia. And even if higher levels of kinesthetic intelligence no longer have direct 
survival value, it remains crucially important to one‘s intuitive sense of well-being and 
hence to one‘s self-concept. Everyone needs this, not just musicians and dancers. And 
yet eurhythmics education hardly features in schooling except perhaps at the primary 
and preprimary level (where it indeed is most important) and it is infrequent that one 
finds music education philosophers pressing the case for it.  
 
 
Returning to the issue of domain-specificity 
 
It is now appropriate to consider further Elliott‘s claims that ―each performing and 
nonperforming art is a specific kind of human practice that rests upon an independent 
form of situated thinking and knowing‖ and that ―each kind of artistic knowing needs to 
be taught and learned in its own context through active involvement in artistic making.‖ 
I do not know at what point in cultural evolution that music acquired independence as a 
specific kind of practice, but we can be sure that it was relatively recently. It would be 
interesting to consider how this came about, but it is not sufficiently relevant to the 
present discussion. Suffice to say here that so-called ‗absolute music‘ is very much the 
exception in the music that people know and cherish the world over, as is the mode of 
engagement it calls for in the way of dedicated venues (concert/recital halls) and 
characteristic audience ‗etiquette‘.  
 
I certainly do not consider dancing and musicking to be ‗independent forms of situated 
thinking and knowing.‘ Both share the same kinesthetic and proprioceptive capacities 
and both involve periodicity, entrainment and the need to attune one‘s inner metronome 
and kinesthetic sense to that of others. Moreover, the notion that they are independent is 
inconsistent with how they manifest in many cultural traditions. One of the important 
lessons John Miller Chernoff (1979) learned from his immersion in West African 
drumming traditions was that: "One who ‗hears‘ the music ‗understands‘ it with a 
dance.‖ Hugh Tracey long ago observed that in African cultures 
 
... the dancers themselves often provide an important part of the music ... This may 
be by audible means such as singing, clapping, stamping, making use of certain parts 
of the dance costume that are designed to sound; or by inaudible or visual means, by 
moving parts of the body in rhythmic patterns that add to the total musical 
expression, even if only on an individual level. (1969: 27) 
 
I do not in any way suspect music education philosophers of being devious in their 
inattention to Eurhythmics and kinesthetic development; yet if such development was to 
become a real concern for education, this could significantly shift support away from 
programs that treat music as per Elliott‘s model toward ones that accord prominence to 
dance, Eurhythmics and forms of musicking that are more accessible and less 




tonal-harmonic sense. Dancing is musicking and fulfills all of the conditions that Elliott 
sets for music as a ―multidimensional form of thinking‖ that is ―procedural in essence‖ 
and that engages formal, informal, impressionistic and supervisory knowledge. It surely 
must have been a prominent if not the dominant mode of musicking for our ancestors. 
But in general education, dancing and Eurhythmics have been marginalized to a far 
greater degree than ‗Music‘ and to some degree at least, part of the blame must lie with 
the territorialism that is endemic in schooling with its compartmentalization of 
knowledge and experience, something which philosophical positions such as Elliott‘s 
might serve to perpetuate. Such compartmentalization is consistent with the world of 
work with its specializations and separate ‗fields‘, a fragmented world of largely 
incapacitated citizens who are totally reliant on experts and easy prey to their whims 
and schemes. But it is totally inconsistent with the kind of world in which more than 
99% of our evolution took place. 
 
 
And what of song? 
 
Music is universal and this is what makes it of interest to evolutionary psychologists, 
biomusicologists and Darwinian aestheticians. But when we consider different forms of 
musiking, what we find as most widespread and participatory are dancing and singing. I 
am not aware of any culture where instrument playing is something that everyone does. 
The norm is that it is something that specialists do as it is activity that does not come as 
naturally as dancing and singing, and which requires an apparatus and skill and 
knowledge in how to use it. 
 
Emphasis was given in Chapter Two to the widely accepted theory that language and 
music share a common ancestor in some form of musilanguage such as Mithen styles as 
―HMMMM.‖   
 
[I]t was Holisitic, multi-modal, manipulative, and musical. While each of these features is 
found in the communication systems of modern apes and monkeys, I believe that they 
became integrated together among the early hominids. The result was a communication 
system more complex than that found now among non-human primates, but one quite 
different from human language. (2005:138) 
 
What better way to describe song? And given what Mithen argues so compellingly, it is 
not surprising that when I ask people about their favourite music, they almost invariably 
name songs, even many of my instrumentalist friends. I am an instrumentalist and not 
much of a singer and yet it is to vocal music that I most tend in my listening. I have of 
course derived deep aesthetic satisfaction from listening to music without words and my 
capacity and predilection for this have no doubt been greatly increased through what I 
have experienced praxially as a performing and improvising musician. But when I 
consider what has had the most profound impact on me in terms of my extra-musical 
life and my world-view generally, it has been songs with great lyrics.  
 
When I consider the most influential songs of my youth, for example, Joni Mitchell‘s 
―Both Sides Now,‖ I have no problem speaking to either the words, the music or the 
performance of it, but am unable to articulate that quality that is seemingly nameless 
and yet quintessential, a gestalt that has no equal in any other form of artistic 
expression, for me at least.  It is not that music has been added to words or vice versa, 




produced something that is far greater than the sum of its parts. It is expression in which 
form and content, syntax and semantics, are unified, made one and made memorable. 
As much as I love poetry, I find it far easier to remember song lyrics. I know hundreds 
while there are but a handful of poems that I can recite from heart.120  
 
I have not investigated the matter systematically, but from my own experiences and 
from what my students and other teachers have told me, songs get negligible attention in 
schooling as an artistic form that is sui generis. Developing musicianship is the primary 
concern of vocal music programs, not ‗songstership‘, something that requires getting 
beyond the notes and the demands of vocal technique. And in the teaching of poetry, 
song lyrics hardly seem to feature even though they are far more memorable than the 
poems that do. Here the problem must in part lie with the ideology that regards 
readability as a defining characteristic of poetry; a poem must past muster on the basis 
of what has been printed and that alone. It is remarkable that such an ideology ever 
emerged given poetry‘s long history as a performance art.  
 
Simon Frith argues that 
 
To treat the distinction between poetry and lyric as a distinction between the written and the 
spoken word is aesthetically misleading. There is, to put this another way, a continuity 
between poetry and song, rather than a clear division. Between the two lie various sorts of 
―performed‖ language, whether ―oral poetry‖ as technically defined by anthropologists, or 
public and formalized uses of words for special ends as in nursery and playground and 
advertising rhymes; whether in insult rituals like the dozens, or in poetry ―recitals.‖ (1996: 
178) 
 
It is relevant to note that the majority of recognized music education philosophers are 
North American and come from an educational culture in which instrumental music 
programs have for long held the spotlight in music education. The results of this have 
been extraordinary and people are justifiably impressed by the level of proficiency 
achieved by high school bands and orchestras. I am the product of such a program, one 
that was ‗top-drawer‘ as measured by prizes won and ‗Straight-A‘ ratings for our ‗Wind 
Ensemble‘ performing a ‗Grade 6‘ repertoire (the highest). While I could elaborate at 
length at what was overlooked or marginalized in this route to the development of 
musicianship, I cannot but applaud its efficacy vis-à-vis specific skill areas (mastery of 
an instrument and a proficient level of music literacy) and I feel privileged to have been 
a beneficiary of such. The downside was that taking that route was a choice that 
precluded participation in vocal music education (or in ‗Fine Arts‘ or ‗Drama‘).121  
 
Simon Frith makes a pertinent point regarding the voice as musical instrument, that it is 
―particularly expressive of the body; it gives the listener access to it without mediation‖ 
(1996: 191). This is for the obvious reason that we all have voices and have used them 
                              
120  To my knowledge, neurocognitive research has not revealed whether the words and melodic 
characteristics of songs are stored separately in memory or in some integrated form (Mithen 2005: 
53). 
121  The biggest drawback of this for my musicianship was that while I became a proficient reader in the 
sense that I could accurately play written music on my instrument, I never developed genuine musical 
literacy where I could internally ‗hear‘ what was written as I can with written words. I only later 




expressively even if we have shied away from publically using them as musical 
instruments.  
 
The voice is the sound of the body in a direct sense. Certain physical experiences, 
particularly extreme feelings, are given vocal sounds beyond our conscious control – the 
sounds of pain, lust, ecstasy, fear, what one might call inarticulate articulacy: the sounds, 
for example, of tears and laughter; the sounds made by soul singers around and between 
their notes, vocal noises that seem expressive of their deepest feelings because we hear 
them as if they‘ve escaped from a body that the mind – language – can no longer control. 
(192) 
 
Frith also emphasizes the importance of the voice in conveying one‘s sense of personal 
identity and in evaluating the bona fides of others.   
 
The voice … may or may not be a key to someone‘s identity, but it is certainly a key to the 
ways in which we change identities, pretend to be something we‘re not, deceive people, lie. 
We use the voice, that is, not just to assess a person, but also, even more systematically, to 
assess that person‘s sincerity: the voice and how it is used (as well as words and how they 
are used) become a measure of someone‘s truthfulness.. (197) 
 
And, of course, the voice reveals how one relates to and feels about the content of what 
is being spoken or sung, a point that Sparshott takes up.  
 
The difference between saying and singing is like the difference between saying and 
whispering or shouting, only much more subtle. It [singing] conveys what you feel or want 
others to feel about what you are saying, your attitude to it (or the attitude you wish to 
evoke to it), or how you want it to be taken (ironically, quizzically, seriously); it is an 
elaborate form of using a special tone of voice. 
       The music of song, then conveys not so much what the text means as what one means 
by the text or the way one means it. It does not say this, but shows it; and the word 
conventionally used for this kind of showing is ―expression.‖ (1982: 85) 
  
 
Hip Hop:  a way forward for integrated arts education? 
 
I am confident that if Dalcroze and Orff (another proponent of Eurhythmics) were alive 
today, they would be thrilled by the extent to which the principles and methods they 
espoused have been superlatively actualized in contemporary popular performance 
genres. Two groups jump to mind in this regard: Barbatuques,122  a group from Brazil 
whose music is almost entirely comprised of body and mouth percussion; and Stomp,123 
the well-known British ensemble which combines percussion, movement and visual 
drama involving items not generally considered for their musical potential, for example: 
dustbin lids, match boxes, basketballs, kitchen utensils and Zippo lighters. Both of these 
provide paradigms of musical praxis that can be and are beginning to be realized in 
music education programs. What Dalcroze and Orff would also take heart in is the 
growing popularity of drum circles wherein participants not only acquire skill and 
confidence in making music collectively and more refined kinesthesia, but engage in 
what most agree to be a flow experience that is unexcelled. Note should also be made of 
                              
122  See Barbatuques online at  http://br.barbatuques.com.br/ 




the Street-Carnival groups that have for long been popular in Latin American countries 
and in Cape Town, South Africa and that are on the increase in the U.K. where it has 
been recognized for its educative and social values and where Community Arts 
Education has become a university offering.124 Where Dalcroze and Orff would lose 
heart is in the failure of music educators to bring these genres into their classrooms in 
any significant, hands-on way. 
 
There are several dimensions to options such as these that make them viable and 
valuable in music education contexts. The most practical of these is that they afford 
opportunities for quality music education without the need for special facilities and 
technologies. But more important are the ways in which they involve students musically 
that do not require much if any theoretical understanding of music or skill in reading 
and writing it, but which nonetheless produce remarkable, conspicuously kinesthetic 
and highly engaging results. Indeed, it is in performance genres such as Barbatuques 
and Stomp exemplify that students can most accessibly experience music and art as 
praxis. It seems that the need for such praxial engagements is widely felt and is not 
adequately being provided for curricularly. Indeed, where I most encounter real musical 
praxis, as Regelski portrays it, is in the artistic lives of young adults who in more cases 
than not have had little if any formal training in music and other arts or, if they have, 
they derived little from it that feeds into their creative outputs. Indeed, the cultural 
movement wherein one can find the greatest concentration of such ‗reflective 
practitioners‘ is Hip-Hop. And while one can distinguish each of its ‗elements‘ as an 
‗independent form of situated thinking and knowing‘, every practitioner, whether an 
Emcee (performance poet), DJ (turntable-ist), Beat-boxer (vocal percussionist), B-boyer 
(breakdancer), or Graf artist (spray-paint artist), is intimately au fait with all elements as 
well as the ways they integrate and call upon common understandings and principles.   
 
Hip-Hop and the performance genres discussed above also share what might be 
generalized as a counter-culture ethos that make them appropriate arenas for critical 
engagement with sociocultural statuses quo including those that dominate popular 
culture and the mass media. In various ways, Hip-Hop practices and productions can be 
considered as gestures of deconstruction in that they call into question the assumptions 
and beliefs that underpin and legitimize institutional forms of knowledge. 
 
Deconstruction involves a passion for transgression. It is a call for heterogeneity, 
attempting to unsettle the comfortable assurances with which we surround ourselves. It is 
not a rejection of all that has gone before. Rather, it seeks to respect and in some ways 
conserve, while simultaneously demonstrating that present modes of thinking should not set 
absolute limits on the exercise of critical thought and practice. (Higgins 2007: 75) 
 
Such gestures of deconstruction can even be directed inward to challenge developments 
within Hip-Hop culture such as Gangsta Rap with its seeming validation of criminality, 
violence, sexism, and misogyny (not to mention its profanity). Obvious targets are the 
‗bling rappers‘ with their heavy accent on gaudy materialism, opulent jewelry (bling) 
and sexual predation. South African Emcee, Creamy Ewok Baggends takes them on in 
one of his rhymes. 
                              
124  Lee Higgins from the Liverpool Institute for Performing Arts has been instrumental in this regard and 





If ye lookin for the rapper don‘t look for the bling coz the bling izn‘t everything /  
and if ye lookin for the ice [diamonds] ye need to look twice coz the ice izn‘t why 
I‘m shinin /  If ye lookin for that crook-look / shoot-for-the-loot-look / pullin-out-a-
checkbook-look too-cute-look / the video-flow with the gold gets sold to the weak-
heart no-soul shoppin in the window / Oh no ye lookin at the wrong bro Yo! / I be 
he, the white Afro / who you see be the real one / not a gold tooth but a golden 
tongue /  These Gangsta actors only in it for a minute; they just plastic wrappers in a 
minute they‘ll be finished / but with my super powers I can last for hours / I got the 





Having alluded to this Hip-Hop element above, let us consider further the art of 
emceeing as a form of situated knowing and thinking-in-action. Taken to mean either 
‗Master of Ceremonies‘ or ‗Microphone Controller‘ (‗Mic Checka‘), an MC (emcee) is 
essentially a performance poet.   What he has to say is important, but no more so than 
how he is saying it, almost always against a strongly rhythmic groove provided by live 
musicians, programmed backing tracks or a combination of the two.   Good rhyming is 
paramount but so also is the rhythmic placement of rhyming words and repeated 
consonants (alliteration) and vowel sounds (assonance).  The best MCs, like good jazz 
instrumentalists, employ irregular phrase lengths and off-beat accentuation while 
maintaining an overall formal structure that jibes with that of the accompanying music 
(which is more than often grooves based on 4 bar phrases or multiples thereof).    The 
extent to which the words combine into coherent discourses varies, but there always 
needs to be a clear sense of conceptual or thematic continuity as well as a creative use 
of metaphor, allusion, hyperbole and idiom.   Coherence is also influenced by the extent 
to which the emcee is improvising (extemporising), what in Hip Hop terms is called 
‗freestyling‘.  Emcees put their freestyling skills to the test in ‗Emcee battles‘ where 
they compete in rounds against randomly selected opponents.  After a flip of a coin to 
see who goes first, one contestant is given a topic, theme or role and a fixed time, 
generally no more than a minute, to extemporize a rhyme that the opposing contestant 
has to respond to in the same amount of time.125 
 
 
Prosody: the musicality of language 
 
In Chapter Two, I discussed non-verbal communication and, citing Mithen (2005), 
distinguished language from music on the basis that, while both are emotionally 
manipulative, language is also referential, predominantly so. What well could have been 
a strong impetus to the cultural evolution of musicking was the increasing degree to 
which language became referential as lexicons and grammars evolved allowing for 
more precise delineation of the content of what was being communicated. The proto-
language communication capacity Mithen describes as HMMMM became less holistic, 
less mult-modal, and less emotionally manipulative as it became less and less musical. 
                              





In short, content came to supersede form as to what is most important in 
communication; and it is not difficult to understand why this happened, but this does not 
imply that form ceased to have crucial importance in the communicative act. The ability 
to share precise, reliable information about matters of importance was a boon to the 
survival and reproductive prospects of our ancestors for reasons that are obvious and 
have been discussed at various points in this dissertation. Such ability is probably more 
crucial in 2011 environments. Nonetheless, the nondiscursive elements of 
communication remain as vital and people are as much concerned (if not more so) with 
what others feel about what they (self and other) are saying and with what a 
speaker/author means by her words as we are with the words themselves. 
 
Here I am making use of Sparshott‘s remark above about the difference between talking 
and singing. Again it seems clear that we are dealing with what is a quantitative, not 
qualitative difference. The prosodic elements in one‘s verbal exchanges (as well as 
one‘s body language and use of gesture) remain vital even where one‘s intention is the 
explicit communication of emotionally dry information. What Sparshott says of ―the 
music of song‖ applies as much to the prosody of verbal discourse; it ―conveys not so 
much what the text means as what one means by the text or the way one means it. It 
does not say this, but shows it; and the word conventionally used for this kind of 
showing is ―expression.‖ Song is often thought of as ‗enhanced/heightened language‘, 
but just as logically it can be considered enhanced/heightened music, and when we 
conceive it thusly, its value in general education becomes more apparent. It is in the 
multidimensional nature of musicking that Elliott finds its greatest value. The increase 
in multidemsionality is manifold when words are added to the mix.  
 
 
Has music become too much a „pitch game‟? 
 
Prosodic capacity is not actively developed in schooling as far as I am aware and it can 
effectively be developed in ways that bring students to a deeper and more praxial 
understanding of music and its schemes for ‗making meaningful‘ through the temporal, 
tonal and timbral manipulation of sound. What is arguably a confounding factor in 
music education is the extent to which competence in handling pitch related demands 
have become dominant concerns, as they must be if the orientation of music education 
is toward the development of instrumental and choral ensembles capable of rendering 
music that is demanding in these ways. I do not for a moment question the value of 
developing the kinds of performance craft this calls for. What concerns me is the extent 
to which teaching for such development should be prioritized in general music 
education. 
 
The myriad of ways in which western ‗art music‘ has explored and exploited tonal and 
harmonic possibilities is perhaps what most marks it as an extraordinary artistic 
achievement making possible aural experiences that are distinctive in how they 
manipulate and ‗play‘ with innate predispositions for particular pitch combinations and 
the tacit expectations they excite. The schemes of ‗common practice‘ music theory are 
found in popular genres the world over and have been developed and extended in a 
plethora of exciting ways by jazz improvisers, composers and arrangers giving rise, all 
of which have been codified in the complex and challenging field of Jazz Harmony. 
This is all well and good, but it has greatly upped the stakes regarding what counts as 




time to its mastery, perhaps to the disadvantage of other dimensions of musicianship 
and artistry that are also important. 
 
 
Two left feet! 
 
One startling revelation that has come out of my work with students in Music Education 
has been a seeming ineptness on the part of many jazz students when attempting even 
some of the most basic eurhythmic activities I introduce them to, for example, stone-
passing games that primary school children seem to handle with relative ease. These 
jazz students obviously are possessed of a fair measure of kinesthetic intelligence but it 
has been exercised in very specific ways as demanded by their craft and become a kind 
of ‗dedicated kinesthesia‘ as opposed to the holistic and integrated kinesthesia of a 
dancer. This is ultimately a limiting factor in their acquisition of multi-metric 
competence, even the ability to ‗swing‘ convincingly, a point well grasped by jazz 
educators like Peter Burman of the Academy of Music and Drama in Gothenburg, 
Sweden, who requires students to assiduously practice eurhythmic exercises that he 
gives them designed to develop multi-metrics as a whole-body experience. 
 
I have already had much to say regarding my eurhythmic orientation and my holding up 
of kinesthesia as the capacity most fundamental to musicking as it is to physical well-
being and psychomotor functioning. I have also argued that it was the kinesthetic 
demands of musicking (including dancing) that established such activity as something 
we are innately predisposed to. We are also predisposed to sounds of determinate pitch 
and to the proprioceptive effects of combining them, simultaneously and in sequences. 
But, I would argue, this dimension of musicianship is nowhere near as acute in our 
innate endowment as is our rhythmic sense; and I would arguer further that the kind of 
pitch sense and comprehension that has come to be regarded as fundamental to 
meaningful musicking poses a challenge to many students that ultimately does not make 
worthwhile the effort and they tend to put aside any notions of ever being active 
musicers. Where the paradigm is education through music (as opposed to in or for it), it 
seems logical that there should be a stronger focus on the musical capacities that are 
more natural, organic and generic to our non-musical engagements.  
 
Notwithstanding my sentiments in this regard, I am strong in the conviction that most 
children are capable of developing accurate pitch as well as relative pitch sense to levels 
that afford a greatly expanded range of musical involvements and satisfactions that are 
worthy of development. Kodàly and his followers have provided ample evidence that 
this is the case and have come up with methods of achieving it with comparable ease 
provided that the process is started early enough.  
 
I have already alluded to a condition that is endemic in instrumental music education 
programs such as I went through in my schooling, where high levels of performance and 
literacy skill are developed but without the relative pitch capacity that allows one to 
hear and understand pitch sequences and combinations internally. In this regard, I can 
frankly say that my level of relative pitch sense at the conclusion of my BMus studies 
should have precluded my being awarded the degree. It was only after coming to Africa 
and encountering the widespread use of Curwen‘s tonic-sol-fa (relative sol-fa with a 
moveable do) that I began to understand and appreciate what had been sorely lacking in 




of Kodàly education which had not featured in any praxial way in my university Music 
Education courses. Like Dalcroze, Kodàly gets but passing mention in Elliott‘s Music 
Matters with no consideration of what was authentically praxial in the principles and 
methods they developed. I soon began employing these principles and methods, not 
only in my teaching but, as importantly, in my personal praxis and with highly 
rewarding results. The kind of musical literacy I developed through my school and 
undergraduate years empowered me in not inconsiderable ways, but it was a critically 
impoverished and mechanistic literacy devoid of the inner pitch processing that now 
allows me to play ‗by ear‘ with comparable ease and is a boon to my composing and 
arranging. 
 
As with our innate kinesthetic capacity, there are good reasons for believing that our 
distant ancestors were more innately endowed in their pitch acuity and processing 
capacity. Research has indicated as a strong likelihood that the neural mechanism 
underpinning ‗absolute pitch‘ (the ability to identify or reproduce a specific pitch 
without the benefit of an external reference) is one we are all born with but which 
remains functional for as few as one in ten thousand (Conner 2001).126 Perhaps this was 
an ontogenetic trade-off that came with the evolution of our language capacity, where 
the ability to register pitch in this way became less and less of importance 
communication-wise. That it could be an attribute that is atrophying and being selected 
out seems entirely plausible in light of what Gene-Culture Coevolution Theory has 
revealed about culture as a selection pressure that can bring about changes in the 
genome with relative swiftness (as discussed in Chapter Three).  This is speculative of 
course, but the research in question has also indicated that there is a significantly higher 
level of retention among children who begin learning a musical instrument early in life, 
as there also appears to be among people who speak ‗tonal languages‘ such as most 
dialects of Chinese or Vietnamese, where lexical meaning depends heavily on pitch 
variation across single words. The pertinent question is whether ‗absolute pitch‘ is a 
capacity that we should be concerned with helping children retain or regain through one 
or another of the practice regimes that are thought to achieve this. I certainly do not 
think so and would suggest that it makes difficult the acquisition of relative pitch which 
is of far greater value to music praxis generally.  
  
 
More on the development of communicative capacity through music education 
 
Most of my teaching experience as a music educator and music educationist has been 
with students for whom English is their second or third language and many if not most 
have been less than proficient in its use.  And for many of these, what has been even 
more debilitating to their education is a deficient common underlying proficiency 
(CUP). This capacity was conceptualized by Cummins (2001) who believes that in 
learning a first language, children need to acquire an implicit metalinguistic knowledge 
and corresponding skill base if they are ever to be linguistically competent in another 
language and capable of different modes of cognition. In the ways in which so many of 
my university students have been taught both their mother tongue and their second or 
third languages, insufficient attention has given to the development of CUP and the 
                              
126  Conner reports on the research of Jenny Saffran, director of the Infant Learning Laboratory at the 




result of this presents what is the most formidable challenge to tertiary level teachers 
like myself who are expected to turn out students facile in propositional thought and 
higher order cognitive processes (analysis, synthesis, dialectical reasoning, and critical 
evaluation), processes that are dominantly language mediated.  
 
In such situations, it seems appropriate to insist that the art that should be placed center-
stage educationally is ‗word art‘. Even where the teaching/learning medium is one‘s 
first language, performative skill in word art should be a curricular priority given the 
broad scope of what it is efficacious in developing and what it offers as a point of 
intersection where different artistic domains can be integrated in ways that can 
profoundly impact educational success in ‗non-artistic‘ domains (where cognition is 
predominantly language mediated). My use of inverted commas here is occasioned by 
the belief that such interdisciplinary activity cultivates a predisposition that is aesthetic 
in an enlarged sense of the word consistent with an epistemology that will be explored a 
bit further along and shown to be Darwinian in key respects. Where it characterizes 
one‘s awareness of the interconnectedness and interdependency of everything that can 
be experienced, learned and imagined, there are no cognitive domains wherein the 
aesthetic sense is not playing a key role. Gregory Bateson‘s entreaty to western 
education with its compartmentalization of learning domains is apropos: ―Break the 
pattern which connects the items of learning and you necessarily destroy all quality" 
(1979 – online source).  
 
Bateson‘s statement can be taken as a ‗regulatory ideal‘ in Hip-Hop philosophy. I have 
had the good fortune of being able, my age notwithstanding, to get to a meaningful 
degree on the inside of Hip-Hop culture, in particular the performance poetry of emcees 
and ‗slam‘ artists.127 In my home city of Durban, there has been for some years now a 
frequently organized Hip-Hop event which originally went under the name ―Bling 
Free,‖ later to become ―Life Check128,‖ in which competitions are staged in all four of 
Hip-Hop‘s ‗elements‘: Emceeing, DJing, Graf Art, and Breakdancing. The levels of 
skill and creativity demonstrated are formidable in all, but what both elates and 
intrigues me the most is the level of verbal expressiveness and poignancy of content 
achieved by young kids from Durban‘s townships who most certainly cannot attribute 
their ‗emcee chops‘ to anything they learned at school, and many of whom are putting it 
out in a second language. They have found and been swept up by an expressive form in 
which they are able to ―manifest a relatedness‖ (Chernoff 1979) as well as define an 
identity. For sure, status is a primary motivator, but they are nevertheless engaged in a 
real praxis of ―thinking-in-action‖ that develops, refines and deepens their ability to use 
language optimally (their profanities notwithstanding), to use metaphor, hyperbole, 
alliteration, rhyming, allusion, punning, and ‗wit‘ generally. But such verbal and 
conceptual cleverness fails to convince if in its execution there is a lack of the ‗flow‘ 
that everyone is intuitively able to apprehend or sense the lack of, because it is 
intrinsically kinesthetic. At Life Check events, while competitions are being held or set 
up for at their various venues, there is invariably one or more ‗cyphers‘ going on 
outside. These are spontaneously formed circles where those wanting to test their 
                              
127 These are poets who perform their creations in competitions called poetry slams, an event that shares 
some key features with the emcee battles mentioned above. A quick overview of how they typically 
work is given in the Wiki-article ―Poetry Slam.‖ 




rhyming mettle take turns ‗rapping‘ while others provide a backing mostly by ‗beat-
boxing‘, using vocal effects to replicate a kit drum putting down a ‗beat‘. B-boying 
(breakdancing) can also go on in cyphers.  
 
 
Thinking outside the box 
 
My purpose in highlighting word art and songstership has not been to downplay the 
important value of engaging with music that is minimally mediated by referential, 
symbol-based cognition, this being the point of departure for a discussion to follow a bit 
further on. Part of my purpose has been to challenge the insularity of music education as 
is seemingly endorsed by music education philosophers like Elliott. And I have also 
attempted to highlight the incongruence of the inattention to verbal expressiveness in 
education when popular culture offers such obvious and useful paradigms. When I 
consider the majority of students I have worked with over my years of teaching in South 
African universities, it has been in those students who are praxially engaged in 
interdisciplinary pursuits extra-curricularly (or elsewhere in their studies) that ‗shine 
brightest‘. My second and third level Music Education modules are electives for other 
majors and I have been lucky over the years to have had several students from the 
university‘s Drama and Performance Studies program who have almost invariably 
manifested a much higher level of interdisciplinary ‗suss‘ and critical consciousness 
compared to my Music majors who are conspicuously limited in this regard and not 
generally comfortable with having to think outside the box.  
 
I cannot help recalling here what Christopher Small (1998) has observed as common 
among rank-and-file symphony orchestra instrumentalists and how he calls into 
question the kind of praxis if informs, a kind of praxis that I fear is endemic in 
university music programs that are too insular and fixated on musical training at the 
expense of musical education and which show too little concern with how student‘s 
musical lives are connecting up with what is going on outside the program and in their 
extracurricular lives generally. The excerpts that follow are apropos.  
 
The musical skills that are required of a professional orchestral musician are without 
question of a high order … At the same time those skills are very specialized and fall 
within a limited range, consisting of technical dexterity, the ability to sight-read and to 
respond rapidly to the notations and to the conductor‘s gestures, as well as those of attuning 
one‘s playing to that of the ensemble. Skills that are prized in other traditions, such as those 
of improvising and memorizing, are of little use to orchestral musicians and tend to 
atrophy; naturally they form no part of their training. (69-70) 
 
The last sentence is pertinent in relation to what I have observed as trends and 
tendencies in the relative strengths and weaknesses of the students that have gone 
through my Music Education courses. Improvisation features prominently in my Music 
Education modules and it is not surprising those of my students who are from the Jazz 
Studies program take to it more readily. And yet they can be remarkably limited when 
moved out of the comfort zones defined by their particular skill bases and are generally 
weaker when it comes to making extra-musical associations than are students from one 
of the ‗classical‘ streams, who tend to come from more privileged educational 
backgrounds and who are more widely ‗read‘. What can be said of the way they differ is 
in the kinds of connections or conditions of relatedness they are disposed to apprehend 




those that are disposed to link the musical to the extra-musical. Many of our jazz 
students who are the most accomplished in what they can do as improvising musicians 
find themselves almost totally out of their depth in courses that move beyond the notes 
and structures of music to their historical and ideological contexts, an engagement with 
music that assumes a level of general knowledge (history, geography, literature) and 
language-mediated understanding that they have never been adequately assisted in 
acquiring.   
 
That there needs to be such a strong focus on the development of performative chops is 
because the bar has been set so high by the virtuosi  - the ‗stars‘ - who students want to 
emulate and whose performances they can experience again and again on recordings. 
Some of our opera students are uncanny in how thoroughly they have developed their 
vocal apparatus and how closely they can approximate operatic virtuosi. But in many 
ways they seem little more than just proficient mimics, not unlike the Australian 
Lyrebird I referred to in Chapter Three who open their bills and issue what would be 
indistinguishable from a recording of the sound complexes that they have copied from 
their soundscapes: other bird calls, camera sounds and the cacophony of sounds 
produced by ‗foresters‘ with their axes and chain saws. And because learning is 
predominantly by rote (through repeated listening to recordings), this necessitated by 
poor music literacy skills, their repertoire tends to be limited.  
 
Let us consider another generalization that Small reached based on his experience of 
orchestral players. Although Small senses that ―they do feel themselves generally to be 
heirs and guardians of a great tradition,‖ he finds that most ―do not investigate their 
feelings about this very deeply.‖ 
 
In my experience it is difficult to get them to talk about the art they practice with such skill. 
… They resemble, in fact, the members of any other occupational group in that they will 
engage in any amount of shop talk, gossip, and locker-room humor. But rarely do they 
question the nature of the relationships within which they work. That certain kinds of 
relationships within the band are necessary for the performance of the music is an article of 
faith and scarcely discussed. This is due not to any deficiency in intelligence but to the fact 
that the training they received in music college or conservatory, like all professional 
training whether medical, legal, academic, military, or whatever, has been directed as much 
toward the acceptance of the profession‘s assumptions and the maintenance of its esprit de 
corps as it has been toward the acquisition of the skills that are necessary to practice it, and 
like most professionals in any field whatsoever, most orchestral musicians have come to 
accept those assumptions unquestioningly. In general their attitude is more that of the 
craftsman than that of the autonomous artist. (67-68) 
 
 
Music education as aesthetic education: developing responsiveness to „the pattern 
which connects‟ 
 
In Chapter Two I described the evolution of linguistic capacity as a ‗double-edge 
sword‘ and cited Graves‘ ―The Cool Web‖ to more cogently make the point that 
language acquisition engenders a consciousness ―so greedy in its neurocognitive 
demands that it dulls us to - and impedes the direct apprehension of - qualities that are 
informationally rich and significant, or that at least ‗make special‘ experience 
unmediated by language.‖ Music without words or choreography is the least mediated 




distort the direct apprehension of sonically embodied salience, which is not cognized 
consciously but intuited directly; it is felt. The fact that it does not engage language-
mediated, conscious thought is taken to mean that it is not a cognitive experience. But 
this is anything but true when cognition is understood in the broader sense with which it 
has been employed in this dissertation, referring to any neural processing that has 
potential for behavioral expression, and remembering that such processing is 
computational in nature and algorithmic in essence.  There is a great deal of neural 
reorganization going on, the importance and value of which is not well understood and 
needs to be. In this regard, I have argued for Tooby and Cosmides‘ hypothesis (2001a) 
on the adaptive value of aesthetic experience, suggesting it to be a strong theoretical 
support for Langer‘s (1953) philosophy of art as a means of ‗educating‘ intuition, for 
modifying the ‗tacit interpretive schemata‘ through which we perceive and make sense 
of the worlds we inhabit.  
 
 
Looking to the East 
 
Together, these theories present a compelling neuro-cognitive reason for undergoing, as 
often as possible, experiences that are dominantly if not purely ‗aesthetic‘, ineffable, 
feelingful experiences wherein ‗content‘ and ‗context‘ are pretty much kept out of the 
picture. This is an ideal kind of experience that I genuinely believe to be beneficial 
precisely for the reasons these theories suggest, in sum, what it achieves neuro-
cognitively that I intuitively sense to be life-enhancing or at least conducive to more 
positive, satisfying, and healthy emotional states. I have very much the same belief 
about transcendental meditation and regard the ‗disinterested‘, aesthetic attitude I aspire 
to in particular listening scenarios as eminently meditative and at the same time edifying 
and occasionally illuminating. This is a belief entirely consonant with key Hindu and 
Buddhist precepts and the aesthetics they inform, a point which I have explored in some 
depth elsewhere (Robinson 1988). What I wrote over two decades ago has acquired 
greater poignancy for me when now considered from a Darwinian perspective and it is 
worth reconsidering some of my key points in this light. 
 
Informing certain Eastern musical traditions is what I termed a cosmological aesthetic 
of music because of their common belief that there is ―a correlation between the tonal 
and temporal relationships of music and the patterns [essential forms, algorithms] that 
underpin reality but which cannot be consciously apprehended. ―In cosmological 
theory,‖ according to Danielou (1996):  
 
[T]he starting point of every form of being is harmony, a relation which is multiplied in 
more and more complex forms.  When we recreate harmonies we rediscover the basic 
equations which are at the origin of the forms of being, where thought, sensation and form 
have not yet become separated.  These are the patterns, the harmonies which, on the level of 
form, will constitute beauty, in the realm of feeling, emotion, and in the sphere of the mind, 
thought. (18) 
 
As does Langer in her ‗tonal analogue‘ theory, Danielou suggests that the significance 
of music, according to this cosmological aesthetic, is unrelated to anything contextual or 
informational in a discursive sense, but lies in what it recreates. For Langer what music 
recreates is ―the pattern, or logical form, of sentience‖ (1953: 27); in the cosmological 
aesthetic it is the ‗harmonies‘ that connect all that exists and that are given forms that 




is ―the immediate, intuitive apprehension of sound patterns through the adoption of a 
contemplative, learned yet ‗disinterested‘ attitude‖ and in both cases, arguably, the goal 
is ―inner realization on a level where the different states of being are not differentiated, 
where we become aware that form and matter, emotion and intellect, pleasure and joy 
are but expressions of the same codes manifested on various levels,i‖ where one 
approaches ―that state of perfection ... where being, perception and joy (sat-cit-ananda) 
form an indivisible whole‖ (Danielou 1976: 22). 
 
The Hindu cosmology of which Danielou speaks holds to the belief that the seemingly 
infinite range and variety of phenomena are reducible to a limited set of relationships, 
each with a ‗genetic code‘ (informational kernel) that can find expression variously. 
They are believed to be instantiated in the musical patterns built up by accomplished 
instrumentalists out of established tonal and temporal systems, the ragas on which 
Gandharva Veda music is based. According to Ayurvedic tradition, ancient Vedic sages 
or rishis worked out the realization of these codes musically, and when experienced at 
appropriate times of day, these ragas can induce a beneficial homeostatic state, a 
‗balancing of the doshas‘ – the metabolic processes that inform one‘s state of mind and 
sense of wellbeing (Chopra 1990: 154-158). In Chapter Two I argued that we are 
genetically predisposed to tonality and harmonic consonance as we also are for 
rhythmic periodicity and metrical organization and there seems little doubt that 
particular schemes are going to resonate more successfully with inbuilt expectations and 
predilections. 
 
That the Vedic sages may indeed have been on to something seems entirely plausible in 
light of some of the theories of mind that have been discussed in this dissertation. What 
evolutionary psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists would necessarily seek clarity 
on are the cognitive mechanisms involved and why natural selection would have 
equipped us with such. Here we should recall Imberty‘s explication of ‗post-Chomskian 
cognitivism‘ and its refutation of Behaviorism‘s position that a ―subject‘s response to a 
stimulus is a reaction determined by the nature of the stimulus.‖  The cognitivist 
position is that there can be no response without ―the triggering of an adapted program,  
 
a response to an internal perturbation of a competence system that is provoked by 
information in a format that does not conform to the system. The program‘s effect is to 
render the object consistent with its own characteristics and to modify atypical variables: 
thus, it is not the traits of the object that provoke the subject‘s response, but rather the mere 
fact that it is not consistent with the competence system. (2000: 452) 
 
At root, learning is this process of ‗rendering consistent‘ (what Piaget termed 
‗accommodation‘).129 But learning cannot take place when there is nothing in the 
presented information or how it is formatted that conforms to what is in the system. 
There must be some kind of pattern or relationship that one ‗connects‘ with because it is 
isomorphic or homologous with what is already inscribed neurally, either by one‘s 
genes or through learning. Moreover, the level of nonconformity may be slight. Stimuli 
                              
129 This is not a process exclusive to human brains. The weaver birds that nest in my garden are 
genetically equipped with an inbuilt ‗competence system‘ for the construction of their intricately 
woven nests, but the weaving and knot-tying abilities needed to build a nest that will pass muster with 
a potential mate require fine-tuning through trial-and-error drawing upon knowledge imprinted while 




can be contrived whose characteristics – the patterns and forms they present – are 
consistent with one or another competence system or complex of systems.  This I would 
argue is what artists accomplish. The levels to which the stimuli they contrive (the art 
they produce) are consistent with existing competence systems depend on the artist‘s 
aesthetic intentions (witting or unwitting). Some art is created to be deliberately 
inconsistent in ways that challenge the perceiver and that even subvert innate and/or 
conditioned expectations. But there is also art that attempts to be optimally consistent 
with what is neurally inscribed and which with varying degrees of success induce 
homeostatic neural states, perhaps through some form of entrainment, a synchronizing 
of disparate neural activations in the brain. This kind of ‗tuning in‘ or ‗harmonization‘ 
of neural activity brings proprioception to the fore while conscious thought processing 
recedes and perhaps even ceases for a while. We are thus afforded an experience 
however transient where we ―apprehend the point of intersection of the timeless with 
time.‖ I have quoted here from the third of T. S. Eliot‘s Four Quartets (1943), poetic 
words that are clearly consonant with that perfect state Danielou describes, where 
―being, perception and joy (sat-cit-ananda) form an indivisible whole.‖  It is a here-
and-now experience that is almost always fleeting but which is more effortlessly 
sustained when what is being presented to perception, a raga for example, induces the 
afore-mentioned entrainment and the music is ―heard so deeply that it is not heard at 
all‖ and you actually ―are the music while the music lasts.‖ 
 
Men's curiosity searches past and future 
And clings to that dimension. But to apprehend 
The point of intersection of the timeless 
With time, is an occupation for the saint— 
No occupation either, but something given 
And taken, in a lifetime's death in love, 
Ardour and selflessness and self-surrender. 
For most of us, there is only the unattended 
Moment, the moment in and out of time, 
The distraction fit, lost in a shaft of sunlight, 
The wild thyme unseen, or the winter lightning 
Or the waterfall, or music heard so deeply 
That it is not heard at all, but you are the music 
While the music lasts. These are only hints and guesses, 
Hints followed by guesses; and the rest 
Is prayer, observance, discipline, thought and action. 
The hint half guessed, the gift half understood, is Incarnation. 
Here the impossible union 
Of spheres of existence is actual, 
Here the past and future 
Are conquered, and reconciled … 
 
(from ―The Dry Salvages130,‖ No. 3 of Four Quartets) 
 
 
There is in Eliot‘s verse the clear suggestion that such glimpses of ‗Incarnation‘ are 
esoteric, available only to an initiated few and perhaps only realized through ‗a 
lifetime's death in love, ardour and selflessness and self-surrender‘.  So why bother 
                              




getting into such esoteria in a dissertation concerned with the education of the rank-and-
file of humanity? It may well be that such rarefied experiences are beyond the ken of 
most, that they require competence systems quantitatively more efficacious and rare. 
Even if they are not, does this make them worth the ‗prayer, observance, discipline, 
thought and action‘ they seem to demand?  What this might be seen to come down to is 
a question of the value that one ascribes to experiences and states alluded to with nouns 
such as awe, veneration, exaltation, flow and ecstasy, and with adjectives like sublime, 
profound, peak and transcendent. In formal education, there seems but a modicum of 
concern with whether or not students acquire the capacities and dispositions for such 
experiences. 
 
Again I return to what is perhaps now less outrageous an assertion, that education‘s 
purpose is to make us more successful in our pleasure-seeking pursuits. This can be 
easily misread to mean nothing more than that we should come get to experience 
pleasure more frequently, but it is really about the kinds of pleasure, satisfaction or 
gratification one is after. An experience has no significant developmental value if the 
pleasure it affords is merely the short-lived satisfaction of a base need (one of the Four 
Fs). Such satisfactions are important and students should be helped to understand such 
needs and appetites for what they are, evolved adaptations common to us all and to 
which we are all in various ways and degrees beholden. Understanding our genetic 
imperatives is an important step toward the transcendence of them. Enabling and 
guiding this transcendence is what I have argued to be the raison d‟être of education. 
This, as Maslow well understood, requires that higher-order needs supplant lower-order 
ones as motivators of interest and effort. Educational success in this view is less about 
what one has learned as it is about what motivates one in one‘s pursuits; and educational 
progress is most saliently marked by the kinds of pleasures or satisfactions that are 






What needs to be pursued further here is what the preceding discussion suggests as a 
kind of praxis that deserves further consideration because of its potential educational 
value. I have repeatedly argued that what is now needed more urgently than ever is a 
world citizenry of critically aware and ecologically committed individuals. And I have 
attempted to develop an understanding of critical consciousness that takes account of 
the capacities, aptitudes, and predispositions that constitute our evolved, universal 
nature. What I perhaps have not emphasized enough is the importance of self-
knowledge. What is meant by this becomes a more complex and challenging question 
when one understands that self and consciousness are illusions. In light of what we have 
come to understand about the adapted mind as a massively parallel computational 
system without any central control unit, self-knowledge becomes something of an 
oxymoronic concept; what is it that the knowledge is of and who is it that acquires or 
constructs such knowledge? These are not intractable problems, but it perhaps might be 
better to use Gardiner‘s formulation – intrapersonal intelligence – even if I am not 
convinced by key assertions of his Multiple Intelligences theory as I intimated in 
Chapter Two. When we consider the more specific traits that characterize intrapersonal 
intelligence, its importance to critical consciousness becomes more apparent. People 




honestly on what they are and what is at play internally that gives rise to their sense of 
self and the psychosocial states that attend it. They are able and inclined to more deeply 
and realistically analyze their strengths and weaknesses as well as the motivations and 
feelings that cause them to think and act in the ways that they do. This assists them in 
establishing goals and gives breadth and objectivity to their consideration of ideas, 
theories, and beliefs. Such intrapersonal intelligence is characteristic of self-actualizers 
who Maslow typified as being resistant to enculturation and confident in the 
transcendence of any particular culture. For the self-actualizer ‗my culture‘ is what the 
individual has constructed for her/himself, not an ideational preset that has constructed 
her.  
 
With intrapersonal intelligence, as with any aptitude or capacity, people vary 
quantitatively in terms of how they have been endowed genetically; but how their 
potential unfolds and becomes productively functional is critically dependent on what 
opportunities are afforded them in life. Taking intrapersonal intelligence to the level of 
‗inner realization‘ or ‗enlightenment‘ is the goal of Buddhists and the path that leads to 
enlightenment is one that anyone can take but on which little progress can be expected 
if certain understandings are not internally realized and if one does not engage in 
practices (‗dharma practice) that assist the cessation of craving and clinging that keeps 
us stuck in our ways and modes of thought. Buddhism shares with Hinduism the belief 
that human suffering (dukkha) is a symptom of an inability to stop clinging to what is 
ultimately transitory and illusory, in particular one‘s notion of self. The opposite of 
dukkha is nirvana, the ineffable and ultimate reality which lies beyond the illusory 
world of phenomena and which can only be realized through meditation, yoga and other 
forms of dharma practice.131 Such practices must become constants in one‘s life praxis 
such that the ‗glimpses of Incarnation‘ they afford come to inform one‘s thoughts and 
perceptions in day to day life.  
 
We may recall from the last chapter Blackmore‘s position regarding the liberating effect 
that comes with a realization that self and consciousness are illusions built up of memes 
and memeplexes. It did not come as any surprise to discover that Blackmore is a 
practicing Buddhist and has been one for over two decades. In a 2006 Point of 
Inquiry132 interview, she speaks to the compatibility of a scientific understanding of 
how brains create minds with the Buddhist doctrine of anatta or ‗no self‘, which is: 
 
that there is nobody in there; there is just stuff happening; everything is caused by 
something else and things just happen. … The idea of a self is recreated every moment as 
soon as you think of yourself as a self … Oh, there it is; and then it kind of goes away and 
… Oh, there it is again. There is not a continuing self. That is what comes out of both 
                              
131  In his influential novel Siddhartha, Hermanne Hesse  (1957: 110-111) tells of the young Buddha‘s 
self-realization through meditation on the bank of a river.  ―When Siddhartha listened attentively to 
this river, to this song of a thousand voices; when he did not listen to the sorrow or laughter, when he 
did not bind his soul to any one particular voice and absorb it in his Self, but heard them all, the 
whole, the unity; then the great song of a thousand voices consisted of one word: Om - perfection ... 
From that hour Siddhartha ceased to fight against his destiny.  There shone in his face the serenity of 
knowledge, of one who is no longer confronted with conflict of desires, who has found salvation, who 
is in harmony with the stream of events, with the stream of life, full of sympathy and compassion, 





Buddhism and science and … that is one of the main reasons why I find both of them 
helping the other. (Blackmore 2006) 
 
In The Meme Machine (1999), Blackmore tells of a famous speech in which the 
Buddha, Siddhartha Gautama, told his followers ―actions do exist, and also their 
consequences, but the person that acts does not.‖ 
 
He taught that because we have the wrong idea about our self, we think that we will be 
happy if we gain more material things, or status or power. In fact it is wanting some things 
and being averse to others that makes us unhappy. If only we could realize our true nature 
then we would be free of suffering because we would know there is no ‗me‘ to suffer. (230) 
 
But is Buddhist praxis something that we should be teaching for in public education? 
Most definitely, I would argue, even though I am well aware of the kind of resistance 
that such an idea would likely run up against, mostly based on the erroneous assumption 
that such praxis demands the adoption of some religious dogma. Blackmore is an atheist 
and cites as one of her favorite books Stephen Batchelor‘s Buddhism Without Beliefs 
(1997) (which as is it turns out is also a favorite of mine). In it, Batchelor claims that 
―the Buddha was not a mystic and his awakening was not a shattering insight into a 
transcendent Truth that revealed to him the mysteries of God‖ (5). 
 
[W]hat the Buddha taught was not something to believe in, but something to do. Buddha 
challenged people to understand the nature of anguish, let go of it origins, realize its 
cessation and create a certain way of life and awakening. (from cover note) 
 
The Buddha woke up to the nature of the human dilemma and a way to its resolution. The 
first two truths (anguish and its origins) describe the dilemma, the second two (cessation 
and the path) its resolution. He awoke to a set of interrelated truths rooted in the immediacy 
of experience here and now. (6) 
 
I am perhaps not alone as a music education philosopher that sees Buddhist praxis as a 
sorely needed ‗way forward‘ for human kind. ―Who‘s Asking? (Who‘s Answering?)‖ is 
the title of an insightful editorial by Wayne Bowman (2008) introducing an issue of the 
Mayday Group‘s Action, Criticism, and Theory for Music Education  entitled 
―Theorizing Social Justice in Music Education.‖  In it, Bowman offers Buddhism as an 
alternative way of ―imagining just practices and societies.‖ As to the problem of pinning 
down what ‗social justice‘ actually means, Bowman makes a suggestion that jibes well 
with what I suggested at the very beginning of this dissertation concerning how we 
should conceive ‗society.‘ In both cases – and the same could be said of ‗culture‘ – 
people tend to commit ―a fairly basic category mistake‖ by treating the term as the name 
of ―some kind of thing, when it‘s more properly conceived of as a kind of process – an 
ethical process, reliant on our capacities for reflexivity and reciprocity.‖ Social justice 
relies on ―our abilities to put ourselves in the place of the other.‖ Bowman points to 
another grounding idea of Buddhist thought that it shares with the Hindu cosmology 
described by Danielou as it does with Berry‘s ecozoic vision (1996), ―the idea of the 
organic interdependency of all beings‖ (Bowman 2008: 9).  Implicit in Buddhist praxis 
is a commitment to ―honoring and preserving that interdependency‖ which requires that 






At issue here are things like integration, balance, reciprocity, and mutual reliance. The point 
of departure – the foundational consideration, if you will – is not an individual whose rights 
and freedoms are sacrosanct and inviolable, but rather the integrity of the bond between self 
and Other. …  ―Being,‖ on this view, is never simply a question of self-existence: ―To be‖ 
is necessarily and always ―to be in relationship.‖ The notion of an autonomous, 
independent self—a frequently pivotal consideration in Western appeals to social justice—
is an illusion, a source of sickness, suffering, and worse. From these foundational beliefs it 
follows that authentic ―being‖ requires that one both contribute to and receive from the 
whole without which no being exists. This represents quite a contrast to concerns about 
―self-determination‖ or ―individual agency,‖ the pillars on which Western theories so often 
rest. Where selfhood is something to be ―gotten over‖ rather than protected at all costs, the 
question ―What‘s in it for me?‖ takes on decidedly different dimensions. Indeed, to ask 
what‘s-in-it-for-me can only be answered by addressing what‘s-in-it-for-others. … To be 
selfless is to be Other-full. And to that extent, enlightenment (nirvana) requires full social 
engagement—an ecologically-oriented attitude of care, grounded in awareness that being is 
always relational, and in the realization that a crucial part of selfhood IS other-hood. (9-10) 
 
That Buddhism and other cosmologies have developed practices providing a path to 
enlightenment does not mean that they are alone in grasping life‘s essential condition of 
interdependency. It is well captured in the African philosophy of Ubuntu, which I have 
often heard encapsulated as "I am what I am because of who we all are." Nobel laureate 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu‘s perspective on this is especially salient here. 
 
A person with Ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel 
threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance that 
comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when 
others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed. (1999: quoted 
in ―Ubuntu Philosophy‖ on Wikipedia) 
 
Bowman takes us to what is, or at least should be, the issue that is core, which is 
fundamental to social justice as authentic praxis as opposed to a philosophy to 
rationalize and espouse. 
 
The notion of justice is often a rational and calculative one, one that is reasonably (forgive 
the pun) well suited to certain aims and circumstances. But justice is often not enough, and 
―doing the right thing‖ cannot always be assured by the pursuit of ―just‖ solutions. The 
missing dimension involves such crucial concerns as empathy, compassion, and care—
concerns that take us well beyond the measured, formulaic, tit-for-tat realm of justice, 
crucial though that may be. The dimension to which I am alluding here is one that is 
grounded not so much in obligation to as unconditional responsibility to and for the other. 
… Social justice is reasoned and reasonable, and to that extent something often argued and 
pursued at arm‘s-length: it requires care to ―give it legs.‖ (2008: 11 - my emphases) 
 
I am reminded here of the words of Shelly from his ―A Defence of Poetry.‖ 
 
The great secret of morals is love; or a going out of our nature, and an identification of 
ourselves with the beautiful which exists in thought, action, or person, not our own. A man, 
to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must put himself in the 
place of another and of many others; the pains and pleasure of his species must become his 
own. The great instrument of moral good is the imagination. (1819/1962: 233-234) 
 
What Shelly is inadvertently suggesting is that the core issue pedagogically is 




concepts. In concluding Chapter Two, I tried to get to the root of what imagination is 
and to explain why it is the most distinguishing and essential characteristic of art. What 
I see as most salient from that discussion is the understanding that imagination is a 
fundamental human capacity without which people would not be able to make sense of 
the world or to learn. But while we all have imaginative capacity, we do not employ it 
as a matter of course in our relationships with others and, for the most part, we do not 
use it to break the bonds of the illusions that bind us and prevent us from apprehending 
―the pattern which connects‖ (Bateson 1979) and fully realizing that ―a crucial part of 
selfhood IS other-hood‖ (Bowman 2008: 10). The illusions that bind us are not only 
those of self, consciousness and free-will but also the ‗selfish memes of our 
indoctrination‘ that Nietzsche alluded to in his 1873 unpublished essay, ―On Truth and 
Lies in a Nonmoral Sense‖ (―Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn‖). 
 
What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms: in 
short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, 
transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, 
canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions — they 
are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins 
which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins. 
(quoted in ―On Truth and Lies in an Extramoral Sense‖: on Wikipedia)  
 
 
„The pattern which connects‟ 
 
―The pattern which connects‖ is the concept that Gregory Bateson advanced in Mind 
and Nature: A Necessary Unity (1979) as a way of bringing into focus the condition of 
―phylogenetic homology‖ that is everywhere to be found for eyes, ears and brains that 
are disposed to find it and, in it, to find deep significance as it reveals the 
interconnectedness and interdependency that integrates and unifies not only biological 
life, but everything. Here it seems apropos to think back to my discussion in Chapter 
Three around the question of what information is, where I made use of Pinker‘s 
definition: ―a correlation between two things that is produced by a lawful process (as 
opposed to coming about by sheer chance)‖ (1997: 65). It is a correspondence that 
manifests in some kind of organization, a pattern that, potentially at least, can influence 
the formation of other patterns. Such patterns do not manifest in material things only; 
they are found in how matter and energy behaves in time, for example, in the patterned 
compression and rarefaction of air molecules that we hear as sound, in the flight of a 
bird, or in the eddying of currents of water or air. Information inheres in matter and 
processes but is not ‗fixed‘ by them and the same informational patterns can be realized 
in any number of substrates. The informational correlations are ultimately 
―mathematical and logical‖ relationships that can not be ―defined in terms of the stuff 
that the correlated entities are made of‖ (1997: 65). Here we may recall the example of 
this syntactic mutability that I gave in Chapter Three: the sequence of transductions of a 
pattern of energy from one medium to another as happens when music is performed, 
recorded (encoded in an analog or digital form in some physical substrate), decoded and 
re-encoded in the movements of speaker cones and the sympathetic vibrations of ear 
drums, and then transduced into electro-chemical data streams in brains that we process 
into a coherent and meaningful aural experience. Bateson‘s definition of ‗aesthetic‘ is 
simple and perfectly consonant with both the Eastern cosmological aesthetic 
characterized by Danielou and Langer‘s thesis of ‗isomorphism‘. ―By aesthetic, Bateson 






Universalism vs. contextualism in the Philosophy of Music Education 
 
Where Darwinian perspective might most be expected to weigh in is on the question of 
how much is universal in music and how much is contextual or socially contingent. This 
has important implications for what we teach and how; and music education 
philosophers are divided on the issue in key respects.   
 
Elliott, Regelski and many of the MayDay Group philosophers are strongly 
contextualist, believing, as Swanwick (1998) expresses it, ―that the reality, meaning and 
value of music can never be intrinsic or universal but lies in what is socially situated 
and culturally mediated (Elliott, 1995; Walker, 1996). Musical value resides in its 
specific cultural uses, in what it is 'good for' in the lives of people.‖ Elliott 
acknowledges that there is a generalized kind of human practice that we can call 
‗music‘, but that there is nothing that could be considered archetypal.  Instead:  
 
Worldwide, there are many musical practices, or ―Musics.‖ Each musical practice pivots on 
the shared understandings and efforts of musicers who are practitioners (amateur or 
professional) of that practice. As a result, each musical practice produces music in the sense 
of specific kinds of musical products, musical works, or listenables. These products are 
identifiable as the outcomes of particular musical practices because they evince (manifest 
or demonstrate) the shared principles and standards of (44) the musical practitioners who 
make them. (1995: 44-45) 
 
Elliott, I suggest, would be in agreement with the position taken decades ago by 
composer Harry Partch:  
 
Music … has only two ingredients that might be called God-given – the capacity of a body 
to vibrate and produce sound and the mechanisms of the human ear that registers it … All 
else in the art of music, which may be studied and analysed, was created by man or is 
implicit in human acts and is therefore subject to fiercest scrutiny.133 
 
Considering that music and language share a common ancestor (or so I have argued), it 
seems logical that what Elliott and Partch have said regarding music should be true of 
language.  Let us reword Elliott‘s position to see what sense it makes where language is 
the communication mode in question. 
 
Worldwide, there are many languages, each of which pivots on the shared understandings 
and efforts of users (amateur or professional) of that language. As a result, the use of each 
language produces specific kinds of linguistic products. These products are identifiable as 
the outcomes of particular linguistic practices because they evince (manifest or 
demonstrate) the shared principles and standards of (44) the language practitioners who 
make them.  
 
Regelski (1998) also eschews any attempt to ―define "music" as a singular "thing" or 
process, or similar attempts to define an aesthetic essence for all music.‖ 
                              






[S]uch singular, universal or essentialist definitions of "music" simply no longer obtain 
when the pluralism of postmodern musics is properly recognized. These musics, each a 
separate praxis with its own unique characteristic qualities and criteria of musicianship and 
artistry, thus give lie to the pretense that any aesthetic theory of musical essentialism can 
rationalize either the value of such musics or can serve to guide them in praxis. (online 
source) 
 
Again, let us consider the result when we substitute language for music. 
 
[S]uch singular, universal or essentialist definitions of "language" simply no longer obtain 
when the pluralism of contemporary languages is properly recognized. These languages, 
each a separate praxis with its own unique characteristic qualities and criteria of linguistic 
skill and artistry, thus give lie to the pretense that any single theory of linguistic 
essentialism can rationalize either the value of such languages or can serve to guide them in 
praxis. 
 
This simply does not hold water. Chomsky‘s ‗universal grammar‘ is a ‗single theory of 
linguistic essentialism‘. Just as we have a ‗language instinct‘ so too do we have a 
‗music instinct‘ and Biomusicology has gone far in helping us understand why all 
humans come equipped with it notwithstanding how multifaceted it is and must be 
given music‘s diverse temporal, timbral and tonal possibilities. Similarly, Darwinian 
Aesthetics does not presume to offer a ‗single theory of artistic essentialism‘. Instead it 
offers several theories. No single theory could ever suffice given that various biological 
adaptations are involved that have different evolutionary origins and explanations, i.e. 
they evolved at different times in response to different selection pressures in different 
environments of evolutionary adaptedness (EEAs). However, to again quote Dutton: 
―the arts in all their glory are no more remote from evolved features of the human mind 
and personality than an oak is remote from the soil and subterranean waters that nourish 
and sustain it‖ (Dutton 2009: 2).  
 
As to Partch‘s quote above, Chapter Two exposed such a position as a kind of musical 
‗blank slate-ism‘ that no longer can be taken seriously. We are not innately neutral to 
the tonal, timbral and rhythmic patterns that music presents, a point that was argued in 
Chapter Two. It simply is not true that we are as innately open to Schoenberg‘s music as 
we are to Mozart‘s. It was in Small‘s 1977 Music-Society-Education that I came across 
Partch‘s statement and it is clear that Small endorsed this extreme form of musical 
relativism at the time. In Musicking (1998), Small does not speak directly to universals 
of music, but it is clear that he by this point no longer embraces a blank slate 
epistemology. Indeed, it is in Bateson‘s evolutionary epistemology that he roots many 
of his assertions about music and relationship.134 
 
                              
134  In an interview by Robert Christgau (2000), Small had the following to share regarding how he has 
moved epistemologically during his writing career. ―Yeah, there was a time when I thought of myself 
as an anarchist, that's true. … I don't know where I stand anymore. … The whole issue of 
sociobiology, for example; I try to tell myself that I don't believe a word of it. Nevertheless, it's 
unsettling.‖ (Christgau) Which would suggest to you that the anarchist model isn't altogether 
appropriate to what human beings actually are. (Small) Yes, I don't see that we can actually do it, 




Elliott and Regelski are both Mayday Group philosophers and it is apropos to consider 
the group‘s second ‗regulatory ideal‘ given that it is the one most germane to the present 
discussion. I include below it the qualifying text as it is given on the group‘s website. 
 
The social and cultural contexts of musical actions are integral to musical meaning and 
cannot be ignored or minimized in music education.  
 
Aesthetic theories, with their claims that musical meaning and value transcend time, place, 
context and human purpose and usefulness, fail to account for the fullest range of meanings 
inherent in individual and collective musical actions. Such theories fall short of providing 
an adequate rationale for music-making or music teaching. Instead, all music must be seen 
as intimately tied to social and cultural contexts and conditions. The theory and practice of 
music education must account for this situatedness of music and music-making. Music 
educators must have, therefore, a theoretical foundation that unites the actions of producing 
music with the various contexts of those actions, so that musical meaning appropriately 
includes all of music's humanizing and concrete functions. (www.maydaygroup.org) 
 
Such ‗aesthetic theories‘ (and we can assume that Reimer‘s MEAE would head the list) 
may fail to account for many of the ―meanings inherent in individual and collective 
musical actions,‖ but what they do account for is anything but insignificant.  I would 
argue that they more than amply provide a rationale both for music-making and music 
teaching. The Mayday Group ‗ideal‘ does not categorically deny that there are musical 
meanings and values that transcend time, place and context, but neither does it make 
much allowance for such. Indeed, none of the regulatory ideals make accommodation 
for them or for the capacities and predilections that are part of our universal human 
nature and which inform the countless cross-cultural cross-fertilizations and ‗fusions‘ 
that one comes across in the world of music.135  
 
 
Swanwick on „music as culture‟ 
 
Keith Swanwick is a prominent music education philosopher who, like Reimer, is more 
universalist in his philosophizing even though, as with Reimer, there is little if anything 
in his philosophizing that is expressly Darwinian.136 In 1998, Swanwick was requested 
to produce a monograph on the Mayday Group Ideal No. 2 excerpted above which he 
entitled ‗Music as Culture‘.  In it he uses as a point of departure, Alan Merriam‘s well-
known ―Functions of Music‖ (Merriam, 1964: 219-227) which posit functions that 
music plays in many if not all cultures and which can be regarded as a cluster concept 
such as was formulated by Dutton to define what ‗art‘ is (see Chapter Two).  
 
Merriam's Functions of Music  
 
 Emotional expression 
                              
135  One need only consider the catalogue of ‗World Music‘ CDs produced and put out by Putumayo 
World Music.  
136  I regard his Music, Mind, and Education (1988) as one of the most important texts in the Philosophy 





 Aesthetic enjoyment 
 Entertainment 
 Communication 
 Symbolic representation 
 Physical response 
 Enforcing conformity to social norms 
 Validation of social institutions 
 Contribution to the continuity and stability of culture 
 Preservation social integration 
 
Swanwick agrees that these are functions one finds music performing in cultures the 
world over and recognizes their value for discussions concerning music in education; 
but he warns against seeing the functions of music as being the same as the functions of 
music education. He then takes Merriam‘s list and separates them into two categories 
according to their potential for cultural transformation. All of Merriam‘s functions 
involve cultural transmission, but some of these are limited to this and Swanwick hence 
describes them as tending ―be tied in to more or less closed systems.‖ 
 
The purpose of these is to support cultural reproduction: enforcing conformity to social 
norms, the validation of social institutions, supporting religious rituals and making a 
contribution to the continuity and stability of culture and to the integration of society. These 
functional settings tend not to create or encourage the creation of new meaning, to develop 
what Mead calls 'new human values'. (1998 – online source) 
 
As important as these functions may be in particular social contexts, Swanwick argues 
that it would be inappropriate to limit music education to such functions concerned with 
cultural preservation and reproduction and which are negligibly open to ―the possibility 
of metaphor, of generating new meaning.‖  On the other hand, emotional expression, 
aesthetic enjoyment, communication and symbolic representation are functions that 
Swanwick regards as having ―potential both for cultural transmission and for cultural 
transformation‖ as they more directly speak to music as a kind of discourse that is not 
culturally fixed, but for which culture provides sources of material for engendering 
something new. 
 
[T]o some extent they all involve elements of internal representation: the manipulation of 
images, the production of relationships between these images, the creation and development 
of shared vocabularies and the negotiation and exchange of ideas with others. (Ibid) 
 
The key question that Swanwick poses is: ―To what extent and in what situations is 
musical discourse specific to certain cultural practices?‖ His position is one that several 
discussions in this dissertation have argued for, that music and the arts are ―symbolic 
forms [that are] in some way and to some degree culturally free-standing, universal.‖  
What has so often been evident in intercultural music making that I have personally 
been involved in is how remarkably unproblematic has been the finding of common 
ground musically and the fusing of elements from one another‘s musical traditions. 
Where tensions have occasionally arisen has mostly been because of differences in 
aesthetic and creative intentions at the individual level that may have reflected different 
cultural backgrounds but which could not be regarded as culturally or socially 
‗embedded‘. Swanwick agrees with Elliott, Regelski and others that ―all music is 




should not be taken to mean that each and every instance of musicking is ―uniquely 
reflective and expressive of a culture.‖ 
 
We have … to abandon the idea that music stands in a direct relationship with some kind of 
socially independent reality, as though it were a kind of mirror. Of course there are often 
strong connections between the music of particular groups and their life style and social 
position. But this is not to say that music simply embodies these social worlds. Musical 
discourse is inherently social, not in the deterministic sense of representing or 'reflecting' 
society but because any form of discourse depends upon negotiating within systems of 
shared meanings. Distinctive musical styles are maintained and developed through give-
and-take in interpretive communities. Music thus takes place in a cultural context without 
necessarily being culturally determined. (Ibid) 
 
In the contextualist position that Elliott, Regelski and others appear to endorse, 
Swanwick detects ―the lingering shadows of old fashioned referentialism, where music 
is seen as symptomatic of cultural and political values or of the personal biography of 
the musician.‖  A Marxian take would have it that music is more than just symptomatic 
of social reality, ―social structures crystallize in musical structures; … in various ways 
and with varying degrees of critical awareness, the musical microcosm replicates the 
social macrocosm‖ (Ballantine 1984: 5).  While I would agree with this to a point, it is 
clear to me, based on my Darwinian understanding of the human mind, that much of 
what crystallizes in musical structures are archetypal relationships that are neurally 
inscribed in our brains, which in Chapter Two I spoke of as the innate concepts of 
space, time, causation, containment, etc. which are the ―metaphors we live by‖ (Lakoff 
& Johnson 1980), neural representations that constitute the language of mentalese -  the 
―level of fine-grained conceptual structure which we automatically and unconsciously 
compute every time we produce or utter a sentence‖ or tune, or dance, or mime, or 
rhyme.  I would suggest that it is the ‗phylogenetic homologies‘ that connect such 
innate metaphors with the sonic patterns of music that accounts for what we perceive as 
‗inherent meanings‘ or what Lucy Green calls ―that virtual aspect of musical meaning‖ 
or what Bateson would call ‗patterns that connect‖ or what Langer would call 
‗significant import‘.  Swanwick draws on Green (1997) and Finnegan (1989) in the 
following excerpts that I find apropos as a way of concluding what has been another 
stab at ‗nature vs. nurture‘ (a dichotomy that I argued to be a non sequitur at the 
beginning of Chapter Two). 
 
Metaphorical 'likeness' - in the sense of music being 'like' or replicating society - has to be 
seen in the context of music's suggestive dissimilarities - allowing an element of free play, 
of speculative diaphor, what Lucy Green calls a 'chink of light'. 'It is through the experience 
of inherent meanings that we countenance that virtual aspect of musical meaning which is 
in itself free of symbolic content, free of gendered delineation' (Green, 1997: 250). … [I]n 
musical experience the possibility of breaking out into the light exists at three levels: at the 
point where we accept the illusion that sound is expressively shaped, when these shapes are 
perceived in new relationships and when we ourselves are to some extent changed by 
musical insights into what Langer called the life of feeling.  
 
Far from being merely a mirror then, a copy of other forms of cultural activity, musical 
discourse, by virtue of its metaphorical power, can also be a window through which we can 
glimpse a different world. As with all forms of discourse, music bridges the space between 
individuals and between different cultural groups. There is some support here from social 
anthropology and enthnomusicology. Following a long and detailed study of music-making 




context it is also 'a unique and distinctive mode through which people both realise and 
transcend their social existence' (Finnegan, 1989: 339). Along with this goes an 
acknowledgment of the diversity of perspectives among individuals, even within the most 




Education for praxis through the musical arts 
 
As a way of concluding this dissertation, I feel it appropriate to bring the discussion 
back into the realm of education generally remembering that what motivates the 
philosophical inquiry I chose to embark on is my despair with the inertia of 
consumerism that is costing our planet so dearly and which education seems to be doing 
so little to challenge.  
 
[W]e're in the middle of a mass extinction. We happen to be in that moment when the worst 
thing that's happened to the earth in sixty-five million years is happening now. That's 
number one. Number two, we are causing it. Number three, we're not aware of it. There's 
only a little splinter of humanity that's aware of it. The numbers are this: At the minimum, 
twenty-five thousand species are going extinct every year. And if humans' activity were 
otherwise, or if humans weren't here, there would be one species going extinct every five 
years. We've pushed up the natural extinction rate by the order of something like a hundred 
thousand times. (Swimme 2001 – online source) 
 
In the face of what seems an inevitable collapse of the biosphere that sustains us, 
concerns with how well people are being empowered musically seem beside the point 
and perhaps even indulgent. However, if such empowerment is achieved in an 
integrated and optimally interdisciplinary education where the ‗pattern which connects‘ 
is as important as the phenomena it connects, it can contribute significantly to a creative 
and critical consciousness such as is needed if enough people are to break free of the 
consumerist mindset that has such a tenacious hold on the rank and file of humanity,  as 
well the selfish and vain anthropocentrism that keeps us disconnected from the rest of 
life even though we are genetically related to every one of the millions of species that 
cohabit the thin ‗coat of varnish‘ that is Earth‘s biosphere. The Darwinian perspective I 
have argued for keeps this fact in the foreground and makes clear that we have no 
transcendent entitlement that can justify the degradation and destruction of the 
biosphere we are guilty of and the driving to extinction of increasing numbers of its life 
forms.  
 
The critical consciousness to which I have devoted considerable discussion is one where 
there is a clear and well informed awareness of what it is that causes us to think, feel 
and act in the ways we do as it is based on an understanding and appreciation of the 
adapted mind for what it is and what it makes possible.  What is extraordinary about the 
human mind is its capacity to apprehend and make sense of relationships, connections, 
patterns, and correspondences, which, as we have seen, are what information ultimately 
is and which are substrate neutral and capable of being transduced from one physical 
manifestation to another, thus crystallizing in innumerable ways and forms.  
 
Aesthetic education should be regarded as music education‘s overarching purpose if the 
aesthetic sense is understood to be this very capacity for apprehending and internally 




immediate, utilitarian and self-serving ways. Apprehending and valuing the 
relationships that imbue musical patterns with expressiveness allow for a deeper 
experiencing of music, especially when one is active in their realization as a performer, 
composer, or improviser, but the experience becomes more profound when connections 
are made with what lies beyond the notes. Expressiveness and significance are not 
inherent qualities of the sounds themselves but the achievement of perception, a 
complex process that makes sense of what is incoming in terms of what is already 
within the body-brain-meme complex. Connections are apprehended and become 
expressive and significant because of what they excite neurally that has been inscribed 
in the brain as the result of the interplay of replicators - genes and memes - such being 
the interplay through which individual humans unfold ontogenetically and where 
education needs most to achieve its purpose. Our brains, like all brains, are modular, but 
what is distinctive about human brains is their level of intermodularity and capacity for 
cross-modal transductions of information, with different brain systems contributing 
information vital to cognition and making every form of perceptual engagement 
multidimensional and multimodal.  Education is what should be the ‗strong force‘ in 
memetic evolution, developing in people the capacity and disposition for critically 
evaluating the memes that compete for selection in the environments of evolutionary 
adaptedness which their brains provide, too often unwittingly. 
 
Without the somatic tagging of cognitions and sense data, we would not be able to learn 
and exercise our powers of reason. Better understanding the neurocognitive processes 
involved give substance to the cliché that music is the language of emotions and make 
more apparent the neurocognitive value of particular forms of musicking including 
those that are not purely musical. Music‘s uncanny capacity for ‗making meaningful‘ 
requires processing in what are the oldest parts of our brain and is what makes 
abundantly clear that sentience is by no means an exclusively human attribute. Indeed, it 
could be argued that the sentience of some of our fellow Earthlings is more genuinely 
aesthetic in that their perception is more direct, unmediated, and undifferentiated - more 
in tune with ―the feeling of what happens when [one‘s] being is modified by the acts of 
apprehending something‖  (Damasio 1999: 10). In humans there is the ―cool web of 
language [which] winds us in‖ such that we ―retreat from too much joy or too much fear 
[and] grow sea-green at last and coldly die in brininess and volubility.‖ Music and the 
arts make it to some degree possible for ―our tongues [to] lose self-possession, throwing 
off language and its watery clasp‖ (Graves 1927).  In song and performance poetry, the 
tongue remains active but what it conveys nondiscursively makes it a medium through 
which we are drawn to ‗the joy or fear‘ that language otherwise inclines us to ‗retreat 
from‘.   
 
Sadly, our ‗cleverness‘ has created a world where willy-nilly education has become a 
tool for sustaining what is ultimately unsustainable but which we participate in without 
sensing that there is something wrong in it all - that it locks us into ways of thinking and 
acting that keep us from becoming enlightened, critically conscious self-actualizers who 
can see the madness for what it is and become active in overthrowing it. Illich‘s call for 
the ‗deschooling‘ of society was not a demand that we discontinue the enterprise of 
schooling, but that we re-conceive what schools are or should be - most certainly not 
―reproductive organs‖ for consumerism. One of the ways that I have argued for 
education to be conceptualized is as a progressive ‗transcendence of our genetic 
imperatives‘; but such transcendence should not be taken to mean the denial or 




esteem and celebrate but which education is characteristically inattentive to because it is 
so caught up with meeting the demands of the Market.   
 
As I write these concluding remarks, many South Africans are celebrating what 
ostensibly appears to be a turnaround in the country‘s ‗educational‘ fortunes - an 
increase of 7% in the Matric pass rate. No doubt it is the matriculants themselves who 
are most ecstatic as they have successfully undergone a rite of passage admitting them 
entry into a world of enhanced vocational prospects and opportunities for the ‗good 
life.‘137 Detractors challenge this increase on the grounds of the dubious ‗employability‘ 
of matriculants and jump on the fact that while there was a ―marginal improvement in 
the number of pupils who passed mathematics with at least 30% … the number of 
pupils who wrote maths dropped over 20% in the past two years.‖ (Parker 2011)  
Concern with employability is well understandable in a country with an unemployment 
rate of over 25%, but what is unacceptable is the extent to which it has become the be-
all and end-all of education, reflecting a false consciousness that finds nothing 
inherently wrong with ‗the system‘ provided everyone is reaping its benefits and 
contributing to its maintenance and growth. Matric results may give an indication of 
who are most likely to be successful and instrumental in this regard (e.g., those who 
‗crack it‘ in Mathematics and Science) but what do they reveal about critical 
consciousness and preparedness for challenging the consumerist status quo?  
 
The following are what come to mind as essential constituents of the critical 
consciousness I have argued for. 
 
 Creative problem solving ability 
 Ecological intelligence 
 Capacity for hierarchical, inductive and propositional reasoning 
 Intercultural awareness and competence 
 Social conscience 
 Intrapersonal intelligence 
 An inquiring disposition 
 Capacity for ideology critique 
 Political awareness and attentiveness to matters of global concern 
 Capacity for moral reasoning 
 Communicative capacity that is cross-modal and that allows for competence in a 
range of social and cultural ‗discourses‘ 
 Cosmological perspective 
 
Frankly, if such capacities and dispositions were to become the key indicators of 
educational achievement, it seems evident that those who ‗made it‘ through to Matric 
(whether they passed or not) should actually be pitied as unwitting victims of a 
monumental educational fraud perpetrated over - and occupying them for - the most 
important years of their lives. They have not been helped in any significant way to 
acquire an ecozoic, cosmological, and Darwinian grasp of humankind‘s privileged 
                              
137   Whatever satisfaction may be derived from this should be tempered by the acknowledgment that 
students now need only ―pass three subjects with a mark of at least 40% and another three subjects 




status as the only known manifestation of the universe becoming conscious of itself, the 
only concatenation of ‗stardust‘ that natural selection has come up with capable of 
comprehending and appreciating the most amazing of ‗truths‘: that if you ―take 
hydrogen gas, and you leave it alone, … it turns into rosebushes, giraffes, and humans.‖ 
While it may have no ultimate purpose or reason, at least we humans can find 
inspiration and significance in the wonders of unfolding creativity that make the 
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